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OF THE ORIGIN AND PROGRESS OF LANGUAGE.

—— verba, quibus voces ſenſuſque notarent,
Nominaque invenêre.

HOR.

VOL. II.

TO WHICH ARE ANNEXED,

THREE DISSERTATIONS, viz.

1. Of the Formation of the Greek Language.
2. Of the Sound of the Greek Language.
3. Of the Compoſition of the Antients; and particularly of that of Demoſthenes.

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OF THE ORIGIN AND PROGRESS OF LANGUAGE.

PART II.

Of the ART of LANGUAGE.

INTRODUCTION.

ALL the ſubjects of human knowledge, how many and various ſoever, are either the works of nature, and the great author of nature himſelf, ſo far as he can be comprehended by our faculties, or the works of art. The author of nature is undoubtedly the higheſt ſubject of the contempla- Intr.

Intr. tion of the human mind; and the works of nature are likewiſe far more noble and excellent than the works of art, being the production of divine wiſdom; whereas the other are produced by human intelligence, working in imitation of divine wiſdom, and upon that model forming a kind of new creation: for not only are the materials of this creation furniſhed by nature, but every idea which we have of order, regularity, beauty, and ſymmetry of deſign, are all taken from the great archetype of divine creation. In this way does man form a little world of his own, of which he is the ſovereign, and which may be called the world of *Art*, in contradiſtinction to the great world of *Nature*. This creative power we have by degrees extended to every ſubject of nature within our reach; but we have chiefly exerciſed it upon ourſelves, being the ſubject of all others the moſt in our power, and which we have, from nature, the capacity of moulding and faſhioning to our own conceit, more than any other animal has that we have yet diſcovered. The greateſt work of art therefore is man himſelf, as we ſee him; for we have made ourſelves, as

I have endeavoured to ſhew, both a *rational* and *political* animal; and alſo have acquired that great inſtrument of the rational and political life, the faculty of ſpeech. The ſubject of this art is both the body and mind of man. The firſt furniſhes what I call the *material part* of language; for of the breath, modified by the organs of the mouth, is produced articulation; and the mind furniſhes the ideas, which make the *form* of language. Intr.

We have, in the preceding part of this work, endeavoured to ſhew how men became firſt poſſeſſed of this faculty of ſpeech, which, for being common, is not the leſs wonderful in the eyes of the philoſopher. We have alſo ſhewn, not only from theory, but from fact, how imperfect this firſt language muſt have been, both in ſound and expreſſion. We are now to explain how, from thoſe rude eſſays, which may be called rather attempts towards ſpeaking than ſpeech, an *art* of language was at laſt formed. And what I chiefly propoſe, in this part of the work, is to ſhew wherein this art conſiſts, and how great the difficulty muſt have been, even from the rude materials furniſhed by the firſt ſavages who articulated, to form

Intr. a regular ſyſtem of a language. This is a view in which language has not hitherto, ſo far as I know, been conſidered; and I hope it will ſerve the purpoſe of vindicating from obſcurity a learned profeſſion, held in high eſteem among the antients, but which, in modern times, has become almoſt a name of contempt, I mean the profeſſion of the *grammarian*. For I think I ſhall be able to ſhew, that it is a matter of great difficulty to explain well the principles of this moſt wonderful art, even after it is invented; and as the grammarian profeſſes to teach us the practice of an art which diſtinguiſhes us chiefly from the brute creation, and not the *practice* only, which children have, and the moſt illiterate of the vulgar, and even ſome brutes in a certain degree, but likewiſe the *ſcience*, ſo that we may ſpeak as becomes rational creatures, it ought to be accounted an art of no leſs dignity, than uſe.

BOOK

BOOK I.

Of the Analyſis of the FORMAL PART of LANGUAGE.

CHAPTER I.

That there muſt have been, in the progreſs of language, two kinds of it; the one rude and barbarous, the other ſucceeding to it a language of art.—The requiſites of a language of art.

THAT a regular and formed language, ſuch as is uſed by every civilized nation, is a work of art, no man who knows any thing of language, or of art, will deny. It is equally clear, both from reaſon, and from the facts mentioned in the preceding volume, that the firſt attempts to ſpeak muſt have been very rude and imperfect; and that the firſt languages among men, though they may have ſerved the purpoſes of communication in a very narrow ſphere of life, with few wants, and as few arts to ſupply thoſe wants, muſt have been almoſt entirely *artleſs.* Ch. I.

Ch. 1. *leſs.* If therefore language was invented, there muſt have been a firſt and a ſecond language; the one altogether rude and artleſs, the other formed by rules of art, and the work of men of art; for that it could not have grown out of popular uſe merely, I will endeavour, in the ſequel, to make evident. But, in the firſt place, it will be proper to ſhew wherein the art of language conſiſts, which is what I propoſe to do in this ſecond part of the work. When that is done, it is hoped very little argument will be neceſſary to prove, that it could not have been produced by the mere *people*, but muſt have been the work of *artiſts*, and men of ſuperior abilities.

The art of language appears to conſiſt in *four* things. 1. In expreſſing accurately and diſtinctly all the conceptions of the human mind. 2. In doing this by as few words as poſſible. 3. In marking the connection that thoſe words have with one another. And, *laſtly*, The ſound of the language muſt be agreeable to the ear, and of ſufficient variety. Before I enter more particularly into my ſubject, I will make ſome general reflections on theſe four requiſites; and what I am to ſay, will be the better

better underſtood by what I have already ſaid of the imperfections of barbarous languages, of which a language of art is almoſt in every particular the juſt reverſe. Ch. 1.

And, *firſt*, with reſpect to the conceptions to be expreſſed by the words of the language, I have already obſerved, that a few words are ſufficient for the purpoſes of barbarous life, in which there are but few wants, and conſequently few arts neceſſary to ſupply thoſe wants; but in civilized life, the number required is prodigious; eſpecially if, in ſuch a life, not only the neceſſary arts, but thoſe of pleaſure and refinement, and likewiſe ſciences of pure curioſity and ſpeculation, are cultivated. To be convinced of this, we need only conſider, 1*mo*, That the number of individuals, not only of all the ſeveral kinds, but of any one kind, is conſidered as infinite: not that it is truly ſo, and ſtrictly ſpeaking; for, in a finite ſpace, ſuch as this our earth, or what of the heavens we ſee, it is impoſſible there can be an infinite number of any thing; but it is ſo with reſpect to our capacity of comprehenſion, and to the uſe of language; and it is for this reaſon that, as I have more

Ch. I. more than once ſaid, there can be no language expreſſing individual things only. The firſt part therefore of the art of language, and the foundation of all the reſt, is reducing this infinity of things to certain claſſes, called by the logicians *genus* and *ſpecies*, according as they are more or leſs comprehenſive. But even this, without ſome further art, is not ſufficient to prevent ſuch a multiplication of words, as would make any language unfit for uſe: For though the number of ſpecieſes is, ſtrictly ſpeaking, farther from infinity than the number of individuals; yet with reſpect to our capacity, they alſo may be conſidered as infinite. In proportion as our knowledge advances in the ſeveral arts and ſciences, we are daily diſcovering new ſpecieſes of things. Nor does the moſt learned man in the world know one hundredth part of thoſe which nature has produced; but if even ſuch as he knows were to be expreſſed all by ſeparate words, entirely different one from another, ſo that the one could not ſuggeſt the other, it is evident, that the memory would be greatly overburdened, and conſequently the language unfit for uſe; and yet it is neceſſary for

for clear and diſtinct expreſſion, that every ſpecies of thing ſhould be denoted by a ſeparate word; and not only muſt the ſpecieſes of ſubſtances be ſo denoted, but but thoſe of qualities, actions, and energies. The barbarous languages, as we have ſeen, by expreſſing ſeveral things by one word, have run into very great confuſion; and inſtead of ſaving the multiplication of words, have greatly increaſed it. Some other way therefore was to be deviſed to prevent words from increaſing to an unwieldy number: and this was done in a way, which, now it is invented, appears very natural and obvious, though, from what has been ſaid of the barbarous languages, it is evident it was not of ſo eaſy invention; and that was by expreſſing things which in their nature are connected together, by words which have alſo a connection with one another. Ch. 1.

As this is one of the chief artifices of language, it merits to be explained at ſome length; and I do not know any example more fit to explain it than the names of numbers. It is neceſſary for the purpoſe of an enlarged ſphere of life, that every individual number, at leaſt to a very great

Ch. 1. extent, ſhould have a particular name. For with reſpect to numbers, it would not be ſufficient for the uſe of life to divide them into claſſes or ſpecieſes, as we do o-other things, ſuch as even and odd, primary and compoſed, ſquare and cube, &c.; but the particular numbers muſt be expreſſed. Now theſe are really infinite, at leaſt *in poſſibility*; and if ſuch of them only as we have occaſion to uſe, were to be expreſſed each by a different word, that alone would make a language much too bulky for uſe. The way therefore that has been contrived, is to give different names to particular numbers, to a certain extent, as *e. g.* to the extent of *ten*, as is practiſed by the European nations, and alſo by ſome of the barbarous *; and then to turn back again

* This is the caſe of the Hurons, as we have ſeen, vol. 1. p. 375.; of the Algonkins, Hontan, vol. 2. p. 217.; of the inhabitants of the new-diſcovered iſland of Otahitee, vol. 1. p. 376. But all the barbarous nations have not ſo perfect an arithmetic. The Cyclops, in Homer, counted his flock by fives, which Homer calls πιμπαζειν. The Caribbs count in the ſame way, likewiſe the Blacks of the coaſt of Guinea. Ariſtotle, if I am not miſtaken, ſpeaks of a barbarous nation of his time, whoſe arithmetic went no farther than four: and that of certain ſavages upon the banks of the river Amazons, according to Monſ. de la Condamine,

gain as it were, and reckon ten and one, ten and two, &c. giving names to the new numbers compounded of the names of the old. In this way we go on, reckoning till we come to twice ten; which may be expreſſed, and I believe is expreſſed in moſt languages, by a word analogous to the names of two and ten; and in like manner we count three tens, four tens, &c. till we come to ten tens: but that, in all languages that I know, is expreſſed by a word quite different. Then the reckoning goes on till it comes to ten hundred, and then another new Ch. I.

Condamine, went no farther than the number three; by which I do not underſtand that they counted no farther than three, but that after they had come to three, they turned back, as we do when we come to ten, and ſaid, Three and one, &c. as we ſay, Ten and one. It may ſeem ſurpriſing, that a nation, after they had gone ſo far as to ſeparate from the maſs of multitude three units, and put them together, ſhould not have gone a little farther, before they turned back, at leaſt as far as the number of their five fingers; but we know, from many other facts, how ſlow the progreſs of invention has been. However obvious therefore a thing may appear to us, nurſed in the boſom, as it were, of arts and ſciences, we ought not from thence to conclude that it was ſo to the firſt men, who had every thing to invent: and to one who conſiders this matter rightly, it will rather appear ſurpriſing, that thoſe other nations ſhould have come the length of the decimal arithmetic practiſed by us, and

Ch. I. new name is deviſed to expreſs that number; and ſo the reckoning goes on again till it comes to ten thouſand, to which the Greeks have given a particular name, viz. *a myriad*. But further in this nomenclature they have not gone; whereas we have gone further, and given a name to ten hundred thouſand, viz. *a million*; and in this way we go on as far as we can conceive, without any new names to numbers.

This example will ſerve at leaſt to illuſtrate one method that has been deviſed by

have been ſo far as complete arithmeticians as we. Perhaps it was the number of the ten fingers that firſt led men to this method of calculation. But I rather think it was ſcience and philoſophy: for the number ten is the completion of number, in ſo far as it contains numbers of all different kinds, even and odd, primary and compoſed, perfect and imperfect, ſquare and cube; and from thence it is ſaid to have had its name of δεκα in Greek, which is ſuppoſed to be derived from δεχομαι, ſignifying to contain. It was therefore very proper to make this number the *cardinal* number, upon which, as upon a *hinge*, all the other numbers ſhould turn. See *Jamblichi Comm. in Nicom. Arithmetic.* —— If this be ſo, it is evident that no barbarous nation could have fixed this boundary of the infinity of numbers, but muſt have got the invention from ſome other nation, conſiderably advanced in arts and ſciences, in the ſame manner, as I ſuppoſe, that thoſe barbarous nations who ſpeak a language of art, have not invented it, but borrowed it from other more civilized nations.

the

the artificers of language to ſave the multiplication of words, namely, compoſition; which is uſed when the idea to be expreſſed is compoſed of two other ideas, to which names have been already given. This is ſo common in all the languages of art, that it is needleſs to give examples of it. I ſhall therefore only add, that I am perſuaded there are many more compoſitions of words than are commonly known; and that ſuch etymologies given by grammarians, however fantaſtical or far-fetched they may ſometimes ſeem, are many of them very well founded. Ch. 1.

But ſuppoſe the idea for which a name is ſought, is not compounded of two ideas, but is connected with or related to another idea, what is to be done in that caſe? And the method is not to invent a new word, as is done in the barbarous languages; but with ſome addition to or change of the word already invented, to expreſs the idea connected with that of the old word: and this method is what is called *derivation*, which is of ſovereign uſe in all the languages of art *.

But

* Theſe derivative words, in the language of Ariſtotle's philoſophy, are called παρωνυμα; and he ſays they differ

Ch. 1. But ſuppoſe that the idea continues the very ſame, but ſome addition made to it, ſuch as that of *time*, *perſon*, *relation* to any thing elſe, or any other neceſſary ad-

differ from the original words τῇ πτωσει, *Ariſtotle's Categories in the beginning*; which, as his commentator Ammonius Hermeias has very well explained it, means the change of the word in the laſt ſyllable. The inſtances which Ariſtotle gives of ſuch *paronymies*, is that of γραμματικος from γραμματικη, and ἀνδρειος from ἀνδρεια. But although, in theſe inſtances, the adjective may be derived from the ſubſtantive, it more frequently happens that the *abſtract noun*, as it is called, that is, the noun expreſſing the quality abſtractedly, is derived from the adjective, which is the word that expreſſes the quality in concrete, that is, conjoined with the ſubſtance. Thus from *bonus*, is derived *bonitas*, from *good*, *goodneſs*, &c. although ſuch derivation be contrary to the order of nature; for, in the order of nature, the abſtract quality is prior to the quality joined with any ſubſtance. And it was perhaps for this reaſon, that Ariſtotle choſe the two inſtances above mentioned, where the derivation appears to be according to the order of nature. But in other paſſages, without regarding the grammatical etymology at all, he derives words according to the order of things in nature. Thus from λευκοτης, he derives λευκος, and from δικαιοσυνη, δικαιος, (ſee *Categor. & Ammon. Comment. fol.* 136.), though the grammatical etymology be directly contrary. And his commentator has carried this philoſophical etymology ſo far, as to derive ἐστι, the third perſon of the preſent of the indicative of the verb εἰμι from ὀν; that is, that he derives the word affirming that any thing exiſts, from a word denoting the abſtract idea of exiſtence. *De Interpret. fol.* 45.

junct,

junct, what is to be done in that caſe? And there likewiſe the artificers of language have deviſed a way of ſaving the multiplication of words, which is of kin to the method laſt mentioned, but is different both as to the form of the variation, and the meaning of the word when varied. It is commonly known by the name of *flection* or *inflection*, and is uſed for the purpoſe of forming the caſes of nouns and tenſes of verbs in the learned languages. Ch. 1.

By theſe three great artifices, the two firſt things which I require in a language of art may be performed, and all the ſeveral ſpecieſes of things, ſo far at leaſt as we know them, and all their different qualities and properties, may be diſtinctly expreſſed, in ſo few words as not to make the language cumberſome and unwieldy, like the Chineſe written language, which conſiſts of ſo many characters, no leſs it is ſaid than eighty thouſand, that no man living perfectly underſtands it. But even after this is done, the buſineſs of language is not completed: for there remains ſtill the third thing that I require in a language of art, which is perhaps more difficult than any thing I have mentioned; and therefore,

Ch. 1. therefore, as I have ſhewn, was of lateſt invention; I mean, marking the connection and relation that words have to one another, or, as it is commonly called, *ſyntax*. For it is evident, that any number of words, expreſſing in the moſt clear and accurate manner the ſeveral things they ſtand for, would convey no meaning at all, if they were not ſome one way or another connected together. For though the bare utterance of the words, would let us know that the ſpeaker had the ideas affixed to the words; yet, without ſome connection of thoſe words, there would be no *ſpeech*, becauſe there would be neither affirmation nor denial, prayer or command expreſſed, nor any other operation of the mind; and therefore, as the buſineſs of language is to communicate to one another the operations of our minds, it is evident, that unleſs the words are connected, the purpoſe of language could not be anſwered. Here then is a new claſs of words to be invented; and a numerous claſs too, if we conſider, that ſubſtances muſt be connected with ſubſtances, qualities with ſubſtances and with one another, and both with *verbs*, or words

words expreſſing *acting* or *ſuffering*. Theſe relations, it is evident, muſt be very various and numerous; and they muſt be expreſſed either by ſeparate words, or by ſome change of one or other, or both, of the words betwixt which the connection is to be expreſſed. Ch. 1.

The laſt requiſite of language I mentioned, reſpects the ſound: as to which three things may be obſerved, *1ſt*, That the words, in order to expreſs ſuch a prodigious variety of things, ſhould be very much varied in the ſound. It is therefore neceſſary that they ſhould not conſiſt of vowels only, or a few conſonants, like the words of the barbarous languages, but be diſtinguiſhed and articulated by as many conſonants as poſſible, but ſo as not to render the ſound harſh and diſagreeable. For, *2do*, A language ſuch as we are ſpeaking of, muſt be of eaſy pronunciation; and not only the facility of the operation of the ſpeaker muſt be ſtudied, but alſo the pleaſure of the ear of the hearer. *3tio*, The words muſt be of a moderate length, not, like thoſe of the barbarous languages, enormouſly long; and particularly the radical words muſt be ſhort, otherwiſe there

Ch. 1. cannot be either compoſition or derivation without enlarging the words immoderately. The declinable words alſo, in order to admit a ſufficient variety of inflection, ſhould be of a moderate length; and not only for theſe reaſons, but for the ſake of the eaſy pronunciation of the language, the words ought not to be exceſſively long.

Having premiſed theſe general obſervations, which will ſerve to explain what is to follow, I will proceed to conſider the ſeveral parts of which language is compoſed.

CHAP. II.

The works of art prior to the art itſelf.—The analytical method followed in this inquiry.—The formal part of language to be firſt analyſed.—Both the form and matter muſt have been analyſed before the writing art was invented.—The nature of that diſcovery.

Ch. 2. ALL the works, both of nature and of art, are compounds, which the ſenſe preſents to the mind. Theſe it is the buſineſs of ſcience to analyſe, and reſolve into their principles,

principles, or conſtituent parts. But not only the works of nature exiſted long before any ſuch analyſis was made, but even thoſe of art, at leaſt to a certain degree. For we are not to imagine, that arts were invented *a priori*, by diſcovering the principles firſt, and from thence deducing the conſequences; on the contrary, men began by practiſing; very rudely and imperfectly no doubt at firſt; but as they improved the practice, they began to diſcover the principles, and at laſt acquired ſcience enough to analyſe the art, and deduce it from its principles. In this manner all arts have been invented, and among others the art of language. But the progreſs was very ſlow from practice to principles; and accordingly men had the uſe of language long before they knew any thing of the grammatical art, by which language is analyſed; and in like manner men ſung, and played on inſtruments, while yet no ſcale of muſic was known, nor any art invented by which a tune could be reſolved into the ſeveral notes of which it is compoſed. And in many nations of the earth at this day, theſe and many other operations of art are performed, without knowledge of Ch. 2.

Ch. 2. the art itſelf; that is, of its principles. As therefore the compound is firſt in order of time, at leaſt with reſpect to us and our perceptions; ſo compoſition in the ſeveral arts, and particularly in language, is much eaſier than the analyſis: for by imitation merely we can compoſe, or by natural ſagacity without imitation, which was the caſe of the firſt inventors of arts; but we cannot analyſe without ſcience. Accordingly, how many people do we ſee, that have not only the ready uſe of language, but ſpeak very properly, without the leaſt knowledge of the grammatical art? But though compoſition be ſo much eaſier and more obvious than analyſis; yet this laſt is the method of ſcience, being that which conſtitutes the very nature and eſſence of ſcience; for nothing is ſcientifically treated of, that is not reſolved into its elements, or firſt principles. So that ſcience does not follow the order of our perceptions, which begin with the compound, but the order of nature, according to which the elements or principles of all things are firſt. As therefore we profeſs to treat of language ſcientifically, we ſhall begin with analyſing it, and then we ſhall

ſhall proceed to the compoſition of it; and this method we think the moſt proper, becauſe the compound, in this matter of language, is well known to every one, as the compoſition is practiſed by every one; whereas, if the compound were not ſufficiently known, it might be proper to proceed in a different method, and begin with it. Ch. 2.

All the works of art, as they are compoſed by man, ſo they can be analyſed by him *. And the beſt method of attaining

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* Every analyſis is a diviſion, but every diviſion is not an analyſis; that is to ſay, in logical language, diviſion is the genus, and analyſis the ſpecies. Any whole may be divided into the parts which compoſe it, as a body may be divided into its different members; but ſuch a diviſion is not that which we call analyſis, becauſe the members of a body are parts of the body, when it is conſtituted or formed, but they are not the principles which conſtitute or form it, or, in other words, they are not the principles or elements of the body. Now it is the diviſion into theſe laſt that I call *analyſis*; which therefore differs from the other diviſion in this, that it divides the ſubjects into parts more minute and ſubtile, not obvious to ſenſe or common apprehenſion; but which being diſcovered, ſhew the nature of the ſubject, becauſe they ſhew the principles which conſtitute it. And it is for this reaſon that analyſis is the method of ſcience. The method of diviſion, or diæretic method, and the analytical method, being two ways of inveſtigating the idea or definition

Ch. 2. a perfect knowledge of them is, firſt to take them down, as it were, in this way, and then to put them up again. Thus if a man would perfectly underſtand the nature of a watch, or any other machine, he ſhould begin with taking it down, and conſidering by itſelf every wheel and ſpring of it, and then he ſhould learn to put them all together again: and in this matter of language, the method in which we teach children to read is, firſt to make them analyſe words into letters, or elemental ſounds, and then we teach them to combine thoſe letters into ſyllables, and the ſyllables into words; and it is evident, that if we taught them in any other way, they would

finition of any thing, are different from the analyſis and diviſion of which we are ſpeaking; but wherein the difference conſiſts does not belong to our ſubject to explain. I ſhall only add, that the beſt example of the diæretic method to be found in Engliſh, and among the beſt in any language, is what Mr Harris has given us in his dialogue concerning *Art*, of which he has moſt accurately inveſtigated the nature according to this method, in the manner that is practiſed by Plato in the *Sophiſta* and *Politicus*. The analytical alſo and ſynthetical methods of reaſoning, are different from the analyſis and ſyntheſis which I am here treating: but to explain wherein that difference conſiſts, would be alſo foreign to our preſent purpoſe.

be

be imperfectly taught. In this manner therefore we propoſe to treat of language; beginning with that firſt and principal analyſis of it, and of every compound, whether of art or nature, I mean into *matter* and *form*. With this diviſion of language we ſet out in this work, and we muſt never loſe ſight of it. Ch. 2.

But this analyſis is too general to explain any thing particularly; it will therefore be neceſſary to analyſe each of thoſe parts ſeparately by itſelf: and I will begin with the *form*, that is, the ſounds of language, not conſidered as ſounds merely, but as ſounds ſignificant. In treating of the barbarous languages, I conſidered the material part firſt; but in examining the languages of art, I think it better to follow a contrary method, and begin with the principal part, that is, the form, which the artificers of language appear to me to have chiefly conſidered, as no doubt they ought to have done, in framing the ſounds of the language. Which of theſe two parts was, in order of time, firſt analyſed, and made the ſubject of art, may be queſtioned; but my opinion is, that no language, complete both in ſound and

Ch. 2. and ſenſe, could have been framed, without knowing the principles and elements of both the matter and the form; for though ſuch a language, when formed, may be uſed without the knowledge of either; yet it could not, I think, have been formed without the knowledge of both. If this be true, the writing-art, which in order of time was certainly poſterior to the art of language, was not ſo great a diſcovery as is commonly imagined. For the great difficulty of that diſcovery, was the analyſis of the ſound of a language into its elements; ſo that upon the ſuppoſition that this had been done before, when the art of language was formed, there remained nothing to be done, but to find out characters to mark the elemental ſounds already diſcovered. And that the invention of writing was no more than this, appears to me from the Egyptian ſtory which Plato has preſerved to us *, of that king of Egypt, who, when he was told by Theuth, the inventor of letters, that he had found out an art of memory, ſaid, after the invention was explained to him, that it was not an art of *memory*,

* *In Phædro, pag.* 1240. edit. Ficini.

but

but of *reminiſcence*. Now reminiſcence ſuppoſes forgetfulneſs, which your art, ſaid that wiſe king, encourages; becauſe men truſting to it, will not exerciſe their memories, nor ſtudy to record their knowledge in their own minds, where it is beſt preſerved. This ſtory ſeems plainly to ſuppoſe, that what this Egyptian Mercury had diſcovered, was not the analyſis of language into its elemental ſounds, which was a great and a uſeful diſcovery, tending much to the improvement of language, and which certainly would not have been diſapproved by the Egyptian king; but only a method of recording thoſe ſounds, of which indeed it may be juſtly queſtioned, whether it has upon the whole contributed to the improvement of knowledge. And perhaps the Druids were in the right, who, as Julius Cæſar tells us, did not make uſe of letters, to record their philoſophy and theology, though they knew the Greek letters, becauſe they thought the uſe of them impaired the memory. Ch. 2.

CHAP. III.

General plan of this ſecond part of the work. — Analyſis of the formal part of language into words. — Diviſion of words into two kinds, nouns and verbs. — Subdiviſion of verbs into words expreſſing the accidents of ſubſtances, and thoſe expreſſing the affections of the mind.

Ch. 3. THE method therefore in which I propoſe to treat this ſubject of a language of art is, firſt to analyſe the *formal* part of it, which will be the ſubject of this firſt book; then to analyſe the *material* part of it, which will be done in the ſecond; and the third book will treat of the *compoſition* of each: and in this way it is hoped the reader will have a complete view of the whole theory of language. For it is not the deſign of this work to explain minutely every part of the grammatical art; but to give a general view of the whole, and to explain the philoſophical principles upon which it is founded. If therefore we any where enter into minute

nute diſcuſſions, it will be of ſuch particulars as we think have not been ſufficiently explained by other writers upon grammar. Ch. 3.

To begin then with the analyſis of the formal part of a language of art, or of the ſounds of it conſidered as ſignificant: This analyſis is very ſimple; becauſe all language, conſidered in this way, is ultimately reſolvable into *words*. For as Ariſtotle has defined a *word*, it is a ſound ſignificant, of which no part is by itſelf ſignificant *; what is leſs therefore than a word, ſuch as a ſyllable, or a letter, does not belong to this analyſis, but to the a-

* Φωνη σημαντικη, ἧς μερος τι ἐστι καθ' αὑτο σημαντικον. *Poetic.* cap. 20. Oppoſed to this is the definition of the compound λογος, which, according to the ſame philoſopher, is φωνη συνθετη, ἧς ἐνια μερη καθ' αὑτα σημαινει τι. This compoſition of words, making a complete ſenſe by itſelf, is what we call in Engliſh a *ſentence*, of which I ſhall ſay more when I come to ſpeak of the compoſition of language. In the mean time, we may obſerve, that λογος, as defined here by Ariſtotle, is uſed only in one ſenſe of the word, namely, to ſignify the matter and form of language joined, or as we expreſs it in Engliſh without ambiguity, *ſpeech*. But it ſignifies alſo the formal part by itſelf, and which is diſtinguiſhed from the other by the epithet of διανοητικος; whereas, *ſpeech* is λογος προφορικος. See the note on chap. 1. book 1. of part 1.

Ch. 3. nalyſis of the material part, or ſound, of a language.

Words then being the leaſt parts of language conſidered as ſignificant, or *ſpeech*, as I ſhall chuſe to call it in one word; the next queſtion to be conſidered is, Of how many kinds words are? or, as it is commonly expreſſed, how many parts of ſpeech there are? The common diviſion is into eight parts; noun, pronoun, verb, participle, adverb, prepoſition, conjunction; to which the Greeks add for an eighth, the article; but the Latins, wanting the article, complete the number by the interjection. But though this diviſion may ſerve the purpoſe of ordinary grammar, it will not be ſufficient for a philoſophical inquiry, ſuch as this, into the nature of language, which requires that every thing of ſpeech ſhould be conſidered relatively to the nature of the things expreſſed by it. And therefore I prefer that diviſion of the parts of ſpeech that has been given both by Plato and Ariſtotle *, into *noun* and *verb*;

* Ariſtotle has given this diviſion in his book of Interpretation, and Plato in the Sophiſta. It is true, that Ariſtotle, in his Exoteric, or popular work upon Poetry, cap. 20.

verb; and I will endeavour to ſhew, that all the other parts of ſpeech above mentioned, may be fitly referred to one or other of theſe two. My reaſon for preferring this diviſion is, that it refers, as I underſtand it, to that grand diviſion of things contained in the Categories, or Predicaments, (the doctrine of which I hold to be the foundation of all philoſophy,) into *ſubſtance* and *accident*; for although the categories are ten in number, the nine laſt are all accidents *, that is, things which have no ſe- Ch. 3.

cap. 20. has given us another diviſion, more ſuited to the capacity of thoſe for whom he wrote that book, viz. into *noun*, *verb*, *article*, and *conjunction*: but I prefer that which he has given in his philoſophical work, ſuch as his book of Interpretation undoubtedly is; eſpecially as it is ſupported by the authority of Plato, who certainly meant to give a general diviſion of the parts of ſpeech, without reference to any particular art or ſcience, ſuch as logic or dialectic.

* The Greek word for *accidents*, viz. συμβεβηκοτα, denotes this their nature better than the Latin word which we have adopted. It is to be obſerved, that I uſe *accident* here in its moſt general ſignification, denoting every quality or property of any thing, whether *eſſential*, or what is commonly called *accidental*, that is contingent; in ſhort, whatever is inherent in another thing, without which it cannot exiſt; and in this large ſenſe, the Greek word συμβεβηκος is alſo uſed.

parate

Ch. 3. parate exiſtence by themſelves, but exiſt in other things; whereas ſubſtance, the firſt of the Categories, has ſuch a pre-eminence of exiſtence, that it exiſts by itſelf, independent of other things. Now a noun is a word expreſſive of the thing exiſting in this laſt manner, ſuch as, a man, or a horſe, or what the mind conſiders as exiſting in this manner, though it really do not ſo exiſt, as ſhall be afterwards explained. The verb, on the other hand, I underſtand to denote every accident of any kind belonging to ſubſtance; whatever, in ſhort, can be predicated of any ſubſtance as a property or accident, whether it be quality, quantity, action, or ſuffering, relation, or connection with any thing elſe.

This diviſion, I think, muſt be allowed to be ſufficiently comprehenſive, and to exhauſt the ſubject. For every thing in nature is either *ſubſtance*, or ſome quality, energy, paſſion, or relation of ſubſtance, that is, in one word, *accident* of ſubſtance; or, if any one diſlike that word, on account of its ambiguity, he may call it, with Mr Harris, *attribute* of ſubſtance. It comprehends alſo mind, and all its energies

nergies and affections of whatever kind *. Ch. 3.

This deſcription of the verb may appear too general; but if we want to make it more particular, we may conſult Ariſtotle's book of Categories, where we find all the ſeveral kinds of *accidents*, being ranged, as I ſaid, into nine claſſes, ſuch as quantity, quality,

* This deſcription of the noun and verb, appears to be different from that which is given by Plato in the *Sophiſta*, p. 183. edit. Ficini, where he ſays, That a *verb* is a word expreſſing *action*, and a *noun* a word denoting the *actor*. And this is no doubt the common notion of thoſe two grammatical terms; and it will coincide with my notion, if by *action* is underſtood, not only actual energy, but the quality, faculty, or power, by which any thing energiſes; and if by agent we underſtand the ſubject in which that faculty or power reſides. That in this way Ammonius underſtood Plato, is evident from his commentary upon Ariſtotle's book of Interpretation, fol. 33.; and as it ſo perfectly coincides with my notion upon this ſubject, I will give the words of it. Ἐκεῖνος γὰ (meaning Socrates in the Cratylus) τὸ ὄνομα μίμημα φησιν εἶναι τῆς ἑκάστου οὐσίας διὰ φωνῆς ἐνάρθρου, (τάυτον δὲ αὐτῶν, ἐκ στοιχείων καὶ συλλαβῶν κατεσκευασμένον) ὥσπερ τὰ ῥήματα τῶν ἐπακολουθούντων, τυτ'ἐστι, τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ταῖς οὐσίαις, μιμήματα εἶναι. Λόγον δὲ, τὸν ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, τοῦτ ὀνόματος καὶ τοῦ ῥήματος συγκείμενον, ὡς ἂν καὶ αὐτὸς διά τε τούτων, καὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ Σοφιστῇ ῥηθέντων, πρὸ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλης μόνα τοῦ λόγου κυρίως μέρη, τὸ ὄνομα καὶ τὸ ῥῆμα εἶναι τιθέμενος. Thus, according to the opinion of this excellent commentator, it was the doctrine both of Plato and Ariſtotle, that the parts of ſpeech were two, the *noun* and the *verb*; the firſt denoting ſubſtances, the other the properties of ſubſtances: and indeed there can nothing exiſt in nature, but *things*, and

Ch. 3. quality, relation, doing, ſuffering, &c. accurately deſcribed and explained. Among theſe, the two laſt I mentioned, viz. doing and ſuffering, or, as they may be expreſſed, action and paſſion, ſo far as they relate to the mind of the ſpeaker, are to be particularly attended to in the matter of language; becauſe all ſpeech whatever, beſides what it may expreſs concerning the nature of things, does of neceſſity expreſs ſome energy, paſſion, diſpoſition, or, as I would chuſe to call it by one word, *affection*, of the mind of the ſpeaker: for it denotes his joy, grief, ſurpriſe, or ſome other paſſion; or it communicates his prayers, wiſhes, commands, or volition of any kind; or it ſimply declares the judgement of his mind concerning any thing, that is, affirms or denies. As therefore the expreſſion of theſe accidents or attributes of the mind of the ſpeaker are

and their *qualities*. So that whatever more parts of ſpeech we make, they can only be ſubdiviſions of the members of this grand diviſion; and accordingly I have endeavoured to bring under one or other of theſe two heads, all the other ſix parts of ſpeech that are commonly reckoned, and I hope I have done it without any ſtraining or difficulty.

eſſential

eſſential to ſpeech, I would chuſe to ſepa- Ch. 3.
rate them from other accidents, which may be expreſſed or not by ſpeech, and to conſider them by themſelves, calling them *the affections of the ſpeaker's mind*, and leaving to the accidents of ſubſtance the common name of *accidents*. We may therefore ſay, that every word expreſſes ſubſtance, or accident, or the affections of the mind of the ſpeaker. The firſt is what I call a *noun*, the other two are *verbs*.

Theſe three are ſometimes expreſſed ſeparately by diſtinct words, ſometimes two of them together, ſometimes all three. When the ſubſtance is expreſſed ſeparately, it makes, what is commonly called, a ſubſtantive noun; when the accident is expreſſed ſeparately, it is a prepoſition, adjective, or conjunction, which, according to my notion, are to be ranked under the verb; and if any affection of the mind of the ſpeaker be ſeparately expreſſed, it is either an interjection, or a ſpecies of verb known by the name of the ſubſtantive verb, ſuch as *eſſe* in Latin, or *to be* in Engliſh, which denotes no more than the affection of the mind of the ſpeaker, either

Ch. 3. *affirming*, that is, aſſerting that the thing *is*, or *commanding*, *praying*, or *wiſhing*, that it *ſhould* be. But of this verb more hereafter.

In theſe inſtances, the three things I mentioned are expreſſed ſeparately: but as, in nature, all things are mixed with all; ſo, in ſpeech, the expreſſion of them is often alſo mixed. Thus the ſubſtance and accident are frequently expreſſed by the ſame word; as *ſenex* in Latin, and *child* in Engliſh; the firſt of which denotes an animal of our ſpecies, with the quality of being old; the other expreſſes the ſame ſubſtance, but with the oppoſite quality of being young. They participate therefore of the nature both of the noun and verb; but as ſubſtance is by its nature more excellent than any quality or attribute, it predominates in the appellation, and they are both called *nouns*. That part of ſpeech too commonly called an *adjective*, joins the accident with the ſubſtance, ſuch as the words *good*, *ill*, and the like; but with this difference, that in ſuch words the expreſſion of the ſubſtance is indefinite or unaſcertained, ſo that it may be applied to any ſubſtance whatſoever; whereas, in the firſt-

firſt-mentioned inſtances, the ſubſtance is definite or determined. The quality therefore predominates in the adjective. For this reaſon I think it is improperly ranged under the noun, and ought to be aſcribed to the verb; as ſhall be afterwards more particularly explained: and I ſay the ſame of the *participle*. Accident, and the affection of the mind of the ſpeaker, are joined together in thoſe parts of ſpeech that are commonly called *verbs*; as in the expreſſion, *I run*, where the word *run* expreſſes not only the action of running, but the energy of the mind of the ſpeaker affirming that action to exiſt. This is, I believe, the expreſſion of the verb in all languages. But in the learned languages all the three are expreſſed, as in the Latin word *curro*, by which the ſubſtance is expreſſed that runs, the action of that ſubſtance, and the energy of the mind affirming it to exiſt *.

Ch. 3.

Thus we ſee that theſe three things are

* The expreſſion of the energy of the mind in verbs, is much fuller and more accurate in Greek. Thus τρεχω affirms the action, τρεχε commands it, τρεχοιμι wiſhes it, and the ſubjunctive mood expreſſes that the action is not ſimply and abſolutely affirmed, but in dependence upon ſomething elſe.

Ch. 3. expreſſed either ſeparately or together; and if together, either in pairs, as ſubſtance and accident together, or accident and the affection of the ſpeaker's mind; or all three together, as in the inſtances laſt mentioned.

CHAP. IV.

Of the noun, and its threefold diviſion; and the ſubdiviſion of the laſt kind of it.

Ch. 4. HAving thus given a general account of this diviſion of the parts of ſpeech into noun and verb, I come now to explain each of them more particularly, beginning with the *noun*. And as I have taken this diviſion from the Categories; ſo, in explaining it, I will follow the doctrine of thoſe higheſt genera, as laid down by Ariſtotle; and in this way I hope to be able to give a ſatisfactory philoſophical account of this part of language, by referring it to the nature of things, of which it ought to be the repreſentation.

A noun, as I have ſaid, is a name for

a

a ſubſtance; that is, as Ariſtotle has de- Ch. 4.
fined it, a thing which exiſts by itſelf, and not in any thing elſe. Of ſubſtance, he diſtinguiſhes two kinds. One is the particular or individual ſubſtance; ſuch as Peter, John, this or that horſe, and all ſuch natural ſubſtances; and likewiſe all artificial ſubſtances, ſuch as this or that houſe or ſhip; in ſhort all ſubſtances of whatever kind, immaterial as well as material. This kind of ſubſtance neither exiſts in any ſubject (which is common to all ſubſtances), nor is predicated of any ſubject; and it is, in his language, called the *firſt* or *primary ſubſtance* *; becauſe, in the order of our perceptions, ſuch ſubſtances are firſt, and the ideas of all other ſubſtances are derived from them. The name which expreſſes this ſubſtance is called, in the common language of grammarians, a *proper name*; but if we have a mind to ſpeak more philoſophically, and according to the doctrine of Ariſtotle, we may call it a *primary name* or *noun* †. The ſecond kind of ſubſtances,

* Ariſtot. *Categ. cap.* 5.

† Quintilian tells us, *lib.* 1. *cap.* 4. that ſome Latin grammarians gave the name of *nomen* only to proper names;

Ch. 4. ſubſtances, according to Ariſtotle, are *ideas* of ſubſtances, which we form by abſtraction from individual ſubſtances, ſuch as the idea of a man, a horſe, or the like; and of this kind are not only the loweſt ſpecieſes, ſuch as the two inſtances mentioned, but alſo the higher genera, ſuch as animal, body, and the like. The words by which this kind of ſubſtance is denoted, are commonly called *appellative* nouns; but, if we have a mind to adopt Ariſtotle's language, may be called *ſecondary* nouns.

Thus far, and no farther, the nature of things goes, in the diviſion of ſubſtances. But the human mind, for the purpoſes of life, as well as for the uſe of ſcience, has created artificial ſubſtances, to which it has given names; and theſe make a third kind of nouns, commonly called *abſtract nouns*. The things denoted by ſuch nouns are accidents, which the mind abſ-

names; diſtinguiſhing the appellatives by the name of *vocabulum*, or *appellatio*. And in this manner likewiſe Dionyſius the Halicarnaſſian, in his treatiſe of compoſition, *ſect.* 2. informs us, that ſome Greek grammarians ſpoke, diſtinguiſhing ὄνομα, that is a proper name, from προσηγορια, an appellative noun.

tracts

tracts from the ſubſtances in which they are inherent; and by making them a ſeparate object of its contemplation, beſtows upon them a kind of ſeparate exiſtence, which they have not from nature. Of this kind are the words *blackneſs*, *whiteneſs*, *goodneſs*, *wiſdom*, and the like, which ſtanding for ideas that are conſidered by the mind as ſubſtances, have not only all the form of ſubſtantive nouns, but are made the ſubjects of propoſitions, and of predication, as much as real ſubſtances. Thus we ſay whiteneſs is a colour, juſt as we ſay man is an animal; and we ſay goodneſs is amiable, in the ſame manner that we ſay that any individual is ſo. This will be further evident, if we compare this kind of noun with the adjective or verb, from which, according to the common uſe of language, it is derived; for the adjective or verb neceſſarily implies the idea of ſome ſubſtance in which it is inherent, nor does the mind conceive it without ſuch ſubſtance. Thus, when *good* ſimply is named, we are not ſatisfied, but we aſk, what is it that is good? but we ſpeak and argue about *goodneſs*, without inquiring, or ſo much as thinking, about any ſubſtance Ch. 4.

Ch. 4. ſtance to which it belongs. This noun, as I have ſaid, is commonly known by the name of an *abſtract noun*, though the ſecond kind of noun is likewiſe the name of an abſtract idea; but as it appears to be, and truly is, a greater power of abſtraction to ſeparate the quality from the ſubſtance, than the general ſubſtance from the particular, it is therefore called, by way of pre-eminence, an *abſtract noun*.

Of this third kind of noun there are ſome ſpecieſes which deſerve particular notice. And firſt, there is one of them made by joining the article to the infinitive of a verb; for the nature of this mood being to denote the action of the verb ſimply, with the addition only of time, but without any expreſſion, either of perſon, or of the affection of the mind of the ſpeaker, by the article being prefixed it becomes a noun, having all the variety of caſes which nouns have, and being like them made the ſubject of predication. For τὸ πραττειν in Greek, is as much a noun as πραξις, (though the laſt only be called a verbal noun), with this difference, that πραξις expreſſes the action of the verb, without the

the circumſtance of time; whereas τὸ πράττειν expreſſes that the action now exiſts, as τὸ πραξαι that it did exiſt in ſome former time. And this appears to me to be the great advantage of this kind of expreſſion, that by it we can denote, not only the ſimple action, which is done by the verbal noun, but alſo the time of the action *. In Engliſh we do this, not by the infinitive only, but by the participle alſo; for we ſay, both, *To do good* is commendable, and, *The doing good is* commendable; we ſay, *The having done good* gives pleaſure upon reflection, and, *To have done good*, &c. Ch. 4.

Another ſpecies of this noun is formed by joining the article to the adjective in the neuter gender; as when they ſay in Greek, τὸ καλον, or τὸ ἀγαθον. By this manner of expreſſion the adjective no longer denotes a quality *concrete*, or inherent in a ſubject, but a quality *abſtract*; with ſome difference however betwixt it and the abſtract noun; for καλλος is not preciſely the ſame with the τὸ καλον, as ſhall

* It is on account of this kind of noun that I have not put into my definition of noun, what Ariſtotle has added, ἀνευ χρονου, *without time*.

Ch. 4. be ſhewn afterwards. This idiom too we have in Engliſh; for we ſay *the good*, and *the fair*. In the ſame way the Greeks form nouns of their participles, as the τὸ τρεχον, and the τὸ ποιων. We have the ſame form of a noun in Engliſh; for we ſay, *the running*, and *the doing*: but the meaning is different; for in Engliſh it denotes, as I have already obſerved, the *action* of the verb; whereas, in Greek, it ſignifies the *agent*.

All theſe three kinds of nouns I call by the common name of *ſubſtantives*, diſtinguiſhing the firſt and ſecond by the names of *primary* and *ſecondary* ſubſtantives, according to the nature of the ſubſtances they expreſs. The laſt may be called *ideal* or *fictitious* ſubſtantives, being entirely of the mind's own creation; but I chuſe to call them by their common name of *abſtract nouns*.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

Of pronouns.—The neceſſity of inventing them.—The nature and different kinds of them.

ALL the objects of human knowledge, and conſequently of diſcourſe, are either *generals* or *particulars*. The knowledge of generals, as I have already had occaſion to obſerve, is by far the more valuable knowledge, as by it we know even individuals; for we know nothing of Peter, James, or John, by hearing them named, or even by ſeeing them, unleſs we know the ſpecies to which they belong. But the knowledge of individuals is alſo abſolutely neceſſary for human life, and in common life the greateſt part of our converſation is concerning individuals. Now the number of individuals is infinite, at leaſt with reſpect to our capacities; yet the purpoſes of life require, that in the uſe of ſpeech they ſhould be ſingled out, and diſtinguiſhed one from another. Here Ch. 5.

Ch. 5. is one of the great difficulties that the inventors of language had to ſtruggle with: let us ſee how they got over it.

It may be thought that proper names for the ſeveral individuals, will ſerve to diſtinguiſh them. But, in the *firſt* place, it is impoſſible that all the individuals which may be the ſubject of diſcourſe, ſhould have particular names, at leaſt ſuch as are known to the ſpeakers and hearers; even the perſons who have occaſion to converſe together may not know one another's names. *2dly*, Suppoſe that the ſubjects of the converſation have all names, and that thoſe names are known to the parties, the ſame name may be common to ſeveral individuals, and indeed it is impoſſible that every individual ſhould have a different name; there muſt therefore be ſome way of marking, that the name uſed by the ſpeaker is the name of the individual whom the hearer knows, and of no other. And *laſtly*, Suppoſe this difficulty got over, and that the parties were agreed about the name, as applicable to the ſame individual known to them both, it would be tedious, and a great incumbrance to the diſcourſe, if the name was to be repeated as

as often as the object was mentioned; and accordingly we obſerve it as a defect in the language of children, that inſtead of uſing the pronoun *I*, they name themſelves*. Ch. 5.

Names therefore will not ſolve the difficulty, and ſome other way muſt be deviſed. The only way that ſeems poſſible is, to divide the ſubjects of converſation into certain claſſes. But into what claſſes? The common diviſion into ſpecieſes, by which the infinity of things is limited and circumſcribed, will not ſerve the purpoſe; for the thing here to be done, is to diſtinguiſh the individuals of the ſeveral ſpecieſes, not the ſpecieſes themſelves. We muſt therefore try ſome other way of claſſing the ſubjects of diſcourſe; and ſuppoſe we ſhould divide them into ſuch as are preſent during the diſcourſe, and ſuch as are not. The diviſion is ſufficiently comprehenſive; for every ſubject of converſation muſt either be preſent or not preſent. But I doubt it will not ſerve the purpoſe neither. The objects preſent indeed might be pointed out by the ſpeaker to the hearer; but we are inquiring at preſent how they are to be diſtinguiſhed

* This is an obſervation of Dr Smith in his Diſſertation on the formation of Languages.

by

Ch. 5. by words, not by ſigns or geſtures. Now though the diſtinction in general, might, no doubt, be marked by words betwixt objects preſent and objects not preſent, how are the ſeveral particular objects preſent or abſent, to be diſtinguiſhed from one another? for there may be many objects preſent during the converſation, and the number of thoſe that are not preſent is without bounds.

But this diviſion, though it do not ſolve the difficulty, leads to another diſtinction that may perhaps do the buſineſs: for of the ſubjects of converſation preſent, there are two which muſt neceſſarily be preſent, and which, by their natures, are limited and determined; I mean the ſpeaker, and the hearer, or the perſon to whom the diſcourſe is addreſſed. And every ſubject of diſcourſe muſt of neceſſity be either the ſpeaker, the hearer, or ſome third object different from both. Here then is another diviſion, equally comprehenſive as the former: let us try whether it will not anſwer the purpoſe better.

If either the ſpeaker or hearer be the ſubject of the diſcourſe, there is no more ado but to invent two words to deſign and diſtinguiſh them from one another. And theſe words

words are called *pronouns*. The one ſtanding for the ſpeaker is called a pronoun of the *firſt perſon*; and the other, which ſtands for the hearer, or perſon addreſſed, is ſaid to be a pronoun of the *ſecond perſon*. But what ſhall we do with the third ſubjects of converſation, ſuch as are neither the one nor the other? How are they to be marked by words? Here again a difficulty meets us: let us try what can be done to get over it. Ch. 5.

The objects of this third kind are either preſent, or they are not preſent. If preſent, and that there is but one of them, the buſineſs is eaſy; for we have no more ado but to invent a word, as in the former caſe, to denote this third ſubject of converſation, which is preſent, and then we have three pronouns, one of the firſt perſon, one of the ſecond, and one of the third. And accordingly, in all the regular languages, there is a pronoun of this third order, which is commonly known by the name of the *demonſtrative* pronoun; ſuch as *hic* in Latin, οὗτος in Greek, and *this* in Engliſh: and if there be more of thoſe objects preſent, which are made the ſubjects of diſcourſe, they are expreſſed

Ch. 5. ed by the plural of this laſt pronoun, in the ſame manner as when there are more ſpeakers or more hearers, they are expreſſed by the plural of the two pronouns of the firſt and ſecond perſon. But if it be further neceſſary, among the ſeveral ſubjects of diſcourſe preſent of the third kind, to diſtinguiſh and ſeparate one from the reſt, that can be done in words by the name only, or by deſcription. And thus much with reſpect to the ſubjects of diſcourſe preſent.

But what ſhall we ſay to the infinite number of objects not preſent, which may be the ſubjects of diſcourſe? How are they to be ſingled out, and the knowledge of them conveyed to the hearer? And if we reflect a little, we muſt be convinced, that this cannot be done, without reference to ſome previous knowledge which the hearer has of this object; for if we ſuppoſe him to know nothing at all of it, neither the name, nor the ſpecies to which it belongs, nor any circumſtance at all concerning it, by which it may be known and diſtinguiſhed from other objects, it is impoſſible that any knowledge at all can be conveyed of it to ſuch a man, otherwiſe than by his ſenſes, that

that is, by producing the object to him. Ch. 5.
But ſuppoſe the object had been mentioned before in the diſcourſe, and that in this way he has come to the knowledge of it, any word marking a reference to the object before mentioned, and denoting that it is the ſame with the object now mentioned, will be ſufficient to ſingle out and diſtinguiſh that object from others. And here we have another pronoun of the third perſon, which ſerves to diſtinguiſh ſubjects of the converſation that are not preſent. Of this kind are *is* and *ille* in Latin, ἐκεῖνος and ἐκεινος in Greek, *it*, *he*, *ſhe*, or *that*, in Engliſh.

The buſineſs of pronouns, as I have obſerved, is chiefly to diſtinguiſh individuals. Priſcian has gone ſo far as to make it their only buſineſs *; and certainly the pronouns of the firſt and ſecond perſon are only applicable to individuals, as likewiſe that of the third perſon, if the object be preſent; but if it be not preſent, the pronoun may apply either to individuals or generals, according as the one or other

* Pronomen eſt pars orationis quæ pro nomine proprio uniuſcujuſque accipitur. *Priſcian, lib.* 12.

Ch. 5. happens to be the ſubject of diſcourſe.

The pronoun is undoubtedly to be ranked under the noun; for it ſtands for the noun, as the name imports, and always denotes a ſubſtance of one kind or another: but it expreſſes ſomething more; for the pronouns of the firſt and ſecond perſon mark a reference to the ſpeaker and hearer. When I uſe the pronoun *I*, it is the ſame as if I ſaid, *This man here who ſpeaks to you*; and when I uſe *thou*, it is the ſame thing as if I ſaid, *This man here to whom I ſpeak.* The demonſtrative pronoun of the third perſon, refers alſo to an object preſent, but different from either ſpeaker or hearer; and when I uſe it, it is the ſame thing as if I ſaid, *This object which is here preſent:* for all thoſe three kinds of pronouns agree in this, that they all refer to an object preſent *. But the other pronouns of the third perſon always refer,

* This I hold to be the reaſon why one of them is ſometimes uſed for the other: for, in the Greek tragedies, the demonſtrative pronoun ὅτος or ὅδι of the third perſon is often uſed for the pronoun of the firſt; and then the ſpeaker talks of himſelf in the third perſon, in the manner above mentioned, as if he ſaid, *This perſon here who ſpeaks to you.* Mr Harris has given an example of

refer, not to objects then known for the first time, but to such as the hearer had been informed of by the preceding part of the conversation; so that they always denote objects *recognised*, or known the second time *. All nouns whatsoever, and indeed all words, suppose in the hearer a previous knowledge of the thing denoted by them, otherwise they would not be intelligible. But the difference betwixt pronouns and other nouns is, that the pronouns suppose the knowledge of the object, either from its being present, or from its having been before mentioned, but not any other kind of previous knowledge. Ch. 5.

As my intention is not to write a grammar, but only to observe what is curious, philosophical, and of most difficult invention in language, I will not enter into any more particulars on the subject of pronouns, nor explain all the different kinds

of the Latins using their *hic* in the same way, from that line of Tibullus,

Quod si militibus parces, erit HIC quoque miles.

Hermes, pag. 36.

* Τῆς δευτέρας γνωσεως. See *Hermes, pag.* 63.

Ch. 5. of them. Mr Harris has very properly divided them into præpoſitive and ſubjunctive, according to their order in the ſentence; and he has, with his uſual accuracy and elegance, explained the nature of that ſubjunctive pronoun commonly called the *relative*, ſuch as *qui* in Latin, *who* or *which* in Engliſh. And I think it is not improperly called the *relative* by way of eminence, becauſe it marks not only that relation which all the pronouns of the third perſon, except the demonſtrative, have to the object mentioned before, but alſo the relation that it has with the ſyntax or conſtruction of the ſpeech, which it joins together, and as Mr Harris expreſſes it, renders more compact *.

From this account of the pronoun, the following definition of it may be extracted: *A pronoun is a word denoting a ſubſtance, not directly, but by reference either to ſomething preſent, or ſomething mentioned in the preceding part of the diſcourſe.*

Before I conclude this chapter, I muſt obſerve, that this part of ſpeech is ſo neceſſary, that the moſt barbarous langua-

* Hermes, pag. 79.

ges

ges have it, even the Huron, as I have obſerved. Thoſe ſavages indeed have not the power of abſtraction ſo much as to form a ſeparate idea of it, and expreſs it by a diſtinct word; but they always throw it in with the ſignification of other words, particularly of the verb: and yet even ſo expreſſed, it ſhows that they have been ſo far philoſophers, as to make in ſome ſort the analyſis above mentioned of the ſubjects of diſcourſe, into the ſpeaker, the hearer, and ſome third perſon or thing. But neceſſity will make philoſophers even of ſavages. Ch. 5.

CHAP. VI.

Of the article, and the various uſes of it.

THis part of ſpeech very well deſerves a chapter by itſelf; for, if I miſtake not, it is of as ſubtle ſpeculation as perhaps any thing belonging to language, particularly as it is uſed in Greek. It is not a neceſſary part of ſpeech, for it is very ſeldom uſed by Homer Ch. 6.

Ch. 6. mer *; and it is not at all uſed in the moſt antient dialect of Greek that is preſerved to us, I mean the Latin. And in the Ionic dialect it is uſed indiſcriminately, either as an article or a relative pronoun. The appropriating of it therefore, for the purpoſe of an article, as is done by all the Attic writers, appears to be a refinement of the language in later times. But wherein this refinement conſiſts, has not, I think, hitherto been ſufficiently explained, nor any ſatisfying account given of certain uſes of it.

The Stoics, as we are informed by Priſcian †, reckoned the article among the pronouns; and both Apollonius and Theodorus Gaza ſpeak of it as a relative pronoun, diſtinguiſhed only from the common relative by its poſition in the diſcourſe; and therefore they call the one the *præpoſitive article*, and the other the *ſubjunctive* ‡. But I hope to be able to ſhew, that its office is different from that of a pronoun of

* ὁ, ἡ, τὸ, is frequently uſed by Homer, in place of the relative ὅς, ἥ, ὅ, but very ſeldom as an article.

† Lib. 1. pag. 574. See alſo *Hermes*, *pag.* 74.

‡ Ὑποτακτικὸν καὶ προτακτικὸν ἄρθρον. See *Hermes*, *pag.* 78.

any

any kind, and that it deſerves very well to be ranked by itſelf among the parts of ſpeech. Ch. 6.

All the words of a language are either the names of individual things, or general terms; that is, in the language of grammarians, either proper names or appellatives. The article in Greek is applied to both; for they ſay ὁ Σωκρατης, as well as ὁ ἀνθρωπος. But they muſt be both the name of ſubſtances of one kind or another; for the uſe of the article, as well as of the pronoun, is to ſingle out and diſtinguiſh ſubſtances from one another, though it does it, as I ſhall ſhew, in a different manner. We will begin with conſidering it as applied to proper names.

The application of it in this way, may appear, at firſt ſight, altogether unneceſſary; for a thing ſeems to be ſufficiently defined and diſtinguiſhed, by being marked by a name. And accordingly, Mr Harris thinks, that the article added to the name of Socrates is a mere pleonaſm, or that it can be of no uſe, unleſs perhaps to diſtinguiſh ſexes *. And it would be ſo,

* *Hermes, pag.* 226.

if

Ch. 6. if there had never had been but one Socrates in the world: for then it would have been as unneceſſary, and as inſignificant a pleonaſm, to add the article to Socrates, as to add it to the pronouns of the firſt and ſecond perſon, which point out particular perſons that cannot poſſibly be confounded with any other. But we all know, that among the Greeks, as well as among us, the ſame name was common to many individuals; nor indeed is it poſſible, by the nature of things, that there ſhould be a ſeparate name for every individual. And in this very inſtance, there have been more of the name of Socrates than one; and particularly, as I remember, there is an eccleſiaſtical hiſtorian of that name; and, even while Socrates lived, there was another Socrates, who is introduced in one of Plato's dialogues, and diſtinguiſhed by the name of *Socrates younger*. How then is this Socrates to be diſtinguiſhed from any other? It is, I ſay, by the addition of the article; and that in two different ways.

In the firſt place, if the name was mentioned before in the diſcourſe or writing, the article denotes a reference to that former

mer mention; and it is the ſame as if we ſaid, *the before-mentioned Socrates* *; ſo that the article uſed in this way, denotes an object of ſecond or repeated knowledge †. And in this uſe of it, it comes very near to the relative pronoun, or *ſubjunctive article*, as it is called by the Greek grammarians. And there are only two differences betwixt them: *firſt*, The poſition in the diſcourſe, the article being always prefixed to the noun, from whence it is called the *prepoſitive article*, but the other ſubjoined to it. *2dly*, The relative connects the diſcourſe, and makes one ſentence of two, which the article does not. Ch. 6.

But ſecondly, The article is applied to Socrates, even though he be mentioned for the firſt time. What is the meaning of it

* This is the ſtyle of our deeds, in which the greateſt accuracy of expreſſion is obſerved; for though the name be ever ſo often mentioned, it is always with the addition, *the ſaid, the foreſaid*, or the *above-mentioned*. This tedious repetition, which clogs and incumbers the ſtyle of our writs ſo much, would be ſaved, if we uſed the article in the way the Greeks do, and the ſtyle would be as well connected as it is, without ſuch *gouty joints*, to uſe an expreſſion of my Lord Shaftſbury's.

† Τῆς δευτερας γνωσεως.

Ch. 6. in ſuch a caſe? Is it not *there* at leaſt a mere pleonaſm? I ſay not; and that it has ſtill a reference to the previous knowledge of the hearer or reader; not that indeed which he has learned from the preceding diſcourſe, but that which he is ſuppoſed to have had before; for who knows not Socrates the great philoſopher? The article therefore is added to Socrates, to mark his being generally known; and in this way, added even to a general name, it will point out a particular perſon. Thus, ὁ ποιητης denotes Homer, ὁ ῥητωρ Demoſthenes; and added to a much more general name than any of theſe, viz. ανθρωπος, it denotes the public executioner in Athens *.

But ſuppoſe the name never mentioned before, and ſuppoſe it likewiſe not to be the name of any famous perſon generally known, then I ſay the addition of the article would be altogether improper: and accordingly it is never uſed; for they ſay, in ſuch a caſe, Σοσικλῆς (for example) τις καλεμενος, or Σοσικλῆς τις ὀνομα.

By this uſe of the article it is clearly diſtinguiſhed from the relative, which it

* *See Hermes, pag.* 222.

ſeems

ſeems otherwiſe ſo much to reſemble; for the relative is never uſed in that ſenſe. But it would ſeem at firſt ſight, that when it refers only to the former mention of the perſon or thing, it might be ſupplied by ſuch pronouns as οὗτος and ἐκεῖνος in Greek, *hic* and *ille* in Latin, *this* and *that* in Engliſh. But all theſe expreſs ſomething different; for with reſpect to the demonſtrative pronouns, οὗτος, *hic*, and *this*, they expreſs the thing with particular emphaſis, and point it out as it were with the finger. It is in this way that Virgil mentions Auguſtus Cæſar, in that fine compliment he pays him in the 6th *Æneid*, Ch. 6.

Hic *vir*, hic *eſt*, *tibi quem promitti ſæpius audis*,
Auguſtus Cæſar, *Divûm genus*.——

And in the ſame way we ſay in Engliſh, *This* is the man who is deſtined to ſave a ſtate, or to do any other great thing. As to the other pronouns above mentioned, ἐκεῖνος, *ille*, and *that*, they mark reference indeed; but in contradiſtinction to the demonſtrative pronouns juſt now mentioned, οὗτος and *hic*; for they denote that the object is not conſidered as preſent, or under the

Ch. 6. eye of the hearer, as it is represented when the other pronouns are used. As to αὐτος in Greek, *is* in Latin, and *he* in English, they are used by themselves, without being joined to any name, which the article never is *; and they refer only to an object formerly mentioned, but never to any knowledge of the hearer, other than what he has got from the discourse. As to αὐτος, when it is used in the sense of the Latin *ipse*, the difference betwixt it and the article is manifest.

It sometimes happens that a person is more distinguished by his country, his profession, or any other quality, than by his name. In that case the article is added to the adjective denoting the quality, and not to the name; as Ἀπολλοδωρος ὁ κυρηναιος, Τρυφων ὁ γραμματικος, Φαβρικιος ὁ τρις ὑπατευσας †, where

* The article indeed is not always prefixed to the name, but sometimes follows it, but never at any great distance; whereas the pronouns I have mentioned, αὐτος, *is*, and *he*, may be at a very great distance from the name to which they refer.

† Mr Harris, pag. 231. very properly observes the difference that there is betwixt adding the article to the proper name, and to the adjective or participle subjoined, in the instance which he gives, ὁ Πτολιμαιος γυμνασιαρχησας ἐτιμηθη, and ὁ γυμνασιαρχησας Πτολιμαιος ἐτιμηθη, or rather Πτολιμαιος ὁ γυμνασιαρχησας ἐτιμηθη.

it

it may ſeem that the article is joined to the adjective or participle, contrary to the rule we have laid down. But it is truly joined to the noun, only with the addition of an epithet. And ſo much for the uſe of the article when it is joined with a proper name. Ch. 6.

The article, when prefixed to general names, ſuch as ἀνθρωπος, is of more various uſe, and therefore muſt be more accurately conſidered. For that purpoſe let us examine what ἀνθρωπος by itſelf, without the article, ſignifies. And I ſay it denotes any ſingle individual of the ſpecies, without diſtinction or diſcrimination; and therefore the logicians tell us, that in propoſitions it is the ſame with τις ἀνθρωπος. Thus ἀνθρωπος ἐστι λευκος is the ſame as τις ἀνθρωπος ἐστι λευκος, being both particular propoſitions, not univerſal *. In like manner the plural of the word, without the article, denotes ſeveral individuals of the ſpecies, but likewiſe without any diſtinction or diſcrimination; ſo that as ἀνθρωπος is the ſame with τις ἀνθρωπος, ἀνθρωποι is the ſame with τινες ἀνθρωποι.

* See Ariſtotle περὶ ἑρμηνειας, and his commentator Ammonius, pag. 70. and 89. See alſo Philoponus's commentary upon the *Firſt Analytics*, pag. 7.

We

Ch. 6. We are next to consider the alteration that the addition of the article makes. What do I mean when I say ὁ ἄνθρωπος, or in English *the man?* My answer is, that it is in this use likewise of the nature of a relative. And first, it refers to the foreknowledge which the hearer had by the person being mentioned before; so that ὁ ἄνθρωπος, or *the man*, is the aforesaid man; and οἱ ἄνθρωποι or *the men*, are the aforesaid men. And in this way we talk of a man or men without naming them; and even though they have not been named in the preceding part of the discourse, but only so described as that it may be known what man or men are meant. Or secondly, in this expression the article may have the same reference to common knowledge or notoriety as when it is applied to a proper name, as in the instance above given of ὁ ἄνθρωπος for the common executioner in Athens; and in our ordinary way of speaking we say, *the city*, *the river*, that is, the city or river well known to the hearer; for that is what is chiefly designed by this kind of expression, not the dignity or excellence of the object: for we speak so of the city we live in, or the river near us, however inconsiderable

considerable that city or river may be. It is true indeed that the notoriety may, in many cases, arise from the dignity or excellence, as in the instances above mentioned, of *the poet* and *the orator*; but it is the knowledge of the hearer, from whatever cause it proceeds, that makes this use of the article proper. Ch. 6.

Thus it appears, that the article being prefixed to the general term ἄνθρωπος, makes a particular term of it, denoting an individual of the species. But suppose I have a mind to preserve the generality of the word, and to denote by it the species itself, what am I to do? The use of the word by itself, without the article, expresses only, as we have seen, some indefinite individual of the species; and with the article it expresses still an individual, but definite. Is there then no other way of denoting the species, but by a circumlocution, such as τὸ εἶδος τῦ ἀνθρωπυ, *the species of man?* There is in the Greek language, and it is by the use of the article, for ὁ ἄνθρωπος, in Greek, denotes the species as well as the individual, as in this proposition, ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐστι ζωον. And this will hold

though

Ch. 6. though the ſpecies be mentioned for the firſt time.

That ſuch is the fact, cannot be denied; but how is it to be reconciled with my notion of the article's being a relative word, referring to ſome previous knowledge of the ſubject? My anſwer is, that it is as much relative in this inſtance, as when it is prefixed to Socrates, or any other individual well known: for it refers to a knowledge which muſt be much more general than that of any individual of the ſpecies, I mean the knowledge of the ſpecies itſelf, which every body is ſuppoſed to know; whereas there are but few individuals of any ſpecies that are generally known.

But how can the ſame article denote both the ſpecies and the individual of the ſpecies? My anſwer is, that there is an ambiguity no doubt in the expreſſion, conſidered ſimply by itſelf; but it muſt be apparent from the context, whether the perſon is ſpeaking hiſtorically of an individual man, or philoſophically of the ſpecies. But there is no impropriety at all that the ſame expreſſion of individuality ſhould be applied both to the ſpecies and the

the individual of the ſpecies. On the contrary, it would have been an impropriety, if the ſpecies had been joined with any word denoting *number* or *many*: for the ſpecies itſelf is truly an individual of the kind, as much as any particular under it, and is ſo called by Ariſtotle *. And it is not only one itſelf, but it makes one of the things under it; for things are ſaid to be one and the ſame, becauſe they are of the ſame ſpecies. Ch. 6.

This philoſophical uſe, as it may be

* Ariſtotle calls it the ἑνομον τῷ εἴδει, and in Plato's language it is ſaid to be *one* of the *many*, and Ariſtotle carries it ſo far as to ſay, that when πας is added to a general term ſuch as ἀνθρωπος, ὁ τὸ καθολου σημαινων, ἀλλ' ὁτι καθολου. The meaning of which is, that any word ſuch as πας, implying diviſion into parts, though it expreſs that all thoſe parts are comprehended, and therefore σημαινει ὁτι καθολου, yet it does not denote the *general* ſimply, or the *idea* of the thing, ὁ σημαινει τὸ καθολου. See *Ammon.* περι ἑρμηνειας, *fol.* 81. Now if πας ἀνθρωπος does not expreſs this *one* idea, and if ἀνθρωπος ſimply does not expreſs it neither, as is evident from this very paſſage of Ariſtotle, it remains, that the only proper expreſſion for it, is the general term, with the article in the ſingular number, which, by its nature, denotes ſingleneſs or individuality, and therefore is applied, not only to the individuals of ſpecieſes, as we have ſeen, but to *monadic* things, ſuch as the antients ſuppoſed the ſun to be. And accordingly they ſay in Greek ὁ ἡλιος. See *Amm. fol.* 78. *ubi ſupra.*

Ch. 6. called, of the article, ſerves to explain another uſe of it, which has been obſerved, but not accounted for, ſo far as I know; which is, to mark the ſubject of a propoſition, and thereby diſtinguiſh it from the predicate or attribute. In the *firſt* place, it is to be obſerved, that the ſubject is not always marked by the article, but by other definitives *, ſuch as πας, *all*, or *every one*, and others to be afterwards mentioned. And ſometimes the ſubject is altogether without any definitive, as in the propoſition above mentioned, ἀνθρωπος ἐστι λευκος, where ἀνθρωπος is the ſubject, but no wiſe limited or defined.

2dly, As the ſubject has not always the article, ſo neither is the predicate always without it; for Ariſtotle mentions a propoſition, where both the ſubject and the predicate have the article, viz. ἡ ἡδονη ἐστι τὸ ἀγαθον †. This makes a good deal of puzzle in the caſe, for clearing which it is neceſ-

* I uſe this word of Mr Harris's, to tranſlate the Greek logical term προσδιορισμος; which ſignifies an addition to the ſubject of a propoſition, by which the latitude or extent in which it is to be taken is determined.

† Ariſtot. *Analyt. prior. lib.* 1. *et* Philopon. *comm. fol.* 85.

ſary

ſary to explain a little of the doctrine of propoſitions. Ch. 6.

In the moſt ſimple propoſition there muſt neceſſarily be ſomething *affirmed* or *denied*, and ſomething *of which* it is affirmed or denied. The firſt is called *the predicate*, or *what is predicated*, in Greek τὸ κατηγορούμενον; the other is called *the ſubject*, τὸ ὑποκείμενον. Now this predication can only be in two ways: for either it muſt be as the genus of the ſpecies, as when we ſay, *man is an animal*, where *animal*, the more general idea, is predicated of the leſs general idea comprehended under it; or, *2dly*, The accident is predicated of the ſubject in which it is inherent, as when we ſay, *man is white*, where *white* is the accident predicated of man the ſubſtance.*

* Ammonius, in his commentary upon the *predicaments*, pag. 59. mentions two other ways of predicating, which he calls παρὰ φύσιν and κατὰ συμβεβηκός; but they may be eaſily reduced to one or other of the two I have mentioned. There are ſome propoſitions wherein an accident ſeems to be predicated of an accident, as when we ſay, *goodneſs is amiable*, *wiſdom is profitable*. But the caſe is, that *wiſdom* and *goodneſs*, in ſuch propoſitions, as they have the form of nouns, ſo they are conſidered as expreſſing ſubſtances, in which the accidents *amiable* and *profitable* are inherent.

Ch. 6. This is the nature of the predicate. As to the ſubject, it is either an individual or a general; and if a general, it has one or other of the following four definitives, or προσδιορισμοι, two univerſal, and two particular. The univerſal is either affirmative, which is expreſſed by the word πας, or negative, denoted by the word ουδεις. The particular definitives are in like manner either affirmative or negative; the affirmative is τις, the negative is ουτις. Or, if it has none of theſe definitives, it has the article. Or, laſtly, it has no limitation or definition whatever. And this is all the variety that the nature of the thing will admit. If If the laſt is the caſe, we have ſeen already that it does not denote the ſpecies, but ſome undetermined individual of the ſpecies. We have alſo ſeen, that πας ανθρωπος denotes all the individuals comprehended under the ſpecies, that is, *the many*; but not the *one*, or the ſpecies itſelf. As to the other definitives τις, ουδεις, and ουτις, it is impoſſible that they can denote the ſpecies. It therefore remains, that when the ſpecies conſidered as *one*, is the ſubject of the propoſition, it can only be marked by the article, according to the philoſophical meaning which I have given to it when prefixed

ed to a general term. And accordingly, Philoponus has obſerved, in the paſſage above quoted *, that we can ſay, ἀνθρωπος ἐστι λευκος, or ἀνθρωπος ἐστι γραμματικος; but we cannot ſay, ὁ ἀνθρωπος ἐστι λευκος, or ὁ ἀνθρωπος ἐστι γραμματικος; becauſe ſuch properties belong only to certain individuals of the ſpecies, not to the ſpecies itſelf. Ch. 6.

And thus it is ſhewn in what caſes, and for what reaſon, the ſubject of a propoſition is marked by the article. But it remains to be inquired how this comes to be a diſtinguiſhing mark, and why the predicate of a propoſition has it not as well as the ſubject; why, *e. g.* do we only ſay, ὁ ἀνθρωπος ἐστι ζωον, but not, ὁ ἀνθρωπος ἐστι τὸ ζωον.

The only one of the definitives above mentioned that has the leaſt reſemblance to the article, is πας. Now let us inquire, whether it could be ſaid, πας ἀνθρωπος ἐστι πας ζωον; but it is evident that this cannot be ſaid, and ſo Ariſtotle has told us †. And the reaſon is plain, namely, that this would be affirming that every man is every animal. Now although πας ἀνθρωπος differs, as I have ſaid, from ὁ ἀνθρωπος in this,

* *Comm. in Analyt. prior. fol.* 7.

† Περὶ ἑρμηνειας, and *Ammon. Comm. pag* 84.

that

Ch. 6. that the one expresses all the individuals of the species, whereas the other denotes the species itself considered as one: yet it would be as absurd to say, that the species man is all animals, as that every man is all animals *.

We cannot therefore say that ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐστι παν ζωον, because we cannot say that πας ἄνθρωπος ἐστι παν ζωον; and for the same reason we cannot say that ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐστι το ζωον, because we cannot say that the species man is the species animal; or, in other words, that the general idea of man and animal are the same: for when we say that animal is predicated of man, we mean that it is predicated in the first sense I mention-

* Ammonius, in his commentary upon the book of Interpretation, observes, that the article has the power of the universal definitive πας, only with this difference, that the article expresses the whole as one, but πας all the parts. I will give the whole passage: Καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ζῶον, καὶ εἴποις ἄν, καὶ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ζῶον· τὸ γὰρ ἄρθρον τῆν δυνάμιν ἔχει τῦ καθόλυ προσδιορισμῦ ὡς μαθησομεθα πρὸς τῷ περάτι τῦ βιβλίυ, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἄρθρον τῆ ἑνώσει προσήκει τῦ καθόλυ ὑποκειμένυ. Διὸ καὶ τῶν μοναδικῶν ἑκάστῳ, καὶ τῶν ἀτόμων συντατεῖται, καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἥλιος λεγόμεν καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης. Ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῦ ὑπερέχοντος λέγονται τῶν ὁμοστοίχων, ὡς ὅταν ὁ ποιητὴς εἴπωμεν, ἢ ὁ ῥήτωρ. Τὸ δὲ πᾶς τῷ πλήθει τῶν ὑπ' αὐτῦ ἀναφερομένων. From which passage it is evident, that Ammonius's opinion, concerning the use of the article in propositions, is the same with that of Philoponus; and indeed it appears to be the doctrine of the whole Peripatetic school.

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ed as the genus of the ſpecies; and the meaning of the propoſition is, that man participates of the general idea of animal. The idea therefore of animal, is more general than that of man, which is comprehended under it; ſo that it is impoſſible we can affirm the whole genus animal of man, any more than we can affirm the whole ſpecies man of any individual. For though we can ſay, Σωκρατης ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος, we cannot ſay, Σωκράτης ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος; and for the ſame reaſon we cannot ſay, ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐστι τὸ ζῶον. For in the one caſe ἄνθρωπος is the predicate, and ζῶον in the other; and therefore if ἀνθρωπος cannot admit the article, it is clear that ζῶον cannot admit it neither. And the reaſon is the ſame for both, namely, that as one individual does not contain the whole ſpecies, ſo neither does one ſpecies contain the whole genus. In ſhort, to expreſs it in that way, would be to confound genus and ſpecies, ſpecies and individual, and to make no diſtinction betwixt what contains and what is contained. And thus I have ſhewn, that the article is properly applied to the ſubject of a propoſition when it denotes the ſpecies, but cannot Ch. 6.

not

Ch. 6. not be applied to the predicate in such propositions as the one I have mentioned.

But what shall we say of the proposition mentioned by Aristotle, ἡ ἡδονὴ ἐστι τὸ ἀγαθὸν? This proposition he says is different from the following, ἡ ἡδονὴ ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν; so that, according to Aristotle, the addition of the article makes a difference of the sense, and therefore ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐστι τὸ ζῶον is a different proposition from ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐστι ζῶον. Thus much then is established by the authority of Aristotle. But what is the meaning of this proposition concerning pleasure? for Aristotle has not told us, but has left us to guess. Philoponus his commentator, in the passage above quoted *, thinks that it is a predication of the first kind above mentioned, by which the general is predicated of the particular under it; and he makes ἡδονὴ to be the genus, and ἀγαθὸν the species; so that the proposition is, that good is a species of pleasure, as man is a species of animal. But by what rule does he so determine? why may not ἀγαθὸν be the genus, as well as ἡδονὴ? I think there is nothing either in the sense, or the expression, to make us determine otherwise.

* *Comm. in Analyt. prior. pag.* 85.

But

But my opinion is, that it is not a propoſition of that kind; but that the meaning is, that the idea of pleaſure, that is, the ἡδονή, is the ſame with the idea of good, or the τὸ ἀγαθὸν; ſo that they are only two names for the ſame thing. Ch. 6.

Beſides theſe uſes of the article, there is another that I have already mentioned when I was treating of nouns, viz. that of making ſubſtantives of adjectives, and of certain parts of verbs. But of this it is needleſs to ſay more, as the only uſe of the article, in ſuch caſes, is to mark, that the word to which it is joined is uſed as a noun, though it have not the form of a noun; ſo that it is truly not an article, but an indication of a noun.

From what is here ſaid of the article, the following definition of it may be collected. "It is the prefix of a noun, "denoting ſimply that the noun to which "it is prefixed, is the ſame with that which "was before mentioned, or is otherwiſe "well known *."

The

* I rank it, as well as the pronoun, under the noun; becauſe it cannot be without the noun, and is truly a certain modification of the noun, though it do not ſtand

Ch. 6. The great uſe of it appears from what has been ſaid. And the want of it muſt be acknowledged a great defect in the Latin tongue, eſpecially in philoſophical writing; for the Latin, by reaſon of this want, cannot diſtinguiſh the unity of the ſpecies, from the multitude of individuals under it, nor the ſpecies itſelf from any undetermined individual of it.—It cannot diſtinguiſh among individuals, thoſe that are indefinite and unknown, from thoſe that are definite and known.—It cannot diſtinguiſh betwixt the ſubject and the predicate of a propoſition.—It cannot ſimply refer to any object, without ſome particular emphaſis.—And laſtly, It cannot connect together the ſubjects of the diſcourſe, by re-

for the noun, as the pronoun does. It expreſſes alſo the accident of relation; ſo that it is of thoſe words that have a mixed ſignification, and participate both of noun and verb. I have ſaid *prefixed to a noun*; and this is always the caſe, though the following noun be ſometimes not expreſſed, but underſtood, as in this expreſſion, Ἕκτωρ καὶ Σαρπηδὼν ἀνῃρέθησαν, ὁ μὲν ὑπ' Ἀχιλλέως ὁ δὲ ὑπὸ Πατροκλου, where Ἕκτωρ is underſtood as following the firſt article, and Sarpedon the ſecond. I have ſaid that it *ſimply* refers to what is previouſly known, becauſe in that way it is diſtinguiſhed, as I have obſerved, from certain pronouns which refer alſo, but with a particular indication, or μετὰ δείξεως, as the Greek grammarians expreſs it.

ferring

ferring them one to another, but leaves the reader or hearer to gueſs, whether they be the ſame that were mentioned before or not. Ch. 6.

CHAP. VII.

Of the uſe of the article in French and Engliſh.

THE learned grammarian, if any ſuch ſhall deign to read my work, may perhaps find fault that I ſhould, in this inquiry into the nature of a language of art, ſpend any time upon languages that have not been formed according to the rules of art, by grammarians and philoſophers, as the Greek language undoubtedly was, but have grown out of vulgar uſe, being mongrel dialects, and the corruption of better languages, from which they derive any thing good that is in them. But we ought to conſider, that ſuch as they are, they are now almoſt the only languages in which even the learned write, ſince the writing in Greek, which was never much practiſed in the weſtern world, Ch. 7.

Ch. 7. is now entirely given over, and the writing in Latin very much diſuſed, or ſo uſed that it were better altogether laid aſide likewiſe. In ſuch circumſtances, it is of importance that the ſeveral languages of Europe, now almoſt the only languages in which ſcience is delivered, ſhould be cultivated and improved, as much as their ſtinted genius, and original faulty conſtitution, will admit. And our Engliſh is, among thoſe dialects, one that I think more capable of improvement than any other. Beſides, the perfection of ſuch a language as the Greek, is never better ſeen than when contraſted by the defects of leſs perfect languages. Having ſaid thus much by way of apology for this chapter, I proceed.

The uſe of the article is, no doubt, a great advantage which both the French and Engliſh have over the Latin: An advantage which they derive from their northern anceſtors; for the French, though it be for the greater part corrupted Latin, has a great mixture in it of the Teutonic and Celtic; and the Engliſh, we know, is a dialect of the Teutonic or German, the parent of which is the Gothic, a language,

as

as I have had occaſion already to obſerve, much more perfect than the preſent Engliſh; and which, among other things belonging to a perfect language, has an article. But we are not to imagine that the French and Engliſh languages have an advantage over the Greek, by having two articles in place of one: on the contrary, the uſe of the particles, *a* and *an* in Engliſh, and *un* in French, commonly called *articles*, is really a defect in thoſe languages; for they are truly numerical words, denoting *one*, for which the French have no other word than this that they call an article. Now what occaſion is there for a term of number to denote an indefinite individual of any ſpecies? This is properly done in Greek by the ſimple noun. Now ſuppoſe any foreigner, learning to ſpeak Greek, ſhould think proper to add the numeral εἷς, and inſtead of ἄνθρωπος ſhould ſay, εἷς ἄνθρωπος, would not that be reckoned a ſoleciſm, and a corruption of the language? Now this article, in French and Engliſh, has, I am perſuaded, ariſen from ſuch ignorance and corruption of a better language. Ch. 7.

But ſhould not this article, if it is to be uſed at all, have a plural? For, as we expreſs

Ch. 7. preſs ἄνθρωπος by "*a* man," why have we not a plural for that article, to expreſs ἄνθρωποι, but are obliged to ſay ſimply *men* in the plural, and that with no very determined ſignification? For we know not exactly whether it mean *ſome* men, *many* men, or *moſt* men; whereas the Greek ἄνθρωποι denotes the ſimple plurality of indefinite individuals of that ſpecies. In this particular I think the French language is more uniform and conſiſtent: for they have a plural for this article, viz. *des*; and *des hommes* in French, is preciſely ἄνθρωποι in Greek.

As to the proper article *the* in Engliſh, and *le* in French, let us firſt, according to the order in which we proceeded with reſpect to the Greek article, conſider the application of them to proper names. And the rule is, both in French and Engliſh, that they are not applied to proper names, unleſs it be when two or more of the ſame name are mentioned: then we ſay, in order to diſtinguiſh the one from the other, *the Peter*, *e. g.* that you ſaw, *the Howard* that did ſuch a thing; though this is not properly an exception to the rule, becauſe the article is not added to the proper name

ſo

ſo much as to the perſon ſo and ſo deſcri- Ch. 7.
bed, juſt as we add it to an appellative noun, as when we ſay, *the man* who did ſo or ſo. Neither is it an exception to the rule in French that they uſe it in proper names, as *La Fontaine*; for there it is a part of the name, not the article added to the name. But it is an exception to the rule, and a whimſical one too, that when we give a plural to thoſe proper names, we then add the article. Thus we ſay, *the Howards*, or *the Stewarts*; and the French in like manner. It will be ſaid, that this is to diſtinguiſh families from one another. But why not diſtinguiſh, in the ſame manner, individuals, when there are more than one of the ſame name? why, for example, ſpeaking of a particular Howard, do not we ſay, *the* Howard, (as the Greeks ſay ὁ Καισαρ), meaning either the Howard before mentioned, or a Howard ſo famous that every body knows him.

Another exception to the rule, both in French and Engliſh, is, when we ſpeak of certain great natural objects, ſuch as great rivers, or great mountains; for we ſay, *the Thames*, *the Severn*, *the Alps*, *the Appennines*, &c.; and the French do the ſame: and

Ch. 7. and alſo when we ſpeak either in French or Engliſh of nations, we add the article; for we ſay, *the French*, *the Engliſh*, *les François*, *les Anglois*. But by a ſtrange caprice of the Engliſh language, when we ſpeak of the country thoſe nations inhabit, we drop the article, and ſay, *France*, *Spain*, &c.: but the French, in this, as well as in many other things, is more regular than our language; for they ſay, *la France*, *l' Eſpagne*, &c. And the Greek muſt be allowed to be more uniform and conſiſtent than either, as it prefixes the article to all proper names, of every kind, except when they are firſt mentioned, and are not of things or perſons generally known. And ſo much for the uſe of the article in French and Engliſh, when applied to proper names.

When applied to a general word, it diſtinguiſhes the individuals of the ſpecies, as in Greek, by referring either to the former mention of them in the diſcourſe, or to the previous knowledge of the party to whom the diſcourſe is addreſſed. Thus we ſay *the* man, when we ſpeak of a man before mentioned; we ſay alſo *the poet*, and *the orator*, referring to ſome famous poet or orator, well known to the hearer, though not

not before mentioned; and we ſay alſo, as I obſerved before, *the river*, and *the mountain*, though neither of them be conſiderable or famous, but only in the neighbourhood of the parties, and ſo well known to them. Ch. 7.

With reſpect to the philoſophical uſe, as I call it, of the article, for denoting the ſpecies, the French are regular and uniform; for they apply it to all ſubſtances, natural or artificial, and even to abſtract nouns. Thus with reſpect to animals, they ſay, *l' homme*, *le cheval*, *l' ours*, &c.; with reſpect to vetegables, *le bled*, *l'olive*, *la vigne*, &c.; as to minerals, they ſay, *l' or*, *le plombe*, *le ſaltpetre*; and ſpeaking of the elements, *la terre*, *l' eau*, *l' air*, *le feu*; and as to artificial ſubſtances, they ſay, *le chariot*, *la charrue*, *la bouſſole*; and as to abſtract nouns, they ſay, *la vertue*, *la ſageſſe*, &c.

In Engliſh there is a ſtrange variety in this matter. And in the firſt place, with reſpect to animals, we ſay, ſpeaking of the ſpecies, *the lion*, *the horſe*, *the bear*, &c.; but with reſpect to our own ſpecies, we always ſay *man* ſimply; as to vegetables, we ſay, *the olive*, *the vine*, *the pome-*

Ch. 7. *granate*, &c. But we commonly ſay *corn* ſimply, and its different ſpecieſes, ſuch as *wheat*, *barley*, and *oats*. I ſay *commonly*, for it is the misfortune of our language, that the uſe of it is not ſo much fixed as of the French; and whoever will try to reduce it to rules, will find very near as many exceptions from as inſtances of the rule. As to minerals, I think we always expreſs them without the article; for we ſay, *gold is the heavieſt of metals*, *ſilver is more difficult to be refined than gold*, and the like. As to the elements, we always ſay *earth* ſimply; for when we ſay *the earth*, we mean the globe of the earth. But as to the words denoting the other three elements, we uſe them indiſcriminately, either with or without the article; for we ſay *air*, or *the air*, *fire*, or *the fire*, *water*, or *the water*. As to artificial ſubſtances, we ſay, *the plough*, *the compaſs*, *the quadrant*, ſpeaking of the ſpecies; but we do not commonly ſay *the houſe*, *the coat*, unleſs ſpeaking of a particular houſe or coat. But when we expreſs the ſpecies, we commonly uſe the particle *a*; for we ſay *a houſe* is a great convenience, *a coat* keeps one warm. And laſtly, as to abſtract nouns, we

we never uſe it at all: for, though we ſay *the goodneſs*, *the wiſdom* of God; yet when we ſpeak of thoſe qualities abſtractedly, without reference to any ſubject in which they are inherent, we ſay *goodneſs*, *wiſdom*, and the like; although the analogy of language require, that as ſuch words denote ſubſtances of the mind's creation, and have in every reſpect the form of ſubſtantive nouns, they ſhould likewiſe have the article prefixed; and accordingly it is ſo uniformly in Greek. Ch. 7.

Another philoſophical uſe of the article is, to diſtinguiſh the ſubject of a propoſition from the predicate, in the manner I have explained. This obtains both in French and Engliſh. In our tranſlation of the New Teſtament, we have a remarkable inſtance of it, upon which a very important article of faith depends. It is in the beginning of the goſpel of St John, where it is ſaid that Θεος ην ὁ Λογος. Here, according to the idiom of the Greek language, Λογος is undoubtedly the ſubject, and Θεος the predicate. And accordingly we have tranſlated it, *the Word was God*. There is another inſtance of the ſame correctneſs of tranſlation in the beginning of the book of

Ch. 7. *Geneſis*, where it is ſaid that God called *the light day, and the darkneſs night*. Here the article added to *light* and *darkneſs*, denotes that they are the ſubjects of the two propoſitions *. But though this be according

* Our tranſlators of the Bible certainly underſtood their own language very well, though they may have miſtaken the ſenſe of the original, as I ſee they have often done in tranſlating the New Teſtament. As to their errors in tranſlating the Old, I muſt refer to thoſe who are learned in the Hebrew; but I will venture to ſay, that if they had taken the ſenſe of the Hebrew from the Septuagint tranſlation, they would not have erred ſo often. I will give but one inſtance, where, by not following the Septuagint, they have made unintelligible a paſſage in the books of Moſes, containing a moſt ſublime doctrine of theology. It is in the book of *Exodus*, *ch.* iii. where God appeared to Moſes in the burning buſh, and being aſked by Moſes what his name was, "God ſaid unto Moſes, I "AM THAT I AM; and he ſaid, Thus ſhalt thou ſay "unto the children of Iſrael, I AM hath ſent me unto "you." Theſe words have to me no meaning. But in the tranſlation of the Septuagint, the paſſage runs thus.

Καὶ ἔπεν ὁ Θεὸς πρὸς Μωσῆν λέγων—Ἐγὼ εἰμὶ Ὁ ΩΝ καὶ ἔπεν, ὅτως ἐρεῖς τοῖς υἱοῖς Ισραὴλ, Ὁ ΩΝ ἀπέσαλκέ με πρὸς ὑμᾶς.

This way rendered, the paſſage is not only ſenſe, but contains a moſt ſublime philoſophical truth, viz. that God is the only being who can be ſaid properly to *exiſt*, ſince he only exiſts *independently*, and all other things have their exiſtence *in him*. *For in him we live, move, and have our being*. In this ſenſe the paſſage is underſtood by Euſebius, *Præp. Evangel. lib.* 7. *cap.* 11. And ſo interpreted it agrees exactly with the famous inſcription above

ding to rule, I dare not aver that it is the constant uſe in Engliſh; for our great poet Milton, who at the ſame time was a great maſter of language, in putting this paſſage into verſe, has tranſpoſed the article in one of the propoſitions, and omitted it altogether in the other. For he has ſaid, Ch. 7.

"——Light *the* day, and Darkneſs night
he nam'd;"

by which, according to the rule I have laid down, we are to underſtand that he called the day *Light*; and as to the other propoſition, it is not eaſy to ſay what to make of it. For it is not the order of the words in Engliſh, any more than in Greek, that ſhould determine the ſubject of the propoſition; for we may ſay either that *the light* he called *Day*, or *Day* he called *the light*. In order therefore to ſave the credit of Milton, I am very much inclined to agree with Dr Bentley, and to

bove the portal of the temple at Delphi. This inſcription was a ſingle letter, namely the letter ε, the name of which in Greek was εἶ, which is the ſecond perſon of the preſent of the indicative of the verb εἰμί, and ſignifies *thou art*, being, as Plutarch has interpreted it, the ſalutation of the God by thoſe who entered the temple. See *Plutarch. de* εἶ *apud Delph.*

ſuppoſe

Ch. 7. ſuppoſe it an error of his amanuenſis, or after tranſcriber, and that he truly gave it,

" And *Day the light*, *the darkneſs Night* he nam'd."

CHAP. VIII.

Of the genders and numbers of nouns.

Ch. 8. HAving thus treated of the different kinds of nouns, according to my diviſion of the parts of ſpeech, viz. the ſubſtantive noun, the pronoun, and the article, I will now proceed to conſider three accidents common to all nouns, and which deſerve a particular conſideration; I mean, *numbers*, *genders*, and *caſes*.

And to begin with *number*, it is one of the moſt general affections of being; for things being ſtripped of all their accidents, and all the qualities that difference them one from another, ſtill retain the diſtinction of one, two, or many *. It was therefore

* This thought is very elegantly expreſſed in the third book of the Hermes, chap. 4. pag. 367. in theſe words.

fore fit that this ſo univerſal property of things ſhould be marked by ſome variation of the word expreſſing the thing, and not by a new word. And I think there is nothing more bungling in the barbarous languages, than their having recourſe to a new word to expreſs the difference betwixt the ſingular and plural of any thing. Even the modern languages of Europe, however imperfect in other reſpects, do all expreſs that diſtinction by a variation of the ſame word. Ch. 8.

To expreſs in that way all the different numbers of things, is by nature impoſſible; and if it ſhould be attempted, even to the length of *ten*, which may be ſaid to be the hinge upon which our arithmetic turns, the word would immediately appear to be greatly incumbered and overloaded. Is there then no medium betwixt *unity* and *multitude?* and nothing elſe to be expreſſed by the numbers of nouns, but ſingular and plural? There is by nature

words. " By ſeparating from the infinite individuals " with which we are ſurrounded, thoſe infinite acci- " dents by which they are all diverſified, we leave no- " thing but thoſe ſimple and perfectly ſimilar units, " which being combined make number, and are the " ſubject of arithmetic."

Ch. 8. a medium, and that is the *duad*, for that is the paſſage from unity to number. *Unity* confeſſedly is not number; neither is the duad number, (for number is defined to be a multitude of monads *), but is a ſtep towards number; for there is a progreſs in the principles of things, and every thing does not ariſe from a ſingle principle. Thus the principles of body are the *point*, the *line*, and the *ſurface*; and of number the principles are the *monad* and the *duad*. This was the philoſophy of the ſchool of Pythagoras †. And it appears to me to have been known to the artiſts who formed the Greek language; and if there were nothing elſe to convince me that this language was the work of philoſophers, as well as grammarians, their uſe of the dual number would be ſufficient. It is true that the Gothic has this number likewiſe, and we cannot believe that the Goths were philoſophers. But there are many other things in that language, which make it impoſſible, in my opinion, that it

* Πλῆθος μονάδων. *Euclid. lib.* 7.

† See Jamblichus's Comm. on the arithmetic of Nicomachus.

ſhould

should have been the invention of a barbarous nation. And therefore we must suppose that they have learned to speak from some nation more advanced in arts and sciences; and that this nation was the same with that from which the Greeks got their language, and all their other arts and sciences, namely Egypt, we have endeavoured to shew, in the first part of this work, p. 442. Ch. 8.

As to *gender*, it is founded upon the distinction of sexes; a distinction not common to all things, like number, but peculiar to animals; or if we have a mind to carry it the greatest length, and take in the vegetable, to animated substances: all other things have no sex: and therefore genders are naturally divided into *masculine*, *feminine*, and *neuter*; which last, as Dr Smith has very well observed, is truly a negation of sex *.

According to this distinction, all words denoting substances inanimate, should be of the neuter gender. But the artificers of language have been pleased to give the variety of masculine and feminine even to substantives denoting inanimate things,

* Dissert. on the formation of languages, pag. 444.

Ch. 8. from certain analogies and ſimilitudes, very ingeniouſly explained in the Hermes, to which I refer the reader.

I ſhall only add further, on this ſubject, that the want of genders muſt be accounted a very great diſadvantage in any language. For, in the *firſt* place, it makes the creation of a new word, or at leaſt an addition to the old word, neceſſary to expreſs the difference betwixt the male and the female of the ſpecies. Thus in Engliſh, to denote the female of the wolf and bear kind, we are obliged to ſay a *ſhe-wolf* and a *ſhe-bear*, inſtead of the Latin *lupa* and *urſa*; and in order to denote the female of the horſe kind, we have been obliged to invent a word quite different, viz. *mare*, inſtead of the Latin *equa* from *equus*. *2dly*, The genders of ſubſtantives, and their correſpondent adjectives, are of ſingular advantage in ſyntax, allowing a variety of arrangement and compoſition, which languages without genders cannot poſſibly admit. And *laſtly*, They give a variety to the termination of thoſe parts of ſpeech, which is very agreeable to the ear, and contributes not a little to the harmony of the learned languages.

CHAP.

CHAP. IX.

Of the caſes of nouns.

THE caſes of nouns are a matter of very great art; and, as I have taken occaſion to obſerve, were probably the laſt thing invented in the art of language, and therefore may be preſumed to have been of moſt difficult invention. And I think they are ſtill of more difficult explanation than perhaps any other thing in language. I own I am not ſatisfied with any thing I have ſeen on the ſubject; and it is not unlikely that the reader will be as little ſatisfied with the account I am now to give of them, though he will certainly approve of my attempt to explain them from principles of philoſophy, which, though perhaps they may not apply to the uſe of language, are ſuch as I apprehend cannot be controverted. Ch. 9.

I have already obſerved, that if any number of nouns or verbs, of the cleareſt and moſt determined ſignification, were

Ch. 9. to be ſet down together, but without any connection among them, they would not conſtitute ſpeech, becauſe they would not make ſenſe, nor convey any ſentiment of the mind of the ſpeaker. Connection therefore is abſolutely neceſſary for the purpoſe of ſpeech. But how is this connection to be marked? I think only in one of three ways; either by words invented for that purpoſe; or by ſome change and variation of the words that are to be connected together; or laſtly, by the poſition or arrangement of the words. The modern languages of Europe connect their ſpeech chiefly by the firſt and laſt method: for they either make the connection by ſeparate words, ſuch as prepoſitions; or by placing the words together they mark that they are to be referred to one another. But the learned languages uſe chiefly the ſecond method; and by certain variations of the word, commonly known by the name of *inflection*, mark its connection with other words in the ſentence. And when in this way the connection betwixt noun and noun, or noun and verb, or noun and prepoſition, is marked by a certain inflection of the noun,

noun, that is what is commonly called a *caſe*. Ch. 9.

But from what is this variation or inflection? I ſay, it is from the noun itſelf, or that form of it which is commonly called the *nominative*; which I hold to be no caſe, becauſe it is not inflected; and in this I am ſupported by the authority of Ariſtotle, who every where ſpeaks of the *noun*, and the *caſe* of the noun, as quite diſtinct things *. The nominative therefore, according to this opinion, expreſſes the thing ſimply and abſolutely in itſelf, without marking any connection or relation to any thing elſe. For although it cannot ſtand that way in the ſentence, but muſt be connected one way or another with ſome other word; that connection is not marked by the nominative, but by that other word, which, beſides its own meaning, expreſſes that connection. Thus *homo*, in a Latin ſentence, ſignifies juſt *man*; but it depends upon the form of ſome other word in the ſentence, whether it is to be the agent or patient of ſome action ex-

* See Ariſtotle's book περὶ ἑρμηνείας. This too is the opinion of Sanctius in his Minerva, who, in ſupport of it, quotes the authority of Ariſtotle.

preſſed

Ch. 9. preſſed by a verb, or whether it be in one way or another connected with another noun.

All caſes have this in common, that they expreſs a connection of one kind or another, with ſome other word in the ſentence, beſides the principal thing denoted by the noun. They are therefore *conſignificant* of connection *, if I may be allowed the word, juſt as the *verb* is of *time*, and are among the number of thoſe words that have a mixed ſignification. But what is the connection they expreſs? for it is impoſſible they can expreſs all the manifold connections and dependencies that words, or the things expreſſed by them, have with reſpect to one another. And if the artificers of language had attempted that, they would have run into very great confuſion, and overloaded the expreſſion of their words, as well as enlarged them to an enormous ſize. It was therefore only the moſt common and neceſſary connections that could be expreſſed in that way, and theſe only the artiſts who formed language have expreſſed.

But what are theſe connections? If they

* Προσσημαινον.

are

are all to be comprehended under one general head, I ſay they belong to the category of *relation*; for I muſt have recourſe again to the Categories, in which, according to my notion, the firſt principles of all arts and ſciences, and among others of the grammatical art, are contained. It is the moſt general of all the categories; for it runs through them all, and is, as the name given it by Ariſtotle imports, the reſpect which things have to one another *: for it is not, properly ſpeaking, in the things themſelves, but in the mind, which conſiders them together, and from that conſideration forms the idea we call *relation*. It cannot therefore ſubſiſt, without two things at leaſt, ſo that if any one of them ceaſes to exiſt, the relation is at an end. This makes it neceſſary to diſtinguiſh carefully betwixt the things themſelves and the relation; for the things may ſubſiſt without one another. Thus Sophroniſcus and Socrates, conſidered as ſubſtances, may ſubſiſt one without the other; but the relation betwixt them of Ch. 9.

* Τὰ πρός τι is the name which Ariſtotle gives this category.

father

Ch. 9. father and ſon cannot ſubſiſt without the exiſtence of both.

But to ſay in general, that the caſes denote relation, is not ſufficient; for there are many different kinds of relation. And Ammonius Hermeias, in his Commentary upon Ariſtotle's Categories, reckons up to the number of eight of them *. But I will take a diviſion of them from the Categories themſelves, through which, as I have ſaid, this category of relation runs, that will I think ſerve my purpoſe better. And I take it from the general diviſion of all the categories into *ſubſtance* and *accident*; for every thing exiſting, is either ſubſtance, or the accident of ſubſtance. Now, according to this way of conſidering relations, they are either of ſubſtance to ſubſtance, of ſubſtance to accident, or of accident to accident.

Let us next apply this diviſion to the particular caſes, beginning with the genitive, which, according to the opinion of the Peripatetic ſchool, is the firſt caſe. The expreſſion of relation by it, appears to me to be very various, and to run though all the three members of the di-

* Εἰς τας κατηγορίας, pag. 96.

viſion

viſion juſt now given. For it expreſſes the relation of ſubſtance to ſubſtance, of ſubſtance to accident, and of accident to accident. Ch. 9.

To begin with the firſt: The relation of ſubſtance to ſubſtance expreſſed by the genitive, ſeems to me to be of three kinds. For, firſt, It expreſſes the connection of *whole* and *part*, ſo that the word in the genitive caſe denotes the *whole*, of which the other word ſignifies a *part*. I will take my examples from our Engliſh idiom, which uſes the prepoſition *of* for the mark of the genitive. In this ſenſe of the caſe, we ſay, *a tree of a foreſt*, *a regiment of an army*, *a man of a country*. Or, *vice verſa*, the word in the genitive denotes the *parts*, while the other word ſignifies the *whole* which is compoſed of thoſe parts; as when we ſay, *a foreſt of oak-trees*, *an army of ſo many regiments*, *a country of ſo many diſtricts or provinces*. And in general we ſay in Engliſh, *the parts of the whole*, and *the whole of the parts* *. What

* In Greek the caſe is varied. For they ſay, μερη or μερος τῦ ὅλυ; but they ſay, ὅλου τοῖς μεροις. See *Ariſtot. Categor.* under the category of *relation*.

Ch. 9. the reaſon is of this ſeemingly oppoſite relation being expreſſed by the ſame caſe, ſhall be immediately explained.

The ſecond relation, betwixt ſubſtance and ſubſtance, expreſſed by the genitive, is when the ſubſtance in that caſe has any *poſſeſſion*, *property*, or *power* of any kind over the other ſubſtance. Thus we ſay, the *land* or *houſe of John*, the *ſubjects of the king*, the *tenants of the landlord*, the *ſervant of the maſter*, &c.

The third relation expreſſed by this caſe, betwixt ſubſtance and ſubſtance, is when the ſubſtance in the genitive is the *cauſe efficient* of the other ſubſtance, or that from which it proceeds. Thus we ſay, the *ſon of the father*, the *picture of ſuch a painter*, or, in general, *the work of either art or nature* *. I ſay the *cauſe efficient*; for if it is the *cauſe material*, then the expreſſion is quite different, and the matter is in the governing caſe, while the thing produced of the matter is in the genitive. Thus we ſay, the *wood of the door*, the *ſtones of the*

* This uſe of the genitive, to ſignify the cauſe productive of any thing, is reckoned by the grammarians ſo principal an uſe of this caſe, that it has got its name from it both in Greek and Latin.

wall,

wall, and in general *the matter of any thing*. And the expreſſion is the ſame if the cauſe be the *formal cauſe*. Thus we ſay, the *idea* or *exemplar of a thing*, the *ſhape* or *frame of a thing*, and in general, the *form of any thing*. This expreſſion of the formal and material cauſe, by the genitive, falls under the firſt head of the relation of ſubſtances to one another, namely, that of the *part* to the *whole*. For the matter or form of a ſubſtance is part of that ſubſtance, every ſubſtance being compoſed of *matter* and *form*; and therefore the expreſſion reciprocates, or is convertible, as in the caſe of the *whole of the parts*, and the *parts of the whole*, and of the particular examples given above; for we ſay, *a door of wood*, *a wall of ſtones*, *a thing of ſuch a ſhape or form*. Ch. 9.

I am now to give the reaſon of this reciprocation, which I take to be this. When two things are related, the relation muſt be mutual: if A is related to B, B muſt be related to A; for A is to B as B is to A in the correſpondent relation. If therefore the relation of A to B, is expreſſed by B being in the genitive caſe, there is no reaſon why the correſpondent relation of

Ch. 9. B to A ſhould not likewiſe be expreſſed by A being in the genitive. For as the relation is mutual, there is no reaſon why one of the terms ſhould be the leading or governing word more than the other. We ſay therefore, *the father* of *the ſon*, and *the ſon* of *the father*, *the king* of *the ſubjects*, or *the ſubjects* of *the king*. But in all ſuch convertible expreſſions, each of the terms muſt expreſs the relation, otherwiſe they will not reciprocate. Thus we ſay, *the ſon* of *the father*, or *the father* of *the ſon*, becauſe both the terms *father* and *ſon* expreſs the relation. But let us ſuppoſe that one of the terms does not expreſs the relation: let us take, for example, the term *man* inſtead of *ſon*, I can ſay *the father* of *the man*; but I cannot convert the expreſſion, and ſay *the man* of *the father*, becauſe the terms in that expreſſion are not correlatives *; the term *man* being much

* Theſe correlatives are, in the language of Ariſtotle, called ἀντιστρεφοντα, which very well expreſſes their quality of being *convertible*. They are fully explained by Ariſtotle in the Categories, more fully I think than he commonly explains any thing, in thoſe books of abſtruſe philoſophy, which he did not intend for publication; and if any thing is wanting, it is ſupplied by his commentator Ammonius.

more

more general than *father*, and expreſſing no relation at all. Ch. 9.

It may be aſked, why we can ſay the *father of a man*, but not *the man of a father?* And I think a reaſon too can be given for this. When I ſay *father*, I expreſs a relation, namely that of cauſe; and as the correſpondent relation of effect, is, as we have ſeen, denoted by the genitive caſe, therefore the genitive which follows, is naturally applied to expreſs this correſpondent relation; whereas, when I uſe the general term *man*, I denote no relation at all, and therefore the genitive that follows is altogether ambiguous; for it cannot expreſs a correſpondent relation, as in the other caſe, and therefore it may expreſs any relation ſignified by the genitive, ſuch as that of power or property; ſo that it may mean that the man is the property of the father, and then it will be underſtood juſt as if we ſaid, *the ox of the father*. The like reaſon may be given why we can ſay, *the ſon of a man*, but not *the man of a ſon*.

And to ſhew that it is the correlation of terms, and nothing elſe, that makes the expreſſion convertible, let us take an inſtance

Ch. 9. ſtance mentioned before, viz. *the houſe of John.* This expreſſion is not convertible, becauſe the terms are not correlatives, that is, do not expreſs correſpondent relations; for *John* expreſſes no relation at all. But let John be changed for a term that has a relation to *houſe*, or any other ſubject of property, and let us ſay *proprietor* in place of it; then we can ſay, *the houſe of the proprietor*, or *the proprietor of the houſe.*

Here it may be objected, That *houſe* is a general term, expreſſing no relation. But the anſwer is, That the article *the* determines it to be a particular houſe, which is the ſubject of property. And it makes the expreſſion the ſame, as if we ſaid *the property of the proprietor*, or *the proprietor of the property.*

It is the force of the ſame article that makes it proper to ſay *the wood of the door*, as well as *the door of the wood:* for though wood be a general term, not expreſſing relation; yet by the addition of the article, and by the genitive which follows, it is made to ſignify a particular piece of wood, which is the matter of the door; and the expreſſion comes to the ſame thing as if we ſaid, *the matter of the form*, or *the form*

form of the matter; for the word *door*, with the addition of the article, neceſſarily implies a particular form, as well as *wood*, with the ſame addition, implies a particular matter. Ch. 9.

And to be convinced of the force of the article in this caſe, let us leave it out, and ſay *wood of door*; I deny that ſuch expreſſion would be proper to expreſs what is denoted by the other, or indeed to expreſs any thing.

The general rule therefore in all ſuch caſes is, that the leading or governing word muſt denote the relation, otherwiſe the expreſſion is improper, or ambiguous; and if the phraſe is convertible, then the correſpondent relation muſt be expreſſed by the other term *.

The next relation expreſſed by the genitive, is that of *accident* and *ſubſtance*; and this relation is the natural relation betwixt accident and ſubſtance, by which the one is inherent in the other as its ſubject; and

* I hope what is here ſaid, will ſolve the difficulties ſtarted by Dr Smith, in his ingenious treatiſe above quoted, on the Formation of Language, concerning the expreſſion of the genitive; and ſhew, that the relation expreſſed by it is not altogether vague and undefineable, as he ſeems to ſuppoſe.

it

Ch. 9. it is the ſubſtance that is marked by the genitive. Thus we ſay, *the whiteneſs of a ſwan, the bravery of a man, the fierceneſs of a lion.* Such expreſſions do likewiſe in the uſe of language reciprocate; for we ſay, a *man of bravery*, a *lion of fierceneſs:* and the reaſon is, that man being a ſubject in which qualities are inherent, and bravery being a quality which muſt neceſſarily be inherent in ſome ſubſtance, *man* and *bravery* are conſidered as correlatives as much as ſubject and accident, of which we ſay, the *ſubject of the accident*, as well as the *accident of the ſubject.*

The third and laſt expreſſion by the genitive, is the relation of accident to accident, which is the ſame relation as that juſt now mentioned, namely, the relation of accident to ſubſtance. For the accident in the genitive caſe is conſidered as a ſubſtance in which the other is inherent as an accident, ſuch abſtract nouns denoting ſubſtances of the mind's creation, and being therefore accounted ſubſtantive nouns. Thus we ſay, *the beauty of holineſs, the happineſs of virtue.*

In this manner I have endeavoured to account for the conſtruction of the genitive with

with a noun. It appears ſometimes to be governed by an adjective, as in the expreſſions, *plenus vini*, *cupidus gloriæ*. But in ſuch a caſe the adjective ought to be analyſed into the parts of which it is compoſed. Theſe are a quality, and ſome ſubſtance in which that quality is inherent: for an adjective expreſſes the quality concrete; whereas the noun that is formed from it denotes it abſtract. The expreſſion, reſolved in this way, ſignifies *plenitudo vini*, or *cupido gloriæ*, belonging to ſome ſubject. The genitive therefore, in ſuch caſes, is truly governed by a noun, and expreſſes the ſubject, of which the noun is the accident: for it is an accident of glory to be deſired, and of wine to fill any thing. Ch. 9.

And this will account for ſome expreſſions which have very much puzzled grammarians, ſuch as that of Lucretius, *nec ſum animi dubius*; for when it is analyſed in the manner juſt now mentioned, it is nothing elſe than *dubietas animi* inherent in ſome ſubſtance.

This caſe is alſo commonly thought by the grammarians to be governed by a verb; but I am of opinion, that in ſuch inſtances

Ch. 9. there is either an ellipſis of a ſubſtantive, as when they ſay in Greek πινειν τῦ οἴνυ, or in Engliſh, *to drink of the wine*, the word μερος, or *part*, is underſtood; or elſe there is an ellipſis of a prepoſition, which I ſee is the opinion of Sanctius in his Minerva, as when it is ſaid in Greek πεποιηται λιθυ, or in Engliſh, *it is made of ſtone*, the prepoſition ἐκ is underſtood in the Greek phraſe, and in the Engliſh it is expreſſed *.

As to the genitive caſe, when it is joined with a prepoſition, it denotes no more than its connection with the prepoſition; for the relation then is not expreſſed by the caſe, but by the prepoſition.

The expreſſion of the *dative* is *motion*. This is none of the categories; becauſe all the categories have a fixed and determined exiſtence; whereas motion is nothing but tranſition or paſſage from one ſtate to another, ſo that it is only the

* The Latins imitate this way of ſpeaking of the Greeks, as in the verſe of Virgil quoted by Mr Harris,

Implentur veteris Bacchi, pinguiſque farinæ;

which is a pure Greciſm; for in Greek it is πιμπλανται οἴνυ, where the prepoſition ἐκ or ὑπὸ is to be underſtood. If the expreſſion had been Latin, it would have been *implentur vino*, where the prepoſition *ex* or *de* governing the ablative is underſtood.

road,

road, if I may ſo ſpeak, to a category, not a category itſelf. It is however nearly allied to the categories, and runs through four of them, viz. *ſubſtance*, *quantity*, *quality*, *where*; and therefore is treated of by Ariſtotle in his book of Categories, by way of ſupplement or appendix to the doctrine of thoſe higher genera *. Ch. 9.

The motion expreſſed by this caſe is not motion in general, but motion to the thing, which is in the dative caſe. And accordingly in Engliſh it is expreſſed by the prepoſition *to*; as when we ſay, *give* to *him*, *go* to *him*, *come* to *him*, and the like. As to motion from the thing, it is not expreſſed by this caſe, but by a prepoſition. It is indeed expreſſed by the Latin ablative, which is a variation that the Latins have made upon the Greek dative; but even then it is commonly ſuppoſed by grammarians to be by virtue of a prepoſition, either expreſſed in the compoſition of the verb, or underſtood. In Engliſh it is denoted by the prepoſition *from*, and ſometimes by two prepoſitions, *out* and *of*, as when we ſay, I came *out of* the city.

* Ammon. in Categor. fol. 170.

Ch. 9. Motion therefore to a thing, is the primary idea of the dative caſe. But there is a ſecondary idea which reſults from this, and that is the idea of *approximation*, *contiguity*, *application*, *juxtapoſition*, and *junction*. It is in this ſenſe, that the dative is joined to the word *like* in Engliſh, *ſimilis* in Latin, and ὁμοιος in Greek, and to many other words denoting compariſon, ſuch as *comparo*, *confero*, *æquiparo*, &c. For all ſuch compariſons are made, by placing the things as it were together; and when a thing is ſaid to be *like* another thing, the the meaning is, that it approximates or comes near to that thing, ſo as to be nearly the ſame. It is in a ſenſe analogous to this, that the dative in Greek, and the ablative in Latin, is uſed to ſignify the inſtrument with which any thing is done, as ξιφει ἐσφαξε, *gladio interfecit*; for there muſt be an application of the ſword to the body, or of the body to the ſword, before that operation can be performed. In Engliſh we expreſs it in the Latin form, by the mark of the ablative, and ſay he was killed *with* or *by* a ſword.

The accuſative alſo relates to motion, expreſſing the relation that there is betwixt the

the *action* and the *ſubject*, or the *effect* of the action: for it denotes either the mere paſſive ſubject of the action, as when I ſay, *Petrus interfecit* JOHANNEM; or it denotes the reſult of the action, and the effect produced by it, as when I ſay, *faber fecit* CATHEDRAM. This is the account which Mr Harris has given of this caſe *; and as I agree with him perfectly in it, I will add no more upon the ſubject, except to obſerve, that as this caſe neceſſarily relates to action, it cannot be conſtrued, except with a verb, unleſs where there is an ellipſis of a prepoſition; as when Virgil ſays, Ch. 9.

Os humeroſque deo ſimilis.

As to the vocative caſe, the expreſſion of it is very ſimple; for it has nothing to do with the nature of things, but denotes only the operation of the human mind addreſſing itſelf to, or calling upon, any perſon or thing.

Theſe are the connections and relations of things which I underſtand to be expreſſed by caſes. And it may be obſerved,

* Book 2. ch. 4. pag. 232. of the Hermes.

that

Ch. 9. that they are common and ordinary connections, such as we have occasion to express every moment in discourse. For nothing is more common than the connection of *part* with *whole*, of *property* or *possession* with the *proprietor* or *possessor*, of *cause* and *effect*, or of *accident* and *substance*. These are the connections expressed by the genitive.—And as to motion, expressed by the dative, it is that by which every cause is connected with its effect.—And as there must necessarily be a subject of every action, the connection expressed by the accusative is such as must occur every time we mention any action.—And that connection betwixt the person who calls upon another, and him who is called upon, expressed by the vocative, is of daily use in the common intercourse of life.—But besides these ordinary connections, there are numberless connections, dependencies, and relations, which, as I have said, it is impossible to express by any variation of the word; and therefore the artificers of language, have denoted them by prepositions, conjunctions, and adverbs *.

* See Dr Smith upon this subject.

The

Ch. 9.

The modern languages of Europe ſupply the want of caſes by prepoſitions, except with reſpect to the accuſative, which they mark only by its poſition next to the verb that governs it. How imperfect this manner of expreſſion is, compared with the antient, may appear from the following conſiderations. In the *firſt* place, our compoſition is clogged and incumbered, and our ear fatigued by the conſtant repetition of ſuch harſh monoſyllables, as *of*, *to*, *with*, *from*, *by*. *2dly*, It cramps us extremely in the arrangement of the words, and denies us that freedom of compoſition, which gives even the beauty of numbers to the antient proſe *. *3dly*, The different termination of the caſes gives a variety to the ſound of the Greek and Latin, and prevents that tedious repetition of the ſame ſound, which is unavoidable in the modern languages, let us take what pains we will upon the compoſition.

* See what Dr Smith has very ingeniouſly ſaid upon this ſubject, in the end of his treatiſe upon the Formation of Languages, where he has ſhewn the defects of our Engliſh compoſition, from a fruitleſs attempt of Milton's to imitate the beauty of the antient. There could not have been a more happy inſtance choſen for the purpoſe.

It

Ch. 9. It may be thought that the expreſſion of the relation, by the inflection of the word, is not ſo clear as when it is expreſſed by a ſeparate word. But I can perceive no difference; for *domus* PETRI is juſt as clear an expreſſion as *the houſe* of *Peter*, or PETER'S *houſe*; where, by the way, we may obſerve, that we have endeavoured to enlarge a little the ſtinted idiom of our language, by forming this kind of genitive, by the addition of the letter *s* to the termination of the nominative; and I think the Greek dative, or Latin ablative, expreſſes, with equal clearneſs, all that we expreſs by four prepoſitions *to*, *with*, *from*, and *by*.

There are ſome moderns, who think that the formation of caſes by the inflection of the noun, ſo far from being a matter of art, proceeds from the want of art, and is truly a defect in thoſe antient languages; for, ſay they, the perſons who framed thoſe languages, not having the faculty of abſtraction to ſuch a degree as to ſeparate thoſe relations from the ſeveral things to which they belong, were obliged to throw them into the lump, as it were, with the ſignification of the noun, and to expreſs all

all by one word, with ſome variation in- Ch. 9.
deed, in order to prevent ambiguity and confuſion. In this way, ſay they, the barbarous nations at this day continue to expreſs different things by the ſame word, which is allowed by every body to be a defect in their language; whereas the moderns, being more philoſophers than thoſe antient maſters of language, and having acquired a greater faculty of abſtraction, have formed the ideas of thoſe relations ſeparated from the ſubjects to which they belong, and have invented words to expreſs thoſe ideas, by which they have given a beautiful ſimplicity to the ſtructure of their languages, that is not to be found in Greek or Latin.

To this ſo plauſible plea in favour of the moderns, I anſwer, That whatever other defect there may have been in the formers of the learned languages, we cannot accuſe them of wanting the power of abſtraction; for that they had abſtract ideas of relations, is evident from the words that they have invented to expreſs them ſeparately by themſelves, I mean the prepoſitions, ſome of which in Greek expreſs relations, very near as hard to define as

Ch. 9. thoſe expreſſed by the caſes. Nor do I know any thing in the Greek language more difficult to be underſtood than the exact meaning of their prepoſitions, either by themſelves, or in compoſition. They have carried this operation of the mind ſo far, as to abſtract accidents from ſubſtances in which they are neceſſarily inherent, and make a kind of ſubſtances of them by themſelves, known by the name of *abſtract* nouns. In like manner, they have diſtinguiſhed in actions three things that are always joined in nature, the *action* itſelf, the *actor*, and the *ſubject* of the action, and have expreſſed each of them by diſtinct words, contrary to the cuſtom of barbarous languages, which expreſs all three together, as they exiſt in nature. We muſt not therefore imagine, that becauſe they choſe to expreſs the relations of the caſes, not by a new word, but by a variation of the ſame, they had not any ſeparate idea of thoſe relations. We might as well conclude, that becauſe they choſe to expreſs *perſons* and *times*, as well as *action*, by the inflections of the verb, that therefore they had no diſtinct idea of perſons, and the different modifications of time; which however

however it is certain they had, as they have expreſſed them by diſtinct words. The fact appears truly to have been, that they had as diſtinct ideas as we, of all the ſeveral relations, accidents, and circumſtances of things; but in forming the language, they had the ſkill to diſtinguiſh betwixt ſuch of them as might be expreſſed by inflection, without overloading the word, and ſuch as could not be ſo expreſſed; and theſe laſt they denoted by ſeparate words, ſuch as prepoſitions and adverbs. This maſterly ſkill the firſt barbarians who ſpoke had not, nor could not be expected to have; and therefore they, without diſtinction, expreſs many different things, and ſometimes whole ſentences, by the ſame word, which has produced thoſe inconveniencies that I have elſewhere taken notice of. As to the much boaſted ſimplicity of the modern languages, the antient are ſo far ſimpler than they, as they expreſs the ſame things by fewer words. This indeed is the effect of great art, and an art not eaſily underſtood or practiſed; but we ſhould remember the Greek proverb, *Fine things are difficult* *. Nor Ch. 9.

* Χαλεπα τα καλα.

Ch. 9 is there any thing fine in any of the arts, that is not of difficult practice. As to the moderns who formed the preſent languages of Europe being philoſophers, or men of ſcience of any kind, the pretence is ridiculous, ſince it is well known, that they were formed by barbarians out of better languages, which they corrupted for want of knowledge of the grammatical art, and of the beauties and excellencies of the languages they wanted to learn.

I think therefore I may conclude this chapter, with the words of Chancellor Bacon, in a paſſage quoted from him by Mr Harris, where, ſpeaking of this very ſubject, viz. of the declenſions and conjugations of the antient languages, and the want of them in the modern, he adds, "Sane "facile quis conjiciat (utcunque nobis ipſi "placeamus) ingenia priorum ſeculorum "noſtris fuiſſe multo acutiora et ſubtilio-"ra *."

* Bacon de augmentis ſcient. VI. 1.

CHAP.

CHAP. X.

Of the verb commonly ſo called.—Its nature, and the things expreſſed by it.

THE verb, in the large ſenſe in which I underſtand it, I divide into declinable and indeclinable; under the firſt, comprehending the verb commonly ſo called, the participle and the adjective; and under the laſt, the adverb and the conjunction. In this chapter I propoſe to treat of the verb commonly ſo called. C. 10.

This part of ſpeech is the moſt artificial and complex of any, and is juſtly eſteemed the glory of the grammatical art. It therefore deſerves to be accurately explained; for which purpoſe it will be neceſſary to recollect what was before ſaid, that whatever is expreſſed by any word, is either ſubſtance, accident, or an energy of the mind of the ſpeaker. It was alſo ſaid, that this laſt was expreſſed by the ſpecies of verb we are now ſpeaking of; and that it was either aſſertion, (that is, affirming or denying), or volition; and the volition expreſſed

C. 10. expreſſed by the form of the verb was twofold, wiſhing or commanding; for there is no verb of this kind, which does not either aſſert, wiſh, or command *. It was alſo obſerved, that the thing which is affirmed, wiſhed, or commanded, or as it may be expreſſed in one word, the *action* of the verb, is neceſſarily implied in the ſignification of the verb; for if we were to affirm, that we do affirm, or did affirm, the energy itſelf, in ſuch a caſe, would be the thing affirmed.

The expreſſion therefore of theſe two things, the energy of the mind of the ſpeaker, and the action of the verb, is eſſential to every verb in every language. There is alſo the expreſſion of the perſon or thing, of which the action of the verb is affirmed, or which is commanded to perform or ſuffer that action, or which is the agent or ſufferer of the action prayed or wiſhed

* This neceſſary implication of the affection or diſpoſition of the mind of the ſpeaker, in the ſignification of the verb, could not eſcape the obſervation of ſo accurate a grammarian as Apollonius. And accordingly he makes it a principal and diſtinguiſhed part of the verb, τῶν ῥήμασι ἐξαιρέτως παρακειται ἡ ψυχικη διαθεσις. *De ſyntaxi, lib.* 3. *cap.* 13.

It may be obſerved here, that under *wiſhing* I include *interrogating*; for every man that interrogates, wiſhes or deſires to be informed.

for;

for; and theſe perſons, according to the diſtinctions of firſt, ſecond, and third, which I have explained under the article of pronoun, are diſtinctly expreſſed, together with their numbers, by the inflection of the verb in the learned languages. Thus τυπτω, in Greek, expreſſes that the perſon who performs the action of beating is the ſpeaker; τυπτεις, that it is the perſon ſpoken to; τυπτει, that it is ſome third perſon. Again, τυπτε, in the imperative, expreſſes that it is the perſon to whom the diſcourſe is addreſſed that is commanded to beat; τυπτετω, that it is ſome third perſon who is ſo commanded. Laſtly, τυπτοιμι expreſſes that it is the ſpeaker who is the object of the wiſh, that is to ſay, it is wiſhed that the ſpeaker may perform the action of beating; τυπτοις wiſhes that the perſon who is ſpoken to may perform that action; and τυπτοι that ſome third perſon may do it. C. 10.

Theſe three things therefore, the energy of the mind of the ſpeaker, aſſerting, commanding, or wiſhing; the thing aſſerted, commanded, or wiſhed, or in one word the *action* of the verb; and laſtly, the perſon or thing to which that action relates in one or other of the manners juſt now mentioned;

are

C. 10. are three things expreſſed in this ſpecies of verb. And there is a fourth thing ſignified by all verbs of this kind, and that is, the *exiſtence* of the action of the verb; for when we affirm any thing, we aſſert that it *does* exiſt; when we command it, we deſire that it *ſhould* exiſt; and when we wiſh for it, it is that it *may* exiſt. This general idea therefore of being or exiſtence is implied in every verb, whatever the action of it may be. But there is one kind of verb which expreſſes nothing elſe for its action but ſimple exiſtence, ſuch as the verb *eſſe* in Latin, and *to be* in Engliſh. It is called by the Latin grammarians the *ſubſtantive* verb; but in Greek it is denominated, as Mr Harris has obſerved, by a much more proper name, ſignifying *exiſtence* *. This may be called the fundamental or radical verb, being the ſimpleſt of all verbs; for it only expreſſes two of the four things above mentioned, viz. *exiſtence*, and the energy or affection of the mind, which are both eſſential to the expreſſion of every verb commonly ſo called; and therefore this verb is implied in all other verbs, every verb being reſolveable

* Ῥῆμα ὑπαρκτικόν.

into

into it and the participle. Thus *amo* is *fum* *amans*, τρεχω is εἰμι τρεχων, and ſo on through all the tenſes. In Engliſh we make uſe of this form of expreſſion, and I think it is a beauty of our language, particularly in the expreſſion of the future; as when we ſay, *I am to do* ſuch a thing; which I hold to be a *paulo poſt futurum*, much more than the Greek tenſe which bears that name. C. 10.

Beſides thoſe four things principally expreſſed by the verb, there is an adjunct, which is neceſſarily implied in every verb of this kind, and therefore is made part of the definition of a verb by Ariſtotle *, I mean *time*. The reaſon of which is, that in the expreſſion of every verb the idea of exiſtence, as we have ſeen, is neceſſarily implied: now all things here below exiſt in time, and all the diſtinctions of time are applicable to them; for they *are*, *were*, and *will be*. And if the curious reader further deſires to know the reaſon of this, it is becauſe all ſublunary things being generated and corrupted, are in a conſtant flux or motion, betwixt generation and corruption. Now where-ever

* Ῥημα δέ ἐστι τὸ προσσημαινον χρονον. *Ariſtot. de Interpret. cap.* 3.

C. 10. there is motion, there muſt be time; for time is nothing elſe but the interval which the mind perceives betwixt what is prior and ſubſequent in motion *. But beſides ſimple exiſtence, all other verbs, except the ſubſtantive, denote ſome kind of action or operation; and hence it is that a verb is commonly ſaid to be a word denoting action †.

The

* Τότε φαμὲν γίγνεσθαι χρόνον, ὅταν τῦ πρότερον καὶ ὑστέρου ἐν τῇ κινήσει αἴσθησιν λάβωμεν. *Natural. auſcult. lib.* 4. *cap.* 16. See the whole paſſage tranſcribed, and moſt elegantly and correctly tranſlated, by Mr Harris, in the *Hermes*, pag. 107.

† This is not a complete definition, as it leaves out the energy of the mind of the ſpeaker, which, as we have ſeen, is eſſential to this kind of the verb. It is alſo an incomplete definition, by which a verb is ſaid to be a word of affirmation: *Firſt*, Becauſe it takes in only the energy of the mind; and *2dly*, Becauſe it does not expreſs the three ſeveral kinds of this energy, but mentions only one of them, viz. affirmation.

It may be obſerved, that there are things in nature that are eternal and immutable, and have nothing to do with change or motion, nor by conſequence with time; and the verbs which we uſe in ſpeaking of them, ought therefore to have no tenſes: but there are no ſuch verbs in any language that I know; for even the ſubſtantive verb, which denotes exiſtence merely, has tenſes like other verbs. Theſe eternal and immutable things, though they do not exiſt in *time*, yet have *duration*, which

The reaſon why no other part of ſpeech implies the ſignification of time is, that no other part of ſpeech implies any energy of the mind, aſſerting or willing the thing expreſſed. Thus when we uſe a word denoting a ſubſtance, or any quality of a ſubſtance, ſuch as *black* or *white*, there is nothing in the terms we uſe, expreſſing or implying that the mind aſſerts that thoſe things do exiſt, or wills that they ſhould exiſt. C. 10.

In the learned languages, the different

which is a more general idea than time, and is expreſſed in the Greek philoſophy by the word αἰων, and in Latin by the ſame word in the Eolic dialect *ævum*; but as there is no motion in ſuch beings, ſo that the mind cannot diſtinguiſh what is firſt and laſt in them, therefore time does not apply to them.

Ariſtotle, in his books, *De Naturali Auſcultatione*, has very properly obſerved, that if there were no circular, that is, motion revolving into itſelf, there would be no certain or determined meaſure of time; not but the mind would diſtinguiſh what is firſt from what is laſt in motion, and conſequently have the perception of the interval betwixt, as we have when we diſtinguiſh betwixt the different thoughts or motions of our own minds; but if it were not for the circular motion of the celeſtial bodies, we ſhould have no ſtandard whereby to meaſure that interval, and ſhould only have a confuſed idea of it, ſuch as we have of any ſpace or interval of which we have no meaſure.

C. 10. diſtinctions of time are marked by different inflections of the verb. But the modern languages of Europe have not many tenſes of that kind, and none at all in the paſſive voice. Their tenſes therefore are moſtly formed by the aſſiſtance of other verbs, which they call *auxiliary verbs*, but which themſelves have but few tenſes. Of this kind in Engliſh are *have*, *am*, *ſhall*, and *will*; and in French *avoir* and *être*.

From this account of the kind of verb we are now ſpeaking of, I think the following definition of it may be drawn. "It is a word principally ſignificant of "accident, of the energy of the mind "of the ſpeaker relative to that acci- "dent, of the ſubſtance to which the "accident belongs, and it is conſignificant "of time *."

This

* In this definition, I have included nothing but what is eſſential to the verb, and which is expreſſed in it, either directly, or by implication. The expreſſion of accident, under which I comprehend both action and exiſtence, is abſolutely neceſſary in every verb; — ſo is alſo the energy of the mind of the ſpeaker; — and therefore they are both directly expreſſed even in the verbs of modern languages, otherwiſe they would not deſerve the name

This adjunct of time to the verb, making what we commonly call *tenſes*, is of ſuch importance in language, that it well deſerves a chapter by itſelf. C. 10.

CHAP. XI.

Of tenſes.

NOthing can be more accurate than the philoſophy of *time* given us by Mr Harris in his Hermes; and his application of it to the tenſes of verbs is new, and very ingenious. But as his ſyſtem, however perfect in ſpeculation, does not appear to me adapted to the uſe of any language, I will give another that I think is more practical, leaving it to the reader to chuſe that which he likes beſt. C. 11.

I think all grammarians are agreed,

name of verbs. As to the other two, viz. the ſubſtance to which the accident belongs, that is, the perſon of the verb, and likewiſe that neceſſary adjunct of all verbs, viz. time, they are implied in the verbs of all modern languages, but only directly expreſſed in ſome of them; whereas they are both ſo expreſſed in the learned languages.

that

C. 11. that whatever variations or modifications there may be of tenſes, there are but three ſimple and original tenſes, viz. the *paſt*, the *preſent*, and the *future*. But the purpoſe of language could not be ſerved by this ſimple diviſion of time; there are therefore various modifications of the ſimple times expreſſed by the verb; and of theſe I am now to ſpeak.

In the firſt place, it is to be obſerved, that there is one part of the expreſſion of the verb which is always of the preſent time, I mean the energy of the mind of the ſpeaker; for he always affirms, wiſhes, or commands, at the time when he ſpeaks; and which, it is to be obſerved, is what is called the *preſent time* in grammatical language. It is therefore only to the action of the verb that the variety of times is applicable.

The firſt diviſion of thoſe ſimple times which I ſhall obſerve is, that the action is denoted to be either perfect or imperfect, or indefinite; the meaning of which laſt is, that it is not determined by the expreſſion, whether it be perfect or imperfect, that is, completed or not completed,

pleted, at the time that is mentioned by the ſpeaker *. C. 11.

In applying this diviſion to the ſeveral tenſes, we will begin with the preſent: for though the paſt be firſt in the order of nature, the preſent is the immediate perception of the mind; and it is with reſpect to it that the paſt and future are denominated. And the firſt thing to be conſidered is, whether or not this diviſion does at all apply to the preſent. And I hold it does not, properly ſpeaking; for the preſent is by its nature always imperfect: and I agree entirely with Scaliger, in the paſſage above quoted, that the expreſſion *præſens-perfectum* cannot be borne, if it be examined with accuracy. For Priſcian has very properly defined the preſent time to be that of which part is paſt, and part to come; and therefore, ſays he, it is called by the

* This diviſion of the ſimple tenſes into *perfect* and *imperfect*, appears, from a paſſage quoted in the Hermes, to have been diſcovered by one Grocin in England; only he has not added the third member of the diviſion, which expreſſes neither the one nor the other. This diviſion Scaliger, *De cauſis ling. Lat.* juſtly commends as very acute and ingenious, and approves of it entirely, except with reſpect to the *preſent-perfect*, of which I ſhall ſpeak by and by.

Stoics

C. 11. Stoics an *imperfect* time *. But out of this imperfect time, as the ſame Priſcian has very well obſerved, there grows a perfect time †. Thus, to uſe the inſtance that Priſcian gives, if I have written but a part of the verſe or line, and am ſtill continuing to write, I ſay, *ſcribo verſum*, *I write*, or *am writing the verſe*; but if I have juſt finiſhed it, ſo that the work is completed, then I ſay, *ſcripſi verſum*, or, as it is expreſſed without ambiguity in Engliſh, *I have written the verſe*. This tenſe is called the *præterite-perfect*, or ſhortly the *præter-perfect*; and, as the name implies, denotes a paſt action, but which is conſidered as completed and perfected at the time it is mentioned by the ſpeaker, as will be more fully explained afterwards. This tenſe therefore I think ought not to be ranked under the preſent, or conſidered as any ſpecies of it; but ſhould be held rather to belong to the paſt, though connected with the preſent. Neither does the

* See the paſſage quoted at large in the *Hermes*.

† *Ex eodem igitur præſenti naſcitur etiam perfectum; ſi enim ad finem perveniat inceptum, ſtatim utimur præterito-perfecto.*

diſtinction

diſtinction of indefinite, in my opinion, apply to the preſent tenſe, as the expreſſion of it neceſſarily denotes an imperfect action. I cannot therefore make the diſtinction that is made in the Hermes, betwixt γραφω and τυγχανω γραφων, as if the firſt denoted an indefinite or aoriſtical preſent, and the other an imperfect or continued preſent. I think there is no more difference betwixt theſe two, than there is betwixt ἐγραφον and ἐτυγχανον γραφων, which Mr Harris acknowledges are the ſame; or than there is betwixt *ſcribo* and *ſcribens ſum*, which Mr Harris has alſo ſet down, as ſignifying the ſame thing; or if there be any difference betwixt γραφω and τυγχανω γραφων, or ἐγραφον and ἐτυγχανον γραφων, it muſt be this, that the one expreſſion imports, that the action of *writing* is contingent or accidental; whereas γραφω ſimply denotes the action, without the addition of that circumſtance. C. 11.

With reſpect to the *paſt* tenſe, I think it admits this diſtinction, of perfect, imperfect, and indefinite. And firſt, I think ἐγραψα, *I wrote*, or *did write* *, is clearly an aoriſt,

* This I hold to be the true aoriſt in Engliſh, though it be ſet down in our common grammars as the imperfect paſt tenſe; for they tranſlate *ſcribebam*, *I wrote* or *did write*,

C. 11, aoriſt, as it is called by all the grammarians, expreſſing ſimply that the action is paſt, without expreſſing whether it was or was not a perfect or complete action at that time. The præter-perfect γεγραφα denotes, as I have already ſaid, not only that the action is paſt, but that the action was completed, and is conſidered as a complete action at this preſent time. The pluſquam-perfect ἐγεγραφειν, *I had written*, alſo denotes that the action was completed, but at ſome paſt time; and ἐγραφον, *I was writing*, denotes that the action is paſt, but was not then completed, but ſtill going on, and therefore it is called the *imperfect*.

As to the future, it appears to me to have likewiſe all thoſe three diſtinctions that I have obſerved in the paſt. For I agree with Mr Harris, that γραψω, or *ſcribam*, expreſſes the future action indefinitely, without determining whether it be perfect or not. And it is certain, that γεγραφως ἐσομαι, or, as the Latins very happily expreſs it by one word, *ſcripſero*, denotes the future action perfect, though there be ſome-

rite, whereas it ſhould be tranſlated, *I was writing*. — For we have not in Engliſh, as they have in French, a flection of the verb to expreſs it, but muſt uſe the auxiliary with the participle.

thing

thing more in the expression of it, as I shall observe afterwards *; and I think that γραφων ἐσομαι may be made a tense of, to denote an imperfect future, such as is expressed by the English phrase, *I shall be writing*, though there be not in any language, so far as I know, any flection of the verb expressing such a tense. C. 11.

Thus far therefore we have gone in the explanation of the tenses; but I think not

* The *paulo post futurum*, as it is commonly called, is in my opinion a tense which expresses the future perfect, and no more. For proof of this, I appeal to the following passage in Plato. —Ἐὰν γὰρ ἄρα ἐμοὶ δοξῇ τινὰ τουτωνὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἐν σὺ ὁρᾷς, αὐτικα μαλα δεῖν τεθνηναί, τεθνήξεται οὗτος ὃν ἂν δοξῇ· κἂν τινα δοξῇ τῆς κεφαλης αὐτων κατεαγῆναι δεῖν, κατεαγως ἔσται αὐτικὰ μαλα κἂν ποιματιον διεσχισθαι, διεσχισμενον ἔσται· οὕτω μεγα ἐγω δυναμαι ἐν τῇ πολει. GORG. *p.* 469. *edit. Serrani.* Here it is evident, that τεθνήξεται answers exactly to κατεαγως ἔσται, and διεσχισμενον ἔσται, which are clearly perfect futures. There is another example that I recollect from the Alcestis of Euripides, where Admetus, speaking to his wife, says,

Ἔσται ταδ' ἔσται, μη τρεσῃς· ἐπει σ' ἐγω
Καὶ ζωσαν εἶχον, καὶ θανουσ' ἐμὴ γυνὴ
Μονη κεκλησῃ, κοὔτις ἀντι σου ποτέ
Τονδε ἄνδρα νύμφη Θεσσαλὶς προσφθέγξεται.

Here κεκλησῃ can signify nothing, but κεκλημενη ἐσῃ; for, so far as I know, this tense is always used in a passive signification, and we may observe, that the perfect signification of it is fitly marked by the reduplication prefixed, which in Greek is the mark of the perfect.

This account of the tense, I know, is different from the common, by which it is made to signify, as the name given it imports, an *immediate* future: but for this signification of it I can find no good authority.

C. 11. far enough to explain fully and diſtinctly the nature and uſe of them. For I think ſomething more is wanting, to give a clear notion of the præter-perfect for example, or of the plu-perfect, than juſt to ſay, that the one denotes an action perfected at the preſent time, and the other an action that was perfected at ſome paſt time; and particularly the uſe of the præter-perfect, and the diſtinction betwixt it and the aoriſt, has not been ſufficiently explained in any book that I have ſeen: for further explanation of it, I think it will be neceſſary to make a diviſion of the tenſes not hitherto mentioned, and which was ſuggeſted to me, by the uſe of the modern languages. The diviſion I mean is into ſimple and compounded. The ſimple are the three I firſt mentioned, viz. the paſt, preſent, and future, with the threefold diſtinction of perfect, imperfect, and indefinite; but of theſe ſimple tenſes, there are various combinations, which are now to be explained.

To find out all the different combinations of theſe three tenſes, is a problem of arithmetic, the ſolution of which would be of very little uſe in the preſent inquiry: for I am perſuaded there is no language that

that by any form of the verb expresses all those several combinations; *e. g.* there is no one tense of any verb, that expresses that the action of the verb *is*, *was*, and *will be*; neither is there any, so far as I know, that denotes, that the action *is* and *will be*, or *was* and *will be* *. But there are three of them which are to be found in several, viz. the past with the present,—the past with the past,—and the past with the future. C. 11.

The first combination makes the tense I have already mentioned, viz. the præterperfect. It is expressed in Greek by one word, γεγραφα; but in English and French, it is expressed by the assistance of the auxiliary, *I have written*, *J'ai ecrit*; which makes the composition of it apparent; for

* Homer, *Iliad*, b. 2. v. 117. speaking of Jupiter, says,

Ὃς δὴ πολλαων πολιων κατελυσε κάρηνα,
Ἠδ' ἔτι καὶ λύσει·———

Now there is no language, so far as I know, that expresses by any one flection of the verb, or even by the assistance of auxiliaries, both the ἐλυσε and λύσει, that is, the past with respect to the time of the speech, and the future. I say, *with respect to the time of the speech*; for there is a compounded tense, as we shall presently see, which expresses a future and a past action; but then the past action is likewise future with respect to the time of the speech.

the

C. 11. the auxiliary being in the preſent tenſe, and the participle in the paſt tenſe, ſhews plainly that it is mixed of both tenſes. I have already obſerved, that this tenſe denotes an action paſt, and alſo an action perfect. I have likewiſe ſaid, that this action is nevertheleſs conſidered as ſome way preſent. It now remains to be explained, how an action, perfectly paſt, can in any way be ſaid to be preſent: and the difficulty ſeems to be the greater, that this tenſe applies, not only to actions that admit of continuance and repetition, as when I ſay, *I have loved, I have reſolved*; but to actions that do not admit either, as when I ſay, *I have built a houſe, I have killed a man.*

In order to explain this matter, we muſt conſider that the *preſent* of grammarians is different from the *now* or inſtant of philoſophers. For this admits of no extenſion or diviſion any more than a point, and is no part of time, but the boundary of it, as a point is of a line; whereas the preſent of the grammarian has a certain extenſion. If it be aſked, what that extenſion is? I anſwer, It depends upon the ſpeaker to make it greater or leſs as he chuſes; he may make

make it an hour, a day, a month, &c. When he does ſo, all the parts of the day or month, as well as the inſtant when he ſpeaks, make all together the preſent *now*. A portion therefore of paſt time is taken into ſuch a preſent, and in this way an action that happened in that paſt time, is conſidered as preſent. C. 11.

If therefore the ſpeaker expreſſes what portion of paſt time he takes into the preſent *now*, there ſeems to be little difficulty in the matter. Thus if I ſay, *I have built my houſe this year*, *This day I have written a letter*, it is plain, that I make in the one caſe the year, in the other the day, the preſent time; and therefore the action, though paſt, is fitly expreſſed by a form of the verb that denotes the preſent, as well as the paſt.

But ſuppoſe I make no ſuch circumſcription of time, nor ſet any bounds to the *now*, ſtill I can ſay, I have built a houſe, I have written a letter, I have reſolved to do ſuch or ſuch a thing. In what ſenſe then are theſe paſt actions preſent? My anſwer is, In their *effects*, which in ſuch expreſſions are always conſidered as preſent, though the action be paſt.

In

C. 11. In order to explain this further, it is to be conſidered, that the effect of ſome actions is a work which remains after the action or energy is over. Thus, when a maſon builds a houſe, or I write a letter, the houſe and the letter remain after the energy of building or writing is paſt. While therefore the houſe or letter exiſts, I uſe this tenſe properly, and ſay, that *I have built the houſe* or *written the letter*; but ſuppoſe them both deſtroyed, I cannot ſay properly, *I have built the one* or *written the other*.

But further, there are actions which end in energy, and produce no work that remains after them *. What ſhall we ſay of ſuch actions? Cannot we ſay, *we have danced a dance*, *played a tune*, *taken a walk*, and the like; and yet how can ſuch actions, ſo perfectly paſt that no traces of them remain, be ſaid in any ſenſe to be preſent? My anſwer is, That the conſequences of ſuch actions, reſpecting either the ſpeaker, or ſome other perſon or thing, are preſent; and what theſe conſequences are, appears from the tenor of the diſ-

* This laſt kind of action, is in Greek called πρᾶξις, the other is ποίησις.

courſe.

courſe. Thus I ſay, *I have taken a walk, and am much the better for it*; *I have played the tune, and am much pleaſed with it*; *I have danced one dance, and incline to dance no more.* In theſe inſtances the action is paſſed, and no work left behind it; but the conſequences remain, and are preſent, and therefore the double time is properly uſed. I may alſo ſay, *I have taken a walk, and am going to dreſs*; but ſuch an expreſſion falls under the firſt uſe I have mentioned of this tenſe, when the bounds of the *now* are extended, ſo as to take in a portion of the paſt; for in this expreſſion I comprehend both actions in the ſame portion of time. C. 11.

It may be obſerved, that the præter-perfect uſed in this laſt way, of denoting the conſequences of a paſt action as preſent, may be applied even to actions that produce works, but which are deſtroyed: for I may ſay, *I have built a houſe, which has coſt me much money*, though the houſe be burnt; but if I mention only the building the houſe, without any conſequences, I cannot uſe that tenſe, after the houſe is deſtroyed.

Thus it appears, that the præter-perfect

C. 11. is properly uſed, either when the paſt action is comprehended in the preſent *now*, or when the effects of it, viz. either the work produced by it, or the conſequences of it, are ſtill exiſting. In ſuch caſes the expreſſion of the tenſe denotes, that the action, though paſt, is conſidered as preſent. But ſuppoſe a certain portion of time is expreſſed, that is cut off and ſeparated by ſome known boundary from the preſent *now*, I cannot, in ſuch a caſe, uſe a tenſe that involves any conſideration of the preſent, nor does the uſe of language conſider that action as any wiſe preſent. Thus I cannot ſay, *I have built a houſe laſt year*, *I have played a tune yeſterday*; but I muſt uſe the aoriſt, and ſay, *I built the houſe laſt year*, and *played the tune yeſterday*; which ſhews, that the firſt and capital uſe of this tenſe is, to expreſs an action comprehended in the preſent *now*; ſo that if there be a circumſcription, which ſeparates it from the *now*, and throws it into a portion of paſt time, this tenſe cannot be uſed.

And here we may obſerve a propriety in our Engliſh idiom, which is not in the French. Both the French and we ſay, *I have done a thing to-day*; but they ſay, in the evening,

vening, *J'* ai *le* fait *ce matin*; whereas we say, *I* did *it this morning*, if the morning be paſſed. C. 11.

As to the aoriſt of the paſt, I have already obſerved, that it does not determine whether the action be perfected or not; but it is alſo indefinite in another reſpect, that it does not determine whether the *now* is to be taken into that paſt time, or whether the action is, in any of the reſpects above mentioned, to be conſidered as preſent. In ſhort, it does not determine whether the tenſe be compounded, or a ſimple paſt tenſe; and it is in this ſenſe, as I apprehend, that it is called an *aoriſt* by the antient grammarians. It is on account of this ſimple ſignification of the paſt that it is ſo much uſed in hiſtory, which commonly ſpeaks of events only as paſt, without any relation to the preſent; whereas the orator very often mentions paſt events with a view to the preſent time, and therefore frequently uſes the præter-perfect.

From this account of theſe two tenſes, it is evident that they may be both properly enough applied to the ſame event: for if I conſider the event ſimply as paſt,

C. 11. without taking into my conſideration the preſent, I uſe the aoriſt; whereas, if I any wiſe refer to the preſent, the compounded tenſe, which expreſſes both the paſt and preſent, is the proper tenſe. Thus I ſay, *He killed a man, and was hanged.* Here the aoriſt is the proper tenſe, becauſe the expreſſion has no relation to the preſent; but if I ſay, *he is to be hanged*, then the proper tenſe of the verb *kill* is the præter-perfect, and I ſhould ſay, *He has killed a man, and is to be hanged.*

The uſe of theſe tenſes is, according to my obſervation, the ſame in Greek that it is in Engliſh, particularly as to what I laſt mentioned, of both being applied to the ſame event in different reſpects. In Demoſthenes's oration againſt Ariſtocrates, whom he accuſes of tranſgreſſing a decree, he uſes the præter-perfect παραβεβηκε, *he has tranſgreſſed*, or the aoriſt παρεβη, *he tranſgreſſed*, juſt as he conſiders the tranſgreſſion of the decree, either as preſent by its effects and conſequences, or ſimply as paſt.

The examples I have given, I hope, are ſufficient to explain my meaning concerning the uſe of theſe two tenſes. I will however give two more; one from the tranſlation

tranſlation of our Bible, and the other from Ariſtotle's philoſophical works. The tranſlators of our Bible, though, as I obſerved before, they may not have perfectly underſtood the original, did certainly underſtand their own language very well; and accordingly I hold the Engliſh Bible to be the beſt ſtandard of the Engliſh language we have at this day. In tranſlating that pious ſentence of Job, after every thing was taken from him, they make him ſay, *The Lord* gave, *and the Lord* hath taken *away*; *bleſſed be the name of the Lord:* where we have both tenſes moſt properly uſed. If in place of *gave*, the aoriſt, they had uſed the compound tenſe *hath given*, it would have been improper, becauſe what the Lord gave was at that time taken away, ſo that the action of *giving*, could not in any way be ſaid to be preſent; whereas the next verb *take*, is moſt properly in the compound tenſe, becauſe his wealth then continued to be taken away. But if he had ſaid ſo after he had got back his wealth, it would not have been proper, and he muſt have ſaid, the *Lord gave*, *and the Lord took away*, becauſe the action of *taking* C. 11.

C. 11. *taking* was then altogether paſſed, without any conſequences of it remaining.

The other example is from Ariſtotle's Phyſics, where, ſpeaking of the power that makes bodies deſcend, he ſays *, Κινει, και κεκινηκε, *It moves it, and has moved it*; by which he means, that while the body gets continually freſh impulſes from gravity, it retains the former impulſes, ſo that the power is always accumulating, and the motion conſequently always accelerating; and our modern diſcoveries have aſcertained that the velocity is as the ſquare of the times. Here therefore the præter-perfect tenſe is moſt properly uſed to denote that the conſequences of the former impulſes ſtill continue.

I muſt further obſerve, that there is an uſe of this tenſe in the imperative mood, very frequent in Euclid, who, when he deſires you to make a diagram, uſes the word γεγραφθω; which imports, firſt, that it ſhall be deſcribed, and then being deſcribed, ſhall continue to ſerve for the demonſtration.

The Latin language, among its other defects, has but one tenſe to expreſs both

* *Phyſ. Auſcult. lib.* 7. *cap.* 6. *p.* 406.

the

the aoriſt and the præter-perfect; for *ſcripſi* with them ſtands for both ἐγραψα and γεγραφα *. I do not think, as ſome grammarians ſeem to do, that the Latin is a corruption of the Greek, as the French or Italian are of the Latin; but I think it is a dialect of the Greek, which came off from the parent-language, and was brought to Italy by Enotrus or Evander before the Greek was perfectly formed, and particularly before their grammarians had learned to diſtinguiſh betwixt the ſimple paſt, and the paſt which takes in the preſent. C. 11.

There is one very peculiar uſe which the Latins make of their preterite, obſerved by Mr Harris, by which they not only do not include the preſent, but exclude it; ſo that the tenſe is neither an aoriſt, which does not exclude the preſent, nor is it a præter-perfect, which does include the preſent, but ſomething betwixt the two. In this ſenſe Virgil

* In the expreſſion *perii*, ſo common in the Latin comedy, the perfect has undoubtedly the meaning of the præter-perfect in Greek. Alſo in that paſſage of Virgil, where Dido ſays, *Vixi, et quem dederat curſum fortuna peregi, vixi* undoubtedly ſignifies ἐζησα. I believe however it is more commonly uſed in an aoriſtical ſenſe; and accordingly it is always the hiſtorical tenſe in Latin.

ſays,

C. 11. ſays, FUIMUS *Troes*, FUIT *Ilium, et ingens gloria Dardanidum.* In like manner Tibullus, *Vivite felices, memores et vivite noſtri, ſive* ERIMUS *ſive nos fata* FUISSE *volent.* And in the ſame ſenſe Cicero ſays of the conſpirators whom he had put to death, *Vixerunt*, in all which inſtances it is evident, that the tenſe excludes the preſent.

But there is a ſenſe in which both the Greeks and Latins uſe the aoriſt, which I have not yet mentioned, and which I think is not commonly obſerved: it is to expreſs, that the action is of a nature to happen frequently, and not at any determined time, either paſt, preſent, or to come. Thus Iſocrates ſays, Ὀλιγος χρονος διαλυσει τὰς τῶν φαυλῶν συνηθειας. And Horace, ſpeaking of the exerciſes and labours that it was neceſſary to undergo in order to gain a prize in the games, ſays, *Qui cupit optatam curſu contingere metam, multa* TULIT FECIT*que puer*, SUDAVIT *et* ALSIT, ABSTINUIT *venere et vino*, &c. Again Virgil ſays, *Non aliter quam qui adverſo vix flumine lembum remigiis ſubigit: ſi brachia forte* REMISIT, *atque illum in præceps prono rapit alveus amni*;* where it may be obſerved, that the perfect *remiſit* is joined with the pre-

* *Georgic.* I. *v.* 201.

ſent

ſent *ſubigit* and *rapit*; ſo that it appears the Latins expreſſed this frequency of action at indetermined times by the preſent, (as we do commonly in Engliſh), as well as by the perfect. There are many more paſſages to be met with, both in Greek and Latin writers, in which this tenſe occurs, and which are not to be explained unleſs we give to the tenſe the ſenſe I have mentioned. And ſo much for the firſt compounded tenſe. C. 11.

The next is called the *pluſquam-perfect*; and is a compoſition of the paſt with the paſt, which is denoted by the Engliſh expreſſion, *I had written*, where we have both the preterite of the auxiliary verb, and the paſt participle of the principal verb. It expreſſes, that the action of the verb is paſſed, not only with reſpect to the preſent *now*, but alſo with reſpect to another action likewiſe paſt; ſo that there is a ſecond paſt action plainly *implied* in the tenſe, and which is always *expreſſed* either in what follows or goes before in the diſcourſe. Thus when I ſay ſimply, *I had written my letter*, it is evident I refer to ſome other paſt action; and I expreſs it, if I add, *when you came in.* And

C. 11. I hold, that the times of thoſe two paſt actions are joined together, ſo as to make only one paſt time; and the only difference I know betwixt this tenſe and the preter-perfect is, that in the place of the preſent being joined to the paſt, ſo as to make of the two but one preſent time, the laſt paſt here is joined to the firſt paſt, ſo as to make together but one paſt time. The firſt action therefore muſt be preſent, in one of the ways above deſcribed, when the laſt action happened, in order to make the uſe of this tenſe proper. And as thoſe two tenſes have ſo great an affinity, we ſee, that in the learned languages, the pluſ-quam-perfect is formed from the preter-perfect, as ἐγεγραφειν from γεγραφα, and *ſcripſeram* from *ſcripſi*.

The laſt combination I mentioned, was that of the paſt with the future, where we are to underſtand, that the action is likewiſe future with reſpect to the time of the ſpeech, and only paſt with reſpect to another event, likewiſe future; ſo that with reſpect to the preſent time, that is, the time of the ſpeech, it may be ſaid to be a combination of *future* with *future*. This tenſe is expreſſed by compoſition in Greek

Greek as well as Engliſh: for in Greek they ſay, γεγραφως ἔσομαι, and in Engliſh, *I ſhall have written*, where the junction of the future and paſt is manifeſt from the expreſſion; but the Latins have been ſo lucky as to hit upon one form of the verb to expreſs it, *ſcripſero*. The tenſe plainly expreſſes a future action, and it implies another future action, with reſpect to which the firſt future action is paſt, and which other future action is always expreſſed in ſome part of the diſcourſe. Thus when I ſay, *I ſhall have written the letter*, it plainly expreſſes a future action, and alſo that it is paſſed with reſpect to ſome other future action; and if I add, *when he will come in*, then I expreſs likewiſe that ſecond future action. C. 11.

This is the beſt account I am able to give of the tenſes of verbs; in which I have taken no notice of the ſecond future and ſecond aoriſt of the Greek verbs; becauſe I agree with thoſe grammarians who think that they have no ſignification different from the firſt futures, and firſt aoriſts, and are no more than the obſolete preſents and imperfects of the old theme of the verb, which were ſtill retained after the

C. 11. new theme came into uſe, but were uſed as different forms of the future and aoriſt; ſo that they only ſerve to enrich the analogy, and make the ſounds of this ſo various part of ſpeech, ſtill more various. Neither can I admit that there is any ſuch tenſe in the Greek, or any other language that I know, as what is called in the Hermes the *inceptive*, ſuch as μελλω γραφειν, or rather γραψειν, (for that is more commonly uſed), which is ſaid to be the *inceptive-preſent*. I know there are inceptive verbs in Latin, as there are deſiderative verbs in Greek; but there is no form of any other verb that expreſſes either the one or the other. For as to μελλω γραψειν, it is plainly a future, as much as *ſcripturus ſum*; and the only difference that I know betwixt it and γραψω is, that μελλω not only expreſſes futurity, and therefore is joined with the future infinitive, but alſo very often implies deliberation, eſpecially in the Attic uſe of the word.

CHAP.

CHAP. XII.

Continuation of the ſame ſubject. — Authorities in ſupport of the doctrine of the tenſes laid down in the preceding chapter. — Dr Clarke's ſyſtem upon this ſubject examined.

I Should be ſorry if the reader thought that I gave the doctrine of the Greek tenſes, laid down in the preceding chapter, for a diſcovery of my own. All I pretend is, to have explained more fully, I think, than has hitherto been done, what the antients have delivered upon this ſubject; and particularly Theodorus Gaza, whom I reckon among the antients, though he lived as late as the fifteenth century, on account of his learning, and the elegance and accuracy of his Greek ſtyle. He has left us a Greek grammar in that language, wherein he has explained ſome things belonging to the art, in ſo maſterly a manner, that while I am reading him, I am ſometimes diſpoſed to forget the refugee Greek, and think that it is Ariſtotle I am ſtudying. C. 12.

C. 12. ſtudying. He is ſhort upon the tenſes, as upon every thing elſe, and has given us little more than definitions of them, but ſuch definitions as agree perfectly with my notion of them.

The preſent he defines τὸ ἐνισταμενον καὶ ἀτελες; from which it appears, that *being imperfect*, was, according to his notion, of the eſſence of the preſent time. Nor does he ſeem to have any idea of a preſent that was aoriſtical, that is, did not determine whether the action was perfect or imperfect, any more than of a preſent which was only inceptive.

His definition of the præter-perfect is, τὸ παρεληλυθος ἀρτι καὶ ἐντελες τῦ ἑνεστῶτος. Here is plainly laid down the compoſition which I ſuppoſe in this tenſe, of the preſent and the paſt; but with this reſtriction and limitation, that it muſt have been lately paſt; that is, it muſt have happened in a portion of time paſt which connects with the preſent *now*, not being divided from it by any boundary or limit, which I have made to be an eſſential part of the ſignification of this tenſe. He further ſays, that it muſt be preſent as well as paſt; but then it muſt not be going on, which

which is the caſe of an action expreſſed by the preſent tenſe, but it muſt be completed; ſo that it is paſt, perfect, and preſent. C. 12.

That the meaning of this expreſſion, *the perfect of the preſent*, is no other than that the action, though preſent, muſt not be imperfect or going on, but perfect and complete, is evident from the ſame author's definition of the imperfect tenſe, viz. τὸ παρατεταμενον καὶ ἀτελες τῦ παρωχημενυ; by which this tenſe is diſtinguiſhed, firſt, from the preſent, which is ἀτελες, or imperfect likewiſe, but then it is τῦ ἑιστημενυ, and not τῦ παρωχημενυ, that is to ſay, of the preſent, not the paſt; and ſecondly, it is diſtinguiſhed from the preter-perfect, by its going on, and not being preſent.

And the names given to thoſe two tenſes, agree with the definitions of them: for in Greek the preter-perfect tenſe is called παρακειμενος, which ſignifies *lying beſide*, denoting that the action, though paſt, is beſide or contiguous to the preſent; and the imperfect is called παρατατικος, that is, *extended*, or going on, by which it is eſſentially diſtinguiſhed from the preter-perfect.

Dr Clarke, in his edition of Homer, has

C. 12. has given us, in one of his notes upon the beginning of the Iliad, a perfect ſyſtem, as he ſeems to think, of the tenſes of the Greek language, not without a good deal of oſtentation, and reprehenſion of other grammarians. He divides all time, as I do, into *paſt*, *preſent*, and *future*. He alſo makes the diſtinction of the action being *perfect* or *imperfect*; but then he applies this diſtinction to the preſent, which I have ſhewn is by its nature, and according to the definition of Theodorus Gaza, always imperfect. And the examples that he gives of a preſent action being perfect, will apply only to an action that is paſt, but is conſidered as preſent, in the manner above explained.

I cannot agree with him neither, that *cænabo* in Latin, or δειπνησω in Greek, is an imperfect future. For I think they are clearly aoriſtical, not determining whether the future action be perfect or imperfect. And as to the account he gives of *cænavero*, *I ſhall have ſupped*, that it is *a perfect future*, it is an improper deſcription of the tenſe, becauſe it does not fully expreſs its nature; for the future action expreſſed by that tenſe, is not only perfect and completed,

pleted, but it is paſt with reſpect to another action; ſo that it is truly a compounded time, ſuch as I have explained it, of the future and the paſt; by which we are to underſtand, as I have already obſerved, that both the times are future with reſpect to the *now*, when I ſpeak, but the one is paſſed with reſpect to the other. And I have alſo obſerved, that this is a compounded tenſe that the Greeks have not in one word, nor can they expreſs it otherwiſe than as we do, by a circumlocution, ſuch as δεδειπνηκως ἐσομαι, in which the compoſition is juſt as viſible as in our Engliſh expreſſion. C. 12.

Dr Clarke's account alſo of the pluſquamperfect is very incomplete; for all he ſays of it is, that it is the perfect of the paſt. But that definition does not diſtinguiſh it ſufficiently from the aoriſt ἐφιλησα, which may be uſed to expreſs an action as perfectly paſt as that expreſſed by the plu-perfect ἐπεφιληκειν. But the true notion of that tenſe is what I have given, namely, that it is a compoſition of the paſt with the paſt, both paſt with reſpect to the time when I ſpeak, and the one paſt with reſpect to the other. And there is this further, as I have ob-

C. 12. ſerved in the Greek plu-perfect, that the action it expreſſes is not only paſt, with reſpect to another time likewiſe paſt, but it is to be conſidered as preſent in one or other of the ſenſes above mentioned at that other paſt time. In ſhort it is the preter-perfect applied to a paſt time, inſtead of being applied to the preſent. And in this way many uſes of this plu-perfect tenſe in Greek that ſeem extraordinary, may, if I am not much miſtaken, be eaſily explained. It will not however explain the uſe of this tenſe in ſome paſſages of Homer, if it be true that the tenſe there is really the plu-perfect; but this I hold not to be the caſe *.

Thus

* The paſſages in Homer I allude to, are the following. In the firſt Iliad, ſpeaking of Jupiter, he ſays,

Ἀλλ' ἀκέων δὴν ἧστο· Θετις ὡς ἥψατο γουνων.

v. 512.

Now ἧστο here is ſuppoſed by all grammarians, ſo far as I know, to be the plu-perfect of the verb ἧμαι, and therefore, according to my notion of the meaning of that tenſe, ſhould ſignify, that Jupiter *had been ſitting, and was then ſitting ſilent*; a ſenſe which the paſſage will not bear. But I ſay, that ἧστο is not there the plu-perfect, but the firſt aoriſt middle, which is ἥσατο, in the 3d perſ. ſing. and by a ſyncope ἧστο, in the ſame manner as ἅλτο is the 3d perſ. ſing. of the 1ſt aor. middle, from ἅλλομαι,

Thus it appears, that the general principles of the Doctor's ſyſtem are erroneous: and his explanation of the particular tenſes is to me not at all ſatisfactory; for he does not ſo much as attempt to explain, otherwiſe than by giving examples, the difference betwixt the aoriſt and the præter-perfect. And he makes a difference betwixt the firſt and ſecond future in Greek, which he does not explain even by C. 12.

ἅλλομαι, according to Euſtathius. By a like miſtake they make ἐληλατο and ἠρηρειστο, to be plu-perfects in the following paſſage.

Διὰ μεν ἄρα ζωστηρος ἐληλατο δαιδαλεοιο
Και δια θωρηκος πολυδαιδαλυ ἠρηρειστο·
Μιτρης θ', ἣν ἐφορει, ἐρυμα χροος, ἐρκος ἀκοντων,
Ἡ οἱ πλειστον ἐρυτο, δια πρὸ δε εἰσατο καὶ τῆς·
Ακροτατον δ' αὖ οἶστος ἐπεγραψε χροα φωτος.

Il. 4. *v.* 135.—6.

Where it is plain that the plu-perfect will make no ſenſe. But the truth is, that ἐληλατο is the 2d aor. middle, formed from the verb ἐλημι, in the ſame manner as ἐσταμην is from the verb ἱστημι. And ἠρηρειστο is the firſt aoriſt middle of the verb ἐρειδω, the word being ἠρεισατο, and by ſyncope, ἠρειστο, or ἐρηρειστο, or ἠρηρειστο. And with this account of theſe two tenſes agrees the tenſe that juſt goes before, viz. ἐπεσε, and the two that follow after, εἰσατο and ἐπεγραψε; and ſo the whole paſſage is uniform and plain. And it may be obſerved, that there is a particular propriety in making ἠρηρειστο the middle voice, ſo that it denotes that the arrow *fixed itſelf* or lodged in the breaſtplate.

C. 12. examples; nor indeed is it poſſible to explain it, as there is truly no difference betwixt them. Then, in order to adjuſt his *ratio temporum*, as he calls it, to certain paſſages in Homer, he gives a meaning to the plu-perfect, ſuch as I am perſuaded it has not in any language of the world; for he makes it to ſignify the *quick performance* of the action. Thus, ſays he, ἔβη, the aoriſt, ſignifies no more but ſimply *he went*; but ἐβεβήκει, the plu-perfect, denotes that he went quickly and ſuddenly, or, as we expreſs it in Engliſh, *was gone in an inſtant*. But this appears to me to be a mere imagination of the Doctor, founded upon a miſapprehenſion of the tenſe of the verb, or rather of the verb itſelf *.

Though

* The Doctor ſeems not to have known, or not to have attended to it, that the Greeks were in uſe to form new verbs from almoſt every tenſe of the old verb, and particularly from the præter-perfect, both active and middle. Thus from the præter-perfect middle, πεπληγα, of the verb πλησσω, they formed a new verb, which we have in Homer, πεπληγω; and of the ſame kind are τετραχα, δεδηα, both likewiſe Homeric verbs. From πεφνα, the perfect middle of the obſolete verb φενω, *occido*, they formed the verb πεφνω, or by ſyncope πεφνα, which occurs ſo often in Homer; and from the ſame tenſe of the old verb

Though I have thus animadverted a little ſeverely upon the errors and defects of the Doctor's ſyſtem, I muſt allow him the merit of being the firſt of the moderns, ſo far as I know, that has attempted to form any thing like a rational ſyſtem upon this ſubject. And I muſt confeſs likewiſe, that he was the firſt who ſet me a-thinking upon it. He was a man of acute parts, and a good metaphyſician: but that was the occaſion of his error; for it made him imagine that he could, without other aſſiſtance, form a ſyſtem of grammar, or of any particular part of it; whereas, if he had been a man leſs ingenious, he would have taken, it is likely, the aſſiſtance of the antient grammarians, whoſe footſteps we cannot quit in ſuch inquiries without the greateſt hazard of going wrong; and then he would have avoided the errors he has fallen into

C. 12.

verb φοβω, *terreo*, which is found in Homer, they formed the verb commonly in uſe, φοβεω. And according to the ſame analogy, from the præter-perfect βεβηκα, of the verb βαω, or, as it is now uſed, βαινω, they formed a new verb, βεβηκω, of which βεβηκει is the 3d perſ. of the preſent; and therefore the Doctor might as well have made a pluperfect of πεπληγει, τετρηχει, δεδηει, which, by all grammarians, are allowed to be in the preſent.

upon

C. 12. upon this ſubject of the tenſes; and if he had ſtudied more diligently the antient commentaries upon Homer, he would have corrected ſeveral blundering tranſlations, which he has given of different paſſages of the Iliad *.

* As this cenſure of ſo celebrated a Greek ſcholar, may appear to many not a little raſh, I will juſtify it by two inſtances taken from the ſame page of his tranſlation of the firſt Iliad. Neſtor ſays, ſpeaking to Agamemnon,

Ἀτρεΐδη, σὺ δὲ παῦε τιὸν μένος, αὐτὰρ ἔγωγε
Λίσσομ' Ἀχιλλῆϊ μεθέμεν χόλον, ὃς μέγα πᾶσιν
Ἕρκος Ἀχαιοῖσι πέλεται πολέμοιο κακοῖο.

which Dr Clarke has tranſlated thus,

Atride, tu autem compeſce tuam iram: verum ego
Precabor Achillem deponere iram, qui magnum omnibus
Propugnaculum Achivis eſt belli mali.

Every intelligent reader, though he do not underſtand Greek, may perceive that Neſtor uſes a very improper argument, to perſuade Achilles to lay aſide his anger, when he mentions that he was *the bulwark of the Greeks in war*. If this were Homer's meaning, he would not, in this paſſage at leaſt, deſerve the commendation which Ariſtotle gives him, of excelling all other poets in ſenſe and argument, as well as diction, λέξει καὶ διανοίᾳ πάντας ὑπερβαλλει. *Poëtic.* It is not therefore eaſily to be believed, that ſuch was Homer's meaning. But further, I ſay, that the words will not bear this meaning, and that the Doctor has conſtrued them improperly, when he has made λισσομαι to govern Ἀχιλλῆϊ, and tranſlated them *precabor Achillem*; for I deny that λισσομαι, either in the uſe of Homer, or of any other Greek writer, governs the dative.

dative, but always the accuſative. And if this be ſo, it is impoſſible that the Doctor can be right in his tranſlation of the paſſage. C. 12.

But what then is the meaning of it? A learned Greek profeſſor, of my acquaintance, conſtrues χολον with Αχιλλῆϊ, and underſtands it to be a requeſt to Agamemnon, *to lay aſide his anger againſt Achilles*. And I obſerve, that it is in this ſenſe that Euſtathius underſtands the paſſage. But there are two objections to this meaning of it, one ariſing from the ſenſe, and the other from the words. For, in the firſt place, it is ſaying the ſame thing twice, Neſtor having, juſt in the preceding verſe, exhorted Agamemnon to appeaſe his anger; and accordingly Euſtathius acknowledges that it is διττολογια. But a repetition of the very ſame thing, in the very next line, is not agreeable to the manner of Homer, nor of any ſenſible writer. *2dly*, I ſay, that χολον Αχιλλῆϊ for χολον κατ' Αχιλλος is not Greek, and cannot be juſtified by any good authority. Rejecting therefore this interpretation likewiſe, I embrace one ſuggeſted to me by an ingenious gentleman of Glaſgow, Mr John Young, who is yet no profeſſor, but very well deſerves to be one. He conſtrues Αχιλλῆϊ with μεθεμεν, and underſtands the meaning of the paſſage to be, requeſting Agamemnon *to forgive Achilles for his paſſion*. That the words Αχιλλῆϊ μεθεμεν χολον will bear this meaning, (and indeed I think they can bear no other), is evident from a paſſage of Herodotus, whom I hold to be the beſt interpreter of Homer's language. It is where Mardonius ſends a meſſage to the Athenians, in the name of his maſter Xerxes, making him ſpeak to them thus, ΑΘΗΝΑΙΟΙΣΙ ΤΑ'Σ ΑΜΑΡΤΑΔΑΣ τὰς ἐξ ἐκεινων ἐς ἐμε γενομενας ΠΑΣΑΣ ΜΕΤΙΗΜΙ. *lib.* 8. *cap.* 140. And the ſenſe of the paſſage, thus underſtood, is worthy of Homer: for Neſtor firſt deſires Agamemnon to appeaſe his own anger, for I underſtand there is an emphaſis in the word τεον joined with μενος, and then he beſeeches him to forgive Achilles *his* paſſion; and to perſuade Agamemnon to do ſo, he uſes a very proper argument, viz. that Achilles was

C. 12. was of ſo great uſe to the Greeks. And in this ſenſe the *Brevia ſcholia*, aſcribed to *Mycellus*, ſeem to underſtand the paſſage, for they render μεθημιν by συγχωρησαι.

The other paſſage in which the Doctor miſtakes the ſenſe of his original, juſt follows, in the anſwer which Agamemnon makes to Neſtor.

Ἀλλ' οὐ ἀνηρ ἰθίλει περὶ πάντων ἰμμεναι ἄλλων,
Πάντων μὲν κρατίειν ἰθίλει, πάντεσσι δ' ἀνάσσειν,
Πᾶσι δὲ σημαίνειν· ἅτιν' ὐ πάσσεσθαι ὀΐω.

Where the Doctor has tranſlated the laſt words in this manner,

——*Quæ minimè perſuaſurum puto.*

Here there is a double error. For, in the *firſt* place, the Doctor ſuppoſes the perſon to be changed from the firſt to the third; for he underſtands it to be, *Ego Agamemnon puto eum* [i. e. *Achillem*] *minimè perſuaſurum*. Now in Greek there never is a change underſtood of the perſon of the verb governing the infinitive; but if there be a change, it muſt be expreſſed; ſo that if the words were to be explained as the Doctor explains them, the pronoun of the third perſon ſhould have been expreſſed, and they ſhould have run thus, ἅτιν' ὐ ἀυτον πεισεσθαι ὀΐω. *2dly*, The verb πειθω, in the middle voice, never ſignifies *to perſuade*, but *to obey*, which is agreeable to the reflective ſignification of the middle voice, as if it were *to perſuade one's ſelf to do any thing*. The meaning therefore of the paſſage is, *I do not think that I ſhall obey him in theſe things*, or, *that I ſhall be perſuaded by him to do theſe things*. And I am the more ſurpriſed, that the Doctor has miſtaken the ſenſe of the word πεισεσθαι here, as he has rendered it rightly a few lines after, v. 296. where Achilles ſays to Agamemnon,

——οὐ γὰρ ἐγωγ' ἔτι σοι πεισεσθαι ὀΐω.

which the Doctor has tranſlated

——*Non enim ego amplius me tibi obtemperaturum puto.*

But the pronoun σοι, it would ſeem, in this paſſage, directed him to the true meaning.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIII.

Of the modes, perſons, numbers, and voices, of verbs.—Enumeration of the ſeveral things expreſſed by the verb.

THE *modes* or *moods* of verbs, as they are commonly called, are no other than thoſe energies of the mind of the ſpeaker, which I have ſaid are eſſential to the verb, expreſſed by different forms or inflections of it. Of theſe I have only mentioned three; *affirmation*, expreſſed by the mood called the *indicative*; *wiſhing*, or *praying*, expreſſed by the *optative*; and *command*, expreſſed by the *imperative*. The *interrogative* is reckoned by ſome among the moods; but as it is not expreſſed by any different form of the verb, but only by particles, or by a certain arrangement of the words, I do not chuſe to call it a mood: and for the ſame reaſon I do not reckon a *potential* mood; which even in Greek is denoted by no inflection of the verb, but by the potential or contingent C. 13.

C. 13. particle ἂν; and in Latin it is not expreſſed at all, (otherwiſe than by a circumlocution), as they have no ſuch particle. The ſubjunctive I rank under affirmation; for it expreſſes an affirmation qualified. The indicative affirms abſolutely; but the affirmation of the ſubjunctive is connected with, or dependent upon ſome other affirmation. I therefore divide affirmation into two moods; the indicative, affirming abſolutely; the ſubjunctive, affirming relatively or conditionally *.

As to the infinitive, I hold it to be no mood, though it be commonly called ſo; becauſe it expreſſes no energy of the mind of the ſpeaker, but ſimply the action of the verb, with the addition of time. It is therefore either uſed as a noun, or it ſerves to connect the verb, with ano-

* When this conditional or relative affirmation is a contingency dependent upon will or inclination, the optative mood is commonly uſed in place of the ſubjunctive, eſpecially by the Attic writers. But it is remarkable, that the optative mood is never once uſed by Euclid, though the ſubjunctive be frequently uſed by him: the reaſon of which is, that in mathematics nothing is contingent or dependent upon human will, but every thing neceſſary.

ther

ther verb or a noun, and ſo is uſeful in ſyntax. C. 13.

It is ſaid, that in Engliſh we have no moods, at leaſt none expreſſed by the form of the verb: and it is true, that in the preſent uſe of the language we make but little diſtinction of moods; but in the older Engliſh writers, particularly Milton, I obſerve a ſubjunctive mood conſtantly uſed in the preſent tenſe; but it is no other than the firſt perſon of the preſent of the indicative, without any variation of number or perſon. Thus Milton ſays, "Although I love; Though thou love; Though "he love;" and many writers ſtill preſerve that uſe, at leaſt in the third perſon.

The French have a regular ſubjunctive mood, which I think is a great beauty in their language; but the uſe of it is a matter of ſome nicety, which very few foreigners who ſpeak the language attend to.

Of numbers and perſons I have ſpoken under the article of the noun. In the learned languages the numbers in verbs are marked in the ſame way as in nouns, viz. by inflection; and the three perſons are diſtinguiſhed likewiſe in that way.

C. 13. This ſhortens the expreſſion in thoſe languages, by making the uſe of the pronoun not neceſſary, beſides the advantage it gives them in the variety of compoſition and arrangement which it allows. In Engliſh, as we have but very little variation of our verbs, they muſt always be accompanied by their nouns or pronouns; and not at a great diſtance neither, for fear of miſtake or ambiguity.

As the French have the numbers and perſons of their verbs regularly marked by inflection, it appears to me ſupriſing that they do not avail themſelves more of ſuch an advantage, but have their compoſition rather more ſtinted and uniform than ours: and this too by way of improvement of their ſtyle; for, in their antient writings, there is a much greater variety of ſtructure and freedom of compoſition, particularly in their old poetry; and therefore I prefer what has been of late written in what they call *ſtile de Marott*, (the name they give to the ſtyle of their old poetry), ſuch as Fontaine's tales and fables, to their poetry of a more modern caſt.

All things in this ſublunary world ſuffer as well as act, and therefore the agent of

of every action of a verb may ſuffer in its turn that very action. According therefore as the perſon of the verb acts or ſuffers, the verb aſſumes a different form, which we call a *voice*. When the perſon *acts*, it is the *active* voice; when he *ſuffers*, it is the *paſſive*. Moſt languages have no other; but the Greek has a third, called the *middle voice*, denoting that the perſon both *acts* and *ſuffers*, that is to ſay, is the ſubject of his own action; ſo that the verb, in this form, very much reſembles the reflected verbs of the French *. Thoſe who have ſtudied the beauties of the Greek language, muſt know very well, that this voice gives not only a beautiful variety to the inflections of their verbs, but a great conciſeneſs and emphaſis to the expreſſion. C. 13.

From this account of the verb, we may collect the ſeveral things expreſſed by it under one view, which may ſerve for a full deſcription of it, in place of the ſhort definition I gave before. And it denotes, *1mo*, ſome kind of action, under which

* This form of the verb in Greek has not always this reflected ſignification; but is ſometimes nothing more than an active verb, reſembling the deponent verbs in Latin. See *Kuſter. de voce media.*

C. 13. I include exiſtence: for the idea of the action expreſſed by a verb, always implies, as I have obſerved, the idea of exiſtence; and there is one verb which denotes nothing elſe for its action but exiſtence. *2do*, The energy of the mind of the ſpeaker concerning that action, affirming it, wiſhing it, or commanding it. *3tio*, The agent, or perſon acting, and whether one or more. *4to*, The time of the action, and whether it be a completed action or not. *5to*, The ſubject of the action is alſo expreſſed, if it be the ſame with the agent. All theſe things are denoted by the ſingle Greek word ἐκοψαμην, ſignifying, *I did beat my ſelf*, as was the cuſtom of the antients upon occaſion of any great affliction. And *laſtly*, if the perſon ſuffers the action of the verb, inſtead of being the agent, that alſo is expreſſed by a form of the verb.

Though the expreſſion of the Greek verb be ſo various and manifold; yet, as I obſerved before, there are only two things that muſt neceſſarily be expreſſed by the verb. The firſt is the energy or affection of the mind; the ſecond is ſome action, or at leaſt exiſtence. To be convinced that theſe two are eſſential to the nature

nature of the verb, we may take the caſe of a verbal noun, ſuch as *curſus* in Latin, and aſk, why it is not a verb as well as *curro*, from which it is derived? and the anſwer is plain, that it expreſſes no energy of the mind of the ſpeaker who pronounces this word; nor does it affirm that the thing exiſts or does not exiſt; nor does it command that it ſhould or ſhould not exiſt; nor does it wiſh that it may or may not exiſt, but ſimply gives us the conception of the mind of the ſpeaker. All the other things above mentioned may be expreſſed by other words, as in Engliſh our moods, and the greateſt part of our tenſes are. And in the ſame manner, numbers, perſons, and voices may be expreſſed: and they are ſo expreſſed, for the greater part, in moſt of the modern languages of Europe; but if the word wants the expreſſion of the energy of the mind, and of action or exiſtence, it ceaſes to be a verb, I mean in the common acceptation of the word, and becomes ſome other part of ſpeech. C. 13.

There is another obſervation, that I likewiſe made before, and which is a conſequence of the preceding one, namely, that the

C. 13. the ſimpleſt of all verbs is the ſubſtantive verb, expreſſing nothing but the energy or affection of the mind, joined with the ſimple idea of exiſtence, the moſt metaphyſical and abſtract of all ideas, of which time and place, and other univerſals, are but adjuncts. It may therefore be called the *metaphyſical verb*; and if it were diveſted of tenſes, moods, and perſons, as it is of voices, it would be the philoſophical verb that I mentioned before, fit to expreſs univerſal truths, which have nothing to do with time, perſons, or the diſpoſition of the mind.——But to return to the Greek verb:

To expreſs all thoſe ſeveral things above mentioned, without any ambiguity or confuſion, and thereby to ſave the unneceſſary multiplication of words, inſtead of increaſing it, which we have ſhewn to be the caſe of the barbarous languages, when they expreſs ſeveral things by one word, muſt be eſteemed by every man who attentively conſiders it, a moſt exquiſite piece of art; and it is plain that it muſt have been the contrivance of men who had ſtudied the nature of things, and could make the proper diſtinction betwixt thoſe

those things that could commodiously be expressed by one word, and what could not. C. 13.

But it may be said, that this Greek verb is too artificial a thing; and that our verb being more simple, and yet doing the business as well, is therefore preferable. This objection I have already in a great measure answered; and I shall only add here, that ἐτυψαμην is in one sense simpler than the English expression, *I did beat myself*, because it is shorter. It is true indeed, that to learn the use of a Greek verb, is a matter of more pains and trouble than to learn the use of an English verb, as it may be much easier to use a clumsy, ill-contrived machine, than one complete and perfect in all its parts; but if this last machine, when the use of it is once learned, can be employed with as little or less trouble, it is certainly preferable. Now that is the case of the Greek verb; for no body will deny that it expresses, in fewer words, and without tedious repetitions of the same word, every thing that can be expressed by the English verb: and that the use of it is not so very difficult to be learned, but may be acquired without rule or teaching, by practice merely, we

C. 13. are very ſure; becauſe we know that the women and children in Athens ſpoke the Attic, as our women and children ſpeak Engliſh; and the people in general were noted for elegant ſpeakers, though very few of them learned grammar, which was a piece of education beſtowed upon the children only of people of the firſt rank. But further, I deny that the Engliſh verb, any more than the Latin, anſwers all the purpoſes of the Greek. For, in the firſt place, we have no tenſe that anſwers to the preſent paſſive of the indicative among the Greeks. For example, we cannot expreſs τυπτεται by any tenſe; for though we ſay, *he is beaten*, that is rather the preter-perfect τετυπται, denoting that the action is finiſhed, not going on, which is the meaning of τυπτεται, nor can we expreſs it otherwiſe than by circumlocution, ſuch as, *they are beating him*. And in the ſame manner, the French muſt ſay, *on le bat*, which is not only multiplying words, but changing the form of the verb from paſſive to active. Neither have we a participle preſent of the paſſive voice, ſuch as τυπτομενος, any more than the Latins; for our participle *beaten* is a paſt participle, as much

much as the Latin *verberatus*.——And this leads me to ſpeak of the part of ſpeech next in order after the verb, viz. the *participle*. C. 13.

But before I quit this ſo curious ſubject of the verb, I hope I ſhall be permitted, even by the greateſt admirers of the Greek language, to obſerve that ſomething more perfect of the kind might be perhaps contrived, than even the Greek verb. And it does not appear to me to exceed the power of human art, to form a plan of a language more complete in every part than the Greek; and ſuch they ſay the language of the philoſophers of India, called the *Sanſcrit*, actually is, of which I ſhall have occaſion to ſay more in the ſequel. As to the verb, I have already obſerved that ſeveral more compound tenſes might be imagined; but whether they would not imbarraſs the language too much, and make it too complicated and difficult for common uſe, is what I cannot certainly ſay. But I will mention one or two things, which I think may be added to the Greek verb, without any ſuch conſequence. And, in the *firſt* place, it might not only expreſs numbers and perſons, but, like

C. 13. the adjective, it might alſo have genders, which is the caſe of the Hebrew and Arabic verb; and, as I am told by the learned in thoſe languages, occaſions no confuſion or imbarraſſment in them. 2*dly*, The verbs have more moods as well as tenſes; and to make the ſtructure of the language complete, they ſhould have at leaſt one more. In order to explain what I mean, it is neceſſary to premiſe, that every language that is in the leaſt degree perfect, muſt have, beſides the indicative, the imperative, and infinitive moods, a ſubjunctive mood, which is, as I have obſerved, a form of the verb, denoting that what is ſignified by it is not affirmed abſolutely by itſelf, but relatively to ſome other verb to which it is ſubjoined, and upon which it is dependent. And it is a very great defect in our preſent Engliſh, (for it was not always ſo), that this mood is very little uſed, or uſed indiſcriminately with the indicative. In Latin they have but one mood of that kind; but in Greek they have two, viz. the ſubjunctive, properly ſo called, and the optative, which, as I have obſerved, is likewiſe uſed as a ſubjunctive. If the preceding, or principal

cipal verb, is in the preſent tenſe, the proper mood of the depending verb is the ſubjunctive; or if it be in the preter-perfect, it is the ſame on account of the preſent time, which is involved in it, as I have explained above: but if the principal verb be in any other paſt time, the proper mood of the depending verb is the optative. So far is very well. But ſuppoſe the time of the principal verb is future, ought there not to be a third ſubjunctive mood for the depending verb? But this even the Greek language has not, but uſes, in place of it, the ſubjunctive mood properly ſo called. C. 13.

CHAP. XIV.

Of participles, adjectives, prepoſitions, conjunctions, and interjections.

THE participle, though in our common grammars it be ſet down in the conjugation of every verb as a part of it, yet is truly a ſeparate part of ſpeech; for it does not expreſs any energy of the mind of the ſpeaker, which, as I have ſaid, is eſſential C. 14.

C. 14. eſſential to the verb; but it denotes the action of the verb, not abſtractedly as a verbal noun does, but inherent in, or belonging to ſome indefinite ſubſtance; and therefore I have ranked it under verbs, in my large ſenſe of the word, and not under nouns. It has however ſo much of the noun, as to have numbers and caſes; and as it neceſſarily refers to a noun, and may be conſtrued with a noun of any of the three genders, it has likewiſe all thoſe genders. It has alſo ſo much of the verb, commonly ſo called, that it is conſignificant of time. Although therefore in my diviſion of the parts of ſpeech, it is ranked under the verb; yet, in the common diviſion, it ought to be reckoned a part of ſpeech by itſelf, ſeparate both from verb and noun.

The adjective, in the common grammars, is very improperly claſſed with the noun; for it is not a noun, for the ſame reaſon that the participle is not a noun, viz. becauſe it denotes primarily a quality or accident inherent in ſome indefinite ſubſtance. It is therefore joined to any ſubſtance, with which it agrees, as well as the participle, in gender, number, and caſe; nor is there any difference betwixt the two,

two, except that the participle is conſig- C. 14.
nificant of time, which the adjective is not.

There are ſome adjectives formed by the Greeks from verbs, which deſerve a particular notice, as they ſhew perhaps as much as any thing in the language, the accurate and philoſophical genius of the formers of this language. But of theſe I will ſpeak in the next chapter, under the article of derivatives.

Prepoſitions I likewiſe claſs under verbs, as they denote relations of things; not abſtractedly, for then they would be nouns, but inherent in their ſubjects, ſo that they are qualities which are not conſidered as having a ſeparate exiſtence. The chief uſe of them, as appears to me, is to expreſs relations, which could not be conveniently expreſſed by the caſes of nouns, ſuch as place, ſituation, order, and many other connections of things, which are obſerved by grammarians, in the ſignifications they give to the ſeveral prepoſitions. They are of very great uſe in ſyntax, and govern a caſe, whereby we know the word to which they refer.

To know the preciſe meaning of the prepoſitions in the Greek language, and to be able to diſtinguiſh the proper from the

C. 14. the figurative ſignification of them, is a matter of great nicety. There is ſomething begun upon this ſubject, by an author very eminent for his knowledge of the language *; but which I regret is not finiſhed. The uſe of them in compoſition, gives a particular beauty and accuracy of expreſſion to the Greek language. They uſe commonly enough two of them, and ſometimes three, in compoſition with their verbs, by which they deſcribe ſo minutely the action of the verb, that it is really a kind of painting. Thus Homer, in deſcribing water coming out of the foot of a rock, uſes the word ὑπ-ει-προ-ρεειν, by which is deſcribed, firſt its coming from *below*, then its coming *out*, or *guſhing*, and laſtly its running *forward* †.

The

* Dr Moor, Profeſſor of Greek in the Univerſity of Glaſgow.

† The prepoſition, though compounded with the verb, is often ſeparated from it in the arrangement, particularly by the poets; and this has ſometimes led into miſtakes. Thus thoſe famous lines of Homer, deſcribing Jupiter's nod,

Η, καὶ κυανέῃσι ἐπ' ὀφρύσι νεῦσε Κρονίων,
Ἀμβρόσιαι δ' ἄρα χαῖται ἐπερρώσαντο ἄνακτος.

are, in a late tranſlation, rendered thus. "He ſaid; "and with his dark ſhaggy brows the ſon of Sa"turn nodded above," &c. where it appears, that the tranſlator

The adverb, as the name imports, is a ſort of adjunct of the verb, and appears to me to be ſuch a ſupplement to the verb, as the prepoſition is to the noun; for it expreſſes circumſtances of time, place, manner of C. 14.

tranſlator ſuppoſed the prepoſition ἐπὶ was to be underſtood by itſelf, and accordingly has rendered it by the the Engliſh prepoſition, *above*. What ſenſe this makes, the reader will judge. But to me it is evident that the prepoſition here, as in many other inſtances, is disjoined from the verb νεύσε; ſo that we ſhould underſtand it as if it had been written ἐπένευσε; and then it will ſignify, *upon that he nodded*, or *in conſequence of what he ſaid he nodded*. And according to this ſenſe, Virgil renders it by the verb compounded with the prepoſition *ad*, viz. *annuit*; where he ſays, ſpeaking likewiſe of Jupiter, *Annuit, et totum nutu tremefecit Olympum*. And we may obſerve, that in the next line of Homer, we have the ſame prepoſition compounded with the verb, in the word ἐπερρώσαντο, deſcribing the ſtrong motion of Jupiter's hair. There is another error in the tranſlation of this paſſage, viz. in making Jupiter nod *with his brows*, which I think is hardly to be underſtood in Engliſh; whereas it ſhould have been *with his head*: for the brows being ſo remarkable a feature, particularly in a face of great dignity, are here put for the whole head, (as Euſtathius has obſerved), by a figure common enough, and well known by the name of *ſynecdoche*, or a part for the whole. Neither is κυανέῃσι exactly tranſlated by *dark ſhaggy*; for it does not at all denote *ſhaggy*, but only the colour of *dark gray*, ſuch as that of the eye-brows of a dark complexioned man, well advanced in years.

C. 14. action, and the like, that cannot conveniently be expreſſed by the verb.

As ſingle words are connected together by the means of caſes and prepoſitions, it is fit alſo that ſentences, and members of ſentences, ſhould be connected together; and for that purpoſe, a ſet of words have been invented, called *conjunctions*, which though they may ſeem often only to connect words, yet it is truly ſentences that they connect. Thus when I ſay, *Peter and James did ſo* or ſo, it may ſeem that the copulative *and* only joins the two words *Peter* and *James*; but it really joins the ſentences, *Peter did ſo*, and *James did ſo*. The grammarians divide them into ſeveral claſſes, which, as it is not my intention to write a grammar, I will not go over. I ſhall only obſerve, that though they all go by the name of *conjunctions*, ſome of them *connect*, by *disjoining*, not by joining.

The Greek language abounds more in conjunctions than any language I know; and particularly it has two that no other language, which I know, has, I mean, μὲν and δὲ. They are commonly reckoned of that ſpecies of conjunctions, called *adverſative*.

ſative. But it is only *difference* they mark, C. 14.
not *oppoſition*; and the μεν that precedes, as it always does, does no more than let you know that ſomething different is to follow, but which has a connection with what went before. The Greeks too have many particles, which appear to a perſon not well acquainted with the language to be mere expletives. But they are not ſo; for many of them not only connect the ſpeech, but alſo give an emphaſis and ſignificancy to it, which it would not otherwiſe have. Of this kind are δη and γε, of which laſt it is very difficult to aſcertain the preciſe meaning; but it certainly has a meaning; and a man much converſant in the Attic writers will deſiderate it, if it be any where wanting. And accordingly H. Stephen has often ſupplied it, where, in the MS, it has fallen out.

This abundance of conjunctions and particles is, in my opinion, one of the greateſt beauties of the Greek language; for they make what goes before refer to what follows, as well as what follows, to what goes before, and ſo make the ſentence perfectly cloſe and compact, giving to the words the ſame connection that there is in the

C. 14. thought, and making the ſtyle to flow like a ſtream in one continued tenor, without any ſtop or interruption. For I am ſo far from thinking that that disjointed compoſition, and ſhort cut of ſtyle, which is ſo much in faſhion at preſent, and of which Tacitus, among the antients, is the great model, is a beauty, that I am of opinion it is the affectation of a deformity; nor is there, in my apprehenſion, any thing that more disfigures a ſtyle, or makes it more offenſive to a man of true taſte and judgement in writing. The antients knew it as well as we do, and practiſed it when it was proper; but there is no example of any writer in a good age, or indeed of any writer at all, compoſing a whole work in that ſtyle, before Tacitus: but of this I ſhall ſpeak more hereafter. I ſhall only add at preſent, that one of the greateſt difficulties of compoſing in Engliſh appears to me to be the want of ſuch connecting particles as the Greeks have. We ſee however that the older writers in Engliſh, ſuch as Milton and Lord Clarendon, have pretty well ſupplied that defect, and with ſuch copulatives as they had, have made a ſtyle flowing enough, and agreeable both to the ear and the underſtanding. Nor do

I know any thing in which they deſerve more to be imitated by the later writers. C. 14.

The only part of ſpeech that remains to be treated of is, what the Latin grammarians have added, in place of the Greek article, viz. the interjection; as to which I ſhall only make an obſervation or two. And in the *firſt* place, it may be obſerved, that it expreſſes one of the two things which I have ſaid are eſſential to the verb, namely, the energy or affection of the mind of him who uſes it: but it differs from the affection expreſſed by the verb in this, that it expreſſes only *paſſion*; for it is the expreſſion of joy, grief, ſurpriſe, or ſuch like paſſion.

2*dly*, The interjections may be conſidered as remains of the moſt antient language among men, that by which they expreſſed their feelings, not their ideas. They are therefore the *verba* that Horace ſpeaks of, as uſed by the firſt men who ſpoke,

Quibus voces ſenſuſque notarent,

and were prior to *names*, which could only come after ideas were formed of things. And the indeclinable words in every language, may be conſidered as remains of the antient

C. 14. antient languages without art; for the declenſion of words is a thing of art, which was not practiſed by the firſt men who ſpoke.——And ſo much for the diviſion of words into parts of ſpeech.

CHAP. XV.

Diviſion of words into primitive and derivative.—Defect of our modern languages in point of etymology.—Excellency of the Greek in that point.—The whole Greek language derived from five combinations of vowels in duads.

C. 15. ANother diviſion of words conſidered as ſignificant, is into *original* and *derivative*. What derivation, compoſition, and flection are, I have defined in the firſt chapter of this book, and I have there ſhewn that they are the three great artifices of language. Of flection I have already treated at pretty great length, under the article of the noun and the verb; and I am now to ſpeak of derivation and compoſition, both which I ſhall include under the name

name of derivation; the only difference betwixt the two being, that the derivative word has only one parent, whereas the compounded word has two. C. 15.

A language that has no roots or derivation at all, which is the caſe, as has been ſhewn, of the barbarous languages, muſt be allowed to be very imperfect. And on the other hand a language that has not only derivation, but all its roots within itſelf, and of its own growth, is undoubtedly, in that reſpect at leaſt, a moſt perfect language. Now of all the languages that I know, the Greek is in this, as well as in other reſpects, the moſt complete.

The reader may perhaps be ſurpriſed, that in a work ſuch as this, upon univerſal grammar, I ſhould refer ſo often to the uſe of any particular language. But he ſhould conſider, that my chief purpoſe in this grammatical part of my work, is to obſerve what is moſt perfect in the art, and what conſequently was of moſt difficult invention. Now, as I am not able from theory merely, and *a priori*, to form the idea of a perfect language, I have been obliged to ſeek for it in the ſtudy of the Greek. What men of ſuperior genius may do

C. 15. do in ſuch ſpeculations, I cannot tell; but I know well, that ordinary men, without the ſtudy of ſome model of the kind, would be as unable to conceive the idea of a perfect language, as to form a high taſte in other arts, ſuch as ſculpture and painting, without having ſeen the beſt works of thoſe kinds that are to be found. It would be doing injuſtice to thoſe ſuperior minds, who have in themſelves the ſtandard of perfection in all the arts, to judge of them by myſelf; but I am confident that my idea of perfection in language would have been ridiculouſly imperfect, if I had known no other language than the modern languages of Europe. It therefore deſerves to be conſidered, whether it were not worth the while of a curious man, and a lover of knowledge, but who like me is obliged to look abroad for patterns of perfection, to make a ſtudy of the Greek language, if it were for no other reaſon, but to diſcover what is moſt perfect in the moſt curious, as well as moſt uſeful, art among men.

There is nothing in which the modern languages, and particularly our Engliſh, is more defective than in this matter of etymology,

tymology, of which we are now treating; C. 15.
for in Engliſh we have the roots of our words ſcattered through different languages, being either in the old Teutonic or Gothic, which we do not underſtand, or in other languages of Europe, ſuch as the French or Italian, or laſtly in Greek and Latin; whereas the Greek, as I will endeavour to ſhow, is complete in itſelf, and has all its words of its own growth.

That there is a wonderful generation of words in Greek, no body who knows any thing of the language can deny. The verb is among them the moſt prolific part of ſpeech; for verbs not only beget verbs, of which I have given ſome ſpecimens in a preceding note, but alſo nouns and adjectives without number, which are produced not only from different tenſes of the verb, but from different perſons of the ſame tenſe. Thus from the preter-perfect paſſive πεποιημαι, of the verb ποιεω, are derived three nouns; one from the firſt perſon, ποιημα; another from the ſecond, viz. ποιησις; and a third from the third perſon, viz. ποιητης. And in like manner we have from πρασσω, πραγμα, πραξις, and πρακτηρ, and many ſuch, all formed

C. 15. by the ſame rule, and with the ſame ſignification, according to the different perſons of the tenſe from whence they are derived: For what is derived from the firſt perſon, denotes the effect of the action, or the work performed by it; what comes from the ſecond, the act itſelf, or the operation of the agent; and what comes from the third, the actor or agent. And not only do verbal nouns come from this tenſe, but alſo verbal adjectives. Thus from the third perſon of the perfect paſſive of the two verbs above mentioned, come ποιητος and πρακτος, denoting ſomething that may be done, or may be the ſubject of action; and with the addition of another termination, viz. -ικος, they denote that which by its nature is fit to act; for ſuch is the meaning of the verbals ποιητικος and πρακτικος *. And from the ſecond perſon of this tenſe, in ſome verbs, is derived an-

* Ariſtotle, in his uſe of theſe two verbs, has made a nice philoſophical diſtinction betwixt them; for ποιεω he uſes to denote an action which produces works that remain after the action is paſt; whereas πρασσω denotes an action that ends in the energy, and leaves nothing behind it. This diſtinction I mentioned before in explaining the uſe of the preter-perfect tenſe.

other

other adjective of different ſignification; C. 15.
as, *e. g.* from βεβιωσαι, the ſecond perſon of the perfect paſſive of βιοω, is derived βιωσιμος, which ſignifies having in itſelf the principle of life *actu*, *non potentiâ*; whereas the verbals in -ικος denote only that the principle is in the thing *potentiâ*, *non actu*. So that we have derived from one tenſe of this verb βιοω; firſt the participle βεβιωμενος, ſignifying what has been lived; then βιωτος, ſignifying what may be lived, or what falls under the category of being lived; 3dly, βιωτικος, what may live, or has the principle of life in it potentially; and laſtly βιωσιμος, that which has actually life in it: and there is, beſides all theſe, the preſent participle of the paſſive voice βιωμενος, ſignifying what we can hardly expreſs in Engliſh, even by a circumlocution; for it denotes that which is in the act of being lived at the time we ſpeak. And thus theſe ſeveral participles and verbals, derived regularly from the ſame part of the verb, expreſs this principle of life, conſidered either actively or paſſively, and each of theſe either *actu* or *potentiâ*. So fruitful is the verb in Greek, and ſuch is the

C. 15. philoſophical accuracy of expreſſion in that language.

This ſo copious derivation from the verb in Greek, naturally leads one to ſuſpect that it is the parent word of the whole language; and indeed I believe that to be the fact. For I do not know that it can be certainly ſhewn that there is any one word that is undoubtedly a primitive, which is not a verb, I mean a verb in the ſtricter ſenſe, and common acceptation of the word. By this the candid reader will not underſtand that I mean to ſay, that prepoſitions, conjunctions, and ſuch like words, which are rather the pegs and nails that faſten the ſeveral parts of the language together, than the language itſelf, are derived from verbs, or are derivatives of any kind; but he will underſtand, that I mean the the names of things, which are properly the words of a language. One thing is certain, that many nouns, in our common dictionaries, are ſet down as primitives, which are undoubtedly derived from verbs *. And not only are words of

* Thus φοβος, *metus*, is ſet down in H. Stephens's Lexicon as a primitive; whereas moſt certainly it is a derivative,

of two or more syllables so derived, but even monosyllables of two or three letters, which one should think would be primitives, if there were any such in the language *. C. 15.

And not only does the fact appear to be so, but there is good reason why it should be so; for unless we believe that names were imposed upon things arbitrarily and

tive, as I had occasion to observe before, from the old Homeric word φεβω or φεβομαι, the perfect middle of which is πεφοβα. In like manner δρομος, *cursus*, is commonly accounted a primitive, and yet it is most certainly derived from the old word δρεμω, *curro*. The word παλος, *sors*, is also from παλλω, *quatio*, the way in which lots were antiently drawn, as we learn from Homer, Iliad, 3. v. 316. In the same way ὀσσος, *occulus*, as Eustathius tells us, is from ὀσσω, *video*; σοος, *salvus*, from σοω, *conservo*, or *salvum facio*. And for the same reason φιλος, *amicus*, is from φιλεῖ, *amo*. And it is most certain, that the number of verbal nouns is very much greater than is commonly imagined.

* Thus ἰψ, a name for an *eating worm*, is derived from ἰπτω, *lædo* or *consumo*; ὀψ, *vultus*, from ὀπτω or ὀπτομαι, *video*; φως, *lux*, from φαω, *luceo*; πτωξ, *a hare*, from πτωσσω, *paveo*; λαξ, an adverb, denoting what is done or suffered by the heel, from ληγω, *desino*; and πους, *pes*, is for the same reason derived from παυω, a word of like signification; and γῆ, *terra*, a shorter word than any of them, is from γαω, *gigno*, an old verb preserved to us in Homer, from whence γαια, and by contraction γῆ.

capriciously,

C. 15. capriciouſly, which cannot have been the caſe if the language was the work of art, we muſt ſuppoſe that they were framed with ſome view to the nature of the things. Now how do we know the nature of any thing, but from what it acts or what it ſuffers; for action and paſſion are obvious to the ſenſe, whereas powers and faculties, and what conſtitutes the eſſence of things, are hidden qualities, which are no otherwiſe manifeſted, but by thoſe outward effects. It was therefore very natural, and indeed it was neceſſary, that men, if they followed a rule at all in the impoſition of names, ſhould denominate things from what they ſaw of their operations. Perceiving, for example, an animal very timorous, and that was apt to crouch and ſquat, and in that way to hide itſelf, was it not very natural to denominate ſuch an animal, from a verb which ſignified the action of crouching or hiding? and this is the etymology, as I have obſerved, of the old Greek word for a *hare*. In like manner, obſerving a little inſect that conſumed wood, it was very natural that they ſhould denominate this inſect from the verb ſignifying *to conſume*, which is the

the etymology of the Greek word above mentioned, denoting ſuch an eating worm: And the name of our own ſpecies is derived from the action of *looking upwards* *. In like manner, the names of the elements are derived from verbs that denote their operations, and the effects they produce †. C. 15.

And by this way of giving names to things, the artificers of language appear to me to have followed the order of nature, and of the invention of language; for the firſt words that men uſed, when they began to ſpeak, were certainly words denoting actions and feelings,

——*Quibus voces ſenſuſque notarent.*

For to communicate to one another their feelings, or their operations, was the firſt uſe they had for language; and what in all probability give birth to the invention, as I have ſhewn in the proper place.

This ſyſtem will no doubt appear extraordinary to the young ſcholar, who

* Ἀπὸ ἀθρῶν.

† Thus ἀηρ is from ἀω, ὑδωρ from ὑω, γαια from γαω. As to πυρ, it is, as Plato informs us, not a Greek but a Phrygian word.

knows

C. 15. knows no more of the Greek than what is contained in the common grammars and dictionaries; but it will not ſurpriſe thoſe who have ſtudied univerſal grammar, and have a more general knowledge of languages: and particularly thoſe who are acquainted with the Hebrew, and other oriental languages, will think this ſcheme of derivation not at all extraordinary; for it ſeems now to be a point agreed among all the learned in the Hebrew, that the roots of it are all verbs; and if it be true that there is ſuch a connection, as I ſuppoſe, betwixt the Hebrew and the Greek, it is natural to believe that the ſyſtems of the two languages ſhould agree in this fundamental point, however much they may differ in other particulars.

But how far is this etymology to be carried? We have ſeen that verbs, as well as nouns, are derived from verbs. Where then ſhall we ſtop, and by what rule ſhall we determine that ſuch a verb is the radical verb, and that the etymology goes no further? This is a matter of moſt curious ſpeculation; and I have formed a ſyſtem upon this ſubject, by which I derive the whole Greek lan-

guage

guage from combinations in duads of the ω with the other five vowels α, ε, ι, ο, υ, the ω always being laſt; ſo that αω, εω, ωω, οω, υω, are the radical ſounds from which the whole Greek language, various and copious as it is, may be deduced. Theſe duads are themſelves roots properly ſo called, that is, words ſignificant; and with the addition of other vowels prefixed, and of conſonants, each in its order, form all the roots of the language. But as the explaining this hypotheſis, and anſwering the objections which naturally occur to it, would lead me into a greater detail of the ſtructure of a particular language, than is ſuitable to a work upon univerſal grammar, I have thrown what I have to ſay upon the ſubject into a diſſertation by itſelf *, annexed to this volume, which the reader learned in the Greek language may read if he think proper. I will therefore proceed to a more noble, as well as more curious ſpeculation, of which I gave a hint in the beginning of this work, namely, to inquire, whether words can in any ſenſe be ſaid to be *natural* expreſſions C. 15.

* See Diſſertation 1.

C. 15. of ideas, or whether they be not merely *artificial* ſigns, and from inſtitution, not from nature.

CHAP. XVI.

Whether words are by nature ſignificant, or only by inſtitution.—The arguments ſtated upon both ſides.—Concluſion, That the primitive words of a language have not any natural reſemblance to the things expreſſed by them, but in perfect languages were framed with a view to derivation and inflection.

C. 16. IN all languages of art, there is a certain number of words, for the ſignification of which we can account, I mean derivatives; and the more perfect a language is, the greater number there is of theſe, and the fewer roots. In the preceding chapter I have ſaid, that the Greek language is ſo perfect in this reſpect, that its etymology may be carried back to five duads of vowels, which are roots themſelves, and by

by compoſition with other vowels, and with ſingle conſonants, form all the roots of the language. With reſpect therefore to far the greater part of this language, we are able to give a rational account of the ſignification of the words; but the queſtion now before us is, Whether the etymology can be carried any further back, and whether any ſatisfying account can be given, why thoſe roots ſignify the things they are uſed to denote, and no other; or whether they are not to be conſidered as ſigns of arbitrary inſtitution? C. 16.

Upon this ſo curious ſubject, there is nothing to be found in any antient author, ſo far as I know, except what Plato has left us in the *Cratylus*, and what we have from an author not ſo well known, viz. *Ammonius Hermeias*, a philoſopher of later times, in his commentary upon Ariſtotle's book of Interpretation. But this laſt author has done little more than to ſtate the queſtion, and explain the terms of it *. There is a modern author that has enlarged a great deal more upon the ſubject, I mean the French author of the Mechaniſm of Language, but from whom

* *Fol.* 28.

C. 16. I confeſs I have not received much inſtruction. It is therefore from Plato only that I have got any lights upon this ſubject, who has certainly ſaid a great many ingenious things upon it; and as the Halicarnaſſian informs us *, has the merit of being the firſt that treated the ſubject of etymology.

In this dialogue he introduces two perſonages, *Cratylus*, from whom the dialogue has its name, and *Hermogenes*, who differed very much in their opinions; Cratylus maintaining, that the names of things are all from nature, (and this we are told by Ammonius, in the above-quoted paſſage, and by Proclus in the commentary which is aſcribed to him upon this dialogue †, was the opinion of Heraclitus the philoſopher);

* Περὶ συνθέσεως.

† This commentary is not printed; but I had the uſe of a manuſcript of it from the college of Glaſgow. It is one of thoſe manuſcripts that was brought not long ago from a religious houſe upon Mount Athos, by Mr Aſquieu, an Engliſh gentleman of learning and curioſity. It is not written by Proclus himſelf, but appears to have been taken down, either from his mouth, or rather, I think, compoſed from memory, by one of his ſcholars, who ſeems to have been a Chriſtian. It is, I think, a piece

philoſopher); Hermogenes, on the other hand, maintaining, that the names of things were all from cuſtom and arbitrary inſtitution, and that men might agree to give what names to things they pleaſed. Betwixt theſe two Socrates is choſen umpire, and it is from his mouth, as it commonly happens in thoſe dialogues, that Plato delivers his own ſentiments. The dialogue is wrought up with wonderful art, and all the beauty poſſible of ſtyle and compoſition. The character of Socrates, who pretended to know nothing, is finely kept up in it; for when he becomes etymologiſt, and gives the origin of the names of ſo many things divine and human, he ſays he had catched inſpiration from Euthyphron, an enthuſiaſt of thoſe times, with whom he had converſed that morning. But notwithſtanding this inſpiration, the dialogue concludes ſceptically as to the C. 16.

piece of very little value, if the MS were more perfect, or more correct, than it appears to be from the copy of it which I have uſed; for it is full of the myſticiſm of the Platonic philoſophy; upon which his followers of thoſe times improved ſo much, that they appear to me to have made it little more intelligible than the writings of Jacob Behmen, or any other modern myſtic.

queſtion

C. 16. queſtion in diſpute betwixt the parties; for Socrates firſt refutes Hermogenes, and then Cratylus. Nor does he ſeem to aver any thing poſitively, except that the nature of things was not to be learned from names, as Cratylus aſſerted, but from the things themſelves, nor theſe again but from ideas. So that Plato here, and almoſt every where elſe through his works, contrives to introduce his favourite doctrine of ideas, with which he concludes this dialogue. The later Platoniſts however, ſuch as Proclus, maintained it to be the opinion of Plato, that the names of things were from nature; and upon this ſubject they diſputed with the followers of Ariſtotle, who, in his book of Interpretation, ſays very ſhortly, but very poſitively, that names were given to things by convention or agreement, and that none of them is from nature, but that they are mere ſymbols, and not natural ſigns. Ammonius endeavours in this, as well as in many other things, to reconcile theſe two philoſophers. For I obſerve, that at that time, and long before that time, as far back as the days of Ammonius Saccas of Alexandria, the maſter of Plotinus, the faſhionable opinion among philo-

philoſophers was, that the philoſophy of Plato and Ariſtotle was the ſame. But in later times, and after the days of Proclus, the breach betwixt theſe two ſchools was very much widened; and as far down as the taking of Conſtantinople by the Turks, we have Gemiſtius Pletho, and Georgius Trapezuntius, fiercely diſputing with one another, the one in behalf of Plato againſt Ariſtotle, and the other in behalf of Ariſtotle againſt Plato. As to my own opinion, I think it is evident, that though in many things they agreed, for which reaſon I think the ſtudy of their two philoſophies ſhould never be ſeparated, yet they differed in ſome things, particularly on the ſubject of *ideas*; and on this ſubject too, if it be true, that Plato really believed that the names of things were from nature, not from inſtitution. C. 16.

The firſt thing to be done, before we proceed farther in this queſtion, is to ſtate it fairly, and to explain what is meant, by ſaying that the names of things are from nature.

And, in the *firſt* place, it is evident, that names are not the workmanſhip of nature; for though we ſhould ſuppoſe, contrary

C. 16. contrary to what I have endeavoured to prove, that men have from nature the faculty of ſpeech, ſtill the names would be impoſed by men, and not the operation of nature. Nor is this the meaning of Cratylus in Plato, though I perceive that Ammonius aſcribes this meaning to him *. But what he maintains is, that men in impoſing thoſe names, had a regard to the nature of the things ſignified by them, and framed them ſo as by their ſound to expreſs it. The ſtate therefore of the queſtion, as treated by Plato, is, Whether the nature of the things is any way expreſſed by the names given to them, and whether that was the rule followed by men in impoſing ſuch names?

But there appears to be a queſtion pre-

* *Ammon.* περὶ ἑρμηνειας, *fol.* 29. where he makes Cratylus ſay, that names are the workmanſhip of nature, δημιουργηματα τῆς φυσεως; that every name is by nature appointed for every thing, in the ſame manner as each ſenſe is fitted for its proper object; and that names are not artificial likeneſſes of things, but natural, ſuch as ſhadows, and the appearances of things in water. This miſtake of ſo excellent a commentator, and who was the inſtructor of two other very good commentators, viz. *Simplicius* and *Johan. Philoponus*, ſhews that nothing can be truſted to in thoſe matters, but the original authors themſelves.

vious

vious to this, namely, Whether any rule at all was followed in the impoſition of names; or whether it was not an act of mere fancy and arbitrary will, according to the opinion of Hermogenes? And if it can be ſhewn that men did follow a rule in this matter, and were not guided by mere chance and caprice, it will then be time enough to inquire what rule they followed, whether that ſuppoſed by Cratylus, or any other. C. 16.

And here it may be obſerved, that this inquiry belongs only to the languages of art; for it is evident, from what has been ſaid in the preceding part of this work, that Barbarians follow no rule at all in their languages, not even the moſt common rules of grammar, far leſs can we ſuppoſe them capable of ſuch a refinement as to think of adapting their words to the nature of things. Their languages are ſo artleſs, that they have not, as we have ſeen, either compoſition or derivation; and therefore, whatever connection or relation there may be betwixt the things, there is none at all betwixt the words expreſſing them, ſo little regard had they to the nature of things in the impoſing of

C. 16. names. And accordingly, in fact, I believe it is abſolutely impoſſible to give any reaſon, even the moſt whimſical or capricious, why any of their long vocal words ſhould denote one thing more than another: Why, *e. g.* ſhould not the long word which I mentioned in the Eſquimaux language, ſignifying *little*, denote *much*, or *vice versâ?*

Secondly, It may be alſo obſerved, That even with reſpect to the languages of art, there is a great number of the words, of which we can give a very ſatisfactory account, I mean derivative and compound words. The more perfect a language is, as I obſerved before, the greater number of theſe words there will be in it, and the fewer roots. As to the Greek, I have endeavoured to ſhew that there is a very ſmall number of roots. In other languages of leſs art, the number no doubt will be greater. But whether the number be great or ſmall, it is plain that the preſent queſtion only relates to the roots of every language. And accordingly, to that iſſue the diſpute betwixt Cratylus and Hermogenes is at laſt brought by Plato *.

* *Ibid. pag.* 289.

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The preciſe queſtion therefore is, Whether etymology can be carried any farther than to the radical words of a language; and whether it will go the length of the elements of which thoſe words are compoſed? Whether, in ſhort, any reaſon can be given why ſuch and ſuch elemental ſounds, combined together in ſuch or ſuch an order, ſhould denote ſuch and ſuch things, and no other? Or, is it not more probable, that the artificers of language, after having carried the art ſo far as to derive from a few words all the other words of a language, gave themſelves no further trouble, but abandoned the reſt to fancy and caprice? C. 16.

It may be argued in ſupport of this laſt opinion, That there are certainly many things among men of arbitrary inſtitution; and it is impoſſible to maintain, that all the ſigns of things which we uſe, are natural ſigns, and not *ſymbols*, that is, marks or indications of things by convention. Of this kind are ſignals at ſea or land, letters in ciphers, and other ways that men have deviſed of communicating their thoughts to one another when at a diſtance.—That even the common letters

C. 16. of the alphabet, can be accounted no more than ſymbols for ſuch or ſuch elemental ſounds, as it ſeems impoſſible to give any rational account of the forms of the ſeveral letters, or to render a reaſon why *a*, (*e. g.*) ſhould not ſtand for the elemental ſound expreſſed by *b*, or *vice verſâ*. And with reſpect to an alphabet of another kind, which ſtands for ideas, and not the ſounds expreſſing thoſe ideas, I mean the Chineſe alphabet, Monſ. Freret, a moſt learned French academician, has maintained, that the whole Chineſe characters, amounting, as it is ſaid, to no leſs than eighty thouſand, are nothing more than mere ſymbols or ſigns of arbitrary inſtitution, without any natural reſemblance to the things they expreſs *; and the ſame may be ſaid of the Arabian or rather Indian ciphers, (for from that country they came originally). Then as to the names of the letters, it is obſerved by Plato, that all the Greek alphabet have names, ſuch as *alpha*, *beta*, *gamma*, &c. except four, viz. ι, υ, ο, and ω, which are expreſſed only by

* See his diſcourſe on the principles of the writing-art, contained in the 12th volume of the Memoirs of the Academy of Belles Lettres, *edit. Amſtelod.*

the

the ſounds of the letters *. Now, why not theſe as well as the reſt? or why is α called by that name, and not by any other? or why is not α called *beta*, or β *alpha*? Why have not the Latin letters, or our letters, names as well as the Greek? and why do we ſound all the names of the conſonants in Engliſh with an *e*, and no other vowel, except the *r*, which we ſound with an *a*? And to ſay no more of the marks of language in writing; with reſpect to the words themſelves, it is admitted, that no account can be given of the names of numbers, nor of prepoſitions and conjunctions. And if every thing muſt be accounted for in language, Why ſhould not a reaſon be given for the different forms of inflection and derivation? Why is not the genitive put for the dative, or one tenſe of a verb for another? Why ſhould not the derivative ποιημα ſtand for ποιητης, or *vice versâ*? In ſhort, as it muſt be admitted that no account can be given of ſome original words in language, the beſt way ſeems to be to make the rule general, that every original word is of arbitrary inſtitution. C. 16.

On the other hand, it may be ſaid, That

* Cratyl. pag. 271. edit. Ficini.

there

C. 16. there are undoubtedly many things among men altogether arbitrary, and governed by no rule or reaſon. But theſe are things that are not, nor cannot, by their nature, be comprehended in any art. Of this kind are ſignals at ſea or land, letters in ciphers, or any ſuch *indicia*, or marks of any thing which muſt be regulated by the private conſent and agreement of parties, not by any general rule founded in the nature of things, like matters of art, otherwiſe they would not ſerve the purpoſe. Neither are the forms of the letters of the alphabet a proper ſubject of art. The analyſis of language into its elemental ſounds, was no doubt a work, and a great work of art; and after that was done, it was an ingenious thought to think of noting thoſe elemental ſounds by viſible marks, and of ſpeaking in that way to the eyes. But here the art ended; and Theuth the Egyptian, or whoever elſe it was that invented the writing art, was at liberty to make uſe of any marks he pleaſed to diſtinguiſh the different ſounds. Nor indeed was this a matter that could, by its nature, be ſubjected to the rules of art. There might however have been ſome accidental reaſon

reaſon (as it ſeldom happens that men act in any thing, without ſome kind of reaſon to determine the will to one thing rather than another) why ſuch or ſuch a figure was choſen to expreſs ſuch or ſuch an elemental ſound. And there is a learned man in France of my acquaintance, Monſ. de Guignes, who was writing a book, ſome years ago, to prove, that the forms of the Phenician or Hebrew characters, were derived from the Egyptian hieroglyphic, which expreſſed the idea denoted by the word that was formed of thoſe characters; ſo that the characters were the diſſection, as it were, of the hieroglyphic. And as to what Monſ. Freret ſays of the Chineſe characters, it is a miſtake, which has been corrected by later information from that country; for by comparing the more antient Chineſe characters with the modern, we perceive, that the former were truly the ſigns, natural or allegorical, of the things they expreſs; and that the modern are thoſe antient characters abridged, or altered in ſuch a way, as every thing of that kind is in a long courſe of time. And as to the Arabian ciphers, that manner of notation C. 16.

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C. 16. tion of numbers, is no doubt a matter of great art, as well as great utility, and a moſt ingenious contrivance, unknown to the Greeks and Romans. But the figures of the ciphers themſelves were a matter entirely of fancy, though it is not unlikely that there may have been ſome reaſon, of one kind or another, that determined the inventors of this art to chuſe one mark for a number, rather than another. And what I have ſaid of written language, may be ſaid likewiſe of language that is ſpoken, namely, that though it be an art, and the greateſt I think of all arts; yet there muſt neceſſarily belong to it things of arbitrary choice, that cannot be reduced to any art. Such are the names of ideas ſo abſtract as thoſe of numbers; and ſuch muſt likewiſe be the names for thoſe pegs or nails of diſcourſe, that we call *prepoſitions*, *articles*, and *conjunctions*. But where-ever any thing belonging to an art is capable of being ſubjected to rule, and governed by certain principles, it will undoubtedly be ſo, if the art is perfect, and will not be left to fancy or arbitrary will. If therefore it can be ſhewn why the roots of any language ſhould be ſuch

or

or ſuch ſounds, rather than others, it is evident, that if this language be a complete piece of art, the roots of it will be of that kind. There muſt have been, as we obſerved before, a progreſs in the art of language, as well as in other arts; nor is it poſſible that it could have been invented all at once. We ſee, in the barbarous languages, the beginnings of art: ſome of them have ſome few words that ſeem to be derived from others of like ſignification; that would go on by degrees, till at laſt the greateſt part of the language would become derivative or compounded words. Then the artiſts, we may preſume, would proceed a little further, and try whether the ſyſtem could not be completed by abridging ſtill more the number of roots; and giving a certain form to them, ſuch as appeared beſt ſuited to the nature of things, or the genius of the language, and ſuch as would anſwer beſt all the purpoſes of the language. For if we ſee that upon any ſubject art has gone very far, we can hardly ſuppoſe that it will ſtop ſhort till the whole is completed: *e. g.* We have ſeen how far art has gone in the formation of the Greek language, particularly in that part of it reſpecting etymo- C. 16.

C. 16. gy and derivation; we are informed alſo, that the art of the Sanſcrit or Bramin language has gone ſo far as to make roots of ſounds that are not words of the language, nor have any preciſe or determinate ſignification, but only denote a relation of one kind or another to ſome general idea *. Now, can we ſuppoſe that the artificers of ſuch languages would give over, like men wearied, and abandon to mere fancy or whim the choice of the radical ſounds, if any reaſon could be given why one kind of them is more proper than another? I therefore think it probable, that, if ſuch reaſon can be aſſigned, it was followed and made the rule in languages ſo perfect as the Greek or Sanſcrit.

The next inquiry is, what reaſon we can ſuppoſe would determine the artificers in this choice of roots. And firſt, is there any thing in the ſound of the human voice, that can expreſs the nature of the things denoted by words? This is averred by Cratylus in Plato; and it is his opinion we are now to examine, after having firſt refuted, according to Plato's method, the opinion of Hermogenes, who maintained,

* See the Jeſuit Dupon's account of this language in vol. 14. of *Lettres edifiantes et curieuſes*.

that

that words were altogether of arbitrary in- C. 16.
ſtitution.

And, firſt, it may be obſerved, that my hypotheſis of the roots of the Greek language being verbs, as thoſe of the Hebrew certainly are, favours very much the argument of Cratylus. For as it is by certain actions of the organs of the mouth that articulation is performed, it is natural enough to ſuppoſe, that by one kind of action another may be imitated, or in ſome way expreſſed or repreſented. And upon this ſubject Plato has made ſome very ingenious obſervations, tending to ſhew, that by the powers of the letters, different kinds of motion may be expreſſed. Thus he ſays, that by the conſonant *r* is expreſſed any quick or rough motion; on the contrary, by *l* is expreſſed a ſoft gliding motion. What is fixed and preſſed is expreſſed by the conſonants *d* and *t*; and on the other hand what is ſwoln, puffed up, or windy, is denoted by the hiſſing conſonant *ſ*, or by the double or aſpirated conſonants, ſuch as ζ, φ, ψ, which requiring a great deal of breath in the pronunciation, are fit for that expreſſion; and all this he illuſtrates by many examples from

C. 16. his own language *. And if the reader wants examples from other languages, he may consult the author of the *Mechanism of Language*, where he will find very many instances from different languages, particularly with respect to the expression of the letters *l* and *r*. And as to the vowels, Plato says, that by the position of the mouth in the pronunciation of them, the figure and magnitude of things may be expressed; as, *e. g.* by the form of the mouth, when *o* is enunciated, *roundness* may be denoted; and by the manner in which *a* is pronounced, what is *wide opened, or expanded*, or in general *great*, may be signified; what is long by *u*; and what is slender, sharp, and piercing, by *i* †.

These observations of Plato are certainly so far true, that there are, I am persuaded, in every language, many words which express the nature of the things signified by them; and of these I believe the Greek language affords as great a number as any. But it is to be observed, that all these words express sounds of different kinds, and

* *Pag.* 292. *edit. Ficini.*

† *Ibid.* pag. 292. & 293.

therefore

therefore are ſaid by grammarians to be *verba ex ſono facta*, and it is to ſuch words only that the ὀνοματοποια, ſo much talked of, relates. Now there can be no doubt but that ſounds may be imitated by the human voice, eſpecially when modified by articulation. But this kind of imitation can expreſs nothing but ſounds, and therefore will go very ſmall length in expreſſing the almoſt infinite variety of the ideas of the human mind; and it is an expreſſion, as Plato obſerves, that belongs rather to muſic than to language *. For, as to the expreſſion of language, he requires, that by letters, ſyllables, and words, the nature and eſſence of things ſhould be expreſſed, even of this very thing *ſound*. Now I muſt confeſs this appears to me very difficult to be done by the power of letters, however variouſly combined into ſyllables and words. Nor does Plato himſelf ſeem to be confident that it can be done; but, as I obſerved, concludes ſceptically upon the point. For it is evident, that whoever formed a language upon this plan, muſt have known, or thought that he knew, wherein the eſſence of things conſiſts; that is, in other words, he muſt C. 16.

* *Cratyl. p.*

have

C. 16. have been a very great philoſopher. And accordingly Socrates, in Plato, when he refutes Hermogenes, proceeds upon the ſuppoſition, that thoſe lawgivers in language, as he calls them, were philoſophers of the ſect of Heraclitus, who maintained that every thing was in conſtant flux and motion. And upon this hypotheſis he has given us a great number of derivations, ſome of them ſo whimſical and ſo much forced, that he himſelf, I am perſuaded, did not believe there was any reality in them, but gives them only as a kind of *jeu d' eſprit* *. And after having, in this way, explained the names of many things, both divine and human, when he comes to refute Cratylus in his turn, he ſhews that ſeveral words which he had mentioned before, may be etymologiſed upon a ſyſtem of philoſophy directly oppoſite, namely, that every thing

* Some of them contradict all the rules of etymology and derivation; *e. g.* he ſays that κακια is derived from κεκτῆς ἑαυτὸν. And with reſpect to κακος, from which it is plain that κακια comes according to the common way of forming noun ſubſtantives from adjectives, he can give no other account of it, except that it is a Barbaric word, ſuch as πυρ that he had mentioned before; *pag.* 285. *edit. Ficini.* In the ſame manner he might have derived *malitia*, in Latin, from *malè ire*.

ſtands

ſtands ſtill and is at reſt; that in this the eſſence of every thing conſiſts; and that to perceive this ſtability and fixedneſs of things, is knowledge and ſcience *. In ſhort, he unſays every thing that he had ſaid before upon the ſubject of thoſe philoſophical etymologies, and very plainly ſhews, that from the names themſelves we can infer nothing with reſpect to the opinion of thoſe who impoſed them concerning the nature and eſſence of things. C. 16.

Two things therefore in this matter appear to me to be ſufficiently evident: firſt, that by combinations of letters in ſyllables, the nature of things, other than ſounds, could not be expreſſed with any degree of diſtinctneſs and clearneſs; and, ſecondly, ſuppoſing they could, it does not appear to me probable, that the artificers of language had it at all in their view in forming the roots of the language.

For proof of this laſt, let us take for example the roots of the Greek language, in which I am perſuaded, if in any, this reſemblance betwixt the ſound, and the thing expreſſed by it, is to be found. And

* *Ibid. pag.* 299. And upon this hypotheſis he explains the words ἱστημι, σιδηρος, ἱστορια, μυημη, &c.

ac-

C. 16. accordingly it is from this language that Plato takes his examples. It is certain, firſt, That four at leaſt of the five duads are themſelves roots. Secondly, That if all the other roots do not end in one or other of theſe duads, according to my hypotheſis, a very great number of them does, ſo that thoſe letters are eſſential parts of ſuch roots. Now, if by letters the nature of things is expreſſed, I deſire to know how it comes that ſo many things, ſo different in their nature, are expreſſed by the ſame letters. Thus ἀω ſignifies by itſelf *ſpiro*. With different conſonants prefixed, it has ſignifications quite different from this, and from one another. Thus with a ϛ prefixed, it ſignifies *to go*, as in ϛαω; with a γ prefixed, it ſignifies *to beget* or *produce*, which is the meaning of the root γαω; with a δ prefixed, it forms the word δαω, which ſignifies *to burn*, or *to divide*; with a ζ prefixed, it makes ζαω, ſignifying *to live*. In the ſame manner καω, κταω, μαω, ναω, &c. are formed, all having different ſignifications. And alſo when it is compounded with vowels, ſuch as ι and ῐ making the words ιαω and ῐαω, it appears to retain nothing of its original ſignification;

signification; and these words, though formed out of it, have no resemblance in their meaning. And supposing we should go so far in favour of Cratylus's hypothesis, as to admit that those duads, though making the greater part of the roots, had no meaning at all, and were to be considered only as terminations, it remains to be accounted for, how those single letters prefixed should denote things so different. Why should ϛ, for example, before ἰω, signify to *go*, while γ before the same duad, signifies to *beget*, and so on? and why should the same consonant ϛ, for example, prefixed to divers of these insignificant duads, denote different things, as in ϛαω, ϛιω, ϛοω, ϛυω? C. 16.

A third observation may be made, that supposing each letter of the alphabet was by nature appropriated for expressing such and such things, and that the artificers of language knew this, and made use of them accordingly; yet in order to fill up their words to a proper length and fullness of sound, they must have used other letters, not having the same significancy, perhaps a contrary one, but which, with the significant letters, made a pleasing sound, and

C. 16. filled up the word agreeably; ſo that they muſt ſoon have ſeen that their attempt to expreſs, by thoſe elemental ſounds, the nature of things would, in the progreſs of language, come to nothing. For as Plato has obſerved, ſo many other letters are thrown in for the ſake of the beauty or magnificence of the ſound *, that the original ſignificant letters are quite overwhelmed and loſt.

* Καλλωπισμῳ καὶ μεγαλοπρεπειας ἕνεκα. And he has given a very ſtriking example of it in the word σκληροτης, where there is only one letter, viz. ρ, which expreſſes the idea of hardneſs or roughneſs; ſo that all the reſt of the letters, and among others the λ, which, as he obſerves, has a quite different ſignificancy, are thrown in merely to fill up the word. *Cratyl. pag.* 297. *Fic.* This ſtudy of the pomp and beauty of ſound may be obſerved in the derivatives of the Greek language, which have many uſeleſs letters on that account, of which Plato gives one example in the word κατοπτρον, where he ſays that the ρ is thrown in merely for the ſake of the ſound. I will give the paſſage at length, as it contains the ſubſtance of what I have ſaid above, expreſſed with his uſual elegance. Ὦ μακάριε, οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅτι τὰ πρῶτα ὀνόματα τεθέντα κατακέχωσται ἤδη ὑπὸ τῶν βουλομένων τραγῳδεῖν αὐτά, περιτιθέντων γράμματα καὶ ἐξαιρούντων, εὐστομίας ἕνεκα, καὶ πανταχῇ στρεφόντων, καὶ ὑπὸ καλλωπισμοῦ καὶ ὑπὸ χρόνου· ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν τῷ κατόπτρῳ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ἄτοπον εἶναι τὸ ἐμβεβλῆσθαι τὸ ρω; ἀλλὰ τοιαῦτα (οἶμαι) ποιοῦσιν οἱ τῆς μὲν ἀληθείας οὐδὲν φροντίζοντες, τὸ δὲ στόμα πλάττοντες. ἃ δ' ἐπεμβάλλοντες πολλὰ ἐπὶ τὰ πρῶτα ὀνόματα, τελευτῶντες ποιοῦσι μηδ' ἂν ἕνα ἀνθώπων συνεῖναι, ὅ τι ποτὲ βούλεται τὸ ὄνομα· ὥσπερ καὶ τὴν σφίγγα ἀντὶ σφιγὸς σφίγγα καλοῦσι, καὶ ἄλλα πολλά. *Ibid.* 284.

Muſt

Muſt we then retract what we endeavoured to prove, that the artificers of the Greek language did proceed upon ſome principles of art, when they formed the roots of that language? and muſt we in this caſe give up Leibnitz's maxim, that there is a ſufficient reaſon for every thing? or may ſome other reaſon be given for the impoſition of thoſe *firſt* names, as Plato calls them, beſides what Cratylus has given? And I think there may. And in the firſt place, ſuppoſe we ſhould ſay that they were choſen for the beauty and ſweetneſs of the ſound, it is evident from what has been already ſaid, that the Greeks ſtudied this very much in the formation of their language; and it ſhall be further made appear, when I come to treat of the material part or ſound of languages of art. Would it therefore be thought incongruous, or repugnant to the genius of the language, if I ſhould ſay, that thoſe duads of vowels were choſen for roots, on account of their ſweet and flowing ſound; and that theſe, with the addition of conſonants, and other vowels, furniſhed a ſufficient number of ſtocks upon which to graft the whole language? C. 16.

C. 16. But, ſecondly, it appears to me, that the Greeks had ſtill a more ſubſtantial reaſon which led them to chuſe thoſe duads for the primitive ſounds of their language; and that was for the ſake of flection and derivation. It is evident, that they muſt have formed their ſyſtem of flection and derivation at the ſame time that they fixed upon the radical words. For it is undoubtedly for the ſake of derivation that there are roots in any language; and flection is nothing but a ſpecies of derivation taken in a larger ſenſe. Now I have ſhown, in the diſſertation annexed to this volume, that no termination of verbs, ſuch as all the radical words in Greek are, could be ſo proper for all their variety of flection and derivation as thoſe duads, and that from them, as from a plentiful fountain, the whole Greek language flows with an eaſy deſcent, and a moſt copious ſtream. And thus it appears to me, that it was not without art that thoſe radical ſounds of the Greek language were choſen rather than any other. And I am perſuaded thoſe who are learned in the Hebrew, if they will conſider the roots of that language in the ſame view, will find that there

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is a like reaſon for chuſing them rather than any other. C. 16.

And here I conclude the analyſis of language conſidered as *ſignificant*: And ſo far as I have gone, I have endeavoured to deduce the principles of grammar from the principles of philoſophy, upon which all ſciences ought to be founded, otherwiſe they never can be perfectly underſtood, nor truly deſerve the name of ſcience. In this view I have divided and explained the parts of ſpeech, in a manner a good deal different from the common, and all along I have endeavoured to ſhew the great art that appears in the ſtructure of a regular language. And particularly I have at conſiderable length explained thoſe three great artifices of language, flection, derivation, and compoſition; and I have concluded, that no part of a complete language that is capable of art, is without art, not even the formation of the radical words of the language. I proceed, in the next book, to analyſe the material part of language, or language conſidered as *ſound merely*.

BOOK

BOOK II.

Analyſis of the MATERIAL PART of LANGUAGE.

INTRODUCTION.

Intr. LANGUAGE is ſo commonly uſed, and of ſuch facility in practice, that men who have not ſtudied the art are apt to think that there is no art in it: on the other hand, men of curioſity, who are not ſatisfied with the practice, but want to know the reaſon of things, find great difficulty in explaining the nature of language, and giving a rational account even of the common parts of ſpeech, and of their various uſes; and they will be convinced, if they take the trouble to read the preceding book, of the truth of what I ſaid in the beginning of this part of my work, that a man, in order to be a complete grammarian, muſt have made no inconſiderable progreſs in philoſophy, even in

in the moſt abſtruſe parts of it. But there is one ſatisfaction from the ſtudy of the works of art, and which, to the lover of knowledge, is abundant recompence for the labour it coſts him, that we can get to the bottom in ſuch ſtudy, and diſcover the firſt principles of the art: whereas in the works of God and nature, there is a wiſdom and contrivance of which we cannot ſee the end; and therefore I doubt whether, in ſuch matters, the human faculties can ever attain to perfect ſcience. Intr.

The art of language is ſo beautiful, and of ſuch wonderful contrivance, that an ingenious man would think it well worth his while to ſtudy it for the ſake of mere curioſity, and though his labours were to be recompenſed by no profit. But the utility of the ſtudy is very great. For, in the firſt place, we learn by it to compare different languages, and to pronounce with certainty which of them is the moſt excellent. Then we can diſtinguiſh betwixt what is good and agreeable to rule in the uſe of every language, and what is the contrary; ſo that our judgement does not depend upon faſhion or popular opinion, which is prevalent in language as well as in

Intr. in every thing elſe belonging to man; and we are enabled to diſtinguiſh what is or ought to be ſubjected to rule in language, from that which by its nature muſt be governed by arbitrary uſe. Farther, the grammatical art is the foundation and groundwork of all ſtyle and compoſition of every kind, whether in verſe or proſe; for we cannot ornament language, nor pretend to invert the common idiom, or depart from the rules of plain ſpeech, unleſs we know thoſe rules, and how far they may be varied conſiſtently with the nature of language in general, and the genius of the particular language in which we compoſe. An exact ſtudy therefore of grammar is indiſpenſably neceſſary for the orator or public ſpeaker *. Nor muſt the poet,

* To this purpoſe Cicero, ſpeaking of Julius Cæſar's talent of oratory, ſays, *Solum quidem, et quaſi fundamentum oratoris, vides locutionem emendatam et Latinam; cujus penes quos laus adhuc fuit, non fuit rationis aut ſcientiæ, ſed quaſi bonæ conſuetudinis.* *De Claris Oratoribus, cap.* 74. And in the ſame paſſage, a little after, he ſays, That even in his time the Latin language began to be corrupted by the great confluence of ſtrangers to Rome: *Quo magis expurgandus eſt ſermo, et adhibenda, tanquam obruſſa, ratio, quæ mutari non poteſt, nec utendum*

poet, inſpired as he is by the muſes, pretend to be exempted from the rules of this art. What other learning is required for excelling in poetry and rhetoric, I ſhall mention when I come to treat of thoſe arts. Intr.

dum praviſſimâ conſuetudinis regulâ. And accordingly he ſays Cæſar followed this rule: *Cæſar autem, rationem adhibens, conſuetudinem vitioſam et corruptam purâ et incorruptâ conſuetudine emendat. Itaque cum ad hanc elegantiam verborum Latinorum (quæ, etiam ſi orator non ſis, et ſis ingenuus civis Romanus, tamen neceſſaria eſt) adjungit illa oratoria ornamenta dicendi; tum videtur tanquam tabulas bene pictas collocare in bono lumine.* Theſe paſſages evidently ſhew it to have been the opinion of Cicero, that not only we cannot excel in oratory without the grammatical art, but that we cannot be ſure of ſpeaking correctly or properly, if we have not a rule ſuperior to common uſe, and by which we are able to correct that uſe, when it goes wrong.

CHAPTER I.

Diviſion of the analyſis of the ſound of language into three heads, articulation, accent, and quantity.

Ch. 1. THE analyſis of ſpeech or language, conſidered as ſignificant, is ſimple; for it can be reſolved into words only, of which we have explained the nature and different kinds. But the analyſis of language, conſidered as ſound, is more various; for explaining of which it will be neceſſary to recollect what we ſaid above, that the common matter of which both muſic and language are formed, is the *human voice*. But there is a higher genus, of which we muſt take notice, viz. *ſound*; for voice is the ſound produced by the breath of an animal, coming from his lungs, through the wind-pipe and larynx, and from thence through his mouth; and the efficient cauſe of it, is ſome movement of the mind, or inward principle of the

the animal *. This voice, variouſly modified by the different poſitions and actions of the ſeveral organs of the mouth, is what we call *articulate voice*, as was before explained: and as this is eſſential to language, the analyſis of it, conſidered as articulate ſound, is firſt to be explained; next we are to conſider it as ſound ſimply; and in this reſpect it has either different degrees of acuteneſs or gravity, which are called the *proſody* of language, or it has different lengths of ſound, which make what we call *quantity*. Thus the analyſis of language, conſidered as ſound, is threefold; for it is either, of the articulation of it, of the proſody, or of the quantity †. Ch. 1.

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* *Ammon.* ἀς τὸ περὶ ἑρμηνείας. *fol.* 25. His words are, Φωνὴ δὲ ψόφος, ἐξ ἐμψύχου γινόμενος, ὅταν διὰ τῆς συρίγγος ὑπὸ θώρακος ἐμβαλλόμενος ἀπὸ τοῦ πνεύμονος ὁ ἀσπιτυθεὶς ἀὴρ προσπίπτῃ ἀθρόως τῇ καλαμίνῃ τραχείᾳ ἀρτηρίᾳ, καὶ τῇ ὑπερῴᾳ ἤτοι τῷ γαργαριῶνι, καὶ διὰ τῆς πληγῆς ἀποτελῇ τίνα ἦχον αἰσθητὸν, κατά τινα ὁρμὴν τῆς ψυχῆς.

† This threefold diviſion of the ſound of language, is made by Plutarch in his miſcellaneous works, where he ſays, that three things at leaſt muſt fall under the ſenſe of hearing, in the pronunciation of language; the tone or note, (which is what I call the proſody); the time or quantity, as we commonly call it; and the articulation of the ſyllable or letter. His words are, Δεῖ γὰρ ἀναγκαίων τρία ἐλαχίστα εἶναι τὰ πίπτοντα εἰς τὴν ἀκοὴν — φθόγγοντι — καὶ χρόνον — καὶ συλλαβὴν ἢ γράμμα; where I am ſurpriſed to find that

Ch. 1. We will begin with the analyſis of articulate ſound.

CHAP. II.

The analyſis of articulate ſounds into letters, —Where and when this diſcovery probably was made.—The nature of letters, and the ſeveral kinds of them.—Perfection of the Greek alphabet.—Defects of the Engliſh.

Ch. 2. ARticulate ſounds are reſolveable into *ſentences*, *words*, *ſyllables*, and *letters*. Of theſe laſt only we propoſe here to treat,

Mr Foſter, in his learned eſſay upon accent and quantity, tranſlates the beginning of the paſſage in this way, p. 16. "Three *very minute* things do neceſſarily ſtrike the ear "at once." For this is neither the meaning of the words, nor the ſenſe of Plutarch, who, in a paſſage which follows afterwards, ſpeaks of the ear being able to perceive and diſtinguiſh theſe three things, each from the other, without which he adds that it is impoſſible to ſee what is faulty in each of them, and what is not. See *Plutarch. tom. 2. pag. 1144. Xyland.* And Mr Foſter himſelf has made it evident, that no Greek or Roman, in thoſe days, could have been at any loſs to diſtinguiſh thoſe three things in the pronunciation of their language.

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becauſe theſe are truly the *elements* into which language, conſidered as ſound, is ultimately reſolveable. The other three are compoſed out of them; and therefore, according to the method we have laid down, they are to be treated of when we come to ſpeak of the compoſition of language. Ch. 2.

The analyſis of language into letters, by which I mean the elementary ſounds, (for I do not ſpeak at preſent of the characters by which they are expreſſed), was certainly a great diſcovery; and I ſhould have had no doubt, even if Plato had not told us ſo *, that it was firſt made, if not only made, in that parent-country of all arts and ſciences, I mean Egypt; but not, I am perſuaded, till after all the neceſſary arts of life were invented, government and religion eſtabliſhed, and even ſome progreſs made in ſpeculation and ſcience. It muſt have been made, I think, much about the time that men began to reform the barbarous jargon they firſt ſpoke, and form a language of art; for which purpoſe, as I have ſaid, I hold that the knowledge of

* Plato *in Philebo, p.* 374. *edit. Ficini.*

the

Ch. 2. the elemental ſounds, and their powers, was abſolutely neceſſary. I think it is probable that it was not made all at once, but, like the diſcoveries in other ſciences, by degrees; and it is not unlikely that there was a ſtop in the progreſs. They would begin, no doubt, with diſtinguiſhing words from the reſt of the diſcourſe: this would not be difficult. Then they would reſolve words into ſyllables, which would not be ſo eaſy. But it is likely that they ſtopped there for ſome time, perhaps for ages, (ſo ſlow is the progreſs of human knowledge), before they came to the laſt reſolution of ſyllables into letters, which however eaſy and obvious it may appear to us, was certainly a great work of art; for letters in ſyllables are ſo combined and incorporated together, that it requires a very accurate diſſection to ſeparate them. And what makes this conjecture the more probable, is the account that Kempfer gives us in his hiſtory of Japan, of the Japaneſe alphabet, which he ſays is ſyllabical. Now, if this be not only a ſhort-hand way of writing, and if they really do not know the elemental ſounds, then they, or whatever other nation

tion they got their alphabet from, muſt have ſtopped, as I ſuppoſe the Egyptians did, after carrying the analyſis the length of ſyllables. But be that as it will, it would appear that the diſcovery was fully made, before a language of art came into Greece; at leaſt there is no evidence that any one elemental ſound was diſcovered by the Greeks, though they found out new characters for them, of which more hereafter. I hold therefore that the Greeks got this diſcovery from the ſame country from which they got the alphabet, that is ſo nearly connected with it. Ch. 2.

Whether this Greek or Egyptian alphabet contains all the articulate ſounds the human voice is capable of uttering, may juſtly be doubted; for it is very difficult, if not impoſſible for us, to define and limit exactly the powers of ſo various and excellent an animal as man, and to ſay preciſely that they can go ſo far, and no farther. One thing I believe is certain, that the Greek alphabet is the fulleſt and moſt complete of any known; ſo that in this reſpect, as well as in many others, the Greek language is the moſt perfect that we know. I incline however to believe,

Ch. 2. lieve, that there are ſounds to be found in other languages, that cannot be expreſſed by the Greek letters, or any combination of them, and I mentioned one ſound that is pronounced in the iſland of Otaheite, which could not be pronounced by any of our people that were there.

I have already given a general account of the nature of articulation, and of the great diviſion of the elemental ſounds into vowels and conſonants *. The vowels, as I have ſaid, are abſolutely neceſſary for articulation, being the vehicle, as it were, by which the other letters are enunciated; or, as Plato expreſſes it, the bond or tie by which they are bound together †. It is for this reaſon that I believe all languages, even the moſt barbarous, have all the five vowels, either ſounded each by itſelf, or mixed with other vowels. They are not however the principal parts of articulation, as I have elſewhere obſerved, but are to be conſidered only as the cement that binds the conſonants to-

* *Vol. 1. lib. 3. pag. 329. et ſeqq.*

† *Plato in Sophiſta, pag. 177. edit. Ficini.*

gether,

gether, which therefore are the principal materials in the structure of language. Ch. 2.

The consonants are subdivided into *liquids*, *mutes*, and the *monadic* or solitary letter *s*. The liquids are distinguished from the rest of the consonants by this, that they make of themselves a kind of beating or chopping noise *: and it is perhaps for that reason, that in pronouncing their names, we prefix the vowel; whereas in the names of the other consonants we postpone it. They are four in number, *l*, *m*, *n*, *r*, to which some grammarians add the *s*: but I think it is better that it should stand by itself, both on account of the peculiarity of its sound, which is altogether different from that of the rest of the letters †, and because it unites in the same syllable with many other letters with which none of the liquids will join; for in Greek it goes be-

* *Aristot. Poët.*

† Dionysius the Halicarnassian says of this letter, that it makes a noise more brutal than human, therefore the antients used it very sparingly; and he says there were whole odes composed without one σ, which he calls ᾠδὰς ἀσιγμους. Περὶ συνθες. *sect.* 14.

Ch. 2. fore, in the ſame ſyllable, all the mutes, either aſpirated or not aſpirated, except γ and δ; whereas the liquids go before none of the mutes in the ſame ſyllable.

The mutes in the Greek alphabet are in number nine; and they are divided into three claſſes, according to the organs which chiefly co-operate with the breath in the pronunciation of them, three in each claſs:

The firſt are *labial*, viz.	-	π, β, φ.
The ſecond *palatine*, viz.	-	κ, γ, χ.
The third *dental*, viz.	-	τ, δ, θ.

And each of theſe claſſes is ſubdivided into three, which are ſaid to be of different orders, the one being what is called *tenuis*, viz. - - π, κ, τ.
The ſecond *middle*, - β, γ, δ.
And the third *aſpirated*, φ, χ, θ.

This diviſion is taken from the different degrees of breath with which they are enunciated, and which breath is ſaid to be the *ſpirit* of the letters. For if they are pronounced with a gentle breath, they are ſaid to be *tenues*, or ſlender-ſounding letters; if they are more ſtrongly enunciated, then

then they are ſaid to be middle letters; Ch. 2.
or if more ſtrongly ſtill, they are ſaid to be *aſpirated* or *thickened*, as I think it is better expreſſed by the Greek work δασυς *; for the aſpiration is truly produced by thickening, and as it were condenſing the breath, ſo as to make a very forcible enunciation.

Thus it appears that the artiſts of language knew perfectly the power of the ſeveral elements; the organs that were employed in pronouncing them; and the difference which the different degrees of breath made in the enunciation of them. In ſhort it appears, that the Greek language was formed by men who had thoroughly ſtudied, and minutely diſſected, the operation of the ſeveral organs of articulation. And it may be obſerved, that they did not employ only the ſoft and ſweet-ſounding letters, but alſo the ſtrong and rough, in order to give ſtrength and nerves to their language, as well as ſoftneſs and beauty.

* The *tenues*, on the other hand, are called ψιλοι, which denotes that they are juſt ſimply ſounded, without any addition of breath extraordinary. See the Halicarnaſſian's treatiſe of Compoſition, *ſect.* 14. *in fine.*

Ch. 2. It may likewiſe be obſerved, that aſpiration does not belong properly to conſonants, but chiefly and principally to vowels, which by being aſpirated themſelves, communicate it to the conſonants that precede them; for the conſonants are nothing but ſo many different ways of enunciating the vowel *. And it would appear, that the aſpiration of conſonants was not uſed among the Greeks at firſt; for in the oldeſt dialect of Greek, namely the Latin, though they aſpirated vowels, yet, according to the antient uſe of the language, they did not aſpirate conſonants. Thus they ſaid *pulcros*, not *pulchros*; *Cetegus*, not *Cethegus*; *triumpos*, not *triumphos*; *Cartaginem*, not *Carthaginem* †.

As to the pronunciation of each particular letter of the Greek alphabet, it is very well explained by the author I have ſo often mentioned, Dionyſius the Halicarnaſſian ‡, in his moſt accurate, as well as

* This is the opinion of Scaliger, *De cauſis Linguæ Latinæ*. See alſo Ariſtides, *lib.* 1. *pag.* 44. *Meibomii.*

† Cicero *Orator.* 48.

‡ As I have ſo often quoted this author, and ſhall ſtill make more uſe of him in the ſequel, I think it is proper here

as moſt elegant treatiſe of Compoſition, Ch. 2.
where he has mechanically deſcribed, with
the utmoſt exactneſs, the pronunciation of
each letter; and, according to the beſt of
my

here to give ſome account of him. He flouriſhed in the time of Julius Cæſar, and was one of thoſe learned Greeks that came to Rome, to inſtruct the great men there, after that city had become the capital of the world, and begun to form a taſte for learning and the fine arts; for it was the fate of Rome, both in more antient and later times, to be taught by Greeks. He taught rhetoric, as appears from a paſſage in his treatiſe of Compoſition. And he ſeems to have been familiarly acquainted with ſome of the greateſt men in Rome at that time, particularly with Pompey, betwixt whom and him there was an epiſtolary correſpondence, ſome part of which is yet preſerved to us. He is beſt known by his Roman hiſtory, a work of great erudition, as well as elegance of compoſition. But his critical works are, in my judgement, the beſt extant, both for the matter and the ſtyle. As to the former, it is evident that he was thoroughly learned in the art; and accordingly he has treated every part of it that he has touched, as a matter of ſcience, which is more than I can ſay of ſome of the antient writings upon the ſubject, and of hardly any of the modern. And as to his ſtyle, I think it is undoubtedly the beſt that has been written, ſince fine ſpeaking, and fine writing, were *dead arts*, by which I mean performed only by imitation of dead authors. The period when thoſe arts ceaſed to be living, I fix at the death of Alexander the Great; or, if we have a mind to bring it down a little further, the death of Demoſthenes. Since his time, all writing of any value has been

from

Ch. 2. my judgement, they were pronounced in the manner we pronounce them in Scotland, with ſome ſmall differences which it would be thought trifling to mention; for

from the imitation of him, or of the great authors that lived before him, or at the ſame time. And among thoſe writers by imitation, Greek or Latin, I give the firſt place to the Halicarnaſſian. The MSS of him are very faulty; but his ſtyle is ſo perſpicuous, as well as elegant, that it is not difficult to correct them, unleſs where the gap or the corruption is very great. The moſt finiſhed and perfect of his critical works, are his Judgement of Thucydides, his treatiſe περὶ τῆς δεινοτητος τῦ Δημοσθενης, and his book περὶ συνθεσεως ὀνοματων, the moſt finiſhed of all in my judgement, and which luckily has come down to us entire; whereas the others are mutilated. Of it I ſhall make very great uſe in what I ſhall ſay of the material part or ſound of language; for what he calls συνθεσις, relates only to that.

In general the reader will obſerve, that through the whole of this work, I make but little uſe of the Latin authors in matters of philoſophy, grammar, or criticiſm; for though I have read ſuch of them as are of any note, who have written upon thoſe ſubjects, I muſt confeſs that I have not profited much by them, not even by Cicero, who is certainly, upon the whole, the beſt of them. But the beſt of them are little better than tranſlators from the Greek; and ſome of them I think not good tranſlators, becauſe, inſtead of acknowledging fairly the poverty of their language, as Lucretius does, and uſing the Greek terms of art, they make words of their own to expreſs them, which, for the greater part, are to me not intelligible. Cicero particularly had a great deal of that vanity concerning the language of his country,

for though I myſelf think nothing trifling that belongs to ſo noble and uſeful an art, yet I know well that I do not live in an age ſuch as that of Auguſtus Cæſar, when Meſſala, a noble Roman, and the firſt orator of his time, wrote a book upon each letter of the alphabet; and Julius Cæſar, as it is well known, employed himſelf in writing upon another part of grammar, when he had upon his hands the moſt dangerous war in Ch. 2.

try, which he is not aſhamed to prefer even to the Greek; and therefore, both in his rhetorical and philoſophical works, he has uſed the Greek terms of art as little as poſſible. Quintilian had leſs of it, for which reaſon I am more edified by what he has written upon ſtyle and rhetoric, (though he is certainly not near ſo good a writer as Cicero), becauſe he always makes himſelf intelligible, by giving us the Greek word, as well as the Latin tranſlation of it. If he had not done ſo, I I ſhould not have underſtood that *appoſitum* ſignified an *epithet*, or that *contrapoſitum* or *contentio* denoted that common figure of rhetoric we call *antitheſis*; and much leſs ſhould I have known that *inverſio* ſignified *an allegory*.

Nor is this my judgement only of the Latin learning, but it was the judgement of a very learned man, in a very learned age, I mean Chancellor More; who ſays, that the citizens of his Utopia made very little account of the Latin learning, but applied themſelves almoſt wholly to the Greek. And a very learned man, though not in a learned age, is, I find, of the ſame opinion. See *Hermes, pag.* 411. *et ſeqq.*

which

Ch. 2. which he was ever engaged. I will therefore say nothing more upon this subject of elemental sounds, except to observe, that the Latin was defective in them, by the confession of the Roman authors themselves. For Quintilian has observed, *lib.* 12. *cap.* 10. that they wanted two of the sweetest-sounding letters in Greek, one of them a vowel, and the other a consonant; the vowel is υ, and the consonant ζ. These letters, says he, we borrow when we use any of their words, and by doing this he adds, we give a pleasant and chearful sound to the language; whereas, if we were to use our own letters, the sound would be barbarous and uncouth. He further says of the sound of their sixth letter, viz. *f*, what one would not have believed, if it had been said by any other than a Roman, namely, that it was not like a human voice, or rather like no voice at all, being breathed out through intervals of the teeth; which clearly shews the error of those who confound this letter either with the Greek φ, or the Eolic digamma, of which last Quintilian speaks in the same passage, as of a letter quite distinct from the *f*. Of it he does not commend

commend the ſound neither; and though the Eolians retained it, from whom the Latins had it, it appears that the politer tribes of the Greeks laid it aſide as a barbarous ſound. Ch. 2.

As to our Engliſh, we need not be aſhamed of our defects in elemental ſounds, after what I have ſaid of the Latin. We have not, any more than the Latins, the vocal ſound of *υ*, which, as the Halicarnaſſian has deſcribed, is pronounced as the French *u*; whereas our pronunciation of the *u*, is that of the diphthong *eu*, not of the ſimple ſound. Then in England they do not pronounce the aſpirated *ϰ* or the *χ*, but ſound it juſt as they do the ſimple *κ*, which I obſerve has led the printers there into ſome errors in their editions of Greek books, ſometimes printing the *κ* for *χ*, or *vice verſa*.

CHAP. III.

Of alphabetical characters.—That they came originally from Egypt.—The additions made to them by the Greeks no improvement.—Defects of the Roman and Engliſh alphabet.

Ch. 3. ALthough the notation of language in writing do not, ſtrictly ſpeaking, belong to my ſubject; yet the characters of the alphabet are ſo much connected with the alphabet itſelf, that I cannot well avoid ſaying ſomething of them.

This diſcovery, where-ever it was made, was certainly not early made; and a nation muſt have been far removed from a ſtate of barbarity, before they could have ſo much as thought of this invention. They muſt, I imagine, have firſt invented many other arts, beſides the neceſſary arts of life; and as the art of language is, no doubt, among the firſt arts that men cultivate after they come out of the ſavage ſtate, I think it is highly probable, that an art

art of language was formed before alphabetical characters were invented to expreſs the ſounds of it; and as there does not appear to have been any country, on this ſide of the globe, where arts were cultivated ſo early as in Egypt, I cannot refuſe my aſſent to thoſe authors who give to that country the glory of the invention. And particularly Plato the philoſopher, who had been ſo long in Egypt, and was not free of partiality for his own country, but no wiſe prejudiced in favour of the Egyptians *, appears to me to be a moſt unexceptionable Ch. 3.

* Plato, in his 12th book of Laws, pag. 990. *edit. Ficini*, accuſes the Egyptians of inhoſpitality, even to ſuch ſtrangers as came among them for the ſake of knowledge; and gives them, upon that occaſion, the contemptible appellation of θρεμματα Νηλυ, a word which indeed, by its etymological ſignification, denotes every thing that is brought up or nouriſhed, but is commonly applied only to the brute kind. The paſſage occurs where he is ſpeaking of the manner in which thoſe learned and curious ſtrangers ought to be received in his city, after which he adds, Τουτοις δη τοις νομοις υποδιχεσθαι τε χρη παντας ξενους τε και ξενας εξ αλλης χωρας, και τους αυτων ικνεισθαι, τιμωντας ξενιον δια μεν θρωμασι και θυμασι τας ξενηλασιας ποιουμενους (καθαπερ ποιωσι νυν θρεμματα Νηλυ) μηδε κηρυγμασι αγριοις. What he means by thoſe neats and ſacrifices, and harſh ordinances, by which they drove away ſtrangers, is explained by the writers of the life of Pythagoras, Porphyry and Jamblichus, who tell us, that the Egyptian prieſts would not

Ch. 3. ceptionable authority in the caſe, to which I have nothing that I can oppoſe.

But if the invention of them was ſo late as I ſuppoſe, it is natural to believe, that the Egyptian nation was not all that time without ſome way of conveying intelligence to the abſent, and to poſterity; and the queſtion is, what that way was? Some think they uſed what is called

initiate Pythagoras into the myſteries of their theology and philoſophy, though he was recommended to them by their King Amaſis, till he had gone through a very ſevere novitiate, and had ſubmitted to very hard rules, προσταγματα σκληρα και κεχωρισμενα της Ελληνικης αγωγης, as Porphyry expreſſes it, *in vita Pythagoræ, ſect* 8. among which, no doubt, were thoſe ſtrange meats and ſacrifices mentioned by Plato. And Clemens Alexandrinus, *ſtrom.* 1. further tells us, that circumciſion was one part of the ceremony of his initiation. All which after he had gone through with great patience and fortitude, they taught him every thing he deſired to know. By theſe means he became the moſt learned Greek that ever exiſted, and I believe the moſt learned man that ever was at any time in Europe. It would appear from this paſſage of Plato, that the ſame probationary trial was required of him, to which it is likely he did not ſubmit; and it was probably for this reaſon that, as Strabo tells us, *lib.* 17. *p.* 806. they did not teach Plato every thing they knew: and perhaps they had not ſo much to teach him at that time; for the Egyptians were then, and had been for many years, under the dominion of the Perſians, and their prieſts had no doubt loſt, with the ſplendor of their hierarchy, and their authority in the ſtate, a great

ed *hieroglyphics*. But it is not proved to my ſatisfaction that hieroglyphics were at any time the written language of Egypt, in common uſe: for though there was no doubt a great deal of ſculpture upon the Egyptian obeliſks, and the walls of their temples, repreſenting various forms of things, and particularly of animals; and though there be no doubt that thoſe repreſentations had ſome allegorical or em- Ch. 3.

great deal of their philoſophy and arts. It was ſtill worſe in the days of Strabo, who tells us, *ibid.* that he ſaw, himſelf, at Hieropolis, where once reſided the moſt learned college of prieſts in Egypt, the ruins of their houſes; and there was no body then to be found in that city of any knowledge, except ſome inferior miniſters of the altar, who ſhewed the antiquities of the place, and performed to ſtrangers much the ſame office that the Ciceronis in Rome do at preſent: whereas, when Pythagoras was in Egypt, it was an independent kingdom, the moſt civilized of any then in the world, and flouriſhing in philoſophy and arts.

With reſpect to his own country, Plato does not praiſe it in the abſurd manner that Diogenes Laërtius does, who ſays, that not only philoſophy, but even the human race, began there. On the contrary, he acknowledges, that the barbarians were more antient than the Greeks, and that they got from the barbarians many arts and ſciences, particularly aſtronomy. But he every where inſiſts upon the diſtinction betwixt Greeks and barbarians, commending his own countrymen as of a nature more gentle, humane, and generous, and as improving, and carrying further every thing they had learned from the barbarians. See Plato's *Epinomis*, *pag.* 1012. *edit. Ficini.*

blematical

Ch. 3. blematical meaning, chiefly of the religious kind, as the name in Greek imports; I ſee no reaſon to believe that they ever ſupplied the place of writing, any more than our allegorical ſculpture or painting, or that they were at any time uſed for recording events. One thing at leaſt is certain, that they were not the ſacred characters of the Egyptian prieſts; for thoſe characters were undoubtedly letters, not hieroglyphics *: and if theſe could not be

* This is evident from both Herodotus and Diodorus Siculus. Herodotus, ſpeaking of the Egyptian manner of writing and computing, has theſe words, Γραμματα γραφυσι και λογιζονται ψηφοισι, Ἑλληνες μεν, ἀπὸ τῶν ἀριστερων ἐπι τὰ δεξια φεροντες τὴν χειρα, Αἰγυπτιοι δε, ἀπὸ τῶν δεξιων ἐπὶ τὰ ἀριστερα.—διφασιοισι δε γραμμασι χρεωνται· καὶ τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν ἱρα, τα δε δημοτικα καλεεται, *lib.* 2. *cap.* 36.; where he expreſsly ſays, that the Egyptians uſed two kinds of letters, the one *ſacred*, and the other *popular*. And Diodorus makes the ſame diſtinction, where he tells us, that the prieſts taught their children two kinds of letters, the one called *ſacred*, and the other of *common uſe*: Παιδευουσι δε τῦς υἱυς οἱ μεν ἱερας γραμματα διττα, τὰ τε ἱερα καλυμενα, καὶ τὰ κοινοτεραν ἐχοντα τὴν μαθησιν. *lib.* 1. *cap.* 81. *edit. Weſſeling.* And again, in the beginning of the third book, comparing the cuſtoms of the Egyptians and Ethiopians, he ſays, That among the Egyptians there were two kinds of letters; one called *vulgar* or *popular*, which every body learned; the other called *ſacred*, which the prieſts only among the Egyptians underſtood, the ſon being ſecretly taught them by the father: but among the Ethiopians, theſe ſacred letters were of common

be the invention of a barbarous age, there is much leſs reaſon to ſuppoſe, that thoſe ſymbolical Ch. 3.

common uſe: Ἴδιων γὰρ Αἰγυπτίοις ὄντων γραμμάτων, τὰ μὲν δημωδη προσηγορευομενα παντας μανθανειν, τὰ δὲ ἱερα καλυμενα παρὰ μονοις τοῖς Αἰγυπτιοις μονους γινωσκειν τῆς ἱερικῆς, παρὰ τῶν πατερων ἐν ἀπορρητοις μανθανοντας, κἀκεῖνα δὲ τοῖς Αἰθιοψιν ἁπαντας τυτοις χρησθαι τοῖς τυπις. It is true indeed, that both Herodotus and Diodorus, ſpeaking of theſe letters, uſe the word γραμμα, which in Greek is a general word denoting every kind of drawing or delineation, whether in writing or painting. But it is to be obſerved, 1mo, That the word ſimply uſed, always ſignifies what we call a *letter*. 2do, When it is applied to the ſacred characters, we cannot underſtand it in a ſenſe different from that in which it is applied to the popular, otherwiſe the diviſion into ſacred and popular would be altogether abſurd and unintelligible. Nor is it poſſible to ſuppoſe that two ſuch writers as Herodotus and Diodorus would uſe the ſame word, in the ſame ſentence, in two ſignifications ſo different as that of elemental characters, or marks of ſound, and that of ſymbolical repreſentations of things. And, *laſtly*, If there were any thing doubtful or equivocal in the matter, Diodorus has removed all doubt, by expreſsly diſtinguiſhing betwixt the γραμματα ſimply, or letters, and the γραμματα ἱερογλυφικα; for, in the paſſage laſt quoted, after having explained the uſe of the γραμματα among the Egyptians and Ethiopians, he goes in the next chapter to the explication of the hieroglyphics, which he oppoſes to the letters, in this manner: Περὶ δὲ τῶν Αἰθιοπικων γραμματων, τῶν παρ' Αἰγυπτιοις καλυμενων ἱερογλυφικων, ῥητεον, ἵνα μηδεν παραλειπωμεν τῶν ἀρχαιολογουμενων.

Thus it is evident, that thoſe who confound the ſacred characters of the Egyptians with hieroglyphics, are in a great miſtake, into which even the learned Lipſius has fallen, as appears from his notes upon the 11th book of Tacitus's Annals, c. 14. But this error, both the very learned

Ch. 3. symbolical representations, containing, as is generally supposed, deep mysteries of religion

learned Dr Warburton, in his Divine Legation, and the Count de Caylus, in his Collection of Antiquities, have avoided; and the latter has given us a specimen from antient Egyptian monuments, of both the sacred and popular writing, as quite distinct from the hieroglyphical characters.

As to the nature of this sacred sculpture, it is agreed by all, that the characters used in it, stand not, like alphabetical characters, for the marks of sounds, but express the things themselves directly and immediately. 2*do*, Whatever they may have been originally; yet, as they are described to us by antient authors, and are used upon obelisks, and other Egyptian monuments yet remaining, they are certainly symbolical or enigmatical representations of things. This account is given of them by Diodorus, in the passage last cited, where he says, that the figures used in hieroglyphics were those of animals of all kinds, the members of the human body, and likewise the organs or instruments of art, chiefly those belonging to carpentry. For, says he, this kind of written language does not express its meaning by composition of syllables, but by metaphorical or allegorical representations of things, which, by use and exercise, are fixed in the memory, and so become familiar. Συμβέβηκε τοίνυν τοῖς μὲν τύπους ἀντὶ (i. e. τῶν ἱερογλυφικῶν γραμμάτων) ὅμοιος ζώοις παντοδαποῖς καὶ ἀνθρωπίοις Ἀνθεώπων, ἔτι δὲ ὀργάνοις, καὶ μάλιστα τεκτονικοῖς. ὁ γὰρ ἐν τῆς τῶν συλλαβῶν συνθέσεως ὁ γραμματικὸς παρ' ἄντους τὸν ὑποκείμενον λόγον ἀποδίδωσιν, ἀλλ' ἐξ ὑμάσεως τῶν μεταγραφόμενων καὶ μεταφορᾶς μνήμῃ συνθλαμβάνεις. He proceeds next to explain the nature of this kind of writing among the Ethiopians, and which he supposes to be the same among the Egyptians. "The symbols they use," says he, "are a "hawk,

religion and morality, ſhould have been the invention of ſuch an age. Ch. 3.

What

" hawk, a crocodile, a ſerpent; and of the human bo-
" dy, the eye, the hand, the countenance, and ſuch
" like. And a hawk denotes every thing that is quickly
" done, becauſe this animal is the ſwifteſt of all birds,
" and therefore is uſed metaphorically, to denote every
" thing that is quick, or has any relation to quickneſs,
" in the ſame manner as we uſe metaphors in ſpeaking.
" The crocodile ſignifies all kind of wickedneſs or evil;
" the eye, being the guard or keeper of the whole body,
" is the ſymbol of juſtice; the right hand, with the
" fingers ſpread, denotes the acquiring and collecting
" what is neceſſary for life; the left hand, clinched,
" denotes the cuſtody and preſervation of thoſe things.
" The like may be ſaid of all the other figures from the
" human body, from inſtruments of art, or other things.
" Of theſe repreſentations, having made the meaning
" familiar to them by conſtant uſe, they eaſily read
" what is written in that way." *lib.* 3. *cap.* 4.

Thus far Diodorus Siculus. There are many other ſymbols of the ſame kind with thoſe he mentions, which we find in other antient authors; ſuch as, a ſerpent in a circle to denote eternity, an eye on a ſceptre to repreſent a monarch, and the like; but theſe are ſufficient for our purpoſe. And I think Diodorus, in the paſſage I have quoted, has given us, in a few words, a very clear idea of this kind of hieroglyphical writing. I ſhall not therefore trouble myſelf with explaining ſome other paſſages of antient authors upon the ſubject, particularly two quoted by Dr Warburton, and much inſiſted on by him; one from Porphyry, in his life of Pythagoras, which I hold to be irretrievably corrupted, as well as many other things in that work; and one from Clemens Alexandri-

Ch. 3. What then was the method uſed by the Egyptians before the invention of letters to

mut, which I likewiſe think is not found. Beſides, the authority of Diodorus, who lived in ſo much an earlier age, and was at ſo great pains to inform himſelf concerning Egypt, having been in the country himſelf, in order to collect materials for his hiſtory, is of much greater weight than that of either of thoſe two authors.

The next thing to be conſidered is, When the uſe of this enigmatical language began among the Egyptians? a queſtion not of eaſy ſolution. One thing appears to me certain, that it could not have been the invention of a barbarous age, and that the Egyptians muſt have been far advanced in arts and civility, and even in philoſophy, before they could have thought of expreſſing their meaning by ſuch ſymbols, ſome of which allude to properties of animals, and other natural things, not at all obvious. Another thing ſeems to be alſo certain, that the invention of letters was very early among the Egyptians; for they aſcribe the invention to a god, viz. *Theuth*, who was their Mercury. If therefore hieroglyphical writing was uſed before the invention of letters, it muſt have been uſed before the reign of Menes, their firſt king, during the reigns of their gods; that is, while the Egyptians were learning arts and civility, which were taught them by thoſe firſt kings, whom on that account they deified. That the remains of hieroglyphical writing, upon the obeliſks ſtill preſerved, are ſo old, I believe no body believes; and Dr Warburton acknowledges, that hieroglyphics continued in uſe long after the invention of letters, *Divine Legat.* book 4. ſect. 4. pag. 145. It appears therefore to be certain, that at leaſt thoſe hieroglyphical monuments ſtill extant, are not ſo old as the invention of letters.

We

to perpetuate the memory of events, or communicate knowledge to the abſent? Ch. 3.

I

We are next to inquire, for what purpoſe this enigmatical writing was employed? And that it was not uſed for recording hiſtorical events, which were intended to be publiſhed and made known to all the world, at leaſt that it was not ſo uſed in later times, after the invention of letters, a method of recording ſo much more eaſy and obvious, I hold to be certain. Even the ſacred books of the prieſts, in which the hiſtory of Egypt was contained, do not appear to me to have been written in that language. For otherwiſe Diodorus, who ſaw them, and made uſe of them in compiling his hiſtory, (lib. 1. c. 69. edit. Weſſel.), would certainly have told us ſo. And as to their inſcriptions, ſuch as that upon the firſt pyramid built by Cheops, mentioned by Herodotus, expreſſing the ſum that was expended upon the onions and garlick eaten by the workmen who built it, this hiſtorian has informed us, that it was written in Egyptian letters, γραμματα Αιγυπτια (lib. 2. c. 125); as well as another inſcription, which he mentions upon another pyramid, of which he has given us the very words tranſlated into Greek, (*ibid. cap.* 136.). And if more authority upon this head were wanting, we have that of Tacitus, who tells us, that Germanicus, in his travels through Egypt, ſaw at Thebes, which was even then in ruins, an inſcription ſtill remaining, written in Egyptian letters, (*literæ Egyptiæ*; an expreſſion which, in Latin, without any ambiguity, denotes only elemental characters), which being interpreted to Germanicus by one of the prieſts, was found to contain an account of the power and opulence of this great city, which, at the time of this inſcription, contained ſeven hundred thouſand men fit to bear arms, *Annal.* 2. *cap.* 60. Now we can hard-

Ch. 3. I think it is highly probable, (and we can ſay no more of a thing ſo far beyond all

ly ſuppoſe the obeliſks yet preſerved to be older than this inſcription, or the oldeſt pyramid; and as it appears that it was not the faſhion at that time to record facts of hiſtory in this myſterious character, I think we may ſafely conclude, that the hieroglyphics upon the obeliſks ſtill to be ſeen, are not any hiſtorical record. I am therefore of opinion, that however Kircher, that learned Jeſuit, may have erred in the explanation of the hieroglyphics upon the obeliſks, he is right in the main doctrine upon which all his explanations are founded, namely, that the hieroglyphics contained myſteries of religion and philoſophy, which the prieſts did not mean to publiſh to the whole world, but to keep ἐν ἀπορρήτοις among themſelves. And indeed, if they were not uſed for hiſtorical record, as I think I have ſhewn they were not, it is difficult to conceive for what purpoſe they could have been uſed, other than that of myſtery and concealment.

This account of the antient uſe of hieroglyphics, is perfectly agreeable to what we read concerning them in antient authors, particularly to the account which Pliny gives of two obeliſks that he ſaw at Rome, of which he ſays, *Inſcripti ambo rerum naturæ interpretationem philoſophiâ Egyptiorum continent*; *lib.* 36. *cap.* 14. *edit. Harduini.* Egypt we know was the land of myſtery, and both her religion and philoſophy were covered with that veil; from thence it ſpread all over the Eaſt, of which the wiſe men ſpoke in *parables.* It was imported into Greece by their earlieſt ſages, who travelled in Egypt, ſuch as Orpheus and Muſæus; for in the *myſteries* which thoſe ſages brought from Egypt into Greece, were contained the ſublimeſt truths of religion and philoſophy, at firſt exhibited only in allegoric ſhew, but at laſt plainly revealed to thoſe who were initiated into

all record or memory), that the method they uſed was that moſt natural and obvious Ch. 3.

into the greater myſteries, who were ſaid to be ἐποπτικοί, and to enjoy, as it were, the beatific viſion of the univerſal nature, and the firſt principles of things. See *Clement. Alexand. ſtrom.* 5.; *Strabo, lib.* 10.; and *Divine Legat. book* 2. *ſect.* 4. *pag.* 163. The philoſophy too, which Pythagoras in later times brought from Egypt, wore the diſguiſe of allegory and ſymbol, and was plainly taught by him only to thoſe who had approved themſelves worthy by a long novitiate.

This, according to my notion, was the only uſe of hieroglyphics, after the invention of letters. But were they uſed at all before that invention? And if I ſaw any reaſon to believe that the Egyptians had lived as long in a ſtate of civility and arts, without an alphabet, as the Chineſe have done, I ſhould have been of opinion, that they might have formed this myſterious philoſophical language, though it does not appear that the characters of the Chineſe are of that nature. But as it is certain that letters were invented very early in Egypt, I think the probability is, that before this diſcovery they were not ſo far advanced in philoſophy, as to have any ſuch myſterious language; and that their only way of recording things was by pictures or natural repreſentations, either at full length or abridged. From this picture-writing, I think it is likely that the firſt forms of the Egyptian letters were derived. And hence comes the connection which learned men have obſerved betwixt their alphabetical writing, and their hieroglyphics of later times; for it was natural enough, that with their hieroglyphics, they ſhould mix thoſe antient characters uſed before the invention of letters, which characters, like the hieroglyphics, ſtood for the marks of ideas, not of ſounds. And perhaps

Ch. 3. vious way of ſpeaking to the eyes, I mean by painting or carving natural repreſentations of the things they meant to expreſs. This we know was practiſed by the Mexicans before the Spaniſh conqueſt, and is at this day uſed by the Indians of North America. But as this way of recording things would be very tedious, and take up a great deal of time; and as human invention proceeds but very ſlowly; it is likely, that before the diſcovery of letters, ſome way was contrived of abridging this picture-writing, and making it more fit for common uſe. The Indians of North America are not yet ſo far advanced; but the Chineſe are. For it appears to me certain, from the beſt information that I can get concerning the Chineſe characters, that they were originally no other than the natural repreſentations of the things, which, in proceſs of time, were abridged, and at laſt ſo much

haps they might be neceſſary for connecting together the emblematical figures, and marking the connection and dependence they had upon one another: for, no doubt, in the picture-writing, there would be ſuch marks of connection, which probably were ſigns of arbitrary inſtitution.

ſhortened

ſhortened and altered, that we can now hardly ſee in any of them the original picture. Ch. 3.

From theſe abridged pictures, I think it is a very probable conjecture, that after the analyſis of articulation was diſcovered, the characters uſed to expreſs the elemental ſounds were formed. Thus far at leaſt is certain, that many of thoſe characters which are found in antient monuments of Egyptian alphabetical writing, are likewiſe to be found on their obeliſks *.

The great advantage which the uſe of letters has above any other kind of writing, is, that it connects together ſpeaking and writing, ſo as to make but one art in effect of both. For letters ſtand for ſounds, not for the ideas expreſſed by thoſe ſounds. And therefore, when the ſounds are once learned, we ſee how eaſily even our children learn the expreſſion of them by alphabetical characters; whereas, if the written characters are expreſſive of the ideas, not of the ſounds, then is the written language, and the language that

* See the *Count de Caylus's Collection of Antiquities, tom.* 1. *pag.* 65. *et ſeqq.* See alſo what Dr Warburton has ſaid upon this ſubject, in his Divine Legation.

Ch. 3. is ſpoken, entirely unconnected, and each of them requires a ſeparate ſtudy; and that of the written language, which is ſo much eaſier to be learned among us than the language that is ſpoken, becomes a moſt intricate and difficult ſtudy. Accordingly, it is a fact well known, that the Chineſe, after having learned the language they ſpeak, as we do ours, conſume their whole lives in learning their written language, that is, learning to read.

It no doubt ſhewed a great deal of ingenioufneſs, to think of making ſounds viſible, and the object of one ſenſe, by that means, to fall under the perception of another; but ſtill I am of opinion, that if we ſuppoſe, as I do, that the analyſis of the ſound of language was already made, it was no more than an ingenious thought, but not at all a great diſcovery, at leaſt not to be compared to that of the analyſis of the ſound of language *. For it was no

* Plato gives us an account of the invention both of the analyſis of the ſound of language, and of alphabetical characters The firſt is in the Philebus, *p.* 374. and the other in the Phædrus, *p* 1240. *edit. Ficini.* And he aſcribes both to ſome god or godlike man he calls Θεὺς, the ſame who in Greek was called Ἑρμῆς, and in Latin *Mercury.*

no more than finding out marks for what was known before. And if we ſuppoſe that the Egyptians, like other nations, uſed ſymbols, or repreſentations of things, before they knew the uſe of letters, it would be no more than transferring that method of repreſentation to the elements of ſound. And accordingly, the learned academician whom I mentioned before, M. de Guignes, maintains, that the alphabetical characters were made out of ſuch repreſentations. If the notation of muſic had been invented before letters, which might have happened, and perhaps did actually happen, I ſhould have thought the diſcovery juſt as great as that of letters, but not to be compared to that moſt wonderful analyſis of muſical ſounds, for expreſſing which that notation is uſed. And therefore the only diſtinction I make betwixt the two diſcoveries, is, that the Ch. 3.

Mercury. But there were ſeveral who bore that name in Egypt; and Plato does not ſay that it was the ſame one who invented both, but rather the contrary: for though he mentions ſeveral other inventions of the one who invented letters, he does not ſpeak of the analyſis of articulate ſounds as one of them; and I think it is more probable that it was a Mercury before him who made that greater diſcovery.

Ch. 3. one which was firſt, has the greateſt merit. But I think the inventor even of that one, muſt be contented to ſhare the praiſe with him who firſt deviſed a method of making the ideas of the mind viſible; for there is really no difference betwixt making ideas viſible, and ſounds viſible, if the ideas are of things not viſible.

Whether there was a progreſs in the invention of alphabetical characters, or whether they were invented all at once, is a matter of conjecture. If, as I ſuppoſe, the analyſis of articulation was not made at once, but that they ſtopt at ſyllables, it is not unlikely that a ſyllabical alphabet may have been firſt invented, ſuch as that of the Japaneſe. If, on the other hand, we ſuppoſe that there were no alphabetical characters invented till the analyſis of articulate ſounds was completed, there is no reaſon I think to believe, but that the whole alphabet would be at once completed, and that a character would be invented for every element that had been diſcovered; for it is difficult to conceive why the inventor ſhould have ſtopt ſhort, and not gone through the whole elements.

As

As to the utility of letters, I have ſaid already *, that the writing-art is not an art of *memory*, but an art of *reminiſcence*. And it is a moſt certain fact, that the practice of writing, ſo far from ſtrengthening the memory, weakens it; for this reaſon, that when we commit a thing to writing, we, as it were, diſcharge the memory of it. And accordingly, thoſe who cannot, or do not write, have much more tenacious memories than thoſe who truſt nothing to memory. I have likewiſe ſaid, that I doubted whether the uſe of letters had contributed to the improvement of knowledge; and if it be true that it weakens memory, as knowledge depends ſo much upon memory, it muſt be likewiſe true, that it retards our progreſs in knowledge. Beſides, as nothing improves knowledge ſo much as mutual intercourſe and communication of our thoughts to one another, ſuch intercourſe is better carried on by converſation, than by writing; and therefore, if the frequent uſe of writing has the effect of making converſation upon ſubjects of ſcience leſs frequent, Ch. 3.

* Part 2. book 1. ch. 2. *in fine*.

Ch. 3. which I doubt is the caſe among us, inſtead of advancing learning, it will be a hindrance to it. And accordingly I am perſuaded, that learning flouriſhed moſt both in Greece and Egypt, when there was leaſt written upon the ſubject. And particularly, in the Pythagorean ſchool, the moſt learned ſchool of philoſophy that ever was in Greece, we are informed, that nothing was committed to writing while the ſchool flouriſhed, and not till, by the perſecution of thoſe philoſophers in Italy, it was broken and diſperſed. Then indeed ſome of them, for the ſake of poſterity, committed ſome part of their philoſophy, but I believe no great part of it, to writing *; and to thoſe writings we owe what is moſt valuable in the philoſophy of Plato and Ariſtotle, the firſt of whom we know purchaſed ſome of thoſe books at a very high price †.

It cannot however be denied, that in other reſpects, the invention of writing has many advantages. In the *firſt* place, It is a method of communication betwixt

* *Jamblichus in vita Pythagoræ, ſect.* 253.

† See Diogenes Laertius *in vita Platonis.*

abſent

abſent perſons, which, in many caſes, is a matter of great utility, as well as pleaſure and ſatisfaction. 2*dly*, It is without doubt the beſt way of preſerving the memory of facts and dates; for though ſcience, whoſe chief ſeat is the underſtanding, may be continued by tradition, and delivered down from father to ſon for many generations, not only without loſs, but with increaſe; it is otherwiſe with facts, and more ſo ſtill with dates, which depending ſolely upon memory, cannot be ſo exactly preſerved by tradition only. And accordingly, the ſacred books of the Egyptians, ſo far as we can learn, contained nothing but facts, either of natural or civil hiſtory, and their dates; for it does not appear that their geometry, aſtronomy, or philoſophy, were recorded there *. But 3*dly*, One principal uſe of it is, what I have already hinted, to preſerve learning againſt ſuch a calamity as befell it in Italy, Ch. 3.

* Diodor. Siculus, who made uſe of theſe books in compiling his hiſtory, *lib.* 1. *ſect.* 69. *edit. Weſſeling.* does not ſpeak of their containing any thing elſe but facts, *ibid. ſect.* 44. And Plato, in the *Timæus*, *p.* 23. *edit. Serrani*, ſays, that all the memorable events that happened, whether in Egypt or other countries, of which they had information, were ſet down in thoſe books.

when

Ch. 3. when the Pythagorean philoſophers were maſſacred, or driven out of the country *; or againſt deſtruction of men and arts, by famine, peſtilence, or inundations of barbarous nations, ſuch as overſpread Europe, and deſtroyed the Roman empire. And it is to the manuſcripts that were ſaved in that general wreck of philoſophy, and all

* This is a fact that is little known. It is not mentioned by any hiſtorian, ſo far as I know, that has come down to us, except Polybius, who ſpeaks of it only in paſſing, *lib.* 2. *p.* 175.; and the text of Polybius is there mutilated. But the fact cannot be doubted of: for it is related by Jamblichus, in his life of Pythagoras, with many circumſtances from authors whom he quotes that are now loſt. It was the greateſt blow that ever learning got, next to the deſtruction of the Egyptian hierarchy; and it would have gone near to have extinguiſhed learning altogether, if ſome of them who eſcaped the maſſacre, had not committed their learning to writing, leſt philoſophy, that beſt gift of the gods to men, as Plato ſays, ſhould be totally loſt; *Jamb. ubi ſupra, ſect.* 253. Thoſe writings were, for a long time, concealed in the families of the authors, being tranſmitted as a ſacred depoſit, from father to ſon. But ſeveral of them at laſt came abroad, and were picked up by the philoſophers of Greece, ſuch as Plato and Ariſtotle; the laſt of whom, as I have had occaſion to obſerve, publiſhed one of them under his own name, I mean the book of *Categories*, which he has made the foundation of his ſyſtem of logic; and indeed it contains the principles of all ſcience. In ſhort, all the good philoſophy we have now in Europe, is little more than fragments that had been ſaved out of this ſhipwreck of learning in Italy, one of the greateſt events in the hiſtory of learning, though ſo little known.

ſcience,

ſcience, that we owe all the learning we have at preſent in Europe. Ch. 3.

Having ſaid thus much concerning the invention of letters, and the utility of them, I will proceed to follow them from Egypt to Greece; whither they were brought firſt by the Pelaſgi, and afterwards by Cadmus, with ſome variation, no doubt, of the form. Whether there was any addition made in Egypt to the firſt invention of them, is, as I have ſaid, a doubtful point. But it is certain that after they came to Greece, there was no addition made to them by the Greeks of any value. The original Egyptian letters were ſixteen in number, viz. five vowels, ſix mutes ſimple and middle, four liquids, and the ſolitary letter σ. With theſe it is likely there came a mark of aſpiration, or an *h*, ſuch as we have in the Roman alphabet, and in ſome antient Greek monuments. To theſe Palamedes added marks for the three aſpirated conſonants, and alſo for the double conſonant ξ. Then came Simonides, who added two other characters for double conſonants, viz. ψ and ζ, and likewiſe marks for two long vowels, viz. the long ι and the long ο.

But

Ch. 3. But these additions, I say, were no improvements, but rather corruptions of the alphabet. For with respect to the double letters, they are at best only an abridgement of the orthography: but I say further, that two of them are equivocal characters; for ξ stands either for κς or γς, and ψ either for πς or βς. And as to the aspirated letters, they too are no more than a short-hand way of writing, such as that which is used for marking the aspiration of the vowels; and accordingly the Latins, and we too in Britain, mark our aspirations very well, both of vowels and consonants, by the original mark of aspiration, viz. the letter *h* *, without

* This is not, properly speaking, a letter, but a mark of aspiration; and accordingly was so used antiently by the Greeks, who wrote Ηεκατον in place of ἑκατον, as it is now written. And the marks of the two spirits, they say, were taken from the division of the antient mark of aspiration, the one half of it, with a bend towards the right hand, being used to denote the *spiritus asper*, and the other half, with a bend the other way, the *spiritus lenis*. And here again we may observe, that the antient manner of writing was more sensible; for they had only a mark for the *spiritus asper*, judging it unnecessary, as it really is, to have any mark at all for the *spiritus lenis*.

Palamedes's

Palamedes's invention. And it may be observed, that this way of marking the aſpiration, ſhews the nature of it better than Palamedes's characters: for they have probably led the grammarians into what I hold to be a miſtake, that the aſpiration belongs to conſonants; whereas it belongs, as I have ſaid, primarily to vowels, and only conſequentially to the conſonants, by their being joined to aſpirated vowels. Thus when I write *Cethegus* in Latin, it is evident that it is the vowel *e* that is aſpirated; whereas, when I uſe Palamedes's character, and write Κέθηγος, it may be thought, and is commonly thought, that the aſpiration belongs principally to the conſonant *t*. And as to Simonides's marks for the long ε and long ο, if he had carried the invention farther, and deviſed marks for all the long vowels, it might have been ſo far uſeful, that it would have ſaved writing; but as he did not carry it ſo far, he had much better have let it alone altogether, and then it is likely the old way of writing would have continued, of doubling the character when the vowel is long, of Ch. 3.

Ch. 3. writing, for example, *aa*, when the *a* was long *.

But though these additions, made by the Greeks to the Egyptian alphabet, were neither necessary nor useful; some corrections which they made upon their own orthography, were certainly a great improvement. For the letter ε, among them, stood for three different sounds, the short ε, the long η, and the diphthong ει, which was the name of the letter. The long η they expressed, as I have just now said, by doubling the character; but it was certainly very blundering to make the letter stand for the name they happened to give it. They might as well have made α stand for the sound ἄλφα, or ϛ for ϛητα. In like manner the letter ο stood not only for both long and short ο, (which ambiguity was removed by writing it double), but also for the diphthong υ, probably for the same reason that ε stood for ει, namely, because υ was the name they gave the letter.

* This was the antient practice among the Latins, as appears from Quinctilian; and probably also among the Greeks. See what I say further of this subject, when I come to treat of accents.

Several

Several other obſervations might be made upon the Greek alphabet, but enough has been ſaid of the alphabet of a particular language: and I ſhall conclude this part of the analyſis of language, after having made a few obſervations upon the Roman and Engliſh alphabet. Ch. 3.

The Roman alphabet was, as I have ſhewn elſewhere, the antient Greek alphabet, probably more antient than that which Cadmus brought into Greece; and as I have ſaid, it was no worſe for wanting the additional letters invented by Palamedes and Simonides. But as the Latin was a dialect of the Æolic, and as the Æolic uſed very much the ſound of the digamma, which reſembled the ſound of our *w*, the Romans had the ſame ſound, but did not uſe the character, making the letter *u* and *v* (for both forms were uſed indiſcriminately) ſtand both for the vowel and the digamma; for as to their letter *f*, it neither expreſſed the Greek φ, nor the Æolic digamma, but a ſound different from either, and a very unpleaſant one, as appears from the paſſage above quoted from Quinctilian, *lib.* 12. *cap.* 10. To ſupply this defect in the

Ch. 3. Latin alphabet, Claudius, the Emperor, introduced the uſe of the Æolic digamma, marked like a Roman F reverſed, which is ſtill to be ſeen in ſome antient inſcriptions, but went out of uſe after his death *.

As to our Engliſh alphabet, it is certainly very faulty. For the firſt letter has three ſounds: *firſt*, the common ſound of *a*; then the ſound of the diphthong *au*; and *laſtly*, the ſound of the Greek *ᾱ*: and yet there is but one character to expreſs all the three. Then the *i* ſupplies the double office, expreſſing both the genuine ſound of that letter, and of the diphthong *ai*. *E*, in like manner, ſtands both for its own ſound, and the ſound of *i*; and *u* is ſometimes the diphthong *eu*, and ſometimes the plain vowel, or rather the diph-

* See what Mr Foſter has collected upon the ſubject of the digamma, pag. 122. of his Eſſay, to which may be added the paſſage I quoted above from Quinctilian, *lib.* 12. *cap.* 10.; and alſo what Mr Foſter has obſerved from Mr Dawes, concerning the effect of this digamma, in making the preceding vowel long, as in the perfect tenſes of the third and fourth Latin conjugation; for in the preterite *cupii* and *audii*, the firſt *i* is ſhort, but by inſerting the digamma betwixt them, it becomes long, as in *cupivi* and *audivi*.

thong

thong *u*; for, as I obſerved, we have not in Engliſh the genuine ſound of that vowel. Then, with reſpect to conſonants, the *c* is an ambiguous character; for it is ſometimes ſounded hard as the *k*, and ſometimes ſoft as the *ſ*; and the *t* is often ſounded as *ſh*. And in the combinations of conſonants in ſyllables, we do not always give them the ſame ſound; for the *th* in *thing* is a much ſtronger aſpirate than in *then* or *though*. Ch. 3.

CHAP. IV.

Of the antient accents.—That they were real notes of muſic, diſtinct from the quantity of the ſyllable.—What accent in Engliſh is?

I Come now to the analyſis of the ſecond part of the matter of language, of which I propoſed to treat, viz. the *Proſody*. And here I am to ſpeak of a thing ſo little underſtood in modern times, that ſome even deny the exiſtence of it; I mean, the *melody* of language, as the antients called it; Ch. 4.

Ch. 4. it; which, as we ſhall ſhew in the ſequel, made a conſiderable part of the beauty of their compoſition. For the better underſtanding it, it will be neceſſary to go back to that higher genus which I mentioned in the beginning of this book, namely, *ſound*. For melody, as I have already obſerved, belongs not to language, as articulated voice, but as ſound, being common to it with muſic.

Sound is defined by antient authors to be a percuſſion of the air, perceivable by the ſenſe of hearing *. Now ſound ſimply without articulation, may be conſidered in a threefold view. For it is louder or ſofter;—it is higher or lower, as to muſical modulation, or, in other words, is acuter or graver;—or, laſtly, it is of ſhorter or longer duration. The firſt of theſe differences does not belong to the art of language, (except ſo far as concerns the pronunciation of ſyllables in Engliſh, of which I ſhall ſay more hereafter): for men ſpeak, and make other noiſes, loud or ſoft, as occaſions require, which are too many and various to be comprehended by

* Φορος μὲν ἐστι πληγὴ ἀέρος αἰσθητὴ ἀκοῇ. *Ammon.* ἀς τὸ περὶ ἁρμονίας, *fol.* 25. See alſo *Euclid, ſect. Can.* in initio.

rules.

rules. But the other two make part of the grammatical art, at leaſt in the antient languages. Ch. 4.

The firſt of theſe, as I have ſaid, is called *proſody*; a word which I obſerve is frequently applied very improperly to quantity *; for προσῳδια in Greek exactly anſwers to the Latin word *accentus*, and denotes that tune or melody which is annexed to, or accompanies ſpeech †: and it is of the analyſis of this melody that I am now to treat.

* In the common Latin grammars, it is uſed to ſignify that part of grammar which treats both of quantity and accent; and it is ſo uſed even in the learned Voſſius's grammar.

† This is the ſenſe in which the word is conſtantly uſed by Dionyſius the Halicarnaſſian, in his moſt accurate treatiſe of Compoſition, ſo often quoted, particularly in *ſect.* 25. where he expreſsly diſtinguiſhes it from quantity; for ſpeaking of the accidents of words, he mentions ἐκτασεις τε καὶ συστολας, καὶ προσῳδιας. The learned Theodorus Gaza, in his grammar, ſpeaks the ſame language, Προσῳδια ἐστι τασις ποια τῆς φωνης ἐγγραμματυ προς ὑφωσιαν τῦ ὅλυ λογυ; and then he proceeds to define τονος, as that of which the προσῳδια was compoſed. And Demetrius Triclinius, an antient grammarian, gives the ſame *ratio nominis* that I have given; for ſpeaking of the marks of accents and ſpirits, he adds, Ἃ δη καὶ προσῳδιας ὀνομασαν ὡς προς τὴν ῳδὴν καὶ τὴν ἐκφωνησιν τῶν συλλαβῶν συντιλυσας. *Preſat. ad Ariſtophan.*

Like

Ch. 4. Like every other melody it ariſes from a combination of ſounds, and is reſolveable into what is called φθογγος in Greek, and in Engliſh a *note*, which is defined by Ariſtoxenus, an antient writer upon muſic, to be "one ſtretch or extenſion of the voice *;" that is, as I underſtand it, a continuation of the voice in the ſame tone, without ſtop or interval, and without change.

A note may have all the three qualities of ſound above mentioned: for it may be loud or ſoft; long or ſhort; acute or grave. But it is of this laſt quality only that I am now to ſpeak †.

And firſt it is apparent, that acuteneſs and gravity are relative qualities, as well as length and ſhortneſs: for it is impoſſible to conceive a ſound either acute or grave, but in relation to another ſound; and in general there is in muſic nothing abſolute,

* Φωνης ἁπλωσις ἐπι μιαν τασιν. *Harmonic. lib.* 1. *p.* 15.

† Thoſe who are entirely ignorant of muſic, may imagine, that loud and acute, grave and ſoft, in ſounds, are the ſame. But they are quite different; for the ſound of a cannon is one of the graveſt ſounds that can be made, and at the ſame time one of the loudeſt.

but

but it is altogether a ſcience of ratios and proportions. But the queſtion is, What is it that makes this acuteneſs or gravity in ſounds? And for ſolution of this queſtion, we muſt go ſtill a little higher than we have hitherto done, I mean, to an idea more general than even that of *ſound*, viz. *motion*: for all ſound is motion; and if all things were at reſt, there would not, as Euclid ſays, be either ſound or voice *. Ch. 4.

It is therefore evident, that acuteneſs or gravity in ſounds muſt be certain modifications of the motion which produces them. And Ariſtotle has told us, that when the ſound is acute, there is much motion in little time; when it is grave, it is little motion in much time †. This is

* *Euclid. ſect. Canonis, in initio.*

† Euclid has ſaid the ſame thing, but at more length, in the beginning of his *ſectio Canonis*. His words are, Τῶν δὲ κινήσεων αἱ μὲν πυκνότεραι εἰσὶ, αἱ δὲ ἀραιότεραι· καὶ αἱ μὲν πυκνότεραι ὀξυτέρους ποιοῦσι τοὺς φθόγγους, αἱ δὲ ἀραιότεραι βαρυτέρους. Ἀναγκαῖον δὲ τοὺς μὲν ὀξυτέρους εἶναι, ἐπὶ ἐκ πυκνοτέρων καὶ πλειόνων συγκεῖται κινήσεων· τοὺς δὲ βαρυτέρους (*lege* βαρυτέρους) ἐπὶπερ ἐξ ἀραιοτέρων καὶ ἐλασσόνων συγκεῖται κινήσεων. From whence it appears, that Euclid knew in ſubſtance the doctrine of our modern philoſophy concerning ſounds, though I am perſuaded he never made experiments ſuch as that German philoſopher made, who diſcovered that a ſtring of ſuch a length and ſuch a thickneſs, and ſtretched by ſuch a weight, made ſo many vibrations in a ſecond.

Ch. 4. truly ſaid, but ſhortly: it therefore needs to be explained; and the diſcoveries of our modern experimental philoſophy have enabled us to do it.

For it is now found out, that the percuſſion of the air, by which the antients defined ſound, is cauſed by the percuſſion of ſome elaſtic body, whoſe vibrations, thereby produced, being communicated to the air, and by the air propagated to the ear, produce the ſenſation of hearing. A ſtring or wire, ſtretched, has been found the moſt proper ſubject for ſuch experiments. If the vibrations of this ſtring are greater or leſs, that is, occupy more or leſs ſpace, then is the note louder or ſofter; if there are more or fewer vibrations in the ſame time, then is the note acuter or graver; and, laſtly, if the ſtring continues to vibrate for a greater or leſs time, without any ſenſible variation of the ſound, then is the note longer or ſhorter: ſo that here we have the threefold diviſion of ſound above mentioned.

That there are all theſe differences in muſic, no man will deny who has only a natural ear, though he never was taught the art; and that two of them, at leaſt, take

take place in language, is as impoſſible to deny. The only queſtion therefore is with reſpect to the third, viz. the diſtinction of acuteneſs and gravity, whether it applies to language. Nor was even this diſputed till of late. But Mr Foſter, in his eſſay above mentioned *, has made the matter ſo perfectly clear, that I will not ſay a word upon the ſubject. And indeed it appears to me, that nothing but abſolute ignorance of the nature of the antient languages, or the moſt violent prejudice, can induce a man to be of another opinion. One reaſon, perhaps, that may have led ſome people into it, is the improper uſe above mentioned of the word *proſody*, by applying it to quantity, and not to accent. This, I imagine, has made Iſaac Voſſius, among others, believe, that quantity and accent were the ſame, or at leaſt that the long ſyllable always was accented †. Another Ch. 4.

* This eſſay did not fall into my hands till I had begun to write upon this ſubject, and had formed the opinion which I was glad to find ſo well ſupported by Mr Foſter. His eſſay is indeed full of excellent grammatical learning, and has furniſhed me with ſeveral authorities, of which I have made uſe.

† The work of Iſaac Voſſius I refer to, is what he

Ch. 4. other probably has been, that there is no accent ſuch as the Greek and Latin accents, in any modern language, as I ſhall afterwards ſhew. And, laſtly, the impoſſibility for us, that are not accuſtomed to it, to ſound thoſe antient accents, has perſuaded many people that it was as impoſſible for the antients to do it.

Taking it therefore for granted, that this antient proſody was, as the name imports, applicable to language; the next thing to be conſidered is, how it was applied. And we are informed, by the antient writers, that it was applied to ſyllables; that is to ſay, that different ſyllables of the ſame word were pronounced with tones differing in acuteneſs and gravity, and ſometimes the ſame ſyllable, as ſhall be afterwards more particularly explained.

But, in the *firſt* place, it is to be obſerved, that this ſyllabic tone is very different from the general tone of a language; for each language has a particular tone with which it is ſpoken. But this

has written, *De viribus rythmi, et cantu poëmatum*; a work written in ſuch excellent Latin, that I read it with pleaſure, though I could find no ſenſe or matter in it of any value.

national

national tone, as it may be called, affects the whole tenor of the ſpeech, not words only, and much leſs ſyllables. Ch. 4.

2dly, It is alſo to be diſtinguiſhed from the tones of paſſion or ſentiment, by which the feelings of the mind are expreſſed; for theſe belong to words or ſentences, not to ſyllables.

And, *laſtly*, It is likewiſe to be diſtinguiſhed from the variation of loud and ſoft in diſcourſe; for we may raiſe our voice in ſpeaking, or ſink it, without any variation of the tone. And in this way we may alter our voice, not only upon words and ſentences, but upon ſyllables; which, as I ſhall ſhew afterwards, is what we call *accent* in Engliſh.

But the antient accents are real notes of muſic, or variations of the tone, by which the voice is raiſed higher, with reſpect to muſical modulation, upon one ſyllable of a word, than upon another: and this ſyllable is ſaid to have an acute accent, while all the reſt of the ſyllables are pronounced with what is called a *grave accent*; that is, they are pronounced upon a level with the reſt of the diſcourſe, or in that key in which the diſcourſe is taken up

Ch. 4. up *. For it is an invariable rule of accenting, both in Greek and Latin, that only one ſyllable of a word, how many ſoever there be, has an acute accent; for it ſeems they thought, that the raiſing the tone upon more than one ſyllable of the word, would have made the pronunciation of common ſpeech too various and complicated, and too like chanting.

There is a third accent in thoſe languages, called the *circumflex*, which is compoſed of the other two. This happens when the tone is both raiſed and depreſſed upon the ſame ſyllable, which never can be but when the vowel is long; for a long vowel in Greek and Latin was ſounded like two ſhort vowels of the ſame kind; and it was ſo written, according to the

* That this is the true notion of a grave accent, is evident from a paſſage of Dionyſius Thrax, in his ſhort but elegant treatiſe of Grammar, publiſhed by Fabricius, in the 7th volume of his Greek library. He defines accent to be, Φωνης ἀπηχησις ἐναρμονιου, ἢ κατ' ἀνατασιν ἐν τῇ ὀξειᾳ, ἢ κατ' ὁμαλισμον ἐν τῇ βαρειᾳ, ἢ κατὰ περιπλασιν ἐν τῇ περισπωμενῃ. So that the grave accent is the fundamental or ordinary level of the ſpeech; and therefore the mark of it is never uſed, except upon the laſt ſyllable of a word; and then it denotes not the grave, but the acute accent. For what reaſon this ſtrange practice has been introduced, I never could learn, nor do I ſee any reaſon for marking two accents, more than for marking two ſpirits.

antient

antient Latin orthography *. Such a ſyl- Ch. 4.
lable therefore might be conſidered as two ſyllables, upon one of which the tone was raiſed, and upon the other depreſſed †. And thus we ſee that thoſe languages had in this matter, all the variety that the nature of the thing will admit; for every ſyllable among them had either an acute accent, or a grave accent, or both.

But how much was the tone of the voice to be elevated in ſounding the acute accent? or was it left to the arbitrary will of every ſpeaker, to raiſe his voice more or leſs, as he thought proper? If that was

* See what Mr Foſter has very well ſaid upon this ſubject, in his Eſſay, pag. 38.; to which I will only add, that in ſome of the antient Roman monuments, particularly the laws of the Twelve Tables, inſtead of writing the character double for the long *i*, they wrote a great character thus, *I*. There is reaſon to think, that the Greeks wrote in the ſame way, before they invented different characters to expreſs ſome of their long vowels. Plato, in the Cratylus, pag. 282. if I underſtand him rightly, ſays, that they wrote two *epſilons* in place of the *eta*, and the figure of the *omega* is plainly the two *omicrons* joined together.

† In this way the circumflex accent is explained by Scaliger, *De cauſis linguæ Latinæ, lib. 2. cap. 60.*; and it is in this ſenſe we are to underſtand the antient authors who ſpeak of the circumflex, as being a *middle* between the acute and grave.

the

Ch. 4. the caſe, it is plain, that the antients, in ſpeaking, muſt have often run into cant; for an elevation and fall of the voice, to a certain degree, will make a kind of ſinging. But neither, in this reſpect, was the Greek language defective; for in it the boundaries were fixed betwixt the melody of ſpeech and muſical modulation. This appears from a paſſage in Dionyſius the Halicarnaſſian's treatiſe, upon Compoſition, that I have ſo often quoted; which paſſage, if it had been rightly underſtood by thoſe who have argued againſt the Greek accents, it is impoſſible, I think, that they could have been of that opinion; for it not only proves the exiſtence of ſuch accents, but explains moſt accurately the nature and meaſure of them. I will therefore give the paſſage rendered into Engliſh; but before I do that, I will, for the ſake of thoſe grammarians who know nothing of the principles of muſic, explain a little of the nature of muſical tones; becauſe I ſuſpect it is the want of knowledge of theſe which has made Mr Foſter's adverſaries not give ſufficient attention to this paſſage.

The Greeks uſed the ſame ſcale of muſic

fic that we uſe, viz. the diatonic ſcale, Ch. 4.
which riſes by certain intervals or degrees, from any given pitch of the voice, called, in the language of muſic, the *fundamental*, to that note which is known by the name of *octave*; and the degrees or intervals by which the voice riſes to the octave, are meaſured by numbers. And as the riſe is chiefly by what is called *tones*, the ſcale has from thence the name of *diatonic*. The interval of a tone is as 8 : 9, if it be a greater tone; or of 9 : 10, if it be a leſſer tone: and there is a ſmaller interval ſtill, called a *ſemitone*, which is as 15 : 16. By theſe intervals of tones, greater and leſſer, and ſemitones, making all together ſeven notes, beſides the fundamental, the voice riſes in a natural and eaſy aſcent to the octave above mentioned, which has that name from its order in the ſcale, being the *eighth* note, including the fundamental, to which it is in the ratio of 2 : 1.

Of theſe ſeven notes all our muſic is compoſed, as all the words of our language are compoſed of the four and twenty elementary ſounds. For though in muſic we go far above the eighth note, it is by the ſame intervals; ſo that all further

Ch. 4. progreſſion upwards, is but a repetition of the firſt ſeven notes, the octave ſerving always for a new fundamental. This way we proceed upwards to a ſecond, third, or fourth octave, or as far as any voice or inſtrument will go *.

This ſcale, though it has been found convenient to divide it into the intervals above mentioned, yet is capable of being divided into intervals very much ſmaller. And accordingly, in ſome ſpecieſes of the antient muſic, the ſcale was divided not only into tones and ſemitones, but likewiſe into third parts of tones, and even the fourth parts of tones, which laſt they called διεσις. But in their diatonic ſcale, they proceeded, as we do, by tones and half-tones. This progreſs we mark by numbers 2, 3, 4, and ſo on, reckoning the fundamental always one. And in like manner the antients proceeded; but what we call a *fourth*, they called the διατεσσαρων; becauſe

* It is a curious problem, How it comes to paſs that the power of nature can go no farther in muſical modulation than an octave? The fact is undoubtedly ſo; but I do not know that it ever has been demonſtrated, though I think it might eaſily be ſo, if this were the proper place.

it

it went through four degrees, including the fundamental, viz. two tones and a half above the fundamental. And the next note, which we call the *fifth*, conſiſting of three tones and a half above the fundamental, they for the ſame reaſon called διὰ τεσσάρων. And the octave, which goes through all the notes of the ſcale, they called διὰ πασῶν. The other ſteps of the progreſs they marked by words, as we do, expreſſing their order. Thus the firſt degree above the fundamental they called διτονον, as we call it a *ſecond*. Ch. 4.

This being premiſed, I come now to the paſſage before us, in which the Halicarnaſſian, after having laid it down, that the beauty of compoſition conſiſts in the melody, rhythm, variety, and, laſtly, what is proper or ſuitable to the ſubject; and after having told us, that the compoſition of words, even in proſe, is a kind of muſic, differing from ſinging or inſtrumental muſic only in the quantity, that is, the more or leſs, not in quality or kind; and that words have their melody, rhythm, and other things above mentioned, as well as muſic; he proceeds to explain the melody of words as follows.

Ch. 4.

" The melody of common ſpeech," ſays he, " is meaſured nearly by one interval, " that namely which is commonly called the " διατονε. Nor does it riſe beyond three " tones and a half towards the acute, nor " is it let down further towards the grave. " But every word has not the ſame tone; " for ſome are ſounded with an acute tone, " ſome with a grave, and ſome have both. " Of theſe laſt ſome have the acute and " grave blended together, in the ſame ſyl- " lable, which are called *circumflected ſyl-* " *lables*; others have them on different " ſyllables, each of which preſerves its " own proper accent, whether grave or " acute, diſtinct and ſeparate from that " of any other. In the diſſyllables of this " kind, the one is grave and the other a- " cute, and betwixt theſe there can be no " middle; but in words of many ſyllables " of whatever kind, there is but one " which is accented acute, while all the " reſt are grave. This is the melody of " ſpeech; but vocal and inſtrumental mu- " ſic uſe more intervals, not the διατονε on- " ly; for beginning with the διαπασων, they " go through the διατονε, the διατεσσαρων, the " διατονον, or (as it ought to be written) " the

"the διτονον, the ἡμιτονιον, and, as some think, "even the διεσις *." Ch. 4.

This passage not only shews, as I have said, that the Greek accents were really notes of music, but also gives us the measure of them, and further marks the difference betwixt the melody of speech and music: which he makes to consist in two things; *first*, That the melody of speech does not rise above a fifth, whereas music goes to an octave, or much higher; *2dly*, The degrees or intervals in music, either

* The passage is in the 11th section of the treatise of Composition. It is too long to be here transcribed. There is no difficulty in it to those who understand the language and the subject; nor was it possible that the author could have used clearer words to express that the accents were musical tones. I shall only observe, that when he says ὁ μην ἁπασα γε ἡ λεξις, ἡ καθ' ἑν μοριον λογυ ταττομενη, τῆς ἀυτης λεγεται τασεως, the addition to the word λεξις, of the description of ἡ καθ' ἑν μοριον λογυ ταττομενη, is only to remove the ambiguity of this word in Greek. For λεξις signifies either the whole style and composition, or a single word or part of speech, in which last sense it answers exactly to the Latin word *dictio*. In each of these senses I observe it used by the same author in the third section of the same treatise. I have therefore translated it simply by *word*, which in English is not ambiguous, without the addition that Mr Foster makes of "that is "placed in a sentence," pag. 142. which appears to me foreign to the sense of the author.

below

Ch. 4. below or above the fifth, are exactly marked. But that was not the case in speech; for the voice did not rise exactly to a fifth on the acute accent, but near to to it, (ὡς ἐγγιστα), so as sometimes to be above it, and sometimes below it; and in falling to the grave, they did not pitch exactly upon the fourth, third, or any particular note below it. And this must necessarily have happened, as the voices of the speakers were of greater or less compass, or their ear more or less just.

But there is another difference betwixt the melody of speech and of music, observed by Aristoxenus *, and other antient writers upon music, That the melody of speech is συνεχης, or continued, while musical melody is διαστηματικος, or distinguished by intervals; by which is meant, that in speech the notes succeed one another so quickly, that the intervals can hardly be perceived; whereas the intervals in music are easily distinguishable, the different

* *Aristoxen. Harmonics, pag.* 9. in the Collection of Meibomius. See also Gaudentius, another writer on music, contained in the same collection. His words are, Ὁι μὲν ἐν τῇ λογικῇ, καθ' ἣν ἀλλήλοις διαλεγόμεθα, φθόγγοι συνεχῶς ἐπὶ τοῖς τον τόπον τοῦτον διεξέρχονται, ῥύσει τινι πεπονθότες παραπλήσιον, ἐπὶ τὸ ὀξὺ, καὶ ἀνάπαλιν, οὐκ ἐπὶ μιᾶς ἱστάμενοι τάσεως.

notes

notes being more exactly marked, and the voice reſting longer upon them. And therefore, ſays our author, the language of paſſion is more muſical than common ſpeech; becauſe, when we are affected by paſſion, we generally dwell longer upon the ſame note. Ch. 4.

It appears therefore to be exactly juſt, what the Halicarnaſſian ſays, that the melody of ſpeech differs from muſical modulation only in degree, not in kind *.

The

* The account I have here given of the antient muſic, is taken from the authors in the collection of Meibomius. As we are upon the ſubject of analyſing language, it may not be improper to obſerve how wonderful the diſcovery was of this analyſis of muſical ſounds, and of the application of numbers to meaſure the tones of a voice or inſtrument. I think it a greater diſcovery than even that of the analyſis of ſpeech into its elemental ſounds; becauſe there was there no application of numbers; and beſides, that analyſis itſelf appears to me more eaſy and obvious. The diſcovery is aſcribed to Pythagoras, by thoſe writers upon muſic, and the authors of his life, who tell a blundering ſtory about his making experiments with a ſtring, ſtretched by different weights. And it is ſaid, he diſcovered that the tones were in the ratio of the weights, *cæteris paribus*; whereas the fact is, that they are as the ſquare-roots of the weights. But the cuſtom of Pythagoras's ſcholars was, to aſcribe to him as diſcoverer every thing he taught them. And we may as well ſuppoſe that his geometry, theology, and every

Ch. 4. The chief objection that I believe many people have to this account of the accents, is

every other ſcience, taught in the ſchool, was of his invention. The truth therefore, I believe, is, that he brought this ſcience of muſic with him from Egypt, along with other ſciences, (for that he was the firſt who taught it to the Greeks, and gave them the uſe and knowledge of the octave, which they had not before, I have not the leaſt doubt). Nor do I think ſuch a diſcovery could have been made, except in a country ſuch as Egypt, where there was a claſs of men ſet apart for the ſtudy of the ſciences. And beſides this advantage, a nation muſt have laſted a long time, and advanced far in other ſciences, before they could have made ſuch a diſcovery. Further, we know very well that muſic was very much practiſed, not only in their religious ceremonies; but, as Plato informs us, it was made a part of the education of their youth, and regulated by law. And he ſpeaks of pieces of muſic of their goddeſs Iſis many thouſand years old, but which were ſtill preſerved in his time. *See Plato de Legibus, lib. 2. p. 789. and 790. edit Ficini.* Now I cannot conceive how they could have been preſerved for ſo great a number of years, with that religious exactneſs which Plato ſuppoſes, unleſs they were noted, or ſome way or other put in writing. And if they had a notation of muſic, as well as of ſpeech, it is evident that they muſt have made the analyſis of the one as well as of the other.

The antient art of muſic appears to me to be leſs known to the moderns, than any other antient art; and accordingly they have fallen into great miſtakes concerning it. I will venture to ſay, that we have not even an idea of their excellence in that art, becauſe we know nothing of two kinds of their muſic which were the moſt excellent:

is the impracticability of them. For how, will they ſay, is it poſſible that the voice ſhould Ch. 4.

excellent: for we know nothing but the diatonic muſic, which they knew alſo; but it was among them the muſic only of the vulgar; whereas the other two kinds, viz. the *chromatic* and *enharmonic*, were the muſic of the learned, and the connoiſſeurs. Now the muſic of theſe two kinds, proceeded by intervals ſo ſmall, as a third or fourth part of a tone, of which we have no practice, nor hardly an idea, except what we may get from an Æolus harp, or the muſic of the birds. And the later antient writers upon muſic tell us, that thoſe two kinds of muſic were much diſuſed in their time, and that hardly any body could be found that was able to practiſe them. And Plutarch, in his treatiſe of Muſic, ſays, that even as early as his time, the enharmonic, which was the muſic moſt eſteemed and practiſed of old, was quite neglected; the intervals of it not underſtood; and they even went ſo far as to deny that the diviſion of the ſemitone, which they called διεσις, was perceptible by the ſenſe, *edit. Froben, p.* 558. And there is a fragment preſerved of Longinus, where, ſpeaking of muſic, he applies to it this verſe of Homer, κλεος μεν ἀκουομεν, ουδε τι ἰδμεν: "We only "hear the fame of it, but know nothing of it."

Further, there are perſons among us ſo ignorant, as to doubt, and even to deny, that the antients knew and practiſed muſic in parts. The contrary of this may be proved by many paſſages in antient authors. I will mention only two or three that I think have not been taken notice of. The firſt is from the *Sophiſta* of Plato, *pag.* 177. *edit. Fic.* where, ſpeaking of letters, he ſays, ſome of them join together to make ſyllables, and ſome of them do not. Then he aſks, to what art it belongs to know what will join or will not join with what? The anſwer is, to the grammatical art. Then follows, τι δε περι τὰς τῶν φ-

Ch. 4. ſhould ſtart at once up to a fifth, from one ſyllable of a word to another, and often

ξεων καὶ βαρεων φθογγους; ἀρ' οὐκ οὕτως; — ὁ μεν τους συγκεραννυμενους τε καὶ μη τεχνην ἐχων γιγνωσκειν, μουσικος· ὁ δε μη συνιεις, ἀμουσος. The meaning of which is, that as the grammarian knows what articulate ſounds will mix together, and what will not; ſo the muſician knows what notes of muſic will mix together, and what not. Now this mixture of ſounds, like that of letters in a ſyllable, can be nothing elſe but what we call *harmony*. The next paſſage I ſhall mention is from Plutarch, in his *Quæſtiones Platonicæ*, where he very particulary deſcribes the way in which the acute and grave ſounds mix together, and the effect which that mixture produces. The words are, Ὀξὺς μὲν γὰρ ὁ ταχὺς γίνεται, βαρὺς δὲ ὁ βραδύς· διὸ καὶ πρότερον κινοῦσι τὴν ἀισθησιν οἱ ὀξεις· ὅταν δε τούτοις ἤδη μαραινομένοις καὶ ἀπολιγομένοις οἱ βραδεῖς ἐπιβάλωσιν ἀρχόμενοι, τὸ κραθὲν ἀυτῶν, δι' ὁμοιοπαθείαν, ἡδονὴν τῇ ἀκοῇ παρεσχεν, ἣν συμφωνίαν καλοῦσι. Here we have harmony, or ſymphony, as Plutarch calls it, and the effects of it upon the ear, very well deſcribed For, if I am not much miſtaken, it will be found by experience, that the acute ſtrikes the ear firſt with a quick impulſe, and that we do not perceive the mixture of the grave, till the acute begins to die away. The third paſſage I ſhall mention, is from Longinus, *De Sublimitate*, *ſect*. 28. where, ſpeaking of the figure called *periphraſis*, he ſays, it is, with reſpect to the proper expreſſion, what the accompaniment in muſic is to the melody or air, as it is commonly called. The words are, ὡς γὰρ ἐν μουσικῇ διὰ τῶν παραφώνων καλουμένων ὁ κύριος φθόγγος ἡδιων ἀποτελεῖται, οὕτως ἡ περίφρασις πολλάκις συμφθέγγεται τῇ κυριολογίᾳ, καὶ ὡς κόσμον ἐπιπολὺ συνηχεῖ. Here we have a concert deſcribed as exactly as is poſſible. The κύριος φθόγγος is the proper expreſſion for the air or melody, which is or ought to be predominant through the whole piece; and if one were to tranſlate into Greek *accompaniment*, one could

ten upon the ſame ſyllable, and then be let down again as many degrees, and as ſuddenly? Ch. 4.

could not find a more proper word to expreſs it than περιφώνη. And it may be obſerved, that in order to make out the ſimile, and apply the caſe of the periphraſe to the concert, he uſes the word συνηχῶ, which preciſely denotes *conſonance*. The laſt authority I ſhall mention, is from the above-mentioned treatiſe of Plutarch, concerning Muſic, where he gives the reaſon why the ſmall intervals of the enharmonic were not practiſed in his time, namely, becauſe they could not make a harmony which ſuited them, *pag.* 558. *edit. Froben.* When we join theſe authorities to thoſe commonly quoted from Ariſtotle, *De mundo*, and Seneca, it makes the matter, in my apprehenſion, abſolutely clear; and indeed the very definition they give of conſonance, or *ſymphony*, as they call it, decides at once the queſtion, συμφωνία δέ ἐστι, ſays Ælian the Platonic, quoted by Iſaac Voſſius, in his treatiſe, *De viribus ryhthmi*, δυοιν ἢ πλειονων φθογγων ὀξυτητι καὶ βαρυτητι διαφεροντων κατὰ τὸ ἁυτο πτωσις καὶ χρασις: than which the Greek language affords no words clearer to expreſs what we call harmony, and to diſtinguiſh it from melody, or muſic by ſucceſſion. To all theſe authorities may be added what our late travellers into the South ſea tell us, of the muſic of the New Zealanders in their concerts, which they ſay, to the beſt of their judgement, was in parts. This is a fact in which our travellers, though not learned in muſic, could hardly be miſtaken. And if thoſe barbarians have ſuch muſic, how can we ſuppoſe that the Greeks and Romans had it not?

Let us not therefore believe, that the antients were ſo ignorant of this fine art, as to know only muſic in ſucceſſion, not in conſonance. I believe, indeed, their harmony was not ſo complicated as ours, in which the air or melody is often loſt; but was more ſimple, ſo that not

Ch. 4. suddenly? But a very ordinary finger finds no difficulty in this; and I am persuaded that any man who has the least ear or voice for music, could, by custom from his earliest youth, be brought to do it with the greatest ease even in common speech. Because therefore we have not a musical language, we ought not to conclude that the Greeks or Romans had none such. The Chinese, at this day, we are

only the air was preserved, but the words sung to it were distinctly heard. No body can doubt but that this was the case of the songs of the chorus in tragedy. And I am persuaded, that when Horace's odes were sung both to lyre and pipe, which he tells us was done, *Epod.* 9. the poetry was not for that lost. So that in the musical compositions of the antients, there was joined together the force of melody, harmony, and poetry; and the more antient the music was among them, the more simple it was. This Horace tells us of the music of the theatre:

Tibia, non ut nunc, orichalco juncta tubæque
Æmula; sed tenuis simplexque foramine pauco
Aspirare et adesse choris erat utilis, atque
Nondum spissa nimis complere sedilia flatu.

Ars Poët.

And Plutarch, in his treatise of Music, gives this simplicity as the characteristic of the antient music. His words are, Τὴν γὰρ ὀλιγοχορειαν καὶ τὴν ἁπλοτητα, καὶ τὴν σεμνοτητα τῆς μυσικης παντελῶς ἀρχαϊκην εἶναι συμβεβηκεν. *Opuscula Moralia, pag.* 551. *edit. Frobenii.* Where we may observe the word ὀλιγοχορεια, which, as I understand it, denotes a simple harmony, or small accompaniment.

assured,

assured, have a language of that kind; for they give different tones to their monosyllables, of which their language entirely consists, and by this difference of tone, they make the same word to signify nine or ten different things. So that it would appear they have a greater variety of accents than even the Greeks, insomuch that strangers among them think they are singing rather than speaking. Ch. 4.

Another objection is, That it is impossible to reconcile this accent with quantity, unless we were to lay the acute accent only on long syllables. And accordingly Isaac Vossius, in his treatise above quoted, *De viribus rhythmi*, maintains, that it is an error to lay it any where else, and that in this respect the accentuation of our Greek books is altogether wrong. But it is he that is in an error, not the books, and a very shameful error for a learned man, proceeding from his not distinguishing accent and quantity: for in the sequel of the passage above quoted from the Halicarnassian, speaking of the violence which the musicians of his time offered to the prosody of the language, he gives an instance from a chorus in the Orestes of Euripides,

Ch. 4. Euripides, where, in the word ἐκπρόβατι, inſtead of giving the acute tone to the ſyllable προ, (which undoubtedly is a ſhort ſyllable), the muſician who ſet it to muſic, or *fecit modos*, according to the Latin expreſſion, brought it down to the fourth ſyllable of the word, ſciz. -βα-; and this, by the way, is of itſelf evidence, if Dionyſius had ſaid no more, that the accent was a real tone of muſic. And beſides, Voſſius ought to have known, that in a Latin diſſyllable there would, according to his rule, have been no acute accent at all, if the firſt ſyllable was ſhort, becauſe the Latins never acuted the laſt ſyllable. Now it is an invariable rule of accenting, that there is an acute accent ſomewhere upon every word, unleſs it be an enclitic, or uſed as an enclitic.

It is therefore moſt certain, that a ſhort ſyllable will bear an acute accent, as well as a long; and the fact truly is, that the acute note, by its quick movement, as above explained, tends rather to ſhorten than lengthen the ſyllable. And accordingly, in ſome Latin words, when the ſyllable would be otherwiſe long by poſition, it is ſhortened by being acuted, as in *óptime*,

time, *sérvitus*, *pérvelim*, *Pámphilus*, where the antepenult ſyllables being acuted, are thereby ſhortened where they would otherwiſe be long *. It is indeed true, that according to our method of pronunciation, (of which I ſhall ſay more afterwards), it is very difficult, if not impoſſible, for us to acute a ſyllable, without making it appear long to our ears; but we ought not from thence to infer, that it was impoſſible for the Greeks or Romans to do ſo. I am informed by a perſon whom I can believe †, that the learned among the Greeks do, at this day, in their pronunciation, make the diſtinction betwixt accent and quantity. It is certain that they both ſpeak and write the antient language; and it is not at all improbable that they may have likewiſe preſerved the pronunciation of it, with the aſſiſtance of thoſe accentual marks, which ſurely are not of modern Ch. 4.

* This is an obſervation of Biſhop *Hare*, quoted by Mr *Foſter* in his eſſay, pag. 279. where there are other quotations upon the ſubject worth reading.

† Dr Turnbull, who was long in the Eaſt, and much among the Greeks, having married a Greek woman, and is a man of learning, as well as worth. He is now in *Florida*, with the colony of Greeks that he carried thither.

Ch. 4. invention *. And Sir John Cheke, who lived in the time of Henry VIII. ſays, in one of his letters †, that he, and ſome of his learned friends, ſpoke the Greek according to the antient pronunciation, and particularly according to the antient proſody, obſerving both accent and quantity.

I have only further to add, concerning the Greek accents, that as there is nothing in that language without art, that can be ſubjected to the rules of art, not even

* They are ſaid to have been invented by a famous grammarian, Ariſtophanes of Byzantium, keeper of the Alexandrian library under Ptolomy Philopater and Epiphanes, the firſt likewiſe, as it is ſuppoſed, that practiſed punctuation. Accentual marks, however, did not become of common uſe till about the ſeventh century, when we find them in manuſcripts. It was certainly a uſeful invention for preſerving the genuine pronunciation of the Greek language; I cannot however beſtow ſuch an elogium upon the author of it as Mr Foſter does, who ſays, that poſterity has been more benefited by his diſcovery, than by the writings of any one profane author of antiquity, *pag.* 191. It does not appear that the marking of the accents was ever much practiſed among the Romans. Mr Foſter ſays, he never ſaw but one Latin book that had the accents marked throughout, and that was *Grammaticæ quadrilinguis partitiones*, by *Johannes Droſæus. Paris.* 1544. I have ſeen another, viz. a Virgil in the poſſeſſion of the Earl of Hopetoun; but I have forgot where or when it was printed.

† *Epiſtol. ad Epiſcop. Vinton.* p. 284.

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the choice of their primitive words, according to my hypotheſis; ſo there are fixed rules for the accents, which are to be found in the Greek grammars, particularly in that of Theodorus Gaza, who treats it as a material part of the language, and not as a thing of no uſe, according to the opinion of ſome among us. I have already obſerved a great difference betwixt the Greek and Latin, in the matter of accenting; the Latins never putting an acute accent upon the laſt ſyllable, which the Greeks frequently did; ſo that the Romans were all βάρυτονοι, which gave to their diſcourſe, and to themſelves, the appearance of great gravity, and even of haughtineſs and auſterity *. But at the ſame time it gave an uniformity and ſimilarity to their accentuation, which made their language much leſs ſweet and pleaſant to the ear; and therefore, ſays Quinctilian, who makes this obſervation, when our poets would make ſweet-flowing verſe, Ch. 4.

* *Olympiodorus in Ariſtot.* μετεωρα, *pag.* 27. The paſſage is quoted by Foſter in his *Eſſay*, *pag.* 290.; and likewiſe another to the ſame purpoſe, from Gregory Thaumaturgus, *In laudatione Origenis.*

Ch. 4. they adorn it with Greek names *, ſuch was the effect in the judgement of Quinctilian of thoſe accents, which modern critics condemn as corruptions of the language.

As to accents in Engliſh, Mr Foſter, from a partiality, very excuſable, to his country, and its language, would fain perſuade us, that in Engliſh there are accents ſuch as in Greek and Latin. But to me it is evident that there are none ſuch; by which I mean that we have no accents upon ſyllables, which are muſical tones, differing in acuteneſs or gravity. For though, no doubt, there are changes of voice in our ſpeaking from acute to grave, and *vice verſa*, of which a muſician could mark the intervals, theſe changes are not upon ſyllables, but upon words or ſentences. And they are the tones of paſſion or ſentiment, which, as I obſerved, are to be diſtinguiſhed from the accents we are ſpeaking of. Nor ſhould we confound with them either the general tone, which belongs to every language, or the particular provincial tone of the ſeveral dialects of

* *Lib.* 2. *cap.* 10. See what Foſter ſays further upon this ſubject, pag. 286.

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the ſame language. And there is another difference betwixt our accents and the antient, that ours neither are, nor can, by their nature, be ſubjected to any rule; whereas the antient, as we have ſeen, are governed by rules, and make part of their grammatical art. Ch. 4.

But what do we mean then when we ſpeak ſo much of accent in Engliſh, and diſpute whether a word is right or wrong accented? My anſwer is, That we have, no doubt, accents in Engliſh, and ſyllabical accents too: but they are of a quite different kind from the antient accents; for there is no change of the tone in them; but the voice is only raiſed more, ſo as to be louder upon one ſyllable than another. Our accents therefore fall under the firſt member of the diviſion of ſound, which I made in the beginning of this chapter, namely, the diſtinction of louder, and ſofter, or lower.

That there is truly no other difference, is a matter of fact, that muſt be determined by muſicians. Now I appeal to them, whether they can perceive any difference of tone betwixt the accented and unaccented

Ch. 4. ſyllables of any word; and if there be none, then is the muſic of our language in this reſpect nothing better than the muſic of a drum, in which we perceive no difference except that of louder or ſofter, according as the inſtrument is more or leſs forcibly ſtruck.

This ſort of accent is, if I am not much miſtaken, a peculiarity which diſtinguiſhes our language from other languages of Europe, particularly the French, which has no ſuch accents, at leaſt none ſo ſtrongly marked; and a Britiſh man, ſpeaking French, if he is not a perfect maſter of the language, diſcovers his country as much by the emphaſis he lays upon particular ſyllables, as by any other mark. And I am inclined to believe, that in the Latin, from which the French language is for the greater part derived, and likewiſe in the Greek, there was little or no accent ſuch as ours; one thing at leaſt is certain, that no antient grammarian ſpeaks a word of it.

Of what uſe this accent is in our poetry, and that it is by it, and not by quantity, that our verſe is made, I ſhall have occaſion afterwards to ſhew.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

Of rhythm in general, and the diviſion of it into the rhythm of motion without ſound, and the rhythm of ſound.—Subdiviſion of the rhythm of ſound into five different ſpecieſes.—Of that ſpecies of it which is called quantity *or* metre.—*Verſe in Engliſh not made by quantity, but by what we call* accent.

I Come now to analyſe the third and laſt thing I propoſed to conſider belonging to the ſound of language, namely *quantity*. And, in treating of this, we muſt come back again to the general idea of *motion*, according to the antient method of treating matters of ſcience, which was, to aſcend to what is moſt general of the kind, and from thence to deſcend, marking the ſeveral ſubordinate ſpecieſes. And in this way the whole nature of the thing was explained in its utmoſt extent. In the preceding chapter, we have conſidered the effects of quicker or ſlower motion in the ſame Ch. 5.

Ch. 5. ſame time, the firſt producing what is called *acute* in ſound, the other what is *grave*. We are now to conſider the duration of motion, or its diſcontinuance, and the effects which theſe produce.

Hitherto we have only conſidered motion as accompanied with ſound; but in order to inveſtigate thoroughly the ſubject we are now upon, we muſt conſider it in general, with or without ſound. In this way conſidered, if the mind perceives any relation or analogy betwixt different motions, or parts of the ſame motion, in point of length or duration, then we have the idea of what is called *rhythm*. In this moſt general ſenſe of the word, rhythm is ſaid, by an antient writer upon muſic *, to be perceived by three ſenſes; namely, the ſight, as in dancing; the hearing, as in muſic; and the feeling, as in the beating of the pulſe. In all ſuch motions, perceived by one or other of thoſe ſenſes, if the mind diſcover any relation or analogy, there is *rhythm*. The laſt ſpecies of rhythm mentioned by this author, which falls under the ſenſe of touch, does not, ſo far as I know, make the ſubject of any

* Ariſtides *in Muſic. lib.* 1. *p.* 31. *Meibom.*

art

art or ſcience. What we are to ſay of rhythm therefore will be confined to the other two. Ch. 5.

When in any motion falling under the ſenſe of ſight, the mind perceives any relation of parts, the antients called this by the general term of *rhythm*, as belonging to motion in general, or they called it ῥυθμος ψιλος, as being without ſound; and if it was accompanied with movements or attitudes of the body, it was called ῥυθμος σχηματιζομενος *. And this was the rhythm of dancing, an art of great eſtimation among the antients, being among them an art of

* See Ariſtotle in the beginning of his *Poëtics*, where he tells us, that the imitative arts, of which he there ſpeaks, viz. epic poetry, tragedy, comedy, the dithyrambic art, and the muſic of the flute and the harp, do all imitate by rhythm, by words, and by harmony; and theſe either aſunder, or mixed together.—Απασαι μεν αρματτει τεχναι ποιουνται την μιμησιν εν ρυθμῳ, και λογῳ, και αρμονιᾳ· τουτοις δε, ἡ χωρις, ἡ μεμιγμενοις. And a little after he ſays, that dancing imitates by rhythm only.—Λυτῳ δε τῳ ρυθμῳ μιμουνται, χωρις ἁρμονιας, οἱ των ὀρχηστων [perhaps παιδις has fallen out of the MS.].—Και γαρ ουτοι διὰ των σχηματιζομενων ρυθμων μιμουνται και ἠθη, και παθη, και πραξεις. This was the pantomime art, which, as I have obſerved elſewhere, was brought to ſuch perfection in the days of Auguſtus Cæſar, that not only the things mentioned by Ariſtotle, viz. manners, paſſions, and actions, but ſentiments of every kind, and whole theatrical pieces, were repreſented by it. See *vol.* 1. *pag.* 309.

imitation,

Ch. 5. imitation, by which they represented characters, manners, and sentiments *. And this may suffice at present with respect to the rhythm of motion *without sound*, as it is the rhythm of motion *with sound* that is the subject of our present inquiry.

This rhythm is of two kinds; for it is either of sounds not articulated, which may be called *musical rhythm*, or it is of sounds articulated, and that is the rhythm of language. But before I come to speak of either more particularly, it will be proper to premise some things concerning

* This rhythm of the movements of the body was measured by numbers, as much as the notes of music, as appears from a passage of Plato in the *Philebus*, *p.* 374. *edit. Ficini*; where, speaking of grave and acute sounds in music, and their intervals, and the systems that are made of these intervals, he adds, Ἃ κατιδοντες οἱ προσθεν παρεδοσαν ἡμῖν τοῖς ἑπομενοις ἐκεινοις καλεῖν ἀυτα ἈΡΜΟΝΙΑΣ. Ἐν τε ταῖς κινησεσιν ἀυ τῦ σωματος ἑτερα τοιαυτα ἐνοντα παθη γιγνομενα, ἃ δη δι' ἈΡΙΘΜΩΝ μετρηθεντα, δῶν ἀυτα φασι ῥυθμυς καὶ μετρα ἐπονομαζειν. From this passage it is evident, that they measured and marked by numbers, the ratios, which the several movements of the body had to one another in dancing, in the same manner as they measured the ratios of the several notes of music; and I am persuaded they had a notation for the one, as well as for the other. This is an antient art entirely lost; and I believe it is not generally known that it ever existed, at least I have not met with any critic or antiquarian that speaks of those movements of the body being so adjusted and commensurated to one another.

the

the rhythm of ſound in general, which, Ch. 5.
though it be eaſily apprehended by the ſenſe, is of ſome variety, and I think difficulty in the ſpeculation; nor do I know any book, antient or modern, in which it has been fully and ſcientifically treated.

And firſt, it is evident, that without ſome change of one kind or another in the ſound, there could be no rhythm. For, in one continued ſound of the ſame tenor, without interval, or diſtinction of parts, the ear can perceive no ratio or proportion, and therefore there is neither rhytmh nor number *. In order therefore to know the nature of rhythm, when applied to ſound, we muſt conſider the ſeveral changes and modifications which ſound admits.

The firſt and moſt ſenſible variation, is when the ſound ceaſes altogether. This change is well known by the name of a *pauſe* or *ſtop*, whether in muſic or in ſpeaking: and it admits of two variations; for it is different according to the length

* This is obſerved by Cicero: *Numerus autem in continuatione nullus eſt: diſtinctio, et æqualium et ſæpe variorum intervallorum percuſſio, numerum conficit; quem in cadentibus guttis, quod intervallis diſtinguuntur, notare poſſumus, in amni præcipitante non poſſumus.* De Orat. lib. 3. cap. 48.

Ch. 5. or ſhortneſs of the pauſes, or according to the frequency of them. So that, belonging to this modification of ſound, we have two ſpecies of rhythm, the one produced by the various lengths of the intervals, the other by the various diſtances or intermediate ſpaces betwixt thoſe intervals. For if the mind perceives any ratio betwixt the lengths of the intervals themſelves, or of the diſtances betwixt them, then it has the idea of rhythm; and accordingly this is a great part of the rhythm, or the muſic, as it may be called, of a drum. And it belongs not only to muſic and language, but to every kind of noiſe in which the mind can obſerve and compare any intervals, as in the inſtance which Cicero gives, in the paſſage above quoted, of the droppings of water.

Theſe are the rhythms produced by ceſſation of ſound; and we are next to conſider thoſe which ariſe from the changes of ſound, without any ceſſation or interval, at leaſt ſuch as makes a pauſe, or is diſtinctly perceptible to the ear. For in every change, or different modification, of the ſound, there is of neceſſity ſome interval. Thus, when a muſician, playing upon

upon an inſtrument, goes from one note to another, we are ſure, from the change of the operation of the hand, that there muſt be ſome interval betwixt the two notes, that is, betwixt the motion which produced the firſt, and that which produces the laſt. And as different configurations and motions of the organs, are neceſſary for the enunciation of different ſyllables, there muſt, for the ſame reaſon, be neceſſarily an interval betwixt thoſe ſyllables. But as neither of theſe intervals is diſtinctly perceptible to the ear, either in ſpeaking, or playing on an inſtrument, they are accounted for nothing in this argument; and the ſound of different notes of muſic joined together without a pauſe, and of ſyllables in ſpeaking, and even of words, when they are pronounced quickly, and without any ſtop, is held to be continuous. Ch. 5.

The queſtion then is, What changes continued ſound admits of, and what are the rhythms thence ariſing? And there is one obvious change which very ſtrongly ſtrikes the ſenſe, namely, that from louder to ſofter, or *vice verſâ*. This proceeds from a ſtronger or weaker percuſſion of the ſonorous body, which produces greater

Ch. 5. vibrations of the body, and conſequently of the air. By greater vibrations, I mean thoſe which occupy greater ſpace in their courſes and recourſes. That there is a rhythm of this kind, is evident from the caſe of the drum, which, beſides the two rhythms of intervals above mentioned, has alſo this third rhythm, ariſing from the mixture of loud and ſoft, and theſe three together make its whole muſic; for it has neither variation of tone nor length of ſound.

There is a modification of ſound ſomething akin to this laſt mentioned, but carefully to be diſtinguiſhed from it, which ariſes from the different number of vibrations in the ſame time produced by one percuſſion, according to which the ſound is graver or acuter. This modification I have already treated of, under the article of *accent* or *proſody*, by which name it was known among the antients, and by them carefully diſtinguiſhed from rhythm, as a ſpecies of thing altogether different, though they have been confounded by modern writers.

The next variety in continued ſound I ſhall obſerve, is that of quick and ſlow.

For

For as motion, which produces ſound, is quicker or ſlower in the ſame time, ſo alſo is ſound; and this variety of ſound, ariſes from the percuſſion, which, as I have ſaid, produces it; for as the percuſſion is more or leſs frequent in the ſame time, the ſound is quicker or ſlower. And this is evident to the ſenſe: for if we make but one percuſſion upon the ſonorous body, the ſound dies away ſlowly; or if we repeat the percuſſions, but at intervals of ſome length, the ſound continues, but is ſtill *ſlow*; whereas, if we repeat them faſt, it is both continued and quick. And here too we muſt likewiſe carefully diſtinguiſh betwixt the acuteneſs or gravity of the ſound, and the quickneſs or ſlowneſs of it: for though in both caſes there be more motion in the ſame time, it is the quicker and more frequent vibrations of the *body ſtruck*, that make the note acute; whereas, in the other caſe, it is the more frequent motion of the *body ſtriking*, that makes the ſound quicker, without altering the tone of the ſonorous body, whoſe vibrations continue ſtill to be of the ſame number in the ſame time. And if the percuſſion is not ſtronger, they continue to occupy the Ch. 5.

Ch. 5. the ſame ſpace in their courſes and recourſes. And the only effect of the repeated percuſſion in that caſe, is to prevent them from growing lower as the ſound decays. And hence proceeds a fourth ſpecies of rhythm. For, if the mind perceives any analogy betwixt the ſounds in point of quickneſs and ſlowneſs; if, for example, it perceives the one ſound to be equally quick with the other, or twice as quick, it has the idea of this kind of rhythm.

But the variety of nature does not ſtop even here; for there is one variety yet to be obſerved in continued ſound, and which brings us directly to our ſubject. It is the variety of long and ſhort; for as the ſame motion may be continued a ſhorter or longer time, ſo may the ſame ſound. And that ſound which continues any length of time, we call a *long ſound*, and that which continues a ſhort time, we call a *ſhort ſound*. And as this quality of ſound depends entirely upon the time of its duration, it is commonly known by the name of *time*.

For explaining this quality of ſound, and diſtinguiſhing it from the quality above mentioned of quick or ſlow, it is neceſſary to obſerve, that when ſound is produced

produced by repeated percuſſions, which as they are more or leſs frequent, make it quicker or ſlower, it is not altogether *continuous*, as we have hitherto conſidered it, nor *one* ſound, but ſeveral ſounds, in which the ear, when attentive, perceives ſome diſtinction, though not ſufficient to make what we call a *pauſe*, or *interval*. For when the muſician repeats the ſame note by different percuſſions, and more ſtill when he changes the note, the ear perceives that the ſounds are diſtinct, and not one and the ſame. What is it then that makes this ſameneſs or unity of ſound to which the quality of long or ſhort belongs? And I ſay it is *continued* motion producing the ſound, not repeated percuſſions, as in the caſe of quick or ſlow ſound. As, for example, when the fiddler, inſtead of repeating the percuſſion of the ſtring with the bow, (by which he only makes the muſic either quicker or ſlower, as the percuſſion is more or leſs frequently repeated), draws the bow acroſs the ſtring, with one continued and uninterrupted motion, ſtill keeping his finger upon the ſtring in the ſame poſition; or if the player upon the flute continues the ſame Ch. 5.

Ch. 5. ſame inſpiration of the breath, with the ſame ſtops of the inſtrument, then it is one and the ſame note, which is either long or ſhort, as the motion which produces it is continued longer or ſhorter time, without interruption or change.

That this is truly the nature of a long note in muſic, is a fact well known to muſicians; for every one of them will tell you, that it is the *continued* motion of the hand in ſtringed inſtruments, and the *continued* inſpiration of the breath in wind inſtruments, that makes a long note. And when, by the nature of the inſtrument, there can be no continued ſound, but only repeated percuſſions of the ſtrings, as in the caſe of the harpſichord, the notes are all of the ſame length, without the diſtinction of long or ſhort; ſo that the only rhythm of this inſtrument, is the rhythm of intervals above explained, and of quick and ſlow. Nor has it what is properly called *time*, but its whole muſic is a jingle of ſounds, differing in acuteneſs and gravity, and diverſified by different pauſes and ſtops, or different degrees of quickneſs or ſlowneſs.

This is the nature of long and ſhort in muſic

muſic. And as to language, when we continue the motion of the breath in the pronunciation of a vowel for ſhorter or longer time, we make the vowel long or ſhort. When it is made long, it appears to be doubled in the pronunciation. Thus when we ſound *a* long, we ſound, as it were *aa*; and accordingly the antient Latins, as we ſhall ſee afterwards, expreſſed the long vowel by doubling the character. Ch. 5.

And this is the fifth and laſt ſpecies of rhythm. For if the mind perceives any ratio betwixt ſounds with reſpect to their length or ſhortneſs, then it has the idea of this kind of rhythm, which in muſic is commonly called *time*; but in language the antient authors call it by the name of the genus, *rhythm*; whereas, in modern authors, it is commonly diſtinguiſhed by the name of *quantity*.

Thus I have endeavoured to explain the different kinds of rhythm belonging to ſound, which I have made to be five; and it does not appear that the nature of the thing admits of any more. For all ſound is produced by motion. Now all motion is either interrupted by pauſes or intervals, or it is without ſuch interruption.

Ch. 5. If it be interrupted, either the intervals are greater or leſs, or the diſtances betwixt the intervals are greater or leſs. And hence ariſe the two firſt kinds of rhythm I mentioned, belonging to the intervals of ſound. Again, if the motion be not interrupted, then it is either more or leſs vehement; and hence ariſes the third rhythm I mentioned, of loud or ſoft in ſound: or it conſiſts of parts, which the ear diſtinguiſhes; and thence ariſes the fourth ſpecies of rhythm, that of quick or ſlow, according as the parts ſucceed one another quickly or ſlowly: or, laſtly, the motion is altogether *continuous*, ſo that the ear diſtinguiſhes no parts in it, and then the ſound is either long or ſhort; which makes the fifth and laſt ſpecies of rhythm. All kinds of rhythm therefore belong either to the intervals of ſound, or to the ſound itſelf conſidered without intervals. Of the firſt kind are two ſpecieſes of rhythm, of the laſt three *.

Of

* Suidas, in his Lexicon, under the word ῥυθμος, after ſpeaking of the rhythm of muſic, has theſe words, Ὁ μὲν ἐν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀλλων ῥυθμος κατὰ τὸ Βραχυ καὶ Βραδυ χαρακτηριζεται. ὁ δὲ ἐπὶ τῆ προφορικῆ λογυ, κατὰ τὸ μακρον καὶ Βραχυ, ὥσπερ μονος κε. μετρον λεγεται· ὁν ἐπὶ τῶν ποιητικῶν δὲ λόγων ταυτα θεωρῶνται, ἀλλα καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ῥητορικῶν. Upon which paſſage it may be obſerved,

Of theſe ſeveral kinds of rhythm, the two firſt, relating to pauſes or ſtops, belong to language, as well as to muſic. They are however no part of the grammatical art, and therefore are not the ſubject of our preſent inquiry, but belong rather to another art, namely *rhetoric* *. The third kind, relating to loudneſs or ſoftneſs, muſt be, as I have already ſaid, by its nature, as various as the different occaſions of ſpeaking; and therefore it is not, ſo far as Ch. 5.

ſerved, 1*mo*, That there is no mention here at all of the rhythm of intervals, for this reaſon, no doubt, that the rhythm of this ſort was not reduced to any art. 2*do*, With reſpect to the rhythm of ſound itſelf, there is, for the ſame reaſon, no mention of the rhythm of loud or ſoft; but the other two are mentioned, as being well known in muſic, and comprehended in the art, viz. ſhort or long, and quick or ſlow, or, in the language of modern muſic, *adagio* and *piano*. But with reſpect to language, or ſpeech, he mentions only one of theſe two, viz. long or ſhort, which alone made what is called μετρον, or *metre*.

* Under this head it is treated of by Cicero, *lib.* 3. *De Oratore*, cap. 44. where he ſays, That ſtops in the proper place belong to the art of ſpeaking, and diſtinguiſh an orator from a vulgar man. His words are, *Neque eſt ex multis res una quæ magis oratorem ab imperito dicendi ignaroque diſtinguat, quam quod ille rudis incondite fundit quantum poteſt; et id quod dicit ſpiritu non arte determinat: orator autem ſic illigat ſententiam verbis, ut eam numero quodam complectatur et adſtricto et ſoluto.*

Ch. 5. I know, comprehended in any art. This is alſo the caſe of the fourth kind, ariſing from different degrees of quickneſs or ſlowneſs, at leaſt ſo far as concerns language. So that it is only the laſt kind, relating to the length or duration of ſound, which belongs to the grammatical art.

It is well known in muſic, as I have ſaid, under the name of *time*. For as the idea of time ariſes from motion, ſo by time is motion of all kinds meaſured, and particularly the motion of muſic. I ſhall ſay nothing further of this muſical rhythm, except to obſerve, that the antients were very accurate in it, as in every thing elſe; for they meaſured it by feet, as they did the rhythm of their language, and had dactyls and ſpondees, and the like, in their muſic, as well as in their poetry *.

As to this rhythm in language, we have the idea of it when we perceive any relation or analogy betwixt articulate ſounds

* See the antient writers upon muſic, collected by Meibomius. See alſo Quinctilian, *lib.* 1. *cap.* 10. where he tells the ſtory of Pythagoras, who allayed the violence of a young man, by cauſing the muſician *mutare modos in* SPONDÆUM.

in

in point of length or duration. This definition extends to all the ſounds of a language, words and ſentences, as well as ſyllables: but the grammatical art conſiders it only in ſyllables; and then it is expreſſed in Engliſh, as I have already ſaid, by the name of *quantity* *, which is the proper ſubject of this chapter. It was meaſured among the antients by what they called *feet*, which conſiſted of ſyllables two or more; and when the rhythm was thus meaſured, it took the name of μετρον or *metre*. Ch. 5.

* This property of the ſound of language, though it be called in Engliſh by the general name of *quantity*, is only a part of the quantity of a language. Scaliger, in his very learned work, *De cauſis ling. Lat. lib. 2. cap. 52.* makes it but a third part; for, ſays he, the voice in language has three dimenſions, *length*, *breadth*, and *height*. And Priſcian before him had ſaid, *Vox, dum tangit auditum, tripartite dividitur, ſciz. altitudine, latitudine, longitudine. Habet quidem litera altitudinem in pronunciatione, latitudinem in ſpiritu, longitudinem in tempore.* The ſpirit, which theſe authors call the *breadth* of the ſound, I have already explained, under the head of articulation; the height too I have given an account of, under the article of accent; and I ſhall only add here, that it is always expreſſed in Greek by the word τασις, though that be a general name, which might apply to any of the three dimenſions, and particularly to the length as well as to the height. The length is the ſubject we are now upon.

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Ch. 5. The analyſis of this kind of rhythm is into ſyllables, which are either long or ſhort. And it was by the various combinations of theſe, that the rhythm of their language was formed, whether the looſer rhythm of their proſe, or the regular rhythm of their verſe. But what at preſent we are concerned with, is the nature of their long and ſhort ſyllables, which are the elements of this part of their language.

And it is here, as in accents, or notes of muſic, there is nothing abſolute, but all is relative; for there is not, nor cannot be by nature, any fixed ſtandard for the length or ſhortneſs of ſyllables. All therefore that art can do, is to aſcertain the ratio that a long ſyllable has to a ſhort. And this the grammarians have fixed to be as two to one. And thus all ſyllables in Greek and Latin, compared together, are either of equal length, or in the ratio of two to one. It is not however exactly true, that all ſhort ſyllables are of equal length, or all long; but ſome ſhort ſyllables are ſhorter than others likewiſe ſhort, and ſome long ſyllables longer than o-

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thers *. But in the metrical art, this difference is not attended to, and all the ſhort ſyllables are held to be equal to one another, and all the long †. Ch. 5.

The next thing to be conſidered is, What makes a ſyllable long or ſhort? And it is either the vowel or the conſonants which follow after the vowel. If the vowel be long, the ſyllable is neceſſarily long, whether any conſonants follow after the vowel or not. If, on the other hand, the vowel be ſhort, the ſyllable is ſhort, unleſs two or more conſonants follow, either in the ſame ſyllable, or in a ſubſequent ſyllable, which neceſſarily retard the pronunciation ſo much, as to make the ſyllable long; but it is not ſo long as if the vowel were

* This is obſerved by the Halicarnaſſian, in his excellent treatiſe of Compoſition ſo often quoted; and he exemplifies it with reſpect to the ſhort ſyllables by the words δῶρος, ῥοδος, τροπος, τροφος, where the firſt ſyllable is ſhort in them all, though in the ſecond it be longer than in the firſt, in the third ſtill longer, and in the fourth longeſt of all. And with reſpect to long ſyllables, he ſays, there can be no doubt but that the vowel ᾱ, with three conſonants before it, and one after it, as in the word σκληρος, makes a longer ſyllable than when it is ſimply by itſelf. *ſect.* 15.

† Ἐν δὲ τοῖς μετρικοις δεῖναι δεῖ ὅτι πᾶσα βραχεια ἴση, καὶ πᾶσα μακρα ἴση. *Longin.* ἐν προλεγομενοις, *ad Hephaeſtionis Encheiridion.*

long:

Ch. 5. long: and in ſome caſes it is ſhortened, as when one of the two conſonants following is a liquid; or though both be mute, it ſometimes happens, that if the acute accent is put upon it, the ſyllable is ſhortened, as in the caſe of the word *optimè*; and ſome others, which I obſerved before. And ſo nice were the antients, that they diſtinguiſhed by their pronunciation, whether the vowel in a ſyllable, long by poſition, was of itſelf long or ſhort *.

The only thing, therefore, in this analyſis that further remains to be conſidered, is, what it is that makes a vowel long or ſhort. And I ſay, a vowel is long two ways; either by continuing the impulſe of the breath double the time that is ſpent in the pronunciation of a ſhort vowel, and ſo enunciating the vowel in the manner it was antiently written by the Latins †, as

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* This obſervation I owe to Mr Foſter, who, in his eſſay, p. 35. quotes a paſſage from Gellius, where he ſays, in the word *unctito*, the firſt vowel is pronounced long; whereas, in *dictito*, the firſt was pronounced ſhort, though they are certainly both long by poſition.

† This was practiſed, ſays Quinctilian, *lib.* 1. *cap.* 7. down to the time of Accius, and even longer: *Uſque ad Accium et ultra porrectas ſyllabas geminis vocalibus ſcripſerunt.*

I have already obſerved, or by incorporating it with another vowel, and making it what is called a *diphthong*. If neither of theſe was done, it was a ſhort vowel. Ch. 5.

Such is the nature of the Greek and Roman quantity; but I hold, that neither their quantity nor their accent, tho' they make their languages muſical, and moſt pleaſing to the ear, are eſſential to the nature of language. It cannot be denied, I think, to be poſſible, that a language ſhould be pronounced, without the ſyllables being diſtinguiſhed by muſical tones. And I have ſhewn, that this in fact is the caſe of the Engliſh, and, for any thing I know, of every other language in Europe. I think it muſt alſo be admitted to be poſſible at leaſt, that a language may be pronounced ſo as to make all the ſyllables of an equal length; and the queſtion is, How this matter ſtands with reſpect to the modern languages of Europe, and particularly the Engliſh?

There are ſome learned men, ſuch as Mr Foſter, who would willingly aſcribe to the

ſerunt. Thus, in place of *émi*, they wrote *eemi*; in place of *édi*, *eédi*; in place of *libo*, *leibo*; in place of *dico*, *deico*; in place of *cõgo*, *coago*, &c. See Foſter, *pag.* 39.

Ch. 5. Engliſh language every beauty to be found in the antient Greek and Latin, and, among others, their quantity; and they endeavour to make out, that our verſe runs upon the ſame kind of feet, and almoſt as many in number, as the Greek and Latin verſe. On the contrary, a French author *, in a diſſertation publiſhed in the Memoirs of the Academy of *Belles Lettres*, vol. 12. p. 91. concerning the comparative merit of the antients and moderns in point of genius and learning, aſſerts, that there is no quantity at all in modern languages, and that their ſyllables are neither long nor ſhort; and that therefore the verſe, in ſuch languages, is only made by the number of ſyllables, and the rhyme. Neither of theſe contending parties is, in my apprehenſion, right; but the truth, as it often happens in ſuch caſes, lies betwixt them.

And, in the *firſt* place, With reſpect to the Engliſh, I think it cannot be denied, that there are ſeveral ſyllables in it which are pronounced long: for we have diphthongs in our language, which, if they are fully ſounded, are neceſſarily long in all

* M. L'Abbe Gedoyn.

languages.

languages. Thus who can deny, that the diphthong *oa* is long in the word *coat*, and that the ſimple vowel *o* is ſhort in the word *cot*, or *cottage*. The ſame is true of the diphthong *oi* and *oy* in the words *oil*, *boil*, *boy*, and the diphthong *ou* and *ow* in the words *hour*, *owl*, *bowl*, &c. We have alſo ſome ſingle vowels that are pronounced ſometimes like diphthongs, and make the ſyllable long. In this way the *o* is frequently pronounced, as in the words *Holy*, *Ghoſt*, &c. where the *o* is ſounded as if it were the diphthong *oa*. In like manner, *u* is often ſounded as if it were the diphthong *eu*; and *i* as if it were the diphthong *ai*; and *a* too as if it were the diphthong *au*. But I ſay, firſt, That ſuppoſe all ſuch ſyllables were to be pronounced ſhort, as is generally done by the common people in Scotland, it could not be ſaid, that the language was eſſentially changed; though, I own, the beauty and variety of its pronunciation would be greatly impaired. And for proof of this, I think it cannot be denied, that the Engliſh language ſpoken in this way would be underſtood by an Engliſhman, and is actually underſtood when ſpoken ſo by a Scotch peaſant, though perhaps he might Ch. 5.

Ch. 5. be at a loſs for ſome words. Whereas, if the Greek and Latin had been ſo ſpoken to an antient Greek or Roman, I am perſuaded he would not have been able to make ſenſe of it.

But, *2dly*, I ſay, That for one ſyllable in Engliſh that is thus long, there are at leaſt twenty that are, as the Frenchman ſays, neither long nor ſhort; that is, are all equally either long or ſhort, as you pleaſe, without any perceptible difference among them. For the vowels among us, unleſs where they are uſed as diphthongs, have no fixed ſtandard of quantity, nor are diſtinguiſhed, as in Greek and Latin, into long and ſhort; neither are they made long even by poſition, unleſs where there happens to be an accent upon the ſyllable, as in the word *ſubaltern*; where it is evident, that the ſyllable *al* ought to be long by poſition: but, nevertheleſs, as it is not accented, it is clearly pronounced very ſhort. And ſuch is the vehemence of our accents, that every ſyllable which follows the accented, is not only ſhort, but almoſt loſt in the pronunciation. And the accented ſyllable itſelf cannot be ſaid to be long: for even the acute accent among the antients, as I obſerved before, has a tendency to ſhorten the

the ſyllable, and much more the rapidity with which our manner of accenting throws out the ſyllable. So that truly the accented ſyllable is not longer than the reſt, but only louder, and pronounced with more violence. Ch. 5.

If this be truly the genius of the Engliſh language, the reaſon is plain, why we neither have, nor can have, verſe made by quantity, ſuch as the Greek and Latin: for by far the greater part of the ſyllables being all of an equal length, we cannot ſo mix long and ſhort together as to make the rhythm of the antient poetry.

But what the Frenchman ſays in general of all the modern languages of Europe, that their verſe is made only by rhyme, and the number of ſyllables, is not true of the Engliſh verſe: for the accent is as neceſſary to our verſe as the number of ſyllables; and as for rhyme, it is not neceſſary at all. And when I come to ſpeak of our verſification, I will endeavour to ſhew, that by the means of our peculiar manner of accenting, we make a better kind of verſe, and of greater variety, than any other nation in Europe.

But, in the mean time, if the reader is not

Ch. 5. not convinced by what I have ſaid of our verſe being made by accent, and not by quantity, let him take any Engliſh verſe, whether blank or rhyming, long or ſhort, and let him make every accented ſyllable either long, ſuch as ſome ſyllables which I have allowed to be ſo in the Engliſh language, or ſhort, as he pleaſes, and try whether that will alter the meaſure of the verſe, the ſyllables ſtill continuing to be accented; and if it does not, that, I think, is demonſtration, that it is not quantity, but accent, which makes our verſe. Take, for example, the firſt verſe of the *Paradiſe loſt:* "Of man's firſt diſo-"bedience, and the fruit." Here the five accented ſyllables are, *man's*, *diſ*, *be*, *and*, *fruit*. Now, take any or all of theſe, and alter them, with reſpect to quantity, as you pleaſe, and you will not injure the verſe. Take, for example, the firſt, *man's*, and make it *moàn's*, which is certainly a longer ſyllable, or make it *ma's*, which is a ſhorter ſyllable, and the verſe is the ſame. Or take any of the unaccented ſyllables, and make them either longer or ſhorter, and there will be no change in the verſe. Thus the unaccented ſyllable

firſt

firſt is certainly, according to the rules of antient quantity, longer than *diſ*, the accented ſyllable; but make it ſhorter, and the verſe will be the ſame. In like manner, the unaccented ſyllable *dience*, having a diphthong in it followed by two conſonants, is certainly longer than the preceding accented ſyllable *be*; but make it as ſhort as you pleaſe, and you will not hurt the verſe. Ch. 5.

As to the French verſe, what the French author ſays is certainly true. For the only thing that makes verſe in French is the number of ſyllables and the rhyme: for even this laſt is abſolutely neceſſary, becauſe they want our accents. And accordingly all their attempts in blank verſe have been miſerably unſucceſsful. At the ſame time, it cannot be denied, that they have ſome long ſyllables in their language, though I think not ſo many as we.

My opinion, therefore, upon the whole, is, that there is a certain hardneſs and want of muſic in all the languages of Gothic or Celtic extraction, or that have a mixture of theſe in them, which makes them incapable of verſe, ſuch as by the flexible and muſical genius of their language

Ch. 5. guage the Greeks and Romans were able to form.

I will only add further upon this ſubject, that in treating of the antient rhythm, I have conſidered it as altogether different from their accents, that is, the melody of their language. So it is treated by all the antient authors; and particularly by the Halicarnaſſian, in his treatiſe upon compoſition, ſo often quoted. I therefore do not approve of the deſcription which Mr Foſter in his Eſſay has given of the rhythm of the antient languages, as if it were a mixture of accent and quantity. In matters of ſcience, the ideas of different things ſhould be kept diſtinct, and expreſſed by different names: for, as I obſerved before, I am perſuaded it was ſome ſuch confuſion in the uſe of the word *proſody* that contributed to lead men into the error concerning the antient accents.

CHAP.

CHAP. VI.

Continuation of the ſubject of quantity.— The Greek and Latin verſe not read by us according to quantity, but in the manner we accent our own verſe.

BUT I ſay further, that not only we do not pronounce our own verſe according to quantity, but not even the Greek and Latin, though it be admitted, that their verſe is made by quantity. This is obſerved by Mr Foſter in his Eſſay, (*pag.* 361). But I think the ſubject deſerves to have ſomething more ſaid upon it. Ch. 6.

And, in the *firſt* place, If it be true, as I ſuppoſe, that we pronounce our own verſe entirely by what we call accent, and not by quantity, there is nothing more natural, and indeed it is almoſt neceſſary, that we ſhould pronounce the Greek and Latin in the ſame manner. And I would have Mr Foſter, who admits that we do not pronounce the antient verſe according to quantity, conſider by what other rule

Ch. 6. we pronounce it. He will not ſay it is by antient accent, which he confeſſes is attended to by very few in practice, and rejected by many even in theory. It remains, therefore, that it can be pronounced only by what I call *Engliſh accent*; that is, by ſounding one ſyllable of the word louder and ſtronger than the reſt. Now I think it is impoſſible that we ſhould pronounce the Greek and Latin verſe in this way, if we did not ſo pronounce our own. And this to me is of itſelf demonſtration of the truth of what I maintain, that our Engliſh verſe is not made by quantity.

But it will be ſaid, Is all the trouble then loſt that we beſtow in learning the quantity of the antient languages? And is it poſſible to ſuppoſe, that thoſe who reject the antient accents, becauſe they interfere as they think with quantity, do not themſelves obſerve quantity in reading Greek and Latin? Or, if they obſerve it, how do they mark it, otherwiſe, than by making the ſyllables long or ſhort? My anſwer is, That they mark it by accenting the words as we do in Engliſh. Thus, *e. g.* in pronouncing the firſt line of Virgil's Eclogues,

Tityre,

Tityre, tu patulæ recubans ſub tegmine fagi, Ch. 6.

they mark the length of the firſt ſyllable of *Tityre*, by accenting it juſt as we accent the firſt ſyllable of this Engliſh verſe,

Little tube, of mighty power,

or any other of thoſe Engliſh verſes that we may call *Trochaic*, if we are fond of giving antient names to modern things.

That this is not a proper way of marking a long ſyllable, is evident. For, inſtead of making the ſyllable longer, we make it only louder and ſtronger; or if we make it in any degree longer, it is not by lengthening the vowel, which ought to be done in this caſe, but it is by poſition. For, by pronouncing the ſyllable ſo ſtrongly, we do in effect double the conſonant, and pronounce it as if it were written *Tittyre*. For, if we obſerve attentively, we ſhall find, that the ſound of the vowel is not altered in any reſpect, but the ſtreſs of the accent falls upon the conſonant, which neceſſarily gives it that double ſound. And to be convinced of this, let us write the long *i* in *Tityre*, as it was written antiently by the Romans, that is, double, and pro-

Ch. 6. nounce it accordingly, and we ſhall ſee what a different ſound it will make.

But ſuppoſing that the long ſyllable were thus properly marked, it is not ſufficiently marked: for there are many long ſyllables that are not ſo diſtinguiſhed. Nor is even this all: for there are many ſhort ſyllables that have that mark, according to our method of reading antient verſe. For proof of both theſe propoſitions, I need only appeal to the ſame line of Virgil, where the ſyllable *tu*, though long, is not accented; and the following ſyllable *pa-*, though ſhort, is accented. In like manner *-læ*, though long, is not accented; and the next ſyllable *re-*, though ſhort, is accented.

If it be again aſked, What long ſyllables then are marked by the accent? my anſwer is, Very few. And if it be further aſked, What theſe few are? I ſay, The penult ſyllables of words of three or more ſyllables, and no other. This may appear a little paradoxical; but it is eaſily proved by induction. And, in the *firſt* place, With reſpect to monoſyllables, though they may be accented, we cannot thereby tell whether they be long or ſhort, becauſe we

we accent them according to their place in the verſe, not according to their quantity. Nor do we diſtinguiſh, by our pronunciation, whether the vowel in them be long or ſhort. Thus, in the above line of Virgil, the monoſyllables *tu* and *ſub* are both long; yet they are not accented. And though the vowel *u* in *tu* be long by its nature, and not by poſition, yet we do not diſtinguiſh it by our pronunciation. And in the following line, Ch. 6.

Nos patriam fugimus, et dulcia linquimus arva,

et is long, and yet not accented.

Again, if the word be a diſſyllable, the rule in Latin, as Quinctilian tells us, is, that the accent is never put upon the laſt ſyllable. Now, though by accent he undoubtedly means what the antients called *accent*, we have, in our practice, applied the rule to *our* accents; and accordingly we never accent the laſt ſyllable in Latin. Suppoſe, therefore, the laſt of a diſſyllable is long, it is not accented; and the firſt ſyllable, whether long or ſhort, is accented. So that the length of it is not diſtinguiſhed by the accent.

And,

Ch. 6. And, *laſtly*, If the word conſiſt of three or more ſyllables, if the laſt be long, it cannot be marked by the accent, for the reaſon juſt now given. If it conſiſt of four ſyllables, and the firſt be long, it cannot be ſo marked neither; becauſe no accent can be carried back beyond the third ſyllable. Again, if the third ſyllable be long, it will indeed be accented; but ſo it will alſo be, if it be ſhort, and the penult likewiſe ſhort. Therefore the length of it is not diſtinguiſhed by the accent. The only poſſible caſe, therefore, remaining, is the penult being long; and then it is accented, and thereby diſtinguiſhed from a ſhort ſyllable; for if it be ſhort, it is not accented.

Thus it appears, that we neither pronounce the antient quantity as we ſhould do; nor, if we did, do we thereby diſtinguiſh ſufficiently the long ſyllables from the ſhort.

The fact therefore truly is, that as we read the antient languages, they have neither accent nor quantity; ſo that by our barbarous pronunciation, we ſtrip them of all their native and genuine muſic, that is, their tones and rhythm, leaving them nothing

nothing in the place of it, but the muſic, if it may be ſo called, of a drum, which is all the muſic of our own language. Ch. 6.

I do not however mean to diſcourage the ſtudy of the rules of antient quantity. It is no doubt a part of the ſtudy of the language; and it is uſeful in practice, even with reſpect to the Latin, as many of their words of three or more ſyllables have the penult long; and it ſhould be ſtill more uſeful in the pronunciation of the Greek, as the genius of that language does not hinder us from accenting the laſt ſyllable, if it be long. But we ought not to flatter ourſelves that we pronounce either Greek or Latin as we ought to do, or as the antients pronounced it. For I am perſuaded, what Scioppius ſays is true, that if Cicero were alive, he would hardly underſtand a word of a modern ſcholar ſpeaking Latin, nor would ſuch ſcholar underſtand Cicero's Latin any better than he would Arabic *.

It is nevertheleſs true, what Mr Foſter obſerves, that notwithſtanding the inuſtice we do Greek and Latin poetry, in

* *Scioppius, De orthoepia.* See the paſſage quoted by Foſter, *pag.* 369.

the

Ch. 6. the pronunciation, it ſtill pleaſes even our ear more than any modern poetry. It is a matter of ſome curioſity to know how this happens. And I believe it might be accounted for otherwiſe than from the prejudice that ſome people imagine we have in favour of the antients; and a ſyſtem of antient proſody (I uſe the word in the common acceptation) might be given, according to which we actually read their poetry, very different indeed from the antient proſody, but more agreeable to that of our own language. But ſuch an inquiry would lead me too far from my preſent purpoſe. I will therefore here conclude my analyſis of the material part of language, conſiſting of ſounds articulated,—accented,—long, and ſhort.

BOOK III.

Of the COMPOSITION of LANGUAGE.

INTRODUCTION.

THE method in which I have propoſed to treat this ſubject, has not been followed in any thing that I have ſeen written upon grammar. But it ſuits beſt what I chiefly propoſe in this part of my work, which is, to ſhew wherein the art of language conſiſts. For a piece of art cannot be more thoroughly known, than by being firſt taken down, and each part of it ſhewn by itſelf, and then the whole put up again. The firſt part of this work we have already performed, having *analyſed* language, conſidered both as ſignificant of things, and as ſound merely; and we now proceed to the *compoſition* of it, following the ſame method, and beginning with the *formal* part, or language conſidered as ſignificant. Intr.

CHAPTER I.

Of ſyntax in general, and the three different kinds of it.—The difference betwixt languages, barbarous and civilized, antient and modern, with reſpect to the uſe of theſe three kinds of ſyntax.

Ch. 1. AS the analyſis of the form of language is ſimply into words, ſo the compoſition of it is as ſimple, namely, into ſentences, by which I mean ſuch a combination of words as of itſelf forms a meaning. For this is the only compoſition of words that grammar has any thing to do with, larger combinations of them belonging to other arts and ſciences.

It has been already obſerved, that any number of words, how great ſoever, of the cleareſt and moſt preciſe ſignification, thrown together without being ſome way connected, would convey to the mind no meaning, except that the ſpeaker had ſuch or ſuch conception; but they would affirm or deny nothing, wiſh or command nothing,

thing, aſk or inquire about nothing. Now a ſentence muſt neceſſarily do one or other of theſe things. Ch. 1.

In order therefore to make a ſentence, the words that compoſe it muſt be ſome way or another connected together, ſo that the mind of the hearer may perceive their relation, and dependency upon one another. That part of grammar which teaches us to connect words ſo as to anſwer this purpoſe, is what is called *ſyntax*. It is the laſt part of grammar in the order of treating it; but, as Theodorus Gaza has well obſerved, is the firſt and principal, being that for which every other part of the art is intended. For the whole art is intended for the ſake of ſpeech, which cannot be, unleſs words be connected together. It likewiſe appears to be the moſt difficult part of the art; and therefore, as I obſerved before, was laſt invented, the barbarous languages being remarkably deficient in that article.

This great buſineſs of language appears to me to be performed in one or other of the three following ways: for either the connection betwixt the words is expreſſed by the words themſelves; or, 2*dly*, It is expreſſed by ſome other word; or, *laſtly*, It

Ch. 1. is expreſſed merely by the words ſtanding together in the ſentence.

As to the firſt, words, in the learned languages, indicate themſelves their connections, by genders, numbers, and caſes; and this in two different ways, either by concord or by regimen. Concord is when the words agree together in certain accidents, ſuch as thoſe above mentioned. Regimen is when they do not ſo agree, but the one, which is called the governing word, produces ſome alteration upon the other.

This kind of ſyntax, whereby the words themſelves ſhew how they are to be connected, is by far the moſt artificial, particularly with reſpect to the caſes; the relations expreſſed by which are, as I have ſhewn, very difficult to be explained, and comprehended in general definitions. I ſhall only add here, that as the great uſe of caſes, as well as of genders and numbers, is for the purpoſe of ſyntax, what I have already ſaid of theſe accidents of words, will make it unneceſſary for me to ſay any thing further here upon the ſubject.

But ſuppoſe a language, of which the art

art is ſo imperfect that it has no caſes at all, no genders of ſubſtantives, neither genders nor numbers of adjectives, and very little expreſſion of numbers, even in their verbs, which is the caſe of the Engliſh, and, for the greater part, of all the modern languages of Europe; in what manner are the words to be connected in ſuch a language? It is evident it can only be in one or other, or both the two ways laſt mentioned, namely, either by ſeparate words, or by juxtapoſition of the words to be connected together; which laſt way, as we have elſewhere obſerved, is almoſt the only ſyntax of the barbarous languages; and as it is a great part of the ſyntax of the modern languages of Europe, ſo far at leaſt it muſt be admitted, that theſe languages approach to barbarity. Ch. 1.

But, with reſpect even to the learned languages, let us ſuppoſe that the relations betwixt things are ſuch, that they cannot be expreſſed conveniently by caſes, or flections of the word of any kind; what is then to be done? In that caſe the relations are to be expreſſed by ſeparate words, called *prepoſitions*, of which, as I have already explained the nature and uſe, and diſtinguiſhed

Ch. 1. diſtinguiſhed betwixt the relations expreſſed by caſes, and thoſe expreſſed by prepoſitions, I will ſay no more of them at preſent.

Again, ſuppoſe the word is indeclinable, ſo that its connection with the other word cannot be marked by any change of it, which is the caſe of adverbs, conjunctions, and the prepoſitions themſelves, then muſt even the learned languages of neceſſity ſubmit to the barbarous ſyntax above mentioned, and connect the words together by juxtapoſition. In this way adverbs in Greek and Latin are connected with the verbs or adjectives to which they belong, and in like manner prepoſitions and conjunctions.

And thus it appears from induction, that there can be no ſyntax but in one or other of the three ways above mentioned. And it alſo appears, how far art in this matter can go, and where it muſt neceſſarily ſtop.

The general rules of ſyntax, as well as of every other part of the grammatical art, and indeed of every art, muſt be founded in the nature of things. For, as the buſineſs of ſyntax is to connect words, which ſtand

ſtand for ideas, and as ideas repreſent things, it is evident that words muſt be joined together according to the nature of the things they ſtand for. For this reaſon it is that in ſyntax, as well as in nature, the ſubſtance is joined with the accident, the action with the agent, or with the qualities and circumſtances of the action, and both the action and agent with the ſubject of the action. But all this is ſo fully, accurately, and elegantly explained by Mr Harris *, that I will not ſay a word more upon the ſubject. Ch. 1.

The differences betwixt the antient and modern ſyntax I have already noted; but it is very well worth while further to obſerve the difference thereby produced, betwixt antient and modern compoſition. The difference which it makes with reſpect to ſound, and the pleaſure of the ear, I ſhall obſerve when I come to ſpeak of the compoſition of the ſounds of language. But, in the next chapter, I will obſerve what difference it makes in conveying the ſenſe.

* *Hermes, book 2. cap. 3.*

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

The difference betwixt the arrangement of words in antient and modern languages conſidered.—The moſt natural order of arrangement, whether the antient or the modern.—The advantages of the antient arrangement in conveying the ſenſe of the ſpeaker.

Ch. 2. I Know it is the opinion of many, that the antient compoſition, or arrangement of words in ſentences, however pleaſing it might be to the ear, was hurtful to the ſenſe, as it diſtracted the attention, and hindered the mind from apprehending the ſenſe ſo clearly and fully as it would otherwiſe do; that the modern arrangement was more natural, conveyed the meaning better, and was therefore on that account preferable. And I remember I heard one of thoſe gentlemen go ſo far as to ſay, that it was impoſſible that Demoſthenes's orations could have been underſtood, if the words had been ſpoken in the unnatural order in

in which we read them. This is a queſtion of ſome curioſity; and as it enters pretty deep into the nature of language, the reader will not be diſpleaſed to ſee it examined at ſome length. Ch. 2.

And I will begin with conſidering what thoſe gentlemen call the *natural order* of words in a ſentence, and inquire for what reaſon the order we obſerve is dignified with that appellation.

In the arrangement of prepoſitions, adverbs, and conjunctions, to which I may add articles, there is little difference, as I have obſerved, betwixt the antient languages and ours. It is therefore the arrangement of ſubſtantives, adjectives, verbs, and, in ſhort, all the declinable parts of ſpeech, that makes the chief difference. Now, ſubſtantives are either joined in ſyntax with adjectives, (under which I comprehend participles, as I do pronouns under ſubſtantives), or ſubſtantives are joined with ſubſtantives, or, laſtly, they are joined with verbs; and in each of theſe ways, either by concord or by regimen. Under this threefold diviſion, I think, every kind of combination of words in ſyntax may be included. And

Ch. 2. let us now examine what is the order of nature in all theſe combinations.

The firſt I mentioned was that of ſubſtantive with adjective, that is, of ſubſtance with quality. And, firſt, let them be joined in concord. In ſuch a junction, one ſhould think, the natural order was to place the ſubſtance firſt, and the quality or accident laſt; and yet the common arrangement in Engliſh is the direct contrary. For we ſay, *a good man*, not a *man good*: whereas, in Latin, they ſay either *vir bonus*, or *bonus vir*; and the ſame in Greek. And the truth is, that the one or the other of them may be put firſt, if it happens to be principally in the view of the ſpeaker. For though, in the order of nature, the ſubſtance is undoubtedly firſt, becauſe it is that in which the accident exiſts, and without which it cannot exiſt; whereas the ſubſtance can exiſt without the accident; yet our thoughts do not always follow the order of nature. So that what is principal in nature, is ſometimes but ſecondary in our conſideration. And it is with reſpect to the arrangement of the words as it is with reſpect to the pronunciation of them: when we ſay, *a*

good

good man, we may lay the emphaſis either upon *good* or *man*, according as the one or the other is principal in the diſcourſe. And for the ſame reaſon, we might put the one or the other firſt in the arrangement, if cuſtom permitted it: for there is nothing in the genius or grammar of the language to hinder it. And accordingly, if we add another quality to the ſubſtance, we may put the ſubſtance firſt: for we may ſay, *a man good and benevolent*. And we ſo arrange it when we make a propoſition of it, as when we ſay, *The man is good*. But even in that inſtance, there is no reaſon why we ſhould be confined to that mode of compoſition, and ſhould not be allowed to ſay, even in common ſtyle, *Good is the man:* whereas ſuch an expreſſion would be tolerated only in poetry, though it be fully as clear as the other. Ch. 2.

As to the conjunction of ſubſtantive and adjective in regimen, we ſay, in common ſtyle, *deſirous of glory*, *full of wine;* whereas the Latins ſay indifferently, *gloriæ cupidus*, or *cupidus gloriæ;* and *vini plenus*, or *plenus vini*. Now, in ſuch combinations, it is not eaſy to determine abſtractly which is principal; the perſon deſiring a thing,

Ch. 2. or the thing desired; the vessel containing, or the thing contained. But whichever of them appears from the tenor of the discourse to be principal in the mind of the speaker, and which, if he pronounce properly, he would lay an emphasis upon, should be first in the composition; and therefore the language should allow the speaker the same liberty that the Latin allows him, to place either of them first. This even the confined genius of our language will admit; for we may say with equal perspicuity, *of glory desirous*, or *of wine full*. But it is allowed only in poetry, for no other reason that I can imagine, but to make our prose composition still more stinted than it is by the genius of our language.

What I next mentioned was the construction of substantive with substantive. And, first, let us consider them in concord. And here, I think, even our use has not determined the natural order: For we say equally, *Achilles the hero*, and *the hero Achilles; Goliah the giant*, and *the giant Goliah; Wisdom the gift of God*, and *the gift of God wisdom*: so that here there appears to be no order more natural than another.

And

And as to ſubſtantive governing ſubſtantive, the common arrangement in Engliſh ſeems to be contrary to the natural order. For we ſay, *the bravery of Achilles*, putting the accident before the ſubſtance. But the truth is, in ſuch caſes, as I ſaid before, there ought to be no order but what the ſpeaker is pleaſed to make; and therefore he ſhould have the liberty of arranging the words as he pleaſes. Ch. 2.

The laſt combination I mentioned was that of the verb with the ſubſtantive. And, firſt, let us conſider them in concord, which is the caſe of the nominative with the verb. According to our Engliſh arrangement, the nominative, that is, the word expreſſing the agent, is always firſt. But it is by no means neceſſary that the agent ſhould be always principal in the diſcourſe: on the contrary, it very often happens that the action is principal. And indeed, according to the nature of things, the action may be often of much more conſequence than the agent. It were therefore to be wiſhed, that the genius of our language permitted us to put either of them in the place of honour that we choſe. But this it does not permit, becauſe we have

Ch. 2. have not caſes whereby to diſtinguiſh the nominative, that is, the agent, from the ſubject of the action, which is commonly in the accuſative caſe in Greek and Latin; but for the accuſative we have no ſign any more than for the nominative.

And this leads me to ſpeak of the regimen of verbs. And the common arrangement in Engliſh is, that the ſubſtantive governed by the verb follows it. But there is no reaſon for this in the nature of the thing: for it may often happen, that by nature, as well as the intention of the ſpeaker, the ſubject of the action is principal. But, as I ſaid juſt now, the want of marks in Engliſh for the nominative and accuſative caſes, makes it neceſſary that they ſhould be diſtinguiſhed by their poſition; the one going before the verb, and the other following after it.

And here we may obſerve the great variety of the Latin and Greek compoſition, in the combination only of three words; I mean the verb, its nominative, and the word governed by the verb; as, for example, *Petrus amat Johannem*, can be arranged in five other different ways. For I can ſay, *Petrus Johannem amat*, —*Johannem*

hannem amat Petrus, —*Johannem Petrus amat*, —*Amat Petrus Johannem*, —and *Amat Johannem Petrus*; in all ſix. Whereas, in Engliſh, we can only ſay it in one way, *Peter loves John.* Ch. 2.

That this is owing to the reaſon I mentioned, the want of a mark for the nominative and accuſative caſes, is evident from this, that where the ſubſtantive governed by the verb is in any oblique caſe, for which we have a mark, ſuch as the genitive, dative, or ablative, there is no neceſſity for the word governed by the verb following after. Thus we ſay, *Fired with anger*, or, *With anger fired*; —*He behaved with courage*, or, *With courage he behaved*; though the laſt form of expreſſion be more uſed in poetry than in proſe; for what reaſon I do not know. Or, if the word governed be a pronoun, which has a diſtinction betwixt the nominative and accuſative, it may likewiſe be put firſt. Thus Milton ſays, HIM *the Almighty power hurled headlong*, though even that way of ſpeaking is not ſo common in proſe.

Hitherto I have gone upon the ſuppoſition, that the firſt place in the arrangement of words was the place of honour; but

Ch. 2. but the laſt place may likewiſe be made the place of honour, as in ſpeaking, more emphaſis may be laid upon the laſt word than upon the firſt. Thus Horace ſays,

Quem virum aut heroa, lyrâ, vel acri
Tibiâ, ſumes celebrare, Clio?
Quem Deum?

On the other hand, Pindar ſays, Τινα θεον, τιν' ἡρωα, τινα δ' ἀνδρα κελαδησομεν; ſo here we have great authorities on both ſides. And it may be ſaid in favour of Horace's order, that it very often happens in the Latin arrangement, and not unfrequently in the Greek, that the verb, which is often the moſt ſignificant word of the ſentence, and always the hinge upon which it turns, is the laſt word in it. It ſhould, therefore, as I ſaid, be left to the ſpeaker to place the words, as well as to lay the emphaſis, where he thinks it will beſt convey his ſenſe to the hearer. And the language which lays him under a reſtraint in that particular is defective. If the defect ariſes from ſome fault in the grammar and conſtitution of the language, there is no help for it; but it ought not to proceed from cuſtom, and an ill taſte of compoſition.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

Objection to the antient compoſition anſwered, and ſhewn to be an advantage to that compoſition.—This illuſtrated by examples.—The preſent faſhionable compoſition altogether different from the antient.

IT may be objected, that in the ſimple compoſitions mentioned in the preceding chapter, the arrangement may be either way, without any injury to the ſenſe or the perſpicuity. But what ſhall we ſay to thoſe artificial arrangements, by which the parts of ſpeech that ought always to go together, are ſet often at a great diſtance from one another, as a verb from its nominative, or the word governed by it, or the adjective from its ſubſtantive; by which means the mind is kept in ſuſpenſe, ſometimes for a great while, and the words ſo joſtled out of their natural order, that it requires often a great deal of pains and ſkill to reſtore them to that order; and, Ch. 3.

Ch. 3. in ſhort, the ſentence is made little better than a riddle.

The thing will be better underſtood by an example; and I will take one from the laſt ſtanza of an ode of Horace, which Milton has tranſlated literally, and thereby indeed ſhewn very clearly, that the genius of the Engliſh language will not bear ſuch an arrangement. But the queſtion is, Whether the genius of the Latin be equally ſtinted? and whether there be any beauty or utility in ranging the words in ſo perverſe an order, as thoſe gentlemen would call it? The paſſage is as follows.

——— Me tabulâ ſacer
Votivâ paries indicat uvida
Suſpendiſſe potenti
Veſtimenta maris Deo.

OD. 5.

Now, according to thoſe gentlemen, the natural and proper arrangement is that which a ſchoolboy learning Latin is ordered by his maſter to put the words in. As thus: *Sacer paries indicat tabulâ votivâ me ſuſpendiſſe uvida veſtimenta potenti deo maris.* If this be elegant and beautiful, then indeed the Greeks and Romans were

in

in a great miſtake when they ſtudied a compoſition the very reverſe of this. For we are not to imagine, that it was the neceſſity of the verſe, and not choice, that made them uſe ſuch a compoſition. For, as ſhall be ſhewn afterwards, it is as common in their proſe writings as in their verſe. And indeed it was one of the chief beauties of the Attic dialect, and which diſtinguiſhed more perhaps than any thing elſe the Attic from the other Greek writers. This beauty the Romans, particularly in later times, imitated very much; for not only Horace is full of it, but even in Virgil's eclogues, where one ſhould have expected more ſimplicity of ſtyle, there is a great deal of it to be found. I ſhall give but one inſtance out of many: Ch. 3.

Hinc tibi, quæ ſemper vicino ab limite ſepes
Hyblæis apibus florem depaſta ſalicti,
Sæpe levi ſomnum ſuadebit inire ſuſurro.

Of this artificial compoſition in Engliſh I will give an example from Milton: it is from the ſpeech of Satan in the beginning of the ſecond book of *Paradiſe loſt:*

Me, tho' juſt right and the fix'd laws of Heaven
Did firſt ordain your leader, next free choice,

Ch. 3. With what beſides in council or in fight
Hath been atchiev'd of merit, yet this loſs,
Thus far at leaſt recover'd, hath much more
Eſtabliſh'd in a ſafe unenvied throne, &c.

Here many objections may be made by the advocates for the natural order. In the firſt place, Milton has taken advantage of the pronoun *I* having an accuſative, and has placed it at the head of the ſentence, at a great diſtance from its verb *eſtabliſhed*; ſo that we do not know what he would be at, till we come to the ſixth line; and inſtead of ſaying plainly, and naturally, "That the loſs they had ſuſtained had e-"ſtabliſhed him much more firmly than "ever in his throne," he has contrived to expreſs it in the moſt perplexed way, throwing in betwixt the verb and the word it governs, which naturally ought to have followed it immediately, whole ſentences concerning the laws of Heaven, the free choice of his ſubjects, the atchievements in battle and in council, and the recovery of their loſs ſo far; and ſome of theſe are parentheſes, ſuch as, *with what beſides, &c.* and, *thus far at leaſt recovered*, which might be both left out in the reading, having no neceſſary connection with what

what goes before and follows, and ſerving only to make the connection more remote betwixt the verb and the pronoun which it governs, and by conſequence the compoſition more intricate. Ch. 3.

This, I think, is the opinion of thoſe gentlemen fairly ſtated, and applied to one of the fineſt paſſages of our greateſt poet, and which, according to my notions of ſtyle, is a perfect pattern of rhetorical compoſition, hardly to be equalled in Engliſh. The pronoun, that in the paſſage I quoted from Horace, and in this from Milton, is ſo far ſeparated from its verb, and which is the great objection to the compoſition, is, I think, in both paſſages, moſt properly placed in the beginning, becauſe it is of himſelf that the perſon is ſpeaking; and therefore the pronoun is naturally made the leading word. And what is thrown in betwixt in both paſſages, particularly in the Engliſh poet, is not idle words, but ſuch as fill up the ſenſe moſt properly, and give a ſolidity and compactneſs to the ſentence, which it otherwiſe would not have. And as to the parentheſes in the paſſage from Milton, it is well known to thoſe who underſtand any thing of ſpeaking, that

Ch. 3. that if parentheſes be not too long, or too frequent, and be ſpoken with a proper variation of voice, they produce a wonderful effect, with reſpect both to the pleaſure of the ear and to the ſenſe, which is often thrown, or as it were darted in, with more force than it could be in any other way.

To be convinced of the truth of what I ſay, let this period be taken down in the manner that a ſchoolboy conſtrues the paſſage of Horace above quoted. Suppoſe, for example, it were to be put into this form: "This loſs, which we have ſo far "recovered, hath eſtabliſhed me in my "throne more firmly than the laws of "Heaven, which ordained me your lead-"er, or than even your own free choice, "and all that I have atchieved in council "or in battle." Now, I aſk any reader of taſte or judgement, whether the period thus frittered down, does not loſe one half of the ſtrength and vigour of the expreſſion, as well as of the beauty and pomp of ſound? and whether there be not wanting in it, not only that roundneſs, which fills and pleaſes the ear ſo much of a popular aſſembly, but likewiſe that denſity of ſenſe which makes ſuch an impreſſion, and which

which the critics praiſe ſo much in Demoſthenes? In ſhort, it appears to me, that by ſuch a change, one of the moſt beautiful periods that ever was compoſed, by which Milton has deſerved the praiſe which Cicero beſtows upon poets, of ſtudying the beauty of oratorial compoſition, though under the fetters of ſtrict numbers *, is rendered flat and languid, loſing not only its *oratorial numbers*, but enervated in its ſenſe †. Ch. 3.

And

* *Orator ad Brutum, cap.* 20. "Poëta eſt eo laudabilior, quod virtutes oratoris perſequitur cum verſu ſit adſtrictior."

† One may ſay of Milton thus *traveſti* what he makes Beelzebub ſay of Satan: "If this be he—But, O! how changed, how fallen!" from him who contends even with Demoſthenes in ſtrength, and beauty of compoſition; and, if the language could have ſupported him, Καὶ νύ κεν ἢ παρελασσεν, ἢ ἀμφηριστον ἔθηκεν, *Hom. Il.* ψ *v.* 382. Demoſthenes excelled, among other things, in the vehemence of altercation. Let any man of taſte read the altercation betwixt Satan and Death, in the ſecond book of Paradiſe loſt, and ſay, whether there be any thing of the kind better in Demoſthenes. Demoſthenes excells alſo in ſtrength of reaſoning, as well as in vehemence of contention. I will venture, in that reſpect too, to compare the diſpute betwixt the Angel and Satan, when he was detected at the ear of Eve, in book 4. of Paradiſe loſt, or betwixt Samſon and Dalilah, in Samſon Agoniſtes, with any thing of that kind in the Greek orator. But it was only

Ch. 3. And the reaſon why I think the ſenſe is better conveyed by ſuch compoſition is this: No ſentence, propoſition, or argument, can be thoroughly underſtood, unleſs it be altogether comprehended, and every part of it at once, in the view of the mind. For the moſt ſimple propoſition cannot be underſtood, if we do not ſee at once and connect the terms of it. Nor can the concluſion of a ſyllogiſm be inferred, if the mind only recogniſes the premiſſes in parts, and does not ſee the propoſitions, and their connection, in one view. For one thing after another will not do in this matter; but the mind muſt perceive both the parts each by itſelf, and the whole together. The queſtion then is, What kind of compoſition it is that contributes moſt to give the mind this complex view? whether that which breaks

only by imitating Demoſthenes that Milton could equal him. And accordingly it is evident, that among the Greek orators, he was his particular ſtudy: and as he had practiſed the rhetorical manner ſo much in his religious and political diſputes, it is no wonder that the ſpeeches in the Paradiſe loſt are ſo admirable, and ſo much ſurpaſſing every thing of the kind we have in Engliſh.

down

down the ſenſe, and makes a kind of pap of it, fit only to feed the minds of children, or that which gives it all at once, ſo interwoven and compounded, that the mind muſt needs perceive it altogether, or not at all? For the ſuſpenſe which thoſe gentlemen complain of, muſt neceſſarily have that effect, as it obliges the mind to carry along with it the whole ſenſe, often to the very laſt word of the ſentence: and if this be a principal word, as it often is, the ſuſpenſe makes it ſtrike the mind with double force. In ſhort, there appears nothing more proper, than that what muſt be united in the mind, ſhould be united in the compoſition: and whatever excites the mind to exert that uniting faculty, ought to be eſteemed an advantage. Ch. 3.

It muſt be owned indeed, that to compoſe in this way is difficult; and that even to underſtand ſuch compoſitions is not eaſy for perſons not accuſtomed to them: but we ought to remember the Greek proverb, *That fine things are difficult;* and that for the ſame reaſon which makes this compoſition diſpleaſe us, we ought to diſlike the declenſions and conjugations in Greek and Latin, and prefer our own lan-

Ch. 3. guage of indeclinable words, as being more eaſily learned. We ought alſo to conſider, that the moſt difficult things become eaſy by uſe; and that by accuſtoming ourſelves to this kind of compoſition, we exerciſe that beſt talent of the mind, the power of uniting, and ſeeing both the *one* and the *many*, both what is firſt and what is laſt, at once: whereas, if we require that every part of a ſentence or argument ſhould be ſtated to us by itſelf, like the ſteps of an algebraical analyſis, the mind never will acquire any great degree of ſtrength or vigour, but will continue in a ſtate of infancy, requiring to have every thing minced down as it were for its tender ſtomach. To this weakneſs of readers, I obſerve, great indulgence has been ſhewn by ſome modern French and Engliſh authors, who have not only renounced the little variety of compoſition which their language admits, but have ſaved their readers the trouble of carrying their attention to a period of any length, and of thereby comprehending ſeveral different things in one view. For they compoſe (if it can be called compoſition) in ſhort ſmart ſentences, *vibrantes ſententiolæ*, very

pungent and forcible, as they think, containing commonly only one thought, with perhaps another ſet in contraſt to it. This is the faſhionable cut of our age, by which we think we triumph over the great writers of antiquity, ſuch as Plato, Demoſthenes, and Cicero; and likewiſe our own old writers, ſuch as Milton, whom I have heard treated by one of thoſe faſhionable gentlemen as a pedant. Ch. 3.

CHAP. IV.

Of the compoſition of Demoſthenes.

THat the patrons of this faſhionable way of writing ſhould be offended with the ſtyle of Demoſthenes, is no wonder, as it is directly oppoſite to what paſſes among them for beſt; but that they ſhould imagine, either that the people of Athens did not underſtand him, or that his harangues were not written as they were ſpoken, is very extraordinary. For if he had not been underſtood, how could he have been ſo much admired by a people Ch. 4.

Ch. 4. that were the fartheſt of any people in the world from being ſimple or ignorant? or how could his ſpeeches have produced ſuch ſurpriſing effects? And that the compoſition of them was ſuch as we now read it, cannot be doubted by thoſe who know that the orations of thoſe great orators were all written, and committed to memory, before they were ſpoken; and that they ſtudied the arrangement of the words, as much as the choice of them. And particularly, with reſpect to Demoſthenes, Plutarch tells us, that having formed this artificial ſtyle, upon the model of Pericles, and other orators before his time, but not having learned enough of the art of pronunciation, nor got breath enough to be able to ſpeak properly, thoſe long periods of his, ſo full of various matter and argument, and therefore requiring variety of tones, as well as great power of voice, he was very ill received at firſt by the people, inſomuch that he once ran out of the aſſembly with his head covered; but afterwards, having learned from a friend of his, that was a player, in what his defect lay, and having applied himſelf to the ſtudy of pronunciation, he became the moſt admired, and in reality

reality the greateſt orator of antiquity: and among many other talents that he poſſeſſed, that in which he was moſt eminent was his compoſition; at leaſt ſuch was the judgement of his antagoniſt Æſchines, who ſhould beſt have known to what he himſelf owed his ruin *. And as to any perplexity or obſcurity of the ſenſe, which ſuch an artificial compoſition as that of Demoſthenes might be thought to produce, I think I am able to ſhew, that beſides pleaſing the ear ſo much, it conveyed the ſenſe more forcibly than it can be conveyed by what we would call the *natural* order of the words. But as this would occaſion a long digreſſion, and ſuch as could only be entertaining or inſtructive to the Greek ſcholar, I have thrown it into a diſſertation at the end of this volume. Ch. 4.

And ſo much for the compoſition of words conſidered as ſignificant into ſentences, which, as I have ſaid, is the only combination of ſignificant ſounds, that grammar is concerned with. They are of different kinds, ſuch as aſſertory, interrogative, optative, and imperative, which

* Dionyſius Halicarn. Περὶ τῆς Δεινότητος τῦ Δημοσθένους, p. 185. *edit. Sylburgii.*

may

Ch. 4. may be all reduced to two general heads, viz. a ſentence of aſſertion, and a ſentence of volition *. But it is ſufficient for my purpoſe juſt to mention them, as it does not belong to grammar, but to other arts, to treat of the different kinds of ſentences. I therefore proceed to the compoſition of language, conſidered as *ſound* merely, following the ſame method that I did in treating of the analyſis of it, and beginning with articulation.

CHAP. V.

Of the compoſition of the material part of language.—And, firſt, of the compoſition of articulate ſounds.—The firſt kind of that compoſition is of letters into ſyllables.—What letters will compound with what.—The influence this compoſition has upon the ſound of language.

Ch. 5. AS I divided the *analyſis* of the material part of language into three heads,

* HERMES, *pag.* 17. See alſo the very fine paſſage upon the ſubject, which he quotes from Ammonius, upon Ariſtotle's book of Interpretation.

viz.

viz. articulation, accent, and quantity; Ch. 5.
ſo I divide the *compoſition* of it in the ſame manner; beginning with articulation. And the firſt compoſition of this kind, is of letters into ſyllables, which, after what I have ſaid of letters, it is hoped will be eaſily underſtood.

And firſt it is to be obſerved, that all letters will not compound in this way with all. The vowels indeed will not only mix with one another, as we have ſeen, forming what is called *diphthongs*; but they will compound in ſyllables with all the conſonants, which are ſo called, becauſe they ſound in company with the vowels *. But this does not hold of the conſonants, with reſpect to one another; for only ſome of them ſound together in ſyllables, while others of them cannot aſſociate in that

* This is an obſervation of Plato's, in the *Sophiſta*, *p.* 177. *edit. Ficini*; where he ſays, that ſome of the letters join with one another, and ſome will not; but the vowels, he obſerves, have this peculiar quality, that they go through all the reſt, and are to them a kind of band or tie, without which they could not join together. They are therefore to be conſidered as the cement in the ſtructure of language, of which the conſonants are, as it were, the ſtones. And it is for this reaſon, as I have elſewhere obſerved, that conſonants are conſidered as the principal parts of articulate ſounds.

way;

Ch. 5. way; the reaſon of which is, that the configuration of the mouth, and the action of its organs, is ſo different in the pronunciation of ſome of them, that they cannot be joined together in the ſame enunciation, nor without ſome reſt or pauſe betwixt, ſo that there may be time to give a different configuration and action to the organs *; whereas, when the pronunciation is not ſo different, the ſounds may be ſo run together as to incorporate in one ſyllable. And in this way five, or even ſix conſonants may be joined in the ſame ſyllable, as in our Engliſh word *ſtrength*; but in that caſe there can be no more than three before the vowel, and as many after.

The queſtion then is, What conſonants will incorporate with what? The conſonants, as I have ſaid, are either liquids or mutes; and beſides theſe, there is the monadic letter, as it is called, *ſ*, which is,

* This is the reaſon given by the Halicarnaſſian, in his treatiſe of Compoſition, *ſect.* 22. where, in accounting why the letter π cannot be ſounded after ν in the ſame ſyllable, after he had deſcribed the different manners of pronouncing theſe two letters, he adds, Ἐν δὲ τῷ μεταλαμβαίνειν τὸ στομα σχηματισμον ἕτερον ἐξ ἑτερου, μητε συγγενῶ, μητε παρομοιον, ἐμπεριλαμβανεται τις χρονος.

properly

properly ſpeaking, neither mute nor liquid, but being nearer a liquid, is reckoned by many grammarians one of them. Of the four liquids, *l*, *m*, *n*, *r*, no two of them will join together in the ſame ſyllable in Greek. To this rule there is one exception; for in ſome few ſyllables μ and ν are ſounded together as in μνησθεις and μιαομαι. Neither is the letter *ſ*, when poſtponed to any of the liquids, ſounded with them in the ſame enunciation, at leaſt in Greek; but when prefixed it can be ſounded with *l*, *m*, and *n*; for ſuch is the variety in this matter, that ſome letters, when prefixed, will join with others in the ſame ſyllable, but not when poſtponed; and with reſpect to others, it is juſt the reverſe, as we ſhall preſently ſee. Ch. 5.

As to the nine mutes, there are not any two of them aſſociated together in the ſame ſyllable, ſo far as I remember, either in Engliſh or in Latin; for though, in the word *ſtrength*, the *g* appears to mix with the aſpirated *t*, it is hardly ſounded in the pronunciation. But as the Greek is more various in its ſound, than any other language, at leaſt that I know, there are ſeveral of the mutes that mix together

Ch. 5. in that language. Thus π and τ being both *tenues*, aſſociate together in the word πτερον, and the like; and for the ſame reaſame reaſon κ and τ incorporate, as in the word κταομαι; but both only in a certain order; for the π and the κ muſt both be prefixed. B and δ alſo join together, but only in one word, ſo far as I remember, viz. βδελυρος; and the reaſon is, that they are related, being both of the ſame claſs of mutes, that is, of the middle claſs betwixt the *tenues* and the aſpirates; for as γ is the middle letter betwixt π and its aſpirate, ſo is δ the middle betwixt τ and θ. As to the aſpirate mutes, they do not at all mix together, either in Engliſh or Latin, ſo far as I can recollect; but in Greek the θ mixes both with the χ, as in the word χθων, and with the φ, as in the word φθισις: but the φ and the χ do not at all incorporate together; for all which there are reaſons, but it would be reckoned too minute and tedious if I ſhould mention them. But with reſpect to the other mutes, the aſpirates do not at all incorporate with them in the ſame ſyllable.

The proper mixture therefore of conſonants in ſyllables, is of mutes with liquids,

quids, and the monadic letter, with this difference betwixt the liquids and that letter, that the liquids, in ſuch compoſition, are always ſubjoined *, at leaſt this holds univerſally in Greek; but in Latin, Engliſh, and other dialects of the Teutonic, the liquid after the vowel, is often prefixed, as in *amant*, *legunt*, *bold*, *bend*, &c. But the σ is indifferently either prefixed or ſubjoined to the mute in Greek, Latin, Engliſh, and other modern languages. Ch. 5.

In this manner I have ſhewn what conſonants in ſyllables may be joined, or may not be joined with what. But of thoſe that may be joined, all do not by their junction make the ſame pleaſant ſound. And a great part of the variety of the ſound of a language, the pleaſantneſs or harſhneſs of it, the manlineſs or effeminacy, will depend upon the proper junction of letters in ſyllables, as well as upon the proper choice of the letters themſelves. If therefore we ſup-

* This is an obſervation of the Halicarnaſſian, in his treatiſe of Compoſition, ſo often quoted, *ſect.* 22. where he ſays, ἄδηλος πέφυκε πρωτάττισθαι τῶν ἀφώνων τὰ ἡμίφωνα: which however is not true, if we reckon, as he does, the σ among the liquids; for it is prefixed to the mute in many ſyllables in Greek.

Ch. 5. poſe in a language, a very frequent uſe of a poor and ſlender-ſounding vowel, ſuch as the *i*, which is the caſe of the modern Greek; and if, at the ſame time, it be joined in the ſame ſyllable with conſonants that do not run eaſily together; it is evident that the ſound of ſuch language muſt be very diſagreeable. In our Engliſh, and other dialects of the Teutonic, there is not that perpetual *iotiſm* which is in the modern Greek, and which makes the ſound of that language reſemble neighing. But the words are crouded with conſonants, and they frequently end with mutes, and often with liquids prefixed to thoſe mutes, which muſt have appeared a very harſh and uncouth ſound to the antient Greeks, who never prefixed a liquid to a mute in the ſame ſyllable, nor ever terminated a word with a mute, nor even with either of the two liquids λ and μ, and but ſeldom with ρ.

CHAP.

CHAP. VI.

Of the compoſition of ſyllables into words, and of words into ſentences.—The ſmoothneſs or roughneſs of a language depends upon ſuch compoſition.—Deficiency of modern languages, and great excellency of the Greek, in that particular.

THE next compoſition of articulate ſounds is of ſyllables into words; as to which it is to be obſerved, that in order to make the ſound of a language pleaſant and flowing, the letter that concludes the preceding ſyllable ſhould run eaſily into that which begins the next. If the preceding or ſubſequent letter be a vowel, there can be nothing harſh in pronouncing together the two ſyllables; or if they be both vowels that will only produce a gaping, or opening of the vowels upon one another, which in many caſes is agreeable, becauſe it expreſſes the nature of the thing ſignified, as in that famous line of Homer, Ch. 6.

Ἤιονες Ϛοσσαι, &c.

But

Ch. 6. But the difficulty is when the firſt ſyllable ends, and the next begins with a conſonant; for if the two conſonants be of ſuch a nature as not to run eaſily into one another, that makes the pronunciation of the two ſyllables unpleaſant. The Greeks, when they came to form and poliſh their language, were very attentive to this; and I will give an example or two of it. The word κατεβαλε, by a ſyncope, they ſhortened into καταβαλε; but as the τ and β do not run well together, and acccordingly are never joined in the ſame ſyllable, inſtead of καταβαλε they ſaid καββαλε; and in like manner, and for the ſame reaſon, they ſaid καππεσε inſtead of κατπεσε. N and χ being unſociable letters, and never meeting in the ſame ſyllable, at leaſt when the ν precedes, if the ν end the firſt ſyllable, and the χ begin the next, the ν is changed into a γ, which is the correſpondent middle letter of the aſpirate χ, as in ἐγχειρίδιον, and many others. And ſometimes it is changed to μ in the end of a ſyllable, when the next ſyllable begins with a conſonant with which μ makes a pleaſant ſound, as in the word ἐμβαλε, and many others. And ſometimes a letter is inſerted

inſerted betwixt it and the ſucceeding letter, to prevent the cacophony, as in the word ἀνδρες in place of ἀνερες or ἀρες, the ε being elided. Ch. 6.

In this article our modern languages, particularly thoſe of Gothic extraction, are not near ſo accurate; and for that reaſon, if there were no other, the ſound of them is much more unpleaſant than that of the Greek.

Further, to give a ſmooth pronunciation and a pleaſant flow to a language, it is neceſſary that the greater part of the words ſhould have a certain length; for the radical words muſt needs be ſhort, otherwiſe there could not be derivatives and compounds, except they were of an enormous length. In this reſpect the modern dialects of the Teutonic are remarkably defective; for the words are commonly monoſyllables, particularly in Engliſh. This neceſſarily makes a great many ſtops in the pronunciation of any ſentence, which deſtroys the continuity and flow of ſpeech, and makes it run like a ſhallow ſtream chafing among pebbles.

The next and laſt compoſition of this kind is of words with words into ſentences.

Ch. 6. ces. In order to make this compoſition pleaſant, the words ſhould run into one another, ſo that there may be as little ſtop as poſſible betwixt them, and the whole joined, as if it were of one continued texture, and but one word *. This is done by making either the following word begin with a vowel, or, if that cannot be done, with a conſonant that will aſſociate with the conſonant which terminates the preceding word, if it do not end in a vowel. When this is neglected, the compoſition becomes broken, harſh, and auſtere, as the Halicarnaſſian has ſhewn very evidently, in his fine criticiſm upon the compoſition of Pindar and Thucydides †. How defective, in this particular, our Engliſh, and other dialects of the Teutonic, are, muſt be evident to every attentive obſerver, moſt of our words beginning and ending with mutes or liquids that will not aſſociate together, or with vowels, of which we cannot help the gaping upon one another.

* The Halicarnaſſian, ſpeaking of this kind of compoſition, ſays, Συναλοιφὰς ἀλλήλοις ἀξιοῖ καὶ συνυφανθῆναι πάντα τὰ μέρια τῆς περιόδου, μιᾶς λέξεως ὄψιν ἀποτελοῦντα ὡς δυνατὸν. *Sect.* 22.

† Περὶ συνθέσεως, *ſect.* 22.

Thus

Thus from obſervations, which I am perſuaded would at firſt ſight appear, almoſt to every reader, minute and trifling, we are able to explain how one language comes to be more pleaſant to the ear than another. It was in this way that the antient maſters of art explained every thing, and made a ſcience of criticiſm, even of that part of it which relates to the ſound of language, and which, by many, is thought to be judged of only by ſenſe and irrational feeling. We may then clearly ſee the reaſon why the Greek is a ſmoother and more agreeable language to the ear than the Engliſh, or any other of Gothic extraction; and why the Greeks, when they came to poliſh their language, threw off the old Hebrew termination in mutes, of which the Latins have retained ſo much, as I had occaſion before to obſerve, and ended all their words in vowels or liquids; nor even all the liquids, as the Latins do, but only ſuch of them as they thought of moſt pleaſant ſound. In this way we can account why, in place of the Latin *legit*, the Greeks ſay λεγει, and in place of *legunt*, λεγουτι or λεγυσι, with ν added to it, when a vowel follows in the beginning Ch. 6.

Ch. 6. beginning of the next word, to prevent a diſagreeable *hiatus* in the pronunciation. In ſhort, the great difference, as appears to me, betwixt the Greek and its ſiſter dialects, ſuch as the Hebrew, Teutonic, and Celtic, is that the Greeks, a moſt ingenious people, and of a truly muſical ear, cultivated and refined the mother-tongue, in ſound as well as expreſſion, while the other nations ſtill kept it in the rude ſtate in which they found it.

The extraordinary care and attention, which the Greeks beſtowed upon the ſound of their language, is a matter of curioſity to thoſe who have ſtudied this language; but as it does not belong to the hiſtory of language in general, I have thrown ſome obſervations upon that ſubject into a diſſertation by itſelf, annexed to this volume. I will therefore here conclude what I had to ſay of the compoſition of articulate ſounds, and proceed to the compoſition of the ſecond part of the matter of language, viz. *accent*.

CHAP.

CHAP. VII.

Of the compoſition of accents in the antient languages.—The variety of that compoſition in Greek.—Not ſo great in Latin.—The effect of it upon the ſtyle.

I Have given, in the preceding book, the analyſis of this part of language, and explained the nature of it. I am now to ſhew the compoſition of it, and the effects which it muſt produce upon language. And though we have not the practice of the antient accents, any man who has the leaſt knowledge of muſic muſt know the effect which the mixture of grave and acute tones muſt produce. We all know, that a monotony in ſpeaking is diſagreeable; but we have no other way of avoiding it, but by tones expreſſive of ſome ſentiment or feeling. Theſe the antients had as well as we, but they had beſides ſyllabic tones, which we have not, and which muſt have made their language ſound in our ears ſomething like recita- Ch. 7.

Ch. 6. beginning of the next w[illegible] perhaps [illegible]nt. But disagreeable *hiatus* in [illegible]bic tones, In short, the great [illegible] than a fifth to me, betwixt [illegible]oice not rest- dialects, such [illegible]ing them on and Celtic, is [illegible]nguished them genious peo[illegible]r cant *. cultivated [illegible]ord had been accented in soun[illegible], and the voice had always other [illegible]th at equal intervals, there in [illegible]ve been an uniformity in their [illegible]s, which would have made them [illegible]t very agreeable. And it was something of that uniformity which Quinctilian complains of in his own language, where all the words were so far accented in the same way, that none of them was acuted upon the last syllable. But the Greek language had all the variety in this respect that two accents could give; for the acute accent was laid indifferently upon any syllable of the word, if not beyond the antepenult, though always according to certain rules; for nothing in

* The Halicarnassian, speaking on this subject, says, that prose composition should be ἐυμελης, not ἐμμελης, as it should be ἐυρυθμος not ἐνρυθμος.—Περὶ συνθες. *sect.* 11. *in fine.*

that

age was without rule, that Ch. 7.
nature, be subjected to rule.
these accents, properly di-
composition, must have
ow well, that the mere
e no idea of this;
e learned, are un-
. But the authority of
an upon the point is ex-
ensive. He says, "That rhe-
composition is a kind of music,
ering from song or instrumental mu-
sic, in the degree, not in the kind. For,
"in this composition, the words have me-
"lody, rhythm, variety, or change, and what
"is proper or becoming *. So that the ear
"in it, as well as in music, is delighted
"with the melody, moved by the rhythm,
"—is fond of variety, and desires, with all
"these, what is proper and suitable. The
"difference therefore is only of greater or
"less." And a little after this, speaking
of the way of varying composition agree-

* Μουσικη γάρ τις ἦν καὶ ἡ τῶν πολιτικων λογων ἐπιστημη, τῷ ποσῳ διαλλαττουσα τῆς ἐν ᾠδαις καὶ ὀργανοις οὐχι τῷ ποιῳ. Καὶ γαρ ἐν ταυτῃ καὶ μελος ἐχουσιν αἱ λεξεις και ῥυθμον καὶ μεταβολην καὶ πρεπον· ὡστε καὶ ἐπι ταυτης ἡ ἀκοη τερπεται μεν τοῖς μέλεσιν, ἀγεται δὲ τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς, ἀσπαζεται δε τας μεταβολας, ποθει δὲ ἐπὶ πάντων τὸ οἰκεῖον. ἡ δὲ διαλλαγὴ κατὰ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον. — Περὶ συνθεσ. 11.

ably,

Ch. 7. tive; and if we were to hear it, perhaps ſome among us would call it *cant*. But the little variety of theſe ſyllabic tones, there being no more of them than a fifth and a fundamental, and the voice not reſting upon them, but running them on without interruption, diſtinguiſhed them ſufficiently from muſic or cant *.

If indeed every word had been accented in the ſame way, and the voice had always riſen to a fifth at equal intervals, there would have been an uniformity in their accents, which would have made them not very agreeable. And it was ſomething of that uniformity which Quinctilian complains of in his own language, where all the words were ſo far accented in the ſame way, that none of them was acuted upon the laſt ſyllable. But the Greek language had all the variety in this reſpect that two accents could give; for the acute accent was laid indifferently upon any ſyllable of the word, if not beyond the antepenult, though always according to certain rules; for nothing in

* The Halicarnaſſian, ſpeaking on this ſubject, ſays, that proſe compoſition ſhould be ἐυμετρος, not ἐμμετρος, as it ſhould be ἐυρυθμος not ἐυρυθμος.—Περὶ συνθες. ſect. 11. *in fine.*

that

that language was without rule, that could, by its nature, be ſubjected to rule. Ch. 7.

The effect of theſe accents, properly diverſified, upon their compoſition, muſt have been very great. I know well, that the mere modern reader will have no idea of this; and many, even of the learned, are unwilling to believe it. But the authority of the Halicarnaſſian upon the point is expreſs and deciſive. He ſays, "That rhetorical compoſition is a kind of muſic, "differing from ſong or inſtrumental muſic, in the degree, not in the kind. For, "in this compoſition, the words have melody, rhythm, variety, or change, and what "is proper or becoming *. So that the ear "in it, as well as in muſic, is delighted "with the melody, moved by the rhythm, "—is fond of variety, and deſires, with all "theſe, what is proper and ſuitable. The "difference therefore is only of greater or "leſs." And a little after this, ſpeaking of the way of varying compoſition agree-

* Μουσικη γάρ τις ἣν καὶ ἡ τῶν πολιτικων λογων ἐπιστημη, τῷ ποσῳ διαλλαττουσα τῆς ἐν ᾠδαις καὶ ὀργανοις ὀχι τῷ ποιῳ. Καὶ γαρ ἐν ταυτῃ καὶ μελος ἐχουσιν αἱ λεξεις και ῥυθμον καὶ μεταβολην καὶ πρεπον· ὡστε καὶ ἐπι ταυτης ἡ ἀκοη τερπεται μεν τοῖς μέλεσιν, ἀγεται δὲ τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς, ἀσπαζεται δε τας μεταβολας, ποθει δὲ ἐπὶ πάντων τὸ οἰκεῖον. ἡ δὲ διαλλαγὴ κατὰ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον. — Περὶ συνθεσ. 11.

ably,

Ch. 7. ably, he ſays, " That long and ſhort " words, rough and ſmooth, ſhould be " mixed, ſo that there ſhould not be " together many words of few ſylla- " bles, nor many polyſyllables; neither " ſhould words of the *ſame tone* be be- " ſide one another, nor words of the " ſame quantity *." And in another paſ- ſage † he ſays, " That in order to make " compoſition beautiful and pleaſant, there " muſt be a noble melody, and a rhythm " of dignity." The laſt paſſage I ſhall mention is where he ſays ‡, That the beſt ſtyle is that which has the greateſt varie- ty; and among other varieties, he men- tions, " different rhythms in different pla- " ces, figures of all kinds, and different " tones of the voice, (which made what " they called *proſody*), ſuch as by their va- " riety do not tire." And in what he has written upon the ſtyle of Demoſthenes, the firſt diſtinguiſhing characteriſtic he men-

* Μηδὲ δη ὁμοιοτονα παρ' ὁμοιοτονοις, μηδὲ ὁμοιοχρονα παρ' ὁμοιοχρονοις. *Ibid.* 12. *initio.*

† Μιλος ἰυγενες—ῥυθμος ἀξιωματικος. *Ibid.* 13.

‡ Καὶ τασεις φωνης αἱ καλυμμεναι προσῳδιαι διαφοραι, κλασεσιν τῇ ποικιλιᾳ τὸν κορον. *Ibid.* 19.

tions

tions of his compoſition is the ἐμμελεια, or melody of it *. Ch. 7.

I have given theſe paſſages at ſome length, becauſe they prove evidently, that the mixture of tones was a beauty in compoſition which the Greeks ſtudied, though we have hardly an idea of it; and that thoſe who deny the exiſtence of ſuch tones, take away a conſiderable part, both of the Greek grammar, and of the ornament of their compoſition; and may be really ſaid to disfigure the language, doing all in their power to make it as harſh and barbarous, and as little favoured by the muſes and graces, as the northern languages of Europe.

CHAP. VIII.

Of the compoſition of accents in Engliſh, and of Engliſh verſe.

I Have ſaid, and I think proved, that though in Engliſh we have ſome ſyllables longer than others, yet our verſe is Ch. 8.

* Περὶ τῆς δεινότητος τοῦ Δημοσθενοῦς, p. 192. 193. *Edit. Sylburg.*

made;

Ch. 8. made, not by quantity, but by what we call *accent*; and I am now to ſhew in what manner it is ſo made. It may be thought, that according to the rules of method, I ought to have delayed this till I came to treat of poetry: but, according to my notion of that art, verſe is not at all eſſential to it; but there may be excellent poetry, and I think I know ſome ſuch, in proſe; as, on the other hand, there may be verſe without poetry. I therefore conſider verſe only as a ſpecies of ſtyle or compoſition; and, as I think, that it is made in Engliſh by a certain compoſition of accents, it belongs to the ſubject of which we are now treating.

Our Engliſh verſe, though it be not formed by quantity, and therefore is eſſentially different from the antient verſe, yet it may be conſidered as a ſpecies of rhythm. For rhythm, as we have ſeen, is a very general idea, comprehending every kind of motion in which the mind perceives any relation or analogy of parts, and is divided, as we have ſeen, into ſeveral ſpecieſes. But we need here take notice only of two of them; that which is produced by the mixture of loud and ſoft ſounds, and that which

which ariſes from the diſtance or intervals betwixt ſuch ſounds. Of theſe two ſpecieſes of rhythm, if I am not miſtaken, the muſic of a drum and the rhythm of our Engliſh verſe is compounded. For there muſt be in it both louder and ſofter ſounds; that is, accented, and not accented ſyllables; and theſe muſt return at equal intervals, or ſuch as have ſome other ratio to one another, otherwiſe there is no verſe. Ch. 8.

To be convinced that this is the nature of our verſe, a very little attention will be neceſſary: for we have no more to do but to repeat any verſe in Engliſh, and we ſhall find, that without the alternate percuſſion of the accented and unaccented ſyllable, it would not be verſe.

There is however ſomething more required to complete the verſe; and that is, a certain number of ſyllables: for if theſe alternate pulſations were to go on without any determined meaſure, they would not make verſe. But theſe, with a certain number of ſyllables, are, I ſay, all that is required to make verſe in Engliſh. We have indeed added *rhyme*, which is made by the laſt ſyllables of the number that

Ch. 8. makes the verſe, being of the like ſound. But it is no more than a barbarous ornament* of our verſe, which came originally from the Arabs, who introduced it with their other arts into Europe. It was firſt uſed by the monks in their Latin verſe, the only verſe at that time known; and it was afterwards adopted into our vernacular verſe, when we began to compoſe in our mother-tongues. And indeed it appears to me to be neceſſary for verſe in moſt of the other modern languages of Europe, and particularly the French.

But our accents, beſides that they make our language capable of blank verſe, I will undertake to ſhew, as I promiſed, give a beauty and variety to our verſe,

* It was not unknown to the antients, and was reckoned among their figures of ſpeech, under the name of ὁμοιοτέλευτον. It is uſed ſometimes by Homer, when he has a mind to make his ſtyle very ſweet and pleaſant, as in the firſt ſimile of the Iliad, and the famous ſimile of the nightingale in the Odyſſey: but it is rarely; and it can be ſhewn, that he has avoided it upon ſundry occaſions. It is therefore the conſtant uſe of it that is barbarous, eſpecially in long and grave works. For if it were to be uſed only in ſong or in ſhort light pieces of the Anacreontic kind, (which is the way that Milton has uſed it), it might paſs for an ornament in our modern poetry, for want of better.

ſuch

ſuch as is not to be found in that of any other language of Europe. And this, I hope, will bring me in favour again with my Engliſh reader; who would no doubt be much diſpleaſed with what I have ſaid in general of our Engliſh verſification, and particularly with the compariſon I made of it to a drum. Ch. 8.

The Engliſh verſe, then, beſides that it requires not the jingle of like endings, and beſides the variety that it admits of long and ſhort verſe, which it has in common with the verſification of other languages in Europe, has this further variety from its accents, that it may have the loud ſtroke or percuſſion, either firſt or laſt. And according to this difference, we have two different kinds of verſe in Engliſh; the one of which we may call *Iambic*, if we muſt needs liken our metre to the antient, and the other *Trochaic*. The firſt is formed when the ſtrong *ictus* is laſt, and the weak firſt; or, in other words, when the unaccented ſyllable is firſt, and the accented laſt. Of this kind is our long verſe, which we dignify with the name of *Hexameter*, or *Heroic*, ſuch as that of Mil-

Ch. 8. ton in the Paradiſe loſt *. And I think it muſt be acknowledged, that the march of this

* It may be obſerved, that Milton uſes a little freedom ſometimes in the beginning of this verſe, by making the firſt foot of it a Trochee inſtead of an Iambus; that is, beginning with an accented ſyllable; as in this verſe:

"Daughter of God and man, accompliſh'd Eve."

And he has been followed in this by later poets; Mr Pope particularly, as in this verſe:

"Pleaſures the ſex, as children birds purſue."

It is an irregularity, if it may be called one, which gives a beautiful variety to the verſe, by interrupting the monotony of the Iambics; and I wonder that it is not more uſed. But Milton, who has varied his verſification, I think, more than any other of our poets, ſometimes breaks the meaſure of the verſe altogether; as in this line:

"Burnt after him to the bottomleſs pit."

Nor are we to imagine, that Milton did this through negligence, or as not knowing the nature of the verſe he uſed; but it was to give a variety to his verſe, and ſome relief to the ear, which might otherwiſe be tired with the conſtant repetition of the ſame meaſure. It is for this reaſon that we have, both in Homer and Virgil, irregularities of a like kind; ſuch as Anapæſts in place of Dactyls, and Iambics or Trochaics in place of Spondees, which have been noted by the critics; and the effect they had upon the verſe obſerved, either in making it empty, and as it were hollow, or tumid and big-bellied. And our Shakeſpeare, I obſerve, though not learned like Milton, and following only the dictates of nature and an excellent genius, has, in ſome of the paſſionate parts of his

this verſe is grave and majeſtic, and well ſuited to heroic argument; eſpecially if it be

Ch. 8.

his plays, broken the meaſure of his verſe, and, as the antient tragic poets were in uſe to do, made a kind of monody of it, in a different ſort of verſe. Of this kind is what he makes King Lear ſay, when he diſcovers his daughter Cordelia:

" Pray do not mock me:
" I am a very fooliſh fond old man,
" Fourſcore and upwards:
" Not an hour more or leſs;
" And, to deal plainly,
" I fear I am not in my perfect mind."

It is to be obſerved, that in words of two or more *ſyllables*, the poet is not at liberty to alter the uſual way of accenting the word. In monoſyllables he has a greater liberty, but which he ought not to abuſe by laying the accent upon inſignificant monoſyllables that will bear no emphaſis, ſuch as *a*, or *the*, or *to*, or *by*, &c. On the contrary, it is a great beauty of verſe, when the monoſyllable on which the accent is thrown, is a word that not only will bear an emphaſis, but requires it. So that the accent, which is the elevation of the voice upon one *ſyllable* of the word, and the emphaſis, which is the ſame elevation upon a *word* of a ſentence, in order to diſtinguiſh it from the reſt, concur together. And this is one of the beauties of that celebrated diſtich of Mr Denham, in his *Cooper's Hill*, which Mr Dryden propoſes as a problem to exerciſe the wits of the critics, to diſcover the reaſons why it is ſo harmonious.

" Tho' deep, yet clear; tho' gentle, yet not dull;
" Strong, without rage; without o'erflowing, full."

where

Ch. 8. be not tagged with rhyme. It conſiſts of ten ſyllables; and, if we pleaſe, we may divide it into feet of two ſyllables each, and call them Iambic; and in this way we ſhall have five feet in the line.

Out of this verſe is made a ſhorter, by cutting off two ſyllables, ſo that it conſiſts only of four Iambics. This is the verſe which Dean Swift commonly uſes, as in

where the emphaſis, as well as the accent, falls upon the monoſyllables *deep*, *clear*, *ſtrong*, *rage*, and *full*. But this is not the only beauty of thoſe lines. For, in the *firſt* place, There are the antitheſes of *deep* and *clear*,—*gentle* and *dull*,—*ſtrong* and *without rage*,—and *full*, *without o'erflowing*. *2dly*, If theſe antitheſes had been all expreſſed in the ſame manner, I ſhould have thought there were too many of them, and that the compoſition was too uniform. But there is only a ſimilarity in the two firſt of them; which being carried no farther, I think, is a beauty. And the expreſſion of the two in the ſecond line is different, not only from thoſe in the firſt, but from one another. Theſe are beauties of compoſition independent of the verſification. But, *laſtly*, There is a further beauty in the verſification beſides that already obſerved; namely, that the ſecond line begins with a Trochee, that is, with an accented ſyllable, in place of an unaccented, with which the firſt line begins. This gives a flow to the ſecond line very different from that of the firſt, and gives a beautiful variety to the whole, which otherwiſe the four antitheſes, notwithſtanding the change of expreſſion, would render a little too uniform in the ſtructure.

the

the ode to Stella on her birthday, beginning thus: Ch. 8.

Thou, Stella, waſt no longer young,
When firſt for thee my lyre I ſtrung.

It is of leſs gravity than the other, becauſe it has not the ſame length or flow. But it is, I think, a pretty kind of verſe, capable of being adapted both to grave and to light ſubjects; which laſt it ſuits very well, with the addition of thoſe double and uncommon rhymes, which Butler and Swift have uſed with ſo much ſucceſs; ſuch as,

Pulpit drum eccleſiaſtic,
Beat with fiſt inſtead of a ſtick.

And,

His brawny back, and ſides Herculean,
Support the ſtar, and ſtring cerulean.

This verſe may be further ſhortened, by cutting off another foot, ſo that it ſhall conſiſt only of three Iambics; as,

Tho' thou the waters warp,
Thy ſting is not ſo ſharp.

Or it may be ſtill further curtailed, and reduced to two; as,

What

Ch. 8.

What place is here?
What ſcenes appear!

When thus ſhortened, it loſes all its gravity, and becomes only fit for ſong or dance.

The other kind of verſe is made by puting the accented ſyllable firſt, as in the ſong,

Before Porto Bello lying, &c.

And that this is the nature of the verſe, is evident from this very line, where we are obliged, in order to make the verſe run, to vary from the ordinary uſe of accenting the word *before*, by laying the accent on the firſt ſyllable inſtead of the laſt.

This kind of verſe, as well as the other, may be agreeably varied by joining together long and ſhort verſes. Thus, in the ſong juſt now mentioned, to a verſe of four trochaic feet, is joined a verſe of three, with a reſiduary ſyllable or half-foot, as we may call it, in this manner:

Before Porto Bello lying
On the gently ſwelling flood.

Mr Weſt, in his excellent tranſlation of the *Iphigeneia* of Euripides, has ſhewn us, that

that this kind will do in Engliſh without rhyme. In the fifth act of this play, Euripides has thought proper to change the meaſure of the verſe, from Iambics to Trochaics, when he comes to deſcribe the preparations for the ſacrifice of Oreſtes. And he has introduced a converſation in this kind of verſe, betwixt Iphigeneia and Thoas, which Mr Weſt has rendered in Engliſh Trochaics, in the following manner. Ch. 8.

IPH. Know'ſt thou what ſhould now be ordered?
THO. 'Tis thy office to preſcribe.
IPH. Let them bind in chains the ſtrangers.
THO. Canſt thou fear they ſhould eſcape?
IPH. Truſt no Greek; Greece is perfidious.
THO. Slaves, depart, and bind the Greeks.
IPH. Having bound, conduct them hither, &c.

It is the beſt imitation of antient verſe I have ever ſeen, and ſhews what can be done in our language without rhyme, not only in our long Iambic, but in other kinds of verſe. I wonder that we have not ſeen more of the ſame kind, now that Mr Weſt has ſet the example.

The nature of this verſe is not ſo grave as that of our Iambic; and, like the antient Trochaics, it is fit for merriment and dan-

Ch. 8. cing *, eſpecially when it is ſhortened by cutting off a foot or two; as,

> Or where Hebrus wanders,
> Rolling in meanders.

And,

> Bending mountains,
> Curling fountains.

But neither is this all the variety of which Engliſh verſe is capable; for this mixture of accented and unaccented ſyllables may be ſtill farther diverſified, by making the interval betwixt the accented ſyllables double, and having twice the number of unaccented as of accented.

* The antients had a kind of verſe, the meaſure of which was ſuited to dancing; and accordingly they danced to it. This kind of poetry they called ὑπορχημα. Of this kind were many of Pindar's odes, as Plutarch informs us, in his treatiſe of Muſic; *Plutarch. Opuſcul. edit. Froben. pag.* 550. Where he likewiſe tells us, that the meaſure of this verſe was ſo much of the *ſaltant* kind, that it was immediately known and diſtinguiſhed; for, ſays he, of a certain poet and muſician, whom he calls *Xenodamus*, there is preſerved to us a ſong, ᾆσμα, ὃ ἐστι φανερως ὑπορχημα. And it appears, from a paſſage of Ariſtotle, *Poëtic. c.* 1. *in fine*, that the Dithyrambic poetry, and another kind, which he calls τῶν νομῶν ποιησις was all of that kind.

This

This kind of verſe may be called *Anapæſtic*, if we will ſtill carry on the compariſon betwixt our verſe and the antient. An example of it we have in the two following lines: Ch. 8.

From the knaves, and the fools, and the fops of the time;
From the drudges in proſe, and the triflers in rhyme.

Where we ſee the number of unaccented ſyllables is double the number of accented, the *ictus* of the verſe falling always upon the third ſyllable, inſtead of the firſt or ſecond, as in the Trochaic and Iambic verſe.

This kind of verſe admits of variety, as well as the other two; for, inſtead of twelve ſyllables, or four feet, as in the example I have given, it may conſiſt only of eleven, as in the old ſong,

My time, O ye Muſes! was happily ſpent,
When Phebe went with me where-ever I went.

Where the firſt foot is an Iambic, and all the reſt Anapæſts. Or it may be varied in another way, by preſerving the ſame number of ſyllables, making the firſt foot like-

Ch. 8. wiſe an Iambic, and the ſame number of Anapæſts, but a reſiduary ſyllable over the laſt Anapæſt; as in theſe lines,

If e'er in thy ſight I found favour, Apollo,
Defend me from all the diſaſters that follow.

This verſe is a graver meaſure than the Trochaic, as it begins with a ſofter ſound, and has two of theſe in place of one loud. At the ſame time the *ictus* of it is more perceptible, by the interval being greater; and therefore it is a meaſure of ſpirit and movement. I do not know that it has ever been tried without rhyme: but I ſee no reaſon why a blank verſe of this kind ſhould not anſwer as well as the Trochaic blank verſe.

Beſides all theſe varieties, there are pauſes in our Engliſh verſe, particularly our blank verſe, ſuch as the ſenſe requires, and which it is in our power to diverſify as much as the ſame pauſes in proſe; ſo that we may give to our verſe all the variety of proſe compoſition in periods. This the antients eſteemed a beauty, even in their verſe *; and it is much more ſo in ours, as

* The Halicarnaſſian, in the 26th *ſect.* of his treatiſe upon Compoſition, praiſes a poem for reſembling, in its compoſition,

as it ſupplies the want of other beauties which they have. And it is one of the things which, in my opinion, gives a very great ſuperiority to our verſe over that of the French, who can have but one pauſe, at leaſt in their long verſe, and that is always made by the *cæſura* in the middle of it. Ch. 8.

The longeſt verſe we commonly uſe, is of the kind I firſt mentioned, viz. the ten-ſyllable Iambic, or Hexameter, as we call it. But our language will bear a longer verſe; for we may run out the Hexameter to twelve ſyllables, which is what we call an *Alexandrian line*, and which, in compoſition with other verſes, has, I think, a very good effect. It is ſometimes uſed in Hexameters; but it always concludes that kind of verſe which is known by the name of the *ſtanza*. This is the greateſt combination of verſe that we have in Engliſh, conſiſting of no leſs than nine lines,

compoſition, proſe that is well compoſed: for, he ſays, it ought to have all the properties of good proſe, and particularly it ought to have periods of different lengths, and different ſtructures, and divided into members likewiſe of different lengths, and ſuch as do not coincide with the verſe, but cut it, and thereby conceal the meaſure, and make it ſound like proſe.

of

Ch. 8. of which eight are Hexameters, and the laſt, as I ſaid, an Alexandrian. It has four lines that muſt rhyme together, viz. the 2d, 4th, 5th, and 7th; and the 1ſt rhymes with the 3d, and the 6th with the 8th and 9th. This ſo great variety of rhyme thus intermixed, makes the compoſition of the ſtanza very difficult: but, if well compoſed, it is, in my opinion, the fineſt of all Engliſh verſe; for it has a great compaſs, and takes in a much greater variety of matter, than any other rhyming verſe we have, without breaking it down into ſhort ſentences of ten ſyllables, as is now commonly done in our rhyming poetry. And the rhyme being ſo much varied and intermixed, has, I think, a better effect than in any other verſe. Then it allows all the freedom of compoſition which was uſed of old both in our verſe and proſe. The poet therefore in the ſtanza may tranſpoſe and arrange words in a manner that would not be tolerated in any other kind of poetry. He is likewiſe indulged in the uſe of old words and phraſes, which gives to the compoſition that ruſt of antiquity, which the Halicarnaſſian praiſes in the ſtyle of Plato; and which, if not carried ſo far

as

as to make the diction uncouth and obſcure, is, I think a great beauty. Further, he is exempted from the bondage impoſed by modern cuſtom of ending his line with a word of importance in the ſentence, being at liberty to conclude even the ſtanza with any word that is proper, juſt as he would conclude a period in proſe. Laſtly, and which perhaps is the greateſt privilege of all, he may make his ſtyle as ſimple as he pleaſes, or is proper for the ſubject. This too is an indulgence in favour of antiquity; for the ſtyle of our poetry of old was much more ſimple than it is now. Verſe of this kind, if not firſt practiſed, was moſt practiſed by Spenſer; who has been very ſucceſsfully imitated, firſt by Mr Thomſon, in his *Caſtle of Indolence*, the beſt, in my judgement, of all his works; and next by Dr Beattie, in his *Minſtrel*, an author who is very well known, and juſtly celebrated, for his philoſophical writings, as well as poetical compoſitions. Ch. 8.

The ſtanza, though it have a greater variety of rhymes than any other Engliſh verſe, has very little variety of long and ſhort verſes; for all its verſes are long and of equal length, except the laſt, which is longer

Ch. 8. longer by two ſyllables than the reſt. But the Engliſh verſification admits of the mixture of long and ſhort verſes, and of Iambic and Trochaic, in almoſt infinite variety; ſo that in variety, as well as in other beauties, the Engliſh verſe far exceeds that of any other modern nation in Europe. Of this excellency of the Engliſh verſification, Mr Dryden has given us a noble ſpecimen, in his ode on St Cecilia, where he has diſplayed the whole variety of Engliſh numbers; for we have there both Iambics and Trochaics, and verſes of different lengths, from four ſyllables to ten; and the different meaſures are moſt admirably adapted to expreſs different ſentiments and paſſions.

And thus I hope I have ſhewn, that the Engliſh verſification, though ſo much inferior to the antient, is far from being contemptible, and much ſuperior to that of the French, or I believe of any other nation in Europe. And let not the reader be ſo much offended with the compariſon of the drum: for that inſtrument, by the mixture of loud and ſoft, and the longer or ſhorter intervals betwixt, makes a muſic which produces a great effect; and it would

would not be a bad eulogium of verſe, to ſay, that it ſtirred the ſpirit like a drum *. Ch. 8.

CHAP. IX.

Continuation of the ſame ſubject.—The Latin verſe, as we read it, not much different from the Engliſh.—The greater ſweetneſs of the Latin verſe, when ſo read, owing to the language, and not to the verſification.

I Will ſay further, in praiſe of our Engliſh verſe, that the muſic of it is not very different from that of the Latin verſe, as we read it. And what difference there Ch. 9.

* Since writing this, there has an author fallen into my hands, one John Maſon, who writes an eſſay on the power and harmony of proſaic numbers. This author has ſet to the muſic of the drum, ſome Engliſh verſes, pag. 15.; and yet this ſame author, in another eſſay, on poetical numbers, would make us believe, that our Engliſh verſe is made by ſhort and long ſyllables, though there be no ſuch thing as ſhort and long in the beating of a drum; and though he himſelf confeſſes, that what principally fixes the quantity in Engliſh numbers, is the accent; pag. 89. of the laſt-mentioned treatiſe.

Ch. 9. is; ariſes more from the greater ſweetneſs of the ſound of the Latin language, than from the meaſure of the verſe, according to our pronunciation: for, as I have ſhewn, we pronounce the Latin verſe, as we do our own, not by quantity, but by accent; ſo that all the muſic of Latin verſe to our ears, is produced by a compoſition of accented and unaccented ſyllables, only mixed in a manner ſomewhat different from that uſed in Engliſh. For the intervals, we may obſerve, are greater and more various in the Latin heroic verſe, which therefore conſiſts of more ſyllables than our Engliſh verſe of the ſame kind: for our Hexameter verſe is only of ten ſyllables; whereas the Latin is commonly of fourteen or fifteen. But in ſhorter verſe, ſuch as the Sapphic, the meaſure may be brought to be almoſt exactly the ſame, with not only the ſame number of ictuſes, or percuſſions of the accented ſyllables, but likewiſe the ſame number of ſyllables altogether. This a late author * has ſhewn, by a tranſlation which he has given of the

* John Herries, who has written a book that he intitles, *The Elements of Speech*, in which there are ſeveral good obſervations.

two

two following ſtanzas of an ode of Horace. Ch. 9.

Pone me pigris ubi nulla campis
Arbor æſtivâ recreatur aurâ;
Quod latus mundi nebulæ, maluſque
Jupiter urget;
Pone ſub curru nimium propinqui
Solis, in terra domibus negata:
Dulce ridentem Lalagen amabo,
Dulce loquentem.

Place me in regions of eternal winter;
Where not a bloſſom to the breeze can open;
But dark'ning tempeſts cloſing all around me,
Chill the creation;
Place me where ſunſhine evermore me ſcorches;
Climes where no mortal builds his habitation:
Yet with my charmer fondly will I wander,
Fondly converſing.

Here we may obſerve, that not only the number of ſyllables and of percuſſions, is the ſame, but the intervals betwixt the correſponding percuſſions are equal, that is, there is the ſame number of unaccented ſyllables betwixt them. And this author has ſhewn, that even in the Latin long Hexameter verſe, though the number of ſyllables be greater than in the Engliſh long

Ch. 9. verſe, yet the number of accents or percuſſions is the ſame; for there are always only five percuſſions in our heroic verſe, and in Virgil's paſtoral, beginning *Sicelides muſæ*, there are no more in each of the firſt five lines.

What therefore makes the great difference betwixt our verſe and the Latin, is, as I have ſaid, the greater ſweetneſs of the Latin language: for our language is harſh and diſagreeable to the ear, by reaſon, firſt, of the number of conſonants, and particularly mutes, with which the ſyllables are crouded; and, ſecondly, the great number of monoſyllables, which makes the pronunciation of our language bounding and hopping as it were, and deſtroys entirely the *flumen orationis*, or that ſweet flow which is ſo agreeable to the ear. This would happen in ſome degree, even if the monoſyllables were ſuch that they could eaſily join together in the enunciation, becauſe there muſt be always ſome little ſtop betwixt the pronunciation of two words, otherwiſe they would not be two, but one. But it is ſtill worſe, when the one monoſyllable ends with a conſonant, and the following begins with another conſonant,

conſonant, which will not coaleſce in the pronunciation with the firſt, but requires a poſition and action of the organs entirely different. This happens very frequently in Engliſh; and muſt of neceſſity entirely break and interrupt the continuity or flow of the ſpeech. In ſome verſes, where the ſenſe requires frequent ſtops, this is no fault, but may be rather accounted a beauty; as in this verſe of Milton, Ch. 9.

Him firſt, him laſt, him midſt, and without end,

or where it is intended to expreſs ſomething broken or diſcontinued, as in this other verſe of Milton,

O'er bog, o'er ſteep, through rough, denſe, ſmooth, or rare.

But of ſuch words it is abſolutely impoſſible, by the nature of things, to make ſweet-flowing verſe; and accordingly Milton, when he would give a ſweetneſs or a flow to his verſe, either compounds the words, or more commonly uſes the foreign words which we have adopted into our language from the Greek or Latin. Of his kind are the lines,

Of

Ch. 9. Of the eternal coeternal beam;

or where he deſcribes the gates of heaven opening,

——————Heaven opened wide
Her ever-during gates, harmonious ſound,
On golden hinges moving.———

Which may be contraſted with what he ſays of the opening of the infernal gates:

———That on their hinges grate
Harſh thunder.———

where the words that expreſs this harſh ſound, are all Saxon, and indeed ſufficiently harſh. And not only does he uſe Greek and Latin words, when he has a mind to ſmooth his numbers, but alſo Italian, as in that fine ſimile,

Thick as autumnal leaves that ſtrow the brooks
Of Vallumbroſa, where the Etrurian ſhades
High over-arch'd embower.

CHAP.

CHAP. X.

Of the compoſition of quantity, and of the numbers both of the antient verſe and proſe.

I Come now to the laſt part of the compoſition of the ſound of language of which I propoſe to treat, namely, the compoſition of its ſounds conſidered as having quantity, or being long or ſhort; and of this I will ſay but little, as I have ſhewn it not to be a common property of language, and particularly not belonging to the modern European languages, at leaſt not to ſuch a degree as to form their verſe. Beſides, the matter has been fully and accurately treated of by many learned authors. C. 10.

The analyſis of this part of language is, as we have ſaid, into long and ſhort ſyllables; of which the firſt compoſition is into feet, conſiſting of at leaſt two ſyllables *, and not more than three. This makes

* If there be but one ſyllable, there is neither foot nor rhythm; but every word that is not a monoſyllable, has ſome rhythm, and conſequently ſome feet. Παν ὀνομα, καὶ

C. 10. makes a diviſion of feet into thoſe of two ſyllables, and thoſe of three. Of the firſt kind there are four feet, which are all the poſſible combinations of two long or ſhort ſyllables together. Of the other kind there are eight, which are all the poſſible combinations of three ſhort or long ſyllables; ſo that the whole number of ſimple feet are twelve *. Of theſe ſimple feet, as many more feet may be compoſed of four or more ſyllables, as you pleaſe; but they are all reſolveable into the ſimple feet above mentioned, and therefore I think they are of little uſe.

Of feet the antients compoſed their verſe, which, as it was exactly meaſured, and had regular returns of the ſame feet, was called by the name of μετρον, or *metre*. And the particular kinds of verſe were denomi-

και ῥεμα, και αλλο μοριον λεξεως, ὁτι μη μονοσυλλαβον ἐστι, ἐν ῥυθμῳ τινι λεγεται. *Dionyſ.* Περι συνθ. *ſect.* 17. For there neceſſarily muſt be a compoſition of two or more ſounds to produce rhythm, which is defined by Ariſtides, a writer upon muſic, to be σχημα ἐν χρονῳ κατα τινα ταξιν συγκειμενον. Now the leaſt ſyſtem or compoſition that can be, is of two, and therefore a diſyllable foot is the leaſt part into which rhythm can be divided.

* All this is accurately and fully explained, in the excellent treatiſe of Compoſition ſo often quoted, *ſect.* 17.

nated,

nated by the number of feet they contained, as *Hexameters*, *Pentameters*, *Tetrameters*, *Trimeters*, and *Dimeters*. C. 10.

In this way they compoſed their verſe; but even their proſe was not without rhythm. But as the rhythm of it was not ſo exactly meaſured, though very much ſtudied and laboured, it had not the name of metre. I do not wonder that many among us have not ſo much as the idea of thoſe *numbers* of proſe, when the Halicarnaſſian tells us, that in his time hardly any body practiſed them. And it would appear, from the pains he takes to prove that they had been practiſed in former times, that ſome people, even in his time, doubted of their exiſtence. But he avers the fact to be, that all the great authors before him ſtudied this part of their compoſition very much: which he proves, firſt, by the authority of Ariſtotle, who, in his books of Rhetoric, makes it an eſſential part of the rhetorical ſtyle, and mentions the particular feet moſt ſuitable to an oration; and, ſecondly, by paſſages which he quotes from Demoſthenes, and which he is at great pains to ſhew were not the

C. 10. effect of chance *; and he obſerves, what an advantage the orator has over the poet, by being at liberty to mix his rhythms as he thinks proper, without being reſtricted to any certain rule or meaſure †. And if more authorities were wanting, Longinus, in his treatiſe of the Sublime, *ſect.* 39. ſays, that it looks like madneſs to diſpute the effect of rhythm in rhetorical compoſition; and he quotes a paſſage from an oration of Demoſthenes, where he ſays, the beauty and grandeur of the compoſition is produced by its running on Dactyl feet. And Cicero, ſpeaking of the effect of numbers in an oration, ſays, that "who does not "feel it, does not deſerve to be reckoned "a man ‡."

This laſt-mentioned author has written, as he ſays himſelf ‖, more fully upon the ſubject of oratorial numbers than any before him; and as he had practiſed the art ſo much, and with ſo great ſucceſs, we muſt allow him to be a good judge of the effect

* Περὶ συνθέσεως, *ſect.* 25. † *Ibid.*

‡ *Quod qui non ſentiunt, quas aureis habeant, aut quid in his hominis ſimile ſit, neſcio. Orator ad M. Brutum, cap.* 50.

‖ *Orator, cap.* 68.

of

of them, which he ſays is ſo great, *ut aliter in oratione nec impetus ullus nec vis eſſe poſſit* *. And he gives us one inſtance, where the whole aſſembly of the people of Rome were excited to acclamations of applauſe by one ſentence ſo arranged as to pleaſe the ear by its numbers †; and in that and ſundry other inſtances ‡, he has ſhewn, that by changing the arrangement, and conſequently the numbers, you deſtroy the whole beauty of the compoſition. And not only has he given very particular directions about the numbers that are proper to be uſed in an oration, but he has given us a hiſtory of this branch of the art of compoſition. Thraſymachus, he ſays ‖, firſt invented the art. Gorgias alſo practiſed numbers very much in his compoſitions; but it was thoſe chiefly which aroſe from the form and ſtructure of the ſentence, in which like things were referred to like, contrary to contrary, and words of the ſame form made to anſwer to one another **. But he ſays, thoſe authors C. 10.

* *Orator, cap.* 68. † *Ibid. cap.* 63.

‡ *Ibid. cap.* 70. ‖ *Ibid.* 52.

** Of this kind of numbers, Cicero, in this book,

C. 10. thors uſed numbers too much, an error which Gorgias corrected in himſelf, when he became old, as appears from a book that he addreſſed to Philip of Macedon, in which he ſays, that he was not ſo ſtudious of numbers in his compoſition as formerly. After thoſe, ſays our author, came Iſocrates, who firſt appears to have taught the uſe of numbers in proſe compoſition; but he uſed them more moderately than either Thraſymachus or Gorgias. From his ſchool, as from the Trojan horſe, iſſued a ſwarm of orators, and from that time the uſe of numbers in orations became common. But before, according to our author, they were not uſed in proſe compoſition; nor do any of the antient writers upon rhetoric mention them, and he particularly inſtances Herodotus and Thucydides, and all the writers of their times, who, he ſays, have no numbers, unleſs it be by accident*. But here the Halicar-

gives a famous example from his own oration, *pro Milon. Eſt enim hæc, Judices, non ſcripta ſed nata lex; quam non didicimus, accepimus, legimus, verum ex natura ipſa arripimus, hauſimus, expreſſimus, ad quam non docti ſed facti, non inſtituti ſed imbuti ſumus.*

* *Orator, cap. 55. and 65.*

naſſian

naſſian differs from him; and I think with good reaſon: for, although the numbers of Herodotus be very different from thoſe of Demoſthenes or Cicero, as certainly the numbers of hiſtorical compoſition ought to be very different from thoſe of oratory; yet I think it is impoſſible to read Herodotus, without being convinced that ſo ſweet a compoſition as his, could not be without ſome ſtudy beſtowed upon the pleaſure of the ear, though it certainly was not his chief ſtudy; nor does there appear, in his work, any affectation of that ſort, which is highly blameable even in an orator; for, as Cicero has well obſerved, the exceſs in this matter offends much more than too little *. And he very much blames thoſe Aſiatic orators, who threw in idle words, in order to fill up their numbers, and which therefore he calls *complementa numerorum* †. I therefore think that the Halicarnaſſian is in the right when he quotes Herodotus as an ex- C. 10.

* *Nimium quod eſt offendit vehementius quam id quod videtur parum. Orator, cap.* 53.

† *Ibid.* 69.

ample

C. 10. ample of numerous compoſition in the hiſtorical kind. And as to Thucydides, his numbers indeed are very different from thoſe of Herodotus, or of the orators. But that he has numbers, and thoſe too ſtudied, and not accidental, the Halicarnaſſian thinks indiſputable; and accordingly he has ſhewn the particular numbers he made uſe of. And in general he appears to me to be in the right, when he avers it to be a fact, that all the great proſe-writers of antiquity ſtudied numbers in their compoſition. And not only did orators do ſo, and even hiſtorians, but likewiſe philoſophers, particularly Plato, whoſe care in the arrangement of his words was ſuch as would appear to us much too nice, and even frivolous; for the Halicarnaſſian tells us, that at his death there were found in his pocket-book two or three different arrangements of the firſt words in the beginning of his books of Polity. And this, no doubt, was one of the reaſons, among others, why his ſcholar Ariſtotle ſaid, that his ſtyle was ſomething betwixt verſe and proſe *.

* *Diog. Laërtius in vita Platonis.*

And

And there is a reaſon, I think, though the Halicarnaſſian has not given it, why rhythm ſhould have been more ſtudied by the more antient writers of proſe, than by thoſe of later times; and it is this, That the firſt writings in Greece, and I believe almoſt in every other nation, were in verſe. It was very natural therefore, that when they firſt began to write in proſe, they ſhould not entirely forſake the numbers of the poets any more than their words. And accordingly, the Halicarnaſſian tells us, if I am not miſtaken, that it was the imitation of Homer which made Herodotus write in a ſtyle ſo numerous, as well as ſo poetical, in other reſpects. C. 10.

It appears from what Cicero tells us *, that among the Romans likewiſe, as well as among the Halicarnaſſian's countrymen, there were who denied the exiſtence of this oratorial rhythm. If ſo, it is no wonder that many among the moderns ſhould not have the leaſt idea of it. And indeed, if we have no true perception of the rhythm of the antient verſe, as I think I have clearly proved, it is evident that

* *Orator, cap.* 54.

C. 10. we can have as little of their proſe numbers.

But we may judge of the effects that they muſt have had upon their learned ears, by the effect that the rhythm of muſic has upon ours; for in that reſpect, I apprehend there is no difference betwixt us and the antients; now among them, even in muſic, rhythm was every thing *. It is true indeed, that there is not near ſo great a variety in the rhythm of language as in that of muſic; for there are but two times in language, the one double the other. But theſe two times, as we have ſeen, do by their combinations make twelve ſimple feet, beſides other combinations that may be made of theſe: now even that is a rhythm, which, properly employed, muſt produce a very great effect upon the hearers; ſo that from the reaſon of the thing, as well as from the authority of thoſe great authors, we may be ſure that the rhythm was a very material part of their compoſitions.

In Engliſh, as we have not quantity, it is impoſſible we can have that kind of

* It is a common ſaying among the writers upon muſic, Παν παρὰ τὸν μυσικὸν ὁ ῥυθμος.

rhythm

rhythm in our proſe, any more than in our verſe; what therefore we have of numbers in our proſe, muſt ariſe from our compoſition in periods of various lengths, conſiſting of various members, differing in number, and likewiſe in length. In this, our language admits of a conſiderable variety: and by concluding theſe periods, and their ſeveral members, aptly; and by the proper uſe of thoſe figures of compoſition, ſuch as the antitheſis, and words of like form anſwering to one another, which, as Cicero obſerves, do of themſelves give numbers to the ſtyle; it is, I think, impoſſible to deny but that we may give a beautiful variety to the cadence of our proſe compoſitions; but of this I will ſay more when I come to treat of ſtyle. C. 10.

To conclude this ſubject, it appears from what has been ſaid, that we cannot now judge of the power of antient oratory, becauſe we can only judge by reading their orations. Now what Æſchines ſaid to one who read Demoſthenes's oration againſt him, and commended it very highly, will apply much more ſtrongly here. "What 'would you have thought," ſaid he, "if 'you had heard him ſpeak it?" For the

C. 10. antients certainly could read their own writings properly, which we cannot; nor from any thing of the kind that we hear among ourſelves, can we form a proper judgement of the effect of an oration of Demoſthenes firſt compoſed, with the greateſt art, and with all that variety in the compoſition, which every man of taſte at this day muſt admire, and then pronounced with all the beauty of melody and rhythm, and all the expreſſion that the action of the beſt player could give it: for this part of the art he had ſtudied extremely, having found the want of it in his firſt public appearances, as I before obſerved. When we add to all this the dignity and ſpirit of the man, the true principles of that δεινοτης, which is eſteemed the diſtinguiſhing characteriſtic of his ſtyle, we need not wonder, that when it was known he was to ſpeak, there was a concourſe from all parts of Greece; and that his orations had the effect to excite to action and hazardous enterpriſe, a people ſo much ſunk in pleaſure and indolence, as the Athenians were at that time *.

But

* There is a French author that I have read, but whose

But there was another kind of compoſition among the Greeks, and which muſt have had ſtill a greater effect upon the paſſions of men, becauſe it united the powers of poetry, muſic, and dancing, i. e. motion performed to muſic, and expreſſive of paſſions and ſentiments. The compoſition, I mean, is the poetry I mentioned before, of the orcheſtic or ſaltant kind, ſuch as ſome of the odes of Pindar, and ſuch as all the Dithyrambic poetry was, and another ſpecies mentioned by Ariſtotle in the beginning of his Poetics, which he calls κρμοι, and ſuch were ſome of the ſongs of the chorus in tragedy *, which, joined with its other beauties, C. 10.

whoſe name I have forgot, who has expreſſed, in a lively manner, the difference betwixt the elequence of Demoſthenes and that of Cicero. "When the Romans," ſays he, "heard Cicero, they cried out, *O le bel Orateur!* "but when the Athenians heard Demoſthenes, they call- "out, *Allons, battons Philippe.*" And the fact truly is, that when Cicero ſpoke, he was often clapped by his audience, that is, applauded in the manner we applaud players: whereas we hear of no ſuch noiſy applauſe given by the Athenians to Demoſthenes; but in place of that, they were convinced, againſt their inclinations; and, ſhaking off their indolence, and love of pleaſure, acted as he would have them.

* *Ariſtides*, lib. 1. p. 63.

C. 10. made it, as it was repreſented in Athens, the moſt elegant and moſt refined entertainment that I believe ever was exhibited; and I can almoſt forgive the Athenians for expending their military treaſure, and a conſiderable part of the revenue of their ſtate, upon it.

CHAP. XI.

The concluſion of the ſubject.—The great excellency of the Greek language, compared with the modern languages of Europe.

C. 11. THus I have gone through both the analyſis and compoſition of language in all its parts; in doing which I have run the compariſon all along betwixt the antient and modern languages, thinking that I could not better ſhew the art of the one, than by contraſting it with the rudeneſs and imperfection of the other; nor recommend more to my readers (which is the principal deſign of this part of my work) the ſtudy of the antient languages, and particularly the Greek, as from that ſtudy only they can learn the perfection

tion of an art ſo noble and uſeful, and of which the invention does ſo much honour to human nature. I have endeavoured to ſhew, that the expreſſion of the Greek language is full and accurate, but without any redundancy of words;—that its flections ſave the multiplication of words unneceſſarily, expreſſing all that can be conveniently expreſſed in that way, and nothing more;—that its radical words are as few in number as poſſible, and ſo framed as to anſwer admirably well the purpoſes both of flection and derivation;—that in the whole ſtructure of the language, they have had a proper regard to the ear, as well as to the underſtanding, and have employed the whole power of elemental ſounds, to make their language both ſoft and manly in the pronunciation; and to ſo perfect an articulation they have added melody and rhythm, by which they have given their language all the muſic that a language ought to have;—in ſhort, that the ſyſtem of the Greek language is complete in every part, in ſound as well as ſenſe; and that the art of it is ſo perfect, that every thing in it is ſubjected to rules that can by its nature be ſo ſubjected, C. II.

C. 11. jected. On the other hand, it appears, that the languages of northern extraction, and particularly the Engliſh, are compoſed almoſt altogether of hard inflexible words, monoſyllables for the greater part, and crouded with conſonants that do not eaſily coaleſce in ſound, and that theſe words are unſkillfuly tacked together by ill-favoured particles conſtantly recurring, and fatiguing the ear, without either melody or rhythm to ſoften the harſhneſs of ſo rude an articulation.

I am very ſenſible, that by what I have ſaid here and elſewhere, of modern languages and modern arts, I ſhall give great offence to many readers. I know how predominant vanity is in this age, and that the vanity of the individual goes even to the age in which he lives. For if it be vilified or diſparaged, he thinks it reflects diſhonour upon him, as it tends to make his fancied ſuperiority over his contemporaries not ſo great a praiſe as he had imagined. But I ſaid in the beginning of this work, that I did not write for the *many*: and I hope there are even in this age a *few* learned and candid judges, (ſome I think I have the happineſs of knowing), whoſe approbation alone I deſire, and who, I am perſuaded,

ſuaded, will not be offended with what I have ſaid in praiſe of antient and cenſure of modern arts. They know, that other bad qualities excite hatred, or perhaps compaſſion, in men of great humanity; but that there is none which makes a man ſo contemptible in the eyes of men of ſenſe as *vanity*. And they know, at the ſame time, that it is founded in ignorance; and that the only cure for it is good ſolid learning, (for a little ſuperficial learning increaſes it), in *philoſophy*, *hiſtory*, and *arts*. By *philoſophy* we learn what the powers of human nature are, and to what a height it may be exalted; but it will teach us, at the ſame time, that man can never riſe to his higheſt elevation without philoſophy. *Hiſtory* will inform him to what perfection men have actually arrived in other ages and nations of the world, and that the manners and inſtitutions alone of a well-regulated ſtate, have formed great men. But it will inform him likewiſe, that in a corrupt and degenerate nation, no man can riſe above the manners of the age, except by the aſſiſtance of *philoſophy*, to which alone we owe thoſe ſhining lights which have illumined the darkeſt ages of the world, and caſt a glory upon the moſt profligate and worthleſs C. 11.

times

C. 11. times *. And laſtly, by the ſtudy of antient *arts*, he will learn to know how much, in thoſe arts, the antients excelled the moderns, and that it is only by the ſtudy of antient arts that we can improve the modern, or judge truly of their merit. By ſuch a courſe of ſtudy he will come to know the nature of man,—what he is,—what he has been,—and what he may be. And it is in this way, and this way only, that we can ever fulfil the precept of the Delphic god, *to know ourſelves*. For it is only by knowledge of the ſpecies that we can know the individual; and a perſon is *vain*, not becauſe he does not know himſelf, (for every man knows himſelf by the moſt certain of all knowledge, viz. conſciouſneſs), but becauſe he does not know what is moſt excellent of the kind. A man, therefore, who has attained this prime knowledge, though he ſhould be conſcious of excelling every man of this age in every valuable accompliſhment, he would not on that

* It was to philoſophy that the Romans owed, in their degenerate days, an Helvidius Priſcus, a Thraſeopetus, and the great and good Emperor Marcus Aurelius; and it was not the manners of the ſtate, but philoſophy, that formed Epaminondas, the greateſt man perhaps that ever Greece produced.

account

account have a high opinion of himſelf; C. 11.
and the chief praiſe he would beſtow on himſelf would be, that though he was far ſhort of what he ſhould be, he was free of that contemptible quality, *vanity*; for ſuch a man, though he might paſs for *proud*, would be (as Swift has well diſtinguiſhed) *too proud to be vain.*——But to return to our ſubject:

I have now finiſhed the grammatical part of this work, which I hope will at leaſt ſerve to ſhew, what I chiefly intended by it, that a language of art is indeed a work of great art. If I have otherwiſe failed in the execution of this work, through the want of knowledge of ſo many particular languages as may be neceſſary for ſuch an undertaking, or through any other want, I think I may venture to ſay, that I have treated the ſubject according to a method which will take in, under one or other of its heads, every thing belonging to every language that ever exiſted.——I will conclude this volume with ſome obſervations upon the Chineſe language, and that invented by Biſhop Wilkins; after which I will endeavour to ſhew, that a language of art could not have grown out of popular uſe, but muſt

C. 11. have been the invention of men of genius and ſcience.

CHAP. XII.

Of the Chineſe language.—The moſt extraordinary language in the world.—Very imperfect, and the reaſon why it has continued ſo long in that ſtate.—Probably came from Egypt through India.

C. 12. THE language of this people is very ſingular, nor do I believe that there is ſuch another language at preſent to be found on the face of the earth. It cannot be called a language of art; nor is it entirely barbarous; but it participates of both, and may be ſaid to be an intermediate ſtage betwixt the two. For it has ſo much of the language of art, that it does not uſe one word to expreſs whole ſentences, but has different words for different things: and with reſpect to the ſound, it has not that peculiarity of all the barbarous languages, namely, very long words; but, on the contrary, all its words are monoſyllables; a ſingularity which diſtinguiſhes it

it from all other languages, ſo far as I know, that are any where ſpoken. On the other hand, it ſo far reſembles the barbarous languages, that it has neither compoſition, derivation, nor flection; and it is ſo much more barbarous than they, that it does not ſhew any thing like an attempt towards any of thoſe great arts of language; whereas the barbarous languages, as we have ſeen, have ſome beginnings of all the three; ſo that, though they have not yet attained to art, they ſeem to be in the progreſs towards it. And that the Chineſe have not the art of compoſition, is the more ſurpriſing, for this reaſon, that in the characters which make their written language they have ſuch compoſition. For example, the character by which they expreſs *misfortune*, is compoſed of a character which ſignifies *houſe*, and another which denotes *fire*, becauſe the greateſt misfortune that can befall a man is to have his houſe on fire *. But with reſpect to the language that they ſpeak, though they very often employ many words to expreſs one thing, yet they do not run them together into one C. 12.

* *Du Halde, tom. 2. p. 227.*

C. 12. word, making certain alterations upon them, that they may incorporate the better, as is practiſed in other languages, but preſerve them entire and unchanged.

I have ſpoken elſewhere of the Chineſe characters, and have ſhewn them to be no other than natural repreſentations of things, but very much abridged, for more expeditious uſe, and compounded together, as we have ſeen, in order to expreſs compounded ideas, with many marks of arbitrary inſtitution, to expreſs things which cannot be repreſented by corporeal forms. And I will now proceed to give a ſhort account of the nature of their language, taken from that great collection upon the ſubject of China, made by Du Halde.

And, in the firſt place, it muſt appear ſurpriſing, that, having nothing but monoſyllables in their language, they ſhould be able to expreſs ſo many things as a life of great policy and refinement, ſuch as theirs, requires to be expreſſed. For without the variety which the compoſition of ſyllables gives to our words, it would be impoſſible for us to expreſs one half of the things which we have occaſion to expreſs. But, in the firſt place, they uſe ſeveral words,

words, as I have juſt now ſaid, to denote one thing; and though they have not the art of compoſition, I am perſuaded they pronounce them ſo as to diſtinguiſh them from other words, ſignifying different and detached things. And, ſecondly, they diverſify their monoſyllables ſo, by different tones which they give them, that the ſame word, differently accented, ſignifies ſometimes ten or eleven different things *, which makes their language appear to ſtrangers to be no better than ſing-ſong †. It is in this way that they ſupply the poverty of their articulation, which indeed is very great; for beſides their having no compoſition of ſyllables, they want the uſe of many letters that we have, particularly the letters *b*, *d*, *r*, *x*, *z* ‡. C. 12.

As they diverſify the words ſo much by

* Du Halde gives an example of this in the monoſyllable *ro*, which, by different accents, and inflections of the voice, as he expreſſes it, is made to ſignify eleven different things, *vol.* 2. *pag.* 225.

† Du Halde denies this, and affirms, that the authors who ſay ſo are miſtaken. *Ibid.* But I rather believe that hē is miſtaken, becauſe I have heard ſeveral perſons who had been in the country, ſay the ſame.

‡ *Du Halde, ibid. pag.* 230.

tones,

C. 12. tones, one ſhould imagine that this muſic of their language roſe high, at leaſt above the acute accent in Greek, which is no higher than a fifth. But if we can believe what Du Halde ſays of the fineneſs and delicacy of their tones, ſo as to be hardly perceptible to a ſtranger *, we muſt ſuppoſe that they do not riſe high, but only by ſmall intervals, ſo that the muſic of their language muſt reſemble ſomewhat the muſic of the birds, which is within a ſmall compaſs, but nevertheleſs of great variety of notes. If this be ſo, the learning the Chineſe language muſt be exceedingly difficult to a ſtranger, if he has not a good voice and ear for muſic, and much practice of it. The great difference therefore betwixt the Chineſe and Greek accents, conſiſts in this, that the Greeks had but two accents, the grave and acute, diſtinguiſhed by a great interval, and that not very exactly marked. For the acute, though it never roſe above a fifth higher than the grave, it did not always riſe ſo high, but was ſometimes pitched lower, according to the voice of the ſpeaker; whereas the Chineſe muſt have many more accents

* *Ibid. pag.* 225.

conſiſting

conſiſting of much ſmaller intervals, and therefore more exactly diſtinguiſhed. So that it is evident the Chineſe language muſt be much more muſical than the Greek, and more muſical than any language ought to be. But, as I have ſaid, it is neceſſary to ſupply the defect of their articulation. C. 12.

For this purpoſe likewiſe they uſe quantity, and by lengthening or ſhortening the vowels of their words, make them ſignify different things. They do the ſame by giving their words different aſpirations, and by ſounding them with different degrees of ſoftneſs or roughneſs *; and by theſe methods of diverſifying their monoſyllables, they make three hundred and thirty of them, ſays our author, ſerve all the purpoſes of language †, and theſe not much varied in their termination; for they all end either with a vowel, or with the conſonant *n*, ſometimes with the addition of the conſonant *g* ‡.

With reſpect to the grammar of this language, as they have no flection, ſo that

* *Ibid. pag.* 225. † *Ibid. pag.* 224.

‡ *Ibid. pag.* 225.

all

C. 12. all their words are indeclineable, their caſes and tenſes are all formed by particles. Genders they have none; and even the diſtinction of numbers, which is marked by ſome change of the word in languages that are otherwiſe exceedingly imperfect, is marked in the Chineſe only by a particle *. They have no more than the three ſimple tenſes, viz. the preſent, paſt, and future; and for want of different terminations, the ſame word ſtands either for the verb, or the verbal ſubſtantive, the adjective or the ſubſtantive derived from it, according to its poſition in the ſentence.

Thus it appears, that the Chineſe language, whether we conſider it as ſound merely, or as ſound ſignificant, is exceedingly defective; yet, ſuch as it is, it has been uſed by this people for three or four thouſand years, and their written language, during that time, has been ſo bulky and cumberſome, that it coſts the labour of a life, to attain to any competent knowledge of it.

I ſhould be much ſurpriſed at this, if I believed, as ſome do, that the Chineſe

* *Ibid. p.* 234. *et ſeqq.*

were

were an ingenious and inventive people. But I am of the opinion of Dr Warburton, "that "the Chineſe are the leaſt inventive people "upon earth *." And I require no other proof of it than their uſing, for ſuch a length of time, a language and orthography ſo extremely defective. It convinces me that they cannot have made any conſiderable progreſs in philoſophy. For it is philoſophy that diſcovers the principles of all arts and ſciences; and if the Chineſe had been philoſophers, ſuch as the Egyptians were, they certainly would have applied their philoſophy to find out, as the Egyptians did, the principles of thoſe two moſt uſeful arts in life, ſpeaking and writing. C. 12.

But I have other proofs of their ignorance in philoſophy. The oldeſt traveller into China that is commonly known, is Marco Paolo, the Venetian, who was in that country in the thirteenth century. But as he was no philoſopher, nor a man of ſcience, ſo far as appears, of any kind, we cannot expect from him any account of the philoſophy and ſciences of the Chineſe, though he tells us a great deal of their

* Divine Legat. book 4. ſect. 4.

C. 12. cuſtoms and political inſtitutions, and relates a good number of curious facts. But four hundred years before, that is, in the ninth century, two Mahometan Arabians travelled into China; and we have their travels tranſlated from Arabic into French by one Mr Renaudaut, with notes and obſervations very well worth reading *. In theſe travels there are a great many curious facts of natural hiſtory, which ſhew that the authors were men of obſervation and curioſity. But what is to our preſent purpoſe is, that one of them, ſpeaking of the Chineſe learning, ſays expreſsly, that they had no ſcience at all, and that even their religion and laws they had got from India †. He adds, that the Chineſe knew a little of aſtronomy, but the Indians more; and that among the Indians, both medicine and philoſophy were cultivated.

The opinion of this Arabian traveller, who lived at a time when the Arabians were far advanced in ſcience and philoſophy, appears to me more to be depended upon, than what we have heard of late

* The Book is printed at *Paris* 1718.

† *Pag.* 45.

from

from the Jeſuits, concerning the wonderful learning of the Chineſe. For, as the French tranſlator has obſerved, the account which the Jeſuits themſelves give of their knowledge of ſome of the ſciences, ſhews that they have made very little progreſs in them. And our author quotes, upon this occaſion, p. 342. what Father Martini ſays of their progreſs in the higheſt philoſophy, and which may be ſaid to contain the principles of all other philoſophy, I mean *metaphyſics*. "It is amazing," ſays that father, "that in all their wri-"tings, they ſay nothing of the author of "all things, and have not ſo much as a "name for him in their copious language." And as to their ſkill in aſtronomy, of which we have heard ſo much, we may judge by the honours that were done to ſome Jeſuits there, who were made preſidents of their tribunal of mathematics, though in Europe they were not known for aſtronomers. And the fact is, according to Mr Renaudaut, that they were not able, without the aſſiſtance of the Jeſuits, to calculate an eclipſe with any tolerable exactneſs. And accordingly, in their aſtronomical tables, of the exactneſs of which C. 12.

C. 12. ſome of the Jeſuits boaſt ſo much, Caſſini, one of the greateſt aſtronomers of later times, has obſerved, that there are the groſſeſt errors in their calculation of eclipſes, and other conjunctions, *p.* 359. But what puts this matter out of all doubt, is what Du Halde, who was himſelf a Jeſuit, tells us, that they know very little either of the theorems or problems of geometry; and when they reſolve any problem, it is rather, he ſays, by induction than by principles *; that is, in other words, they cannot demonſtrate: and accordingly, the French author above quoted, Mr Renaudaut, tells us, that when the Jeſuits put Euclid into their hands, and explained to them the demonſtrations, they admired them exceedingly, as things altogether new to them. If this be true, it is impoſſible that they can have made a ſcience of aſtronomy.

The truth therefore ſeems to be, that though the Chineſe excel in ſome mechanic arts; and though the populouſneſs and extent of their country have obliged them to eſtabliſh an exact police, and to ſtudy the rules of morality

* *Vol.* 3. *p.* 268.

and

and good government, they are far from being men of ſcience and philoſophy. C. 12.

But how came they by their language, which, however imperfect, muſt be acknowledged to be very extraordinary, and like no other that is any where to be found? And the firſt queſtion is, Whether they invented their language? And my opinion is, that though at ſome time or other they may have produced a barbarous jargon, ſuch as is ſpoken by ſavages in the firſt ſtate of barbarity, conſiſting of words, or rather cries, of great length, with very little articulation; yet I can hardly believe, that a people ſo dull and uninventive, would have advanced even the firſt ſtep towards a language of art, by ſhortening their words. For this was the firſt thing that men did when they began to ſpeak by art, without which they could have have had neither compoſition, derivation, nor flection, three things of abſolute neceſſity in a language of art.

From whence then did the Chineſe get thoſe roots of language, (for ſo I call their monoſyllables), if they were not of their own growth? And I think it is probable that they came from the ſame parent-country

C. 12. try of learning from which Europe has derived all its arts, I mean Egypt. For, as I have obſerved in my firſt volume *, the Egyptians ſaid, that their Oſiris overran all the eaſt, with a great army, and penetrated as far as India, where he built cities, and introduced arts and civility. And with this Egyptian ſtory, agreed not only the popular tradition among the Indians, but the opinion of their philoſophers and wiſe men, who related, as Diodorus Siculus informs us †, that Bacchus, who was the ſame with Oſiris, entered India with a great army, and tamed and civilized the people; and, among other arts, I think it is likely he alſo introduced his language. Thus, by the concurrent teſtimony of both countries, we can trace arts from Egypt into India; and from India, according to our Arabian travellers, the Chineſe got their religion and laws, and we may preſume likewiſe their language. And it will be a further confirmation of this, if it be true what is maintained by a learned academician ‡, whom I knew in Paris, that the Chineſe got their

* Lib. 3. cap. 12. pag. 466.

† Lib. 3. ‡ M. de Guignes.

written

written characters from Egypt, being the natural repreſentations of things curtailed and abridged, which the Egyptians uſed before they invented letters. At this time we may ſuppoſe that the Egyptians had proceeded no farther in the art of language, than to ſhorten, and perhaps articulate a little more their barbarous cries, but had not yet invented compoſition and derivation, and all that we call the analogy of language. In this rude ſtate was language, as I conjecture, imported from Egypt to China, through the medium of India. And the Chineſe being a dull uninventive people, have preſerved it juſt as they got it, without improving or enlarging it by the grammatical art. And in like manner, they have kept the written characters ſuch as they originally were, without inventing an alphabet, as the Egyptians did. C. 12.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIII.

Of the philoſophical language invented by Biſhop Wilkins.

C. 13. YOU people of Europe that are ſo ingenious, ſaid the North-American Indian to his miſſionary, has any one of you invented a language *? This Indian it ſeems had ſagacity enough to perceive, what we have laboured ſo much to prove, the difficulty of the invention. The miſſionary, though a man of letters, did not, it is likely, know any thing of Biſhop Wilkins's philoſophical language; otherwiſe he would have been very glad to have anſwered the queſtion in the affirmative, being deſirous, no doubt, to give the Indian a very high opinion of us Europeans; a matter not eaſy among ſuch of them as are beſt acquainted with us. The author of this wonderful invention was Dr *John Wilkins*, one of the firſt members of the Royal Society. He flouriſhed about the

* Vol. 1. p. 392.

middle

middle of laſt century *, a very learned age, when every branch of learning was cultivated, and among other things the nature of language was much ſtudied. I have already had occaſion to obſerve, that another member of this Society, Dr Wallis, invented that moſt ingenious art of teaching the dumb to ſpeak, an invention that could not have been thought of except by a man who underſtood perfectly the mechaniſm at leaſt of language. And that his knowledge went much deeper, is evident from the Engliſh grammar that he has publiſhed †. C. 13.

The gentleman I am now ſpeaking of was a man of a ſingular genius, aſpiring to things great and extraordinary. Not

* The Society gave a warrant for the printing of the book by an act bearing date 13th April 1668.

† Thus it appears, that the ſubject of which I am treating, as well as other branches of ſcience, has been much indebted to the labours of this learned body. The hiſtory of the ſociety, written by a member of it, Dr Sprat, is juſtly eſteemed a ſtandard for the Engliſh language. And if the public ſhall find any accuracy or correctneſs in the ſtyle of this work, it is in great part owing to the friendly admonitions and corrections of Sir John Pringle, who ſo worthily fills at preſent the chair of preſident in that Society.

C. 13. contented with the poſſeſſion of his native element the earth, nor with the power of making himſelf, if he pleaſed, an inhabitant of the water, as much as an otter, or any other amphibious animal, he wanted to vindicate to man the dominion of another element, I mean the air, by teaching him to fly. Of kin, I think, to this attempt, though not ſo romantic, was his ſcheme of an univerſal philoſophical language, both written and vocal. However impracticable the attempt may ſeem, or at leaſt exceeding the abilities of a ſingle man, which indeed the author ſeems to confeſs, it muſt be allowed that he was very well qualified for ſuch an undertaking. For he was deeply learned in the antient philoſophy, from which he had learned that greateſt of all arts, as Cicero calls it*, and abſolutely neceſſary for the execution of his project, by which we are taught to aſcend to what is higheſt and moſt comprehenſive of every kind, and from thence to deſcend through the ſeveral ſubordinate genera and ſpecieſes, dividing, ſub-

* *Brut. ſive de clar. Orat. cap.* 41. And a little before he ſays, it is *ars quæ docet rem univerſam tribuere a partes, latentem explicare definiendo,* &c.

dividing,

dividing, and defining, with the greateſt exactneſs *. This may be ſaid to be the *art of arts*, ſince it is the art by which arts and ſciences are made; and in the writings that have been publiſhed ſince the antient philoſophy was out of faſhion, there is nothing I deſiderate ſo much as order and method, and a deduction of things from their firſt principles. How neceſſary this art was for the invention of a philoſophical language, will appear from the account I am now to give of the language invented by Biſhop Wilkins; for the underſtanding of which it will be neceſſary to recollect what has been ſaid in the firſt part of this work, concerning ideas, and the philoſophy of mind, with which the knowledge of all languages, but particu- C. 13.

* Theſe are two different talents. For Socrates, ſays Ariſtotle, inveſtigated *generals* very well; but he was not ſo accurate in *dividing* the genus, when found, into its ſeveral ſpecieſes. He himſelf excelled in both; and it appears to have been from the ſtudy of him, chiefly, that Biſhop Wilkins acquired thoſe two great nerves of ſcience, definition and diviſion. And in the tables which he has compoſed for the purpoſe of framing his philoſophical language, there is more ſcience to be found than any where that I know in ſo ſmall a compaſs.

C. 13. larly of a philoſophical language, muſt be intimately connected.

In the *firſt* place, we muſt remember, that all things in nature are reducible to certain claſſes, which are termed by logicians *genus* or *ſpecies*, according as they are higher or lower, containing or contained. To make this diviſion and arrangement is the great buſineſs of *intellect*; and it is by this operation that we form our notions or ideas of every thing.

2do, It has alſo been obſerved, that it is in this way only that we have any knowledge or comprehenſion of any thing: for we know nothing *abſolutely*, but only *relatively*, by knowing to what genus or ſpecies it belongs, that is to ſay, what it has in common with other things, and what different. Thus we know nothing of man, except that he is of the genus animal, and of a certain ſpecies of that genus, differing in certain things from other ſpecieſes of the ſame genus.

3tio, It is theſe notions, or ideas, as I call them, thus formed, by comparing things with one another, which, expreſſed by certain ſigns, audible or viſible, make what we call language, ſpoken or written.

And

And if thoſe ſigns are ſuch as to bear a reference to the claſs in which the thing is to be found, ſo that if we underſtand the ſign, we have in effect the definition of the thing, then is the language truly a philoſophical language, and ſuch as muſt be univerſal among philoſophers, who have arranged and diſtributed things into proper claſſes. It may alſo be ſaid to be a *natural* language, as the Biſhop calls it, ſince it follows the order of the human mind in forming the ideas of which language is the expreſſion. C. 13.

4*to*, The difference betwixt ſuch a language, and the common languages, is obvious. For the primitive words of thoſe languages have no connection at all with the nature of things, or the claſſes to which they belong. And as to the derivatives, though they have a connection with the primitive word, it is not ſuch a connection as philoſophy requires, but often the reverſe; as in the caſe of what they call *abſtract nouns*, ſuch as *bonitas* in Latin, or *goodneſs* in Engliſh, which are derived from the adjectives *bonus*, or *good*; whereas, according to philoſophical derivation, and the nature of things, the adjective denoting the

C. 13. the quality concrete, ſhould have been derived from the noun denoting the quality abſtract. Hence it comes, that the knowledge of things does not at all lead to the knowledge of words in ſuch languages, any more than the knowledge of words leads to the knowledge of things. And as to the written characters of ſuch languages, they only expreſs the words, not the things. It is evident therefore that ſuch languages are far from being philoſophical: nor can any of them be ever univerſal, but each will be underſtood only by ſuch as have made a particular ſtudy of it.

From theſe obſervations it appears, that in order to form this philoſophical and univerſal language, we muſt find out a certain number of genera, to which all things in nature are reducible; and we muſt have a mark or ſign for every thing, denoting under which of theſe genera it is ranked. And ſecondly, As thoſe genera muſt have under them a great number of ſubordinate ſpecieſes, that particular ſpecies to which the thing belongs, muſt alſo be marked. And here muſt appear the extraordinary difficulty, both of the invention and uſe of ſuch a language: for ſup-

poſe

poſe the genera, comprehending all things, reduced to a ſmall number, ſuch as would not be burdenſome to the memory; and ſuppoſe them to be diſtinguiſhed by marks that might become familiar by uſe; how is it poſſible to put into any order, or bring into any reaſonable compaſs, the prodigious number of ſpecieſes that muſt be included under each *genus*, if the genera are of a high order; and if they are not, it is evident that they themſelves muſt be of a number too bulky and unwieldy for the uſe of language. What I mean will be beſt explained by an example. Let us take the genus *animal*, which is none of the higheſt genera, that is, of thoſe that are called *categories* or *predicaments*; yet it appears to comprehend under it an almoſt infinite number of ſpecieſes, many more, I am perſuaded, than have yet been obſerved or diſcovered. The ſame may be ſaid of *vegetables* and of *minerals*; and in general the number of ſpecieſes appear to be with reſpect to our capacities, as incomprehenſible as the number of individuals. How then are ſuch numbers to be arranged and expreſſed by marks to be eaſily learned and underſtood, C. 13.

C. 13. ſtood, without confuſion or ambiguity, which is the caſe, as the Biſhop ſays, of the marks invented by him?

Here the Peripatetic philoſophy has helped out the Biſhop a little: for according to that philoſophy, every genus contains in it virtually certain *differences*, by which it is divided into its ſubordinate ſpecieſes. Thus in the example given of *animal*, animals are divided, according to their internal principle, into *rational* and *irrational*;—according to the conſtitution of their bodies, into *ſanguineous* and *exſanguious*;—according to the ſtructure of the different parts of their body, into *whole-footed* and *cloven-footed*, and the like;—according to their method of generation, into *viviparous* and *oviparous*;—and according to their food or diet, into *carnivorous* and *granivorous*. Theſe differences, with reſpect to the genus, are called *diæretic*, or *dividing*, becauſe by them the genus is divided into its ſeveral ſpecieſes. And with reſpect to the ſpecieſes, they are called *ſpecific*, becauſe joined to the genus, they conſtitute the different ſpecieſes. Thus, in the example I have given of *animal*, that genus is divided by

rational,

rational, *irrational*, and the other differences above mentioned. And each of thoſe differences, joined to the genus, conſtitutes ſo many different ſpecieſes, which are ranked under that difference. Thus, for example, under *rational* are to be ranked *man* and *angel*; — under *irrational*, all the ſeveral ſpecieſes of brutes; — under *whole-footed*, are comprehended the *horſe*, *aſs*, *mule*, *camel*, &c.; — under *cloven-footed*, the *ox*, *ſheep*, *goat*, &c. *. Now theſe differences of each genus may be reduced to number; and there is a way well known among the antients, under the name of the *Diæretic* method, or method of diviſion, by which a genus was divided into its ſeveral differences, and the ſeveral ſpecieſes contained under thoſe differences. Of this method we have fine examples in the *Sophiſta* and *Politicus* of Plato, and in Mr Harris's dialogue upon *Art*. C. 13.

Here then is a conſiderable ſtep made

* The nature of *genus* and *ſpecies*, and the method of *dividing* a genus into its ſeveral ſpecieſes by *differences*, are moſt accurately explained by Porphyry, in his introduction to Ariſtotle's Logic, and by Ammonius in his Commentary upon it; which together, if diligently ſtudied, are the beſt preparations for philoſophy that is any where to be found.

C. 13. towards the formation of this univerſal language. For if the genera are reduced to a certain number not too great, and if the *differences* under each of theſe genera are likewiſe brought within a reaſonable compaſs, there remains nothing to be done, but to find out, and rank under each of the differences, the ſeveral ſpecieſes belonging to it; ſo that if theſe likewiſe can be reduced to a moderate number, the buſineſs appears to be done.

For matters being thus prepared, one ſhould think, that nothing was wanting but to find out marks or ſigns, whether written or vocal, for the ſeveral things; expreſſing firſt the genus to which the thing belongs, according to the order in which it ſtands, whether firſt, ſecond, third, &c.; then the *difference* by which the genus is divided, according to the ſame order of firſt, ſecond, and third; and then the ſpecies under that difference, likewiſe in the ſame numerical order. But there ſtill remains what is more difficult perhaps than any thing I have hitherto mentioned, viz. to expreſs, firſt, the ſeveral circumſtances and modes of exiſtence, ſuch as time, place, greater or leſs in degree, ſex, number,

ber, &c.; and, ſecondly, the grammatical conſtruction, or the connection of the ideas with one another; for, as I have taken occaſion to obſerve more than once, any number of the cleareſt and moſt preciſe ideas would not form diſcourſe, unleſs their connection, relation, and dependence upon one another, were marked. Suppoſing therefore a mark found out, expreſſing the genus,—the difference,—and under that difference the particular ſpecies to which the thing belongs; yet, if it be a verb, there muſt likewiſe be a mark found out to expreſs the time of that verb, and likewiſe the mode or diſpoſition of the human mind with reſpect to the action. If it be a noun, there muſt be a mark for its gender and its number, and alſo its caſes, by which its connection with other nouns, or with verbs, is expreſſed; and there muſt be alſo marks for ſuch connectives, as articles, pronouns, prepoſitions, and conjunctions; beſides many other particulars, which are required to conſtitute that moſt difficult part of the grammatical art, called *ſyntax*. C. 13.

Nor is it in one kind of language only that theſe ſo great difficulties are to be got

C. 13. over: for in order to make the art complete, there muſt be two kinds of languages, one vocal or *effable*, as our author expreſſes it, the other *written*; and the *words* of the one, as well as the *characters* of the other, muſt expreſs all the different things above mentioned.

Having ſaid thus much in general, of the nature and requiſites of this philoſophical language, I come now to give ſome account of the one invented by the Biſhop. The firſt thing he does is, to divide all things which may be the ſubjects of language, into certain claſſes, or genera, which he again ſubdivides by their ſeveral differences. After this manner things were divided by the antient philoſophers into *ten* claſſes, called by them *categories*, or *predicaments*, of which I have had occaſion frequently to make mention in the courſe of this work; but our author has only made uſe of five of them, *viz. ſubſtance*, *quantity*, *quality*, *action*, and *relation*, which he has ſubdivided into ſeveral genera, as ſhall be afterwards ſhewn. But there are notions which are ſtill more general than the categories, as I have had occaſion elſewhere to explain; and he finds

finds a difference betwixt theſe general notions, viz. that ſome of them relate to *things*, others to *words*. Thoſe which relate to things he calls *tranſcendental*; and among theſe he finds a *difference*, namely, that ſome of them are *abſolute*, others *relative*. The firſt he calls *tranſcendentals general*. The relative he divides into two kinds: the one he calls *tranſcendentals mixt*, belonging to quantity, quality, whole, and part;—the other kind of relative tranſcendentals are *ſimple*, and proper to action, and which therefore he calls *tranſcendentals of relation of action*. Thus of things tranſcendental, he makes his three firſt genera, viz. *tranſcendentals general*,—*tranſcendentals of mixt relation*,—and *tranſcendentals of relation of action*. General notions relating to *words*, he comprehends under the name of *diſcourſe*, and makes it his fourth genus *. C. 13.

Beſides theſe *general* notions, there are two *ſpecial* things, which he conſiders to be above the categories, viz. the *creator*, and the *world* created by him; and of theſe he makes two other genera; ſo that he makes in all ſix genera of tranſcendentals,

* Eſſay towards a real character and philoſophical language, part 2. chap. 1. *et ſeqq.*

C. 13. ſcendentals, beſides the genera into which he ſubdivides the five categories above mentioned, amounting in all to thirty-four. The number therefore of his genera all together is forty.

I will next endeavour to give the reader an idea of the ſpecieſes into which he divides his genera; beginning, as he does, with the tranſcendentals; which, as I have ſaid, he divides into two kinds, one relating to things, the other to words. Thoſe of things he has ſubdivided into general tranſcendentals, — tranſcendentals of relation mixt, — and tranſcendentals of relation of action; and theſe, as I have ſaid, make his three firſt genera. In the firſt of theſe, viz. tranſcendentals general, he finds ſix *differences*, viz. genus itſelf, or *kind*, as he expreſſes it, — *cauſe*, — *diverſity*, — *difference* relating to the end of action, — *difference* relating to the means, — and, laſtly, *mode*. Under each of theſe differences he numbers ſeveral ſpecieſes: *e. g.* Under the firſt of them, viz. *genus*, he reckons firſt *being* and *nothing*; for in this way he couples his ſpecieſes, either on account of their *oppoſition*, as in this caſe, or on account of their *affinity*. The ſecond ſpecies under this

this difference is *thing* and *appearance*. The third is *notion* and *fiction*, &c. In like manner he numbers the ſpecieſes under the ſecond *difference*, viz. *cauſe*, reckoning *efficient* and *inſtrument* the firſt, *impulſive* and *cohibitive* the ſecond, and ſo on through the other four *differences* of his firſt genus of tranſcendentals general. And in like manner he goes through the ſecond genus, dividing it likewiſe by differences, and enumerating the ſeveral ſpecieſes under each difference; and in the ſame manner he goes through the third genus. Then he comes to general notions or tranſcendentals, as they may be called, relating to *words*, which he comprehends all under the name of *diſcourſe*. This genus he divides by ſix differences, viz. *elements*, — *words*, — *complex grammatical notions* of ſpeech, — *complex logical notions* of diſcourſe, — *mixt notions of diſcourſe* belonging both to grammar and logic, — and laſtly, *modes of diſcourſe*. And under each of theſe he enumerates ſeveral ſpecieſes *. And ſo much for *general tranſcendentals*, relating both to *things* and *words*. C. 13.

He next proceeds to the two ſpecial tran-

* Ibid. part 2. ch. 1.

ſcendentals,

C. 13. ſcendentals, beginning with the *Creator*, or *God*, whoſe eſſence being ſimple and indiviſible, does not admit of a diviſion into ſpecieſes. The ſecond is the *world*, or *univerſe*; which he divides into *ſpiritual*, or immaterial, and *corporeal*; under each of which he enumerates ſeveral ſpecieſes. And in this manner he goes through the firſt ſix genera of notions more general than the categories.

After this he proceeds to his five categories; which he ſubdivides, as I have ſaid, into ſeveral ſubaltern genera, in all amounting to thirty-four. He begins with *ſubſtance*: the firſt *difference* of which he makes to be *inanimate*; which he diſtinguiſhes by the name of *element*, and makes it his ſeventh genus; of which he finds ſix *differences*, ſuch as *fire*, *air*, *water*, *earth*, &c. And under each of theſe differences he enumerates ſeveral ſpecieſes.

He next proceeds to *ſubſtance animate*; which he divides into *vegetative* and *ſenſitive*. The vegetative again he ſubdivides into *imperfect*, ſuch as minerals, (for he holds that minerals have a kind of growth or vegetation), and *perfect*, ſuch as plants. The *imperfect vegetative* he ſubdivides into *ſtone*,

ſtone, which is his 8th genus, and *metal*, which is his 9th. *Stone* he divides by ſix *differences*, which, as he tells us, is the uſual number of differences that he finds under every genus; and under each of theſe differences he enumerates ſeveral ſpecieſes, which ſeldom exceed the number of nine under any one. *Metal*, which, as I have ſaid, is his 9th genus, he divides only by four differences; and in like manner, under each difference, numbers the ſeveral ſpecieſes. C. 13.

Having thus gone through the *imperfect* vegetative, he comes to the *perfect*, or plant, which he ſays is a tribe ſo numerous and various, that he confeſſes he found a great deal of trouble in dividing and arranging it. He has however ſucceeded pretty well, at leaſt ſo it appears to me, who am no botaniſt; for natural things run ſo much into one another, and the principles which conſtitute their eſſences, and diſcriminate them one from another, are ſo ſubtile and latent, that I hold it to be impoſſible to define and divide them ſo accurately as we can define and divide our own abſtract notions. Plants he has divided into *herbs*, *ſhrubs*, and *trees*. The

C. 13. *herb* he defines to be a minute and tender plant; and he has arranged it according to its leaves, in which way conſidered, it makes his 10th *genus*; — according to its flower, which makes his 11th; — and according to its ſeed-veſſels, which makes his 12th *genus*. Each of theſe *genera* he divides by a certain number of *differences*; and under each *difference* he ranges the ſeveral *ſpecieſes*. All other plants being woody, are larger and firmer than the herb; and he divides them into greater and leſſer. The leſſer he calls a *ſhrub*, which he ſays commonly grows up from the root in ſeveral ſtems, and this makes his 13th *genus*. The larger, growing up in one ſingle ſtem, he calls *tree*, and makes it his 14th *genus*; and theſe two genera of plants he alſo divides by ſeveral *differences* *, and under each of the differences he ranges the ſeveral ſpecieſes.

Having thus exhauſted the vegetable kingdom, he proceeds to the animal, or *ſenſitive*, as he calls it, being the ſecond member of his diviſion of animate ſubſtance. This kingdom he divides into *animals*, *ſanguineous* and *exſanguious*, that

* Ibid. chap. 4. pag. 69.

is,

is, animals without blood, and which therefore he conſiders as imperfect animals; and of theſe he makes his 15th *genus*, diſtinguiſhing it, like the others, by ſeveral differences, and ranging under each difference the ſeveral ſpecieſes belonging to it. The *ſanguineous* animals he divides into three kinds, viz. *fiſh*, which makes his 16th genus; *bird*, which makes his 17th; and *beaſt*, which makes his 18th: and each of theſe genera he treats in the ſame manner as he has done the others. C. 13.

Having thus conſidered the general nature of vegetables and animals, he proceeds to conſider the parts of both; ſome of which are *peculiar* to particular plants and animals, and conſtitute his 19th genus; others are *general*, and make the 20th: and theſe two genera are likewiſe diſtinguiſhed and divided like all the reſt.

In this manner he goes through the remaining four categories of *quantity*, *quality*, *action*, and *relation*, and by dividing and diſtinguiſhing them, forms the genera remaining to complete the number forty, all which he exhibits moſt diſtinctly in one general view upon a ſingle page *.

* Part 2. ch. 1. p. 23.

C. 13. It would be too much to ſay, and much more than the author pretends to, that there is no error or inaccuracy in a plan which comprehends the whole of things; and that the many diviſions, ſubdiviſions, and diſtinctions, could not have been more properly made, or the definitions which accompany them, rendered more accurate and ſcientific. The author acknowledges the defects of his work, and ſays, what is very true, that "the defining of all kinds "of *things*, *notions*, and *words*, is too "great an undertaking for a ſingle man, "and ought to be the work of a ſociety." This he ſays was the caſe of an Italian vocabulary, which was the joint production of the famous accademy de la Cruſca, and not finiſhed in leſs than forty years; and the Dictionary of the French accademy, which began in 1639, was not, he ſays, then compleated *. And beſides this difficulty of the work, there happened an accident in the execution of it, which one ſhould have thought would have put a ſtop to it altogether; for, as the author tells us, in the ſame epiſtle dedicatory, all that was printed of it, excepting only two copies, and a great part

* Epiſtle dedicatory.

of

of the unprinted original, was deſtroyed in the fire of London. All this notwithſtanding, the work, ſuch as it is, I think a moſt valuable work, ſhewing a moſt extenſive knowledge in the author, both of nature and art, and a philoſophical genius fitted to excel, not only in one branch of philoſophy, but to comprehend the whole of things. I have ſaid already, that there is more ſcience in his tables than is to be found any where in ſo ſmall a compaſs; and I have given ſome inſtances of his definitions and diviſions. I will give one or two more, which, with what I have ſaid of the general nature of the work, will, I hope, be ſufficient to give the reader a pretty complete idea of it. C. 13.

I have already obſerved, that he reckons minerals a part of animated nature, becauſe he ſays they appear to have growth and nutrition, and to be reproduced from certain ſeminal or ſpermatic parts of thoſe of the ſame kind, which he ſays is proved, by mines in appearance totally exhauſted, again renewing themſelves *. And, if I am not miſtaken, our lateſt diſcoveries agree with his philoſophy. He therefore

* Part 2. ch. 2. p. 54.

aſſigns

C. 13. aſſigns minerals to the vegetable kingdom, and divides them into *ſtones* and *metals*. Stones, he ſays, are a kind of mineral, hard and friable, "to which *earthy concretions* may be annexed by way of affinity, being more ſoft and brittle, and of a middle nature betwixt ſtones and metals." Then he proceeds, according to his method, to give the difference of *ſtones* and of *earthy concretions*. "Stones," he ſays, "are either *vulgar*, and of *no price*, — *middle priced*, — *precious*, — and theſe either *leſs tranſparent*, or *more tranſparent* *." Of *ſtones* therefore he makes thoſe four *differences*: and of *earthy concretions* he makes two; *diſſolveable*, and *not diſſolveable*: and under each of theſe differences he ranks the ſeveral ſpecieſes in their order. Then he proceeds to *metals*; defining *metal* to be a mineral, for the moſt part of a hard conſiſtence, cloſe, ductile, and fuſile. He divides it into *perfect* and *imperfect*. Of the perfect he makes two *differences*, viz. *natural*, which are produced in the earth, without the art of man, ſuch as gold, ſilver, &c.; and *factitious*, which are made by the art of man, ſuch as braſs,

* Part 2. ch. 3. p. 61.

pewter,

pewter, and ſteel. The imperfect he divides into thoſe which are *metalline ſubſtances by themſelves*, and thoſe which are only the *recrementitious parts*, as he calls them, of other metals, which are caſt off in preparing them *. C. 13.

The other example I ſhall give, is of an idea more abſtract; for it is taken from one of the categories, viz. *quantity*, which he divides into *magnitude*, *ſpace*, *meaſure*. "Magnitude," he ſays, "is a word intended to ſignify all the notions of *continued quantity*; to which may be joined, "by way of affinity, the word EXTENSION; by which is meant that kind of "quantity whereby a thing is ſaid to "have *partem extra partem*, one part out of "another, being the ſame thing with the "former, under another conſideration †." Then, after having laid down, and gone through, according to his uſual method, the ſeveral differences of magnitude, and the ſpecieſes under each of theſe differences, he proceeds to the ſecond member of the diviſion, viz. *ſpace*. "This word,"

* Part 2. ch. 3. p. 65.

† Ibid. ch. 7. p. 181.

ſays

C. 13. ſays he, "according to the common uſe "of it, is a name importing the more ge- "neral notion of that wherein any thing "is contained or done, comprehending "*time*, *place*, *ſituation* *." Then having gone through theſe three differences in like manner, he proceeds to the third member of the diviſion, viz. *meaſure*, of which he ſpeaks in this manner. "Thoſe "ſeveral *relations of quantity*, whereby men "uſe to judge of the multitude or great- "neſs of things, are ſtyled by the name "of MEASURE, *dimenſion*, *mete*, *ſurvey*, "*rule*; to which the relative term of PRO- "PORTION, *portion*, *rate*, *tax*, *ſize*, *ſcant- "ling*, *pittance*, *ſhare*, *doſe*, *meſs*, *ſymmetry*, "*analogy*, *commenſurate*, *diſpenſe*, *allot*, *ad- "apt*, is of ſome affinity, ſignifying an "equality or ſimilitude of the reſpects "that ſeveral things or quantities have to "one another. They are diſtinguiſhable "into ſuch as reſpect either *multitude* 1.— "*magnitude* 2.—*gravity* 3.—*duration* 4.— "*which is either more generally conſidered* 5. "—or *as reſtrained to living creatures* 6."

Here we may obſerve his method of ſet- ting down, under each head, all the Engliſh

* Part 2. ch. 7. p. 186.

words

words relative to it. And in this reſpect his work is a very good Engliſh vocabulary; and in order that we may find any word in it readily, he has ſubjoined to his work an alphabetical dictionary, in which all the words are referred to the ſeveral places in his tables where they are to be found. C. 13.

Our author having thus arranged and digeſted, into their proper places, the ideas expreſſed by words, it was neceſſary, as I have obſerved, to find out ſome method of connecting thoſe ideas together, ſo as to form diſcourſe. For the preceding part of the work is to be conſidered as nothing elſe but a *philoſophical dictionary of* NOTIONS, (that was the word then in uſe in place of *ideas*, a word afterwards brought into faſhion by Mr Locke), which, ſays, our author, muſt be formed into complex propoſitions and diſcourſes *; and this is to be done by the grammatical art. It was therefore neceſſary that he ſhould compoſe a philoſophical grammar, as well as a philoſophical dictionary; and accordingly he has done ſo in the third part of his work. Such a grammar is

* Part 3. ch. 1. p. 297.

C. 13. one of the *deſiderata* in learning mentioned by my Lord Bacon; and though our author, who is very modeſt and candid, mentions three other authors * who had written upon the ſubject, but whom I never ſaw nor heard of before, I am perſuaded he is the firſt who has treated it properly. He alſo mentions ſome before him, who had made attempts towards a univerſal language †; but nevertheleſs I am convinced that his work, among other merits, has that of being original, and, ſo far as we know, the only one of the kind now exiſting; for thoſe former works upon the ſubject are, I believe, no where to be found, and no other attempts have been made ſince his time.

He divides grammar very properly into three parts; one of which treats of the different kinds of words, and the various alterations they undergo by inflection, compoſition, and derivation. This part

* Their names are Scotus, in his *Grammat. Speculativa*; Caramuel, in his *Grammat. Audax*; and Campanella, in his *Grammatica Philoſophica*, part 3. ch. 1. pag. 297.

† He names three, *Beckerus*, *Athanaſius Kircher*, and *Phillip Labbè*, p. 452.

be

he calls *etymology*. The ſecond treats of the proper union or right conſtruction of words into ſentences; and this part is commonly known by the name of *ſyntax*. The third concerns the moſt convenient *marks* or *ſounds* for the expreſſion of ſuch names or words, whether by writing, called *orthography*, or by ſpeech, *orthoepy*. C. 13.

Upon this plan he gives us a grammar entirely new; for he appears to me to have been an original genius, who thought for himſelf upon every ſubject, but not like thoſe pretended geniuſes of our time, who ſet up for great writers and philoſophers upon their own ſtock only, without any aſſiſtance from learning; for it is evident that he was very learned in philoſophy, no leſs than in languages. But his grammar, however ingenious and philoſophical it may be, appears to me to be only fitted for the uſe of his philoſophical language; nor do I think that it could be applied to the improvement of any language ſpoken at preſent. What I think moſt curious in it, is that part of it which concerns orthography, and the power of the letters; a ſubject which he had ſtudied very much, and had beſides, as he tells us, the aſſiſt-

C. 13. ance of ſeveral learned men of his time, whom he names. I do not believe that the organs of ſpeech, and their ſeveral operations, have been ſo accurately examined by any body, and whoever is curious upon this ſubject, cannot reſort to a better book for information. There we find all the articulate ſounds that the human mouth is capable of uttering, ſo far as we know, arranged in a new order; new characters invented for ſuch of them as characters had not been provided for, and the old characters confined to the expreſſion of only one ſound. For the Engliſh alphabet, as he has ſhewn, is defective, both in not having characters ſufficient to expreſs all its ſounds, and in employing the ſame character to expreſs more than one ſound; and he has given us a ſpecimen of the Lord's prayer, and of the creed, in our alphabet, thus corrected *. And, not contented with this amendment of the old alphabet, he has given us two alphabets altogether new: in one of which he has ſtudied to give the letters a ſhape bearing ſome reſemblance to the configuration of the organs in the pronunciation

* Part 3. ch. 13. p. 373.

of

of them; ſo that they may deſerve, as he ſays, the name of a *natural character* of the ſounds they expreſs *. C. 13.

All the Biſhop's work, ſo far as I have hitherto given an account of it, is no more than a preparation for the *magnum opus*, the framing of this wonderful language; to which he proceeds in the fourth part of his work, beginning with the written language, or *real character*, as he calls it, becauſe it expreſſes *things*, and not *ſounds*, as the common characters do. And the reaſon he aſſigns for beginning with the character, is, that though, in order of *time*, ſpeech be prior to writing; yet, in the order of nature, there is no priority between them, but voice and ſound may be as well aſſigned to figure, as figure to ſound. "And I do the rather," ſays he, "begin with treating concerning a common character or letter, becauſe this "will conduce more to that great end of "facility, whereby, as I firſt propoſed, "men are to be invited to the learning of "it. To proceed from the language to "the character, would require the learning of both; which being of greater

* Ibid. ch. 14. p. 375.

"difficulty

C. 13. "difficulty than to learn one alone, is not "therefore ſo ſuitable to that intention of "engaging men by the facility of it. And "becauſe men that do retain their ſeveral "tongues, may yet communicate, by a "real character, which ſhall be legible in "all languages; therefore I conceive it "moſt proper to treat of this in the firſt "place, and ſhall afterwards ſhew how "this character may be made effable in "a diſtinct language." And there can be no doubt but that ſuch a character would be of great uſe, ſerving the ſame purpoſe that the Chineſe character does among many of the nations of the Eaſt, who communicate together by the means of that character, though they do not underſtand one another's language.

"All characters," ſays our author, "ſignify either *naturally*, or *by inſtitution*. "*Natural characters* are either the *pictures* "of things, or ſome other *ſymbolical* re- "preſentations of them *." Then he goes on to tell us, that it were to be wiſhed that characters could be found, bearing ſome reſemblance to the things expreſſed by them; but though this he thinks might

* Part 4. ch. 1. p. 385.

be

be done with reſpect to the general kinds of things, yet he judges it to be very difficult, if not impoſſible, to do it with reſpect to particular ſpecieſes. It were deſireable alſo, he ſays, that the ſounds of a language ſhould have ſome reſemblance to the things expreſſed by them, and by conſequence to the written characters, if they were repreſentations of the things. This he holds to be as difficult, or rather as impoſſible, as the other. His language therefore, both written and effable, is, like all other languages, of *inſtitution* merely; nor has the one any natural connection with the other, any more than the ſounds in other languages have with their alphabet. C. 13.

The characters of this univerſal language ſhould, he ſays, have four properties. "1. They ſhould be moſt ſimple and "eaſy for the figure, to be deſcribed by "one *ductus* of the pen, or at the moſt by "two. 2. They muſt be ſufficiently diſ"tinguiſhable from one another to prevent "miſtake. 3. They ought to be comely "and graceful, for the ſhape of them, to "the eye. 4. They ſhould be methodical, "thoſe of the ſame common nature ha-

"ving

C. 13. "ving ſome kind of ſuitableneſs and cor-
"reſpondence with one another; all which
"qualifications would be very advanta-
"geous, both for *underſtanding*, *memory*,
"and *uſe*."

He begins with contriving marks for his forty genera: and theſe he has ſo contrived as to have all the properties he mentions; for they are as ſimple as poſſible, wonderfully varied, ſo as to be ſufficiently diſtinguiſhed, and yet reſembling one another as much as they ought to do. For proof of this I refer to the figures themſelves *.

The next thing to be done is to mark the *differences* under each genus. This is done by affixing little lines at the left end of the character, forming, with the character, angles of different kinds, that is, *right*, *obtuſe*, or *acute*, above or below; each of theſe affixes, according to its poſition, denoting the firſt, ſecond, third, &c. difference under the genus; for, as I have ſaid, all the differences under each genus are numbered.

The third and laſt thing to be done, is to expreſs the ſpecies under each difference

* Ibid. pag. 387.

This

This is done by affixing the like marks to the other end of the character, denoting the ſpecieſes under each difference, as they are numbered in the tables. C. 13.

In this manner are expreſſed all the ſeveral notions of things, which are the ſubject of language. But the moſt difficult part ſtill remains, which is, to *connect* thoſe *notions* together, ſo as to make of them what we call *diſcourſe*. This the grammatical art, in ordinary languages, performs in many different ways; which may be all reduced to two general heads: firſt, variation of the word itſelf; ſecondly, by particles, or ſeparate words, deviſed for the purpoſe of connection. The firſt of theſe our author has ſupplied by hooks or loops, adjected to either end of the character above or below, from which we learn whether the thing is to be conſidered as a noun, or an adjective, or an adverb, or whether it be taken in an active or paſſive ſenſe, or in the plural or ſingular number. The other he ſupplies by marks denoting particles; and theſe marks are circular figures, dots, and little crooked lines or *virgulæ*, diſpoſed in a certain manner. In this way he expreſſes the *co-*

C. 13. *pula* of propoſitions, by which he means the verb, and its various tenſes and modes, pronouns, prepoſitions, interjections, conjunctions, and articles. This, one ſhould think, would make a wonderful perplexity and embarraſſment in his characters; and, no doubt, thoſe ſmall marks are more difficult to be learned and attended to than the greater marks for things; but he has contrived them ſo as to be as eaſy, both for memory and uſe, as is poſſible.

This is the general plan of this written language, or *real character*; but as we cannot judge rightly of any machine, or of thoſe *living machines* (according to the notions of certain philoſophers) which we call *animals*, unleſs we ſee them move, ſo we ſhould never have well underſtood this language of the Biſhop, if he had not ſhewn us the practice of it in two examples, the Lord's prayer and the Creed. And indeed, upon the diligent peruſal of theſe, we not only underſtand the invention much better, but I think it is impoſſible not to admire it exceedingly; and the more attentively you conſider it, the more you will be convinced that it is not ſo chimerical and impracticable as at firſt ſight it

it appeared. I refer the reader therefore to the ſpecimens themſelves, wherein he will obſerve that the capital characters, expreſſing the principal ideas or notions of things, are large; whereas the characters expreſſing the acceſſories, or the connectives of the diſcourſe, which he calls *particles*, are ſmall: and he ought likewiſe to read the author's explications of the ſpecimens, which are given with great accuracy, and propriety of expreſſion; for beſides the value of his matter, his ſtyle is one of the moſt correct in Engliſh, and is as elegant and copious as his ſubject requires. C. 13.

If he had been a man of leſs genius, and not ſo great enterpriſe in ſcience, he would have contented himſelf with the invention of this univerſal written language: but he wanted to make it a language every way complete; and therefore he reſolved to have it intelligible to the ears, as well as to the eyes. He has accordingly invented a philoſophical language of ſounds, which have no natural connection, as I obſerved, with the characters, or the nature of the things expreſſed by them, but the ſyſtem of it is built upon the ſame foundation, namely, the arrangement of

C. 13. things into classes, and his new-invented grammatical art, for the purpose of connecting them together in discourse. His effable language therefore is no other than the expression of what is contained in his tables by letters and syllables, and for this purpose he has used the old alphabet, as corrected and amended by himself.

The requisites of this language he has given us in the following words. "1. The "words should be brief, not exceeding "two or three syllables, the particles con- "sisting but of one syllable. 2. They should "be plain, and facile to be taught and "learned. 3. They should be sufficiently "distinguishable from one another, to pre- "vent mistake and equivocalness; and "withal significant and copious, answer- "able to the conceipts of our mind. 4. "They should be euphonical, of a plea- "sant graceful sound. 5. They should be "methodical, those of an agreeable or op- "posite sense having somewhat correspon- "dent in the sounds of them *."

Proceeding upon this plan, he has expressed his several genera by such sounds as *ba*, *be*, *bi*, and *da*, *de*, *di*, *ga*, *ge*, *gi*,

* Part 4. ch. 3. p. 414.

and

and the like, all compoſitions of vowels, with one or other of the beſt-ſounding conſonants. The differences under each of theſe genera he expreſſes, by adding to the ſyllable denoting the genus, one of the following conſonants, *b*, *d*, *g*, *p*, *t*, *c*, *z*, *f*, *n*, according to the order in which the differences are ranked in the tables under each genus, *b* expreſſing the firſt difference, *d* the ſecond, and ſo on. The ſpecies he expreſſes, by putting after the conſonant which ſtands for the difference, one of the ſeven vowels, according to his alphabet; and if the number of ſpecieſes exceed the vowels, he uſes diphthongs for the reſt. C. 13.

I cannot illuſtrate this better than in his own words "For inſtance," ſays he, "if "*de* ſignify *element*, then *deb* muſt ſignify "the firſt difference; which, according "to the tables, is *fire:* and *deba* will de- "note the firſt ſpecies, which is *flame*. "*Det* will be the fifth difference under "that genus, which is *appearing meteor*; "*deta* the firſt ſpecies, viz. *rainbow*, *deta* "the ſecond, viz. *halo*.

"Thus, if *ti* ſignify the genus of *ſen-* "*ſible quality*, then *tid* muſt denote the ſe- "cond

C. 13. " cond difference, which comprehends co-
" lours; and *tida* muſt ſignify the ſecond
" ſpecies under that difference, viz. *red-*
" *neſs*; *tide* the third ſpecies, which is
" *greenneſs* *," &c.

Next he proceeds to ſhew how the grammatical variations of words are to be expreſſed. If the word is an adjective, ſays he, which, according to his method, is always derived from a ſubſtantive, the derivation is made by the change of the radical conſonant into another conſonant, or by adding a vowel to it. Thus if *da* ſignifies *God*, *dua* muſt ſignify *divine*; if *de* ſignifies *element*, then *due* muſt ſignify *elementary*; if *do* ſignifies *ſtone*, then *duo* muſt ſignify *ſtony*; and in like manner voices and numbers, and ſuch like accidents of words, are formed †. As to the acceſſory words, or *particles*, as he calls them, he expreſſes them by ſimple vowels or diphthongs, or by ſome of thoſe monoſyllables not uſed for any of the genera or differences.

After having laid down the rules for this philoſophical language, he proceeds to give us examples of it in the Lord's

* Ibid. p. 415. † Ibid. p. 417.

prayer

prayer and Creed, with large explanations of them, referring to the rules he has laid down. He confeſſes, that "his contri-"vance for this language, is not ordered, "as to the facility and pleaſantneſs of the "ſound, to ſo good an advantage as it "might have been upon further conſide-"ration and practice; but, as it is, I "think it may even in theſe reſpects come "into compariſon with any of the lan-"guages now known *." And for trial of this, he gives us the Lord's prayer in fifty different languages. C. 13.

He concludes his work with an appendix, wherein he compares his language with the Latin, which he ſays in theſe parts of the world ſupplies the place of a common language *. And in this compariſon he is very ſevere, and I think not without reaſon, upon the Latin, obſerving many defects, redundancies, and anomalies, in the grammar of it. But he very wiſely, in my opinion, abſtains from the compariſon of his languge with the Greek; thinking, I ſuppoſe, that it would not gain ſo

* Part 4. ch. 4. *in fine.*

† Ibid. ch. 6. *in initio.*

much

C. 13. much by that compariſon; for he elſewhere confeſſes that the Greek language is much more philoſophical than the Latin *.

Thus I have endeavoured to explain this wonderful invention of the good biſhop, by which he intended, as he ſays, to remedy the curſe of the confuſion of Babel. I know many of my readers will think that I have given a fuller account of it than was neceſſary or proper; but the book is little known, though I think it deſerves to be very much known and admired. For, in my opinion, it does great honour to the ſociety of which he was a member, and to the nation in general. There are however, no doubt, many defects and inaccuracies in it, as the author himſelf acknowledges; but I am ſure the old proverb will apply very well here, "It is eaſier to find fault, than to imitate, "or do better †." That one part at leaſt of the project is practicable, I mean the forming of a new language of words according to rules of art, I have not the leaſt doubt. In the languages already invented, there is a wonderful variety;

* P. 353. † Μωμησεται τις μαλλον ἡ μιμησεται.

nor

nor is there any reaſon to think, that in them all the variety which the nature of the thing will admit, is exhauſted. And in fact we know, that there is a language actually exiſting, which is formed, like our author's, upon principles of philoſophy; I mean the language of the philoſophers of India, called the *Sanſcrit*: ſo that the only doubt is, whether a ſingle man, in the courſe of a ſhort life, is capable of framing ſuch a language. As to the *real character*, there is, I think, more difficulty in the formation of it. And yet that there may be a language of characters, which are not the marks of ſounds, but of things, the Chineſe language is an irrefragable proof. And as that language appears to have been formed with very little aſſiſtance from philoſophy or art, it cannot be doubted but that, with the aſſiſtance of philoſophy, and the grammatical art, another and a better language of the ſame kind might be formed. C. 13.

With reſpect to the facility of learning the Biſhop's language, he ſays, that there are but three thouſand words in it, and I ſuppoſe as many characters; whereas, he reckons, in the Latin language, thirty

C. 13. thouſand radicals, computing the ſeveral homonymies to be ſo many different words, and by a computation which he gives us from Varro, he makes the number of words all together, with all their different variations by flection, to amount to about five millions. He therefore concludes, that his language is much eaſier to be learned than the Latin, in the proportion, as he ſays, of one to forty; and he does not doubt, but that a man of good capacity and memory, might, in one month's ſpace, attain to a readineſs of expreſſing his mind, either in the character, or the language *.

* Concluſion of the book.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIV.

That a language of art muſt have been the work of men of art, and formed upon a regular plan.—The ſame art neceſſary to preſerve language that is required to form it.—The want of ſuch art the cauſe of the corruption of all languages.—The danger of the Engliſh being ſo corrupted.—Irregularities and imperfections of the Latin.

I Have all along, through the courſe of this work, ſuppoſed, that a language of art could not have been formed without art, and that it muſt have been the work of men of art, and ſuperior abilities; and accordingly I have talked, in the ſtyle of Plato and other antient writers, of the *artificers of language*, and *the lawgivers of words*. It may however be thought, that I make a great deal too much of this matter; and that though there be, no doubt, a great deal of art in language, yet it may have ariſen by degrees from ex- C. 14.

C. 14. perience, obſervation, and vulgar uſe; and that in this way even a language of art may have been formed without any regular plan or ſyſtem. If this be true, I think it muſt be true likewiſe, that all the other arts, liberal as well as mechanical, muſt have been invented in the ſame way; and that painting, muſic, architecture, muſt have been the work of the mere vulgar. The queſtion therefore is general, and deſerves to be conſidered with ſome attention.

And, in the *firſt* place, it is no doubt true, that the art of language, like every other art, muſt have ariſen from experience: for, as Ariſtotle has ſaid *, many experiences make art; and no art ever would have been formed, if men had not firſt begun with the practice; very rude and imperfect no doubt at firſt, but which was improved by degrees, and at laſt formed into an art. For we never ſhould have had the art of architecture, if men had not begun with building huts and cabanes, ſuch as we find among the barbarous nations; nor of painting, if there had not been a beginning by rude draughts, ei-

* *Metaphyſ. lib.* 1. *cap.* 1.

ther

ther in colours or carving, which we likewiſe find is practiſed among ſuch nations; and if men had not firſt ſung, or performed upon inſtruments, there certainly never would have been an art of muſic. And in like manner, if men had not firſt ſpoken, there never would have been an art of language; for it is certain, that in matters of art, men did not begin with the theory, but the practice; and the only queſtion is, Whether, from the practice, a theory did not at laſt ariſe, without which the art could not have been formed? and whether ſuch theory could have been the production of mere people? C. 14.

2dly, I think it is likewiſe evident, that the art of language could not have been formed at once, but there muſt have been a growth and progreſs in it as in other arts. For even after the general plan or ſyſtem of any art was formed, there muſt have been many after inventions and additions made, before the art was completed; and accordingly, I have obſerved a progreſs of this kind in the Greek language.

3dly, It muſt not be thought that a grammar, or any ſyſtem of the language, was written before the art was invented. Whoever

C. 14. Whoever knows any thing of the hiſtory of arts, knows that they were invented and completed before they were reduced to writing. Thus the fineſt buildings of antiquity were reared before Vitruvius, or any other, ſo far as I know, had written upon architecture. Painting was an art of the higheſt eſtimation, and practiſed with the greateſt ſucceſs by Zeuxis, Appelles, and Protogenes, though there does not appear to have been then a word written upon the ſubject. Who can doubt that the art of poetry was well known and practiſed before Ariſtotle wrote his book upon poetry? and that the art of rhetoric, in like manner, was perfectly underſtood before he or any other wrote upon the ſubject? And with reſpect to this matter of language, it is ſaid, that Plato and Ariſtotle were the firſt who wrote upon the ſubject of grammar *, though it be certainly true, that the grammar of the Greek language was completed long before their time, and even as early as the days of Homer. And the fact truly is, that all the books that have been written upon the ſub-

* See Biſhop Wilkins's philoſophical language, book 1. ch. 5. p. 20. and the authorities he there quotes.

ject

ject of any art, have been formed from the practice of that art already invented, not the art from the books. This is plainly the caſe of one of thoſe books I mentioned, viz. Ariſtotle's Art of Poetry, which is clearly no more than a collection of obſervations upon the art, ariſing from the practice of Homer and the tragic poets. And I am perſuaded there is nothing in that book, which was not known to every poet of that age, except the philoſophical principles upon which Ariſtotle has founded the art. C. 14.

Theſe things being premiſed, the queſtion comes to this preciſe iſſue, Whether ſuch a language as the Greek could have been formed by ordinary men employed in the common occupations of life, and without making language their particular ſtudy? or whether, for the framing ſuch a language, men of more than ordinary genius were not required, and who had made a particular ſtudy of the nature both of words and of things?

And, in the *firſt* place, it is to be conſidered, that there is one thing abſolutely required in every art, that it ſhould have ſome plan or ſyſtem; by which I mean, that

C. 14. that it ſhould propoſe ſome end to be attained, and proceed in a certain method, and according to certain rules, for the attainment of that end *. The end of language, for example, is to expreſs the conceptions of the human mind. For this purpoſe, the four things that I mentioned in the beginning of this volume are required, viz. That all the conceptions of the mind ſhould be diſtinctly expreſſed. 2*do*, That this ſhould be done by as few words as poſſible. 3*tio*, That the connection of thoſe words with one another ſhould be ſome way marked. And, *laſtly*,

* Art is defined by the Stoics to be, Σύστημα ἐκ κατάληψεων ἐγγεγυμνασμένων πρὸς τὶ τέλος ἐυχρήστων τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ. And Quintilian defines it to be, *Poteſtas viâ* (i. e. *ordine*) *efficiens*. See Mr Harris's excellent treatiſe of Art, and the notes upon it, p. 260. It is therefore of the eſſence of art, that it ſhould be a *ſyſtem*, and proceed according to rule and method. So that though experience be the mother of art, yet a man would be no better than an empiric, who had collected the greateſt number of facts and obſervations on any art, if he had not digeſted them into a ſyſtem, laying down principles, and drawing from thence conſequences to the practice, and ſo forming that ἕξις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς ποιητική. And if the art is to be carried the length of ſcience, it muſt be founded on principles that are out of the art, and to be found only in philoſophy. And it is in this way that I have endeavoured to connect grammar with philoſophy.

That

That the ſound of the language ſhould be agreeable to the ear, and of eaſy utterance. C. 14.

For attaining theſe purpoſes, we have ſeen in the courſe of this work, how many things were required. Firſt, That a ſyſtem of etymology was to be formed, by which the whole language was to be derived from certain primitive ſounds, or radical words. Then caſes, genders, and numbers, were to be invented; which anſwered a double purpoſe, both of expreſſing different relations and other circumſtances of things, and of connecting words together in ſyntax. Then tenſes and moods of verbs were to be contrived, by which the circumſtance of time, and the affections or diſpoſitions of the human mind with reſpect to the action of the verb, were to be expreſſed. And, laſtly, The elemental ſounds of language muſt be ſo combined in ſyllables and words, and theſe ſyllables muſt be ſo varied in length and modulation, as to make the ſound of the language ſweet and muſical, at the ſame time that it is ſtrong and maſculine. All this was to be done by certain rules: for ſuch is the nature of art, that every thing belonging to it, which by its nature can

C. 14. be ſubjected to rule, muſt be ſo ſubjected; for where there is no rule, there is no art. Now it is impoſſible that all this can be done, without that great work of ſcience being firſt performed, I mean *analyſis*; for language muſt have been analyſed, both the formal and material part of it, before it could be formed into ſuch a ſyſtem as that of the Greek language. Now is it poſſible to believe, that all this could be done by men who never thought of language, but ſo far as it ſerved the ordinary purpoſes of life? If we can believe this, we may alſo believe, not only that all the arts above mentioned were ſo invented, but likewiſe all the ſciences; that geometry, for example, and aſtronomy, and even philoſophy itſelf, would grow up among ſavages, as it were ſpontaneouſly, without care or culture. But the hiſtory of mankind, as well as the reaſon of the thing, contradicts this hypotheſis: for we know, that the ſciences took their riſe in a country where there was an order of men ſet apart for the cultivation of them, having the neceſſaries of life ſupplied to them by the labour of others, and being relieved of all other cares but that of learning

ing and religion. This was the caſe in Egypt; and though in Greece there were no colleges of prieſts, as in Egypt; yet in the progreſs of ſociety, it muſt neceſſarily happen, that ſome men will be relieved of the neceſſity of bodily labour, and enabled to live by the labour of others. Now it was by ſuch men, in Greece, and in other countries, employing their leiſure in the cultivation of arts and ſciences, that language and every other art and ſcience was formed. C. 14.

At the ſame time I would not be underſtood to deny, that ſavages, living in ſuch a ſtate as that of the Hurons, in which every man is obliged to provide for the neceſſities of life, and conſequently has little time for ſpeculations of any kind, would, from mere neceſſity, make ſome progreſs in the art of language, as well as in other neceſſary arts; for the ſame neceſſity that made men invent this method of communication by articulate ſounds, would alſo make them contrive expedients for rendering the uſe of it as eaſy and convenient as poſſible. And accordingly we have ſeen, that among the Hurons, and other barbarous nations,

C. 14. there are ſome beginnings of the art of language. But I deny that among any people, while they continue in that ſtate, a regular ſyſtem of a language could be formed.

There are perhaps readers who may think, that what I have ſaid of the art of the Greek language is much exaggerated, and for the greater part an imagination of my own, particularly with reſpect to its ſyſtem of etymology. But what will they ſay of the Sanſcrit language above deſcribed *? of which all the words are derived from certain radical ſounds, which have no determined ſignification of their own, according to certain rules of derivation, ſo fixed and eſtabliſhed that any man who knows thoſe rules, can never be at a loſs for words in that language, but may form them readily as he needs them, and they will be perfectly underſtood by thoſe who underſtand the language, though they had never heard them before. Muſt not ſuch a language at leaſt have been the invention of philoſophers as well as grammarians? Or if any of my readers ſhould doubt of

* Part. 2. book 1. ch. 16. p. 210. See alſo Diſſertation on the Formation of the Greek language.

the

the truth of this fact, for no other reaſon, C. 14.
that I can conceive, but becauſe the perſon who relates it is a Jeſuit, what will they ſay to the example of the Hebrew language? the words of which are all derived from roots formed of combinations of the ſeveral conſonants in triads. Is it poſſible to ſuppoſe, that a language of ſo artificial a ſtructure ſhould have been the invention of men of no art or ſcience? and yet the Greek is allowed, I believe, by every body who underſtands both, to be a language of much greater art. If we can believe all this, we may believe alſo, that Biſhop Wilkins's philoſophical language may have been invented by the people.

But further, I ſay, that a language of art not only could not have been invented by the people, but that it cannot be preſerved among them, without the particular care and attention of thoſe men of art we call grammarians; whom we may deſpiſe as much as we pleaſe; but if there be not ſuch a ſet of men in every country, to guard againſt the abuſes and corruptions which popular uſe will neceſſarily introduce

C. 14. duce into every language; and if the youth of rank and fortune in the country, are not carefully inſtructed by ſuch men in the principles of grammar; the language of that country, however perfect it may have been originally, will very ſoon become unlearned and barbarous. It is chiefly by ſuch neglect that all the preſent languages of Europe are become corrupt dialects of languages that were originally good; the French, Italian, Spaniſh, and modern Greek, of the Latin and Greek; the Engliſh, German, and other Teutonic dialects, of the Gothic. Nor is what remains of the Celtic, as I am informed, free of corruption.

——— Sic omnia fatis
In pejus ruere, et retro ſublapſa referri.

Such is the fate of all human arts: for not being natural to man, but a kind of forced production of the ſoil, they muſt be preſerved with the ſame care that is required to rear them; and if that is but a little remitted, down the ſtream we go to our natural ſtate of ignorance and barbarity:

Non

Non aliter quam qui adverſo vix flumine lembum C. 14.
Remigiis ſubigit, ſi brachia forte remiſit,
Atque illum in præceps prono rapit alveus amni *.

Thus

* Though we of Britain boaſt of being a learned nation, I doubt the Engliſh language is not mended in our hands. Dr Lowth, in his excellent grammar, has collected a ſurpriſing number of barbariſms and ſoleciſms that are to be found in our moſt admired authors, particularly of this century. The beſt authors may be guilty of inaccuracies of ſtyle through hurry and inattention; but ſuch frequent and repeated blunders could not have proceeded but from abſolute ignorance of the grammatical art. To be convinced of this, let us compare thoſe authors with ſome of the great writers of antiquity, the rules of whoſe language we underſtand as well, perhaps better, than thoſe of our own; and beſides, the philoſophy of language is now ſo well underſtood by the learned among us, that we know not only what a language is, but what it ought to be. Now let us try whether we can find in Plato, Ariſtotle, Demoſthenes, or Cicero, ſuch ſins committed, not only againſt the particular rules of their languages, but againſt the rules of general and philoſophical grammar. Or if we are not learned enough to be able to make this compariſon, let us compare them with ſome of the beſt writers of the laſt age, ſuch as Biſhop Wilkins's book upon philoſophical language, with which, though it appear that Dr Lowth was acquainted, yet I obſerve none of his examples of ſoleciſms are from him; nor do I remember any that he has quoted from an author of the ſame age, but who flouriſhed a little later, I mean my Lord Shafteſbury, whom I have always admired,

C. 14. Thus I think I have proved, that a language of art muſt have been the work of men of art. But a difficulty will here occur: How can we ſuppoſe that the people of any country would receive a language from thoſe few artiſts, and agree univerſally to give up that jargon, which, however rude and barbarous, they and their forefathers had been ſo long accuſtomed to ſpeak? To this I anſwer, firſt, That the ſame thing muſt have happened with reſpect to the other arts, in which, as in language, the many muſt have ſubmitted to be taught by the few; otherwiſe every art of life muſt have continued to be practiſed at this day as rudely and imperfectly as it was at firſt. And the reaſon why men ſhould thus ſubmit to be

admired, not only for the elegance and copiouſneſs of his ſtyle, in both which he perhaps exceeds any Engliſh author, but for the purity of it; and as if fine writing belonged to his family, there is a relation of his in this age, Mr Harris, who is as correct in his ſtyle as he is elegant.

If then it be true, that language is declining, it is time that the patrons of learning among us ſhould take the alarm; for they may be aſſured, that with the art of language, every other art and ſcience will decline. It has always been ſo in every age and nation, and will always be ſo.

inſtructed,

inſtructed, is ſufficiently evident; for man being naturally a docile and an imitative animal, would be diſpoſed to copy whatever he ſaw was better of the kind than what he had been in uſe to practiſe. And this would hold eſpecially, if the new method was recommended by men of authority, ſuch as we muſt ſuppoſe thoſe inventors of the art of language to have been among a ſavage people. And accordingly I ſay, in the ſecond place, That, in point of fact, there are examples of whole nations having given up their language in favour of a better one, recommended to them by their governors, or men of authority among them. This I believe was the caſe of the whole inhabitants of Greece, when the Pelaſgi firſt came among them; as it undoubtedly was of the Athenians, who, as Herodotus tells us, changed their language for that of the Pelaſgi, when they were in poſſeſſion of Attica. And we are informed by Garcilaſſo de la Vega, that many of the barbarous nations in Peru, who ſubmitted to the arms of the Incas, likewiſe received a language from them. C. 14.

When the new language is thus imported into a country by conquerors, the

C. 14. progreſs of it would be quick; but it would be much ſlower when it was invented in the country itſelf, as it muſt have been at firſt in Egypt, or ſome other country; for the progreſs of the invention itſelf muſt have been ſlow, and the teaching it to the people ſtill ſlower. For it is not likely that the people would receive it ſo readily from men of their own country, as from foreign conquerors, bringing in their other arts, and changing the whole ſtate of the country.

In framing this language of art, I am perſuaded the artiſts would make uſe of the materials of the old jargon: for they certainly would uſe the elemental ſounds that had already been invented; and to theſe they would add others, which, upon trial, they found the human mouth could pronounce. What veſtiges of art they found in the old language, ſuch as we have ſhewn are to be found in the moſt barbarous languages, they would follow, and improve upon. They would ſoon ſee the neceſſity of expreſſing things that have a likeneſs by words that alſo have a likeneſs, which can only be done by derivation and compoſition; and for this purpoſe they would find it abſolutely neceſſary

neceſſary to abridge the immoderate length of the old words. They would diſcover, that time was a neceſſary adjunct of all actions. This would naturally lead them to expreſs it by ſome variation of the word denoting action; that is, they would invent tenſes. They would alſo diſcover, that an agent was neceſſary in every action, and they would find the diviſion into three perſons made to their hand. They would therefore naturally think of marking likewiſe this diſtinction of perſons, by a variation of the verb; and there too they would find ſomething already done, as I have obſerved before with reſpect to the Huron language *. And laſt of all they would find out the neceſſity of ſyntax, and of caſes of nouns. C. 14.

This would, as I conjecture, be the progreſs of a language of art among the artiſts themſelves; but the progreſs, as I have ſaid, would be much ſlower among the people. For I believe ſuch a language among them could hardly be eſtabliſhed without government, civility, religion, muſic, and other arts, which therefore I

* Vol. 1. pag. 374.

C. 14. imagine have all come along with this language. In ſhort, I ſuppoſe that the people muſt have been tamed and civilized before they could be taught to ſpeak according to rules of art.

Before I conclude, I will take notice of an objection that will naturally occur to my ſyſtem of language being the work of art. It will be ſaid, that popular uſe is the governing principle in languages,

Quem penes arbitrium et jus et norma loquendi,

as Horace ſays; and according to Quintilian, *Conſuetudo eſt certiſſima loquendi magiſtra; utendumque plane ſermone, ut nummo, cui publica forma eſt* *.

But to theſe authorities, I anſwer, *firſt*, That neither Horace nor Quintilian meant to deny that there was a great deal of art in language. But it is evident, from the context of both paſſages, that their meaning was, that when the rules of art and the reaſon of the thing were upon one ſide, and uniform cuſtom upon the other, the laſt ought to prevail; which is ſaying no more, than that a man muſt not pretend to make a language for himſelf, any more

* *Lib.* 1. *cap.* 6. *initio.*

than

than to coin money for himſelf, to uſe Quintilian's compariſon, but muſt ſpeak like other men, as well as uſe the current coin. But, *2dly*, I ſay this obſervation applies much more ſtrongly to the Latin, which we muſt ſuppoſe thoſe authors had chiefly in view, than to the Greek, or any other pure unmixed language. What mixture the antient Pelaſgic ſuffered when it was firſt imported into Latium, it is impoſſible I believe exactly to determine. Some authors, I know, think, that there is a great mixture in it of Oſcan, and other barbarous dialects. But be that as it will, it is certain, that in later times it was brought much nearer to the Greek ſtandard, by introducing not only a great many Greek words, but a great deal of the Greek analogy and declenſion of words. This makes the Latin analogy not ſo conſiſtent with itſelf, and produces a great many more anomalies in that language, than are to be found in Greek. I will give one or two examples, which occur to me, among many others that might be found. *Aper*, the Latin word for a *boar*, inſtead of the genitive *aperis* or *apris*, according to the analogy of *pater* and *cicer*, and C. 14.

C. 14. and many other words, has *apri*. Now the way I account for this anomaly, is from the Greek. I have little doubt but the Greeks antiently had the ſame word ἀπερ, the termination of which they ſoftened, by adding -ος to it; and then by the ſyncope, they made it ἀπρος; and by the adjection of the κ in the beginning, they made the preſent word καπρος, the genitive of which is καπρυ, from whence comes the Latin genitive *apri*, (leaving out the κ), as from ἀνεμυ comes *animi*; and, by ſome ſtrange accident, the word, with the addition of the κ, has come in Latin to ſignify a *goat*, and likewiſe follows the analogy of the Greek declenſion. This inſtance is given by Quintilian *. I will give another inſtance of the ſame kind, not mentioned by him. The Latin word *ager*, forms its genitive in the ſame way as *aper* does; and it is *agri*, and not *ageris*, as another word very like it in ſound, viz. *agger* has its genitive. Now the reaſon for this irregular genitive, I believe to be the ſame as in the former caſe, namely, that it is taken from the Greek genitive ἀγρυ.

* Lib. 1. cap. 6.

I will only mention another inſtance, C. 14.
where the Latin analogy is irregular and imperfect, becauſe they have adopted the Greek analogy only in part. The Greeks form the preter-perfect of verbs beginning with a conſonant, by reduplication of that conſonant with the vowel ε. This analogy the Latins have followed in ſome words: for from *cado* they form the preterite *cecidi*; from *pango*, or the old word *pago*, *pepigi*; and from *ſpondeo*, *ſpopondi*. But why not carry this analogy throughout, as the Greeks have done? Why not ſay, *lego*, *lelegi*; *pingo*, *pepinxi*? And the fact I apprehend to have been, that theſe reduplications were not antiently uſed in the language, and accordingly are not to be found, ſo far as I know, in any of the old monuments of Latin preſerved to us; but were adopted about the time, when, as Plutarch obſerves, the Latins began to form their language upon the model of the Greek.

But though, in this manner, we may account for many irregularities in the Latin tongue, we cannot, I believe, render a reaſon for them all, particularly for thoſe ſtrange things they call *gerunds* and *ſupines*,

C. 14. *ſupines*, about which grammarians diſpute ſo much, whether they be verbal nouns or parts of the verb *. And all I can ſee with certainty in the matter is, that they have nothing to do with any regular ſyſtem of a language; and are altogether unneceſſary, as we may ſee from the example of the Greek, which has none of them. There are many other irregularities and inconſiſtencies in the Latin language, which have been noted by Biſhop Wilkins, in his moſt ingenious work upon a philoſophical language †, which I have ſo often quoted. But beſides irregularities, there are capital defects in it, ſuch as the want of an article, which even ſome languages that are called barbarous, ſuch as the Gothic, have. They want alſo an active participle paſt, which makes that diſjointed kind of compoſition, by an *ablative abſolute*, as they call it, ſo very frequent in Latin; which has, beſides this great imperfection, that it does not expreſs who is the agent of the action of the verb with

* See, upon this ſubject, *Sanctii Minerva*, with Perizonius's notes.

† Part 4. ch. 6.

which

which the ablative is joined. Thus when we ſay in Latin, *Brutus, interfecto Cæſare, in Græciam profectus eſt*, it does not appear whether it was Brutus, or any other, that killed Cæſar. And there is another capital defect of the like kind, namely, the want of a preſent paſſive participle; and which, as I have already obſerved, is alſo wanting both in Engliſh and French. The defect is ſupplied in thoſe languages, by a clumſy circumlocution, in which the form of the expreſſion is changed, *e. g.* in place of τυπτόμενος, we ſay, *while they are beating him*, and the French ſay, *pendant qu' on le bat*. In Latin they muſt ſupply it likewiſe by a circumlocution, as, *dum verberatur*; or by uſing the perfect participle of the ſame voice in place of it, as when Virgil ſays, *Ventoſa per æquora* VECTI, i. e. πορευμένοι. We muſt therefore, I doubt, acknowledge, that the Latin language came off from the Greek ſtock before it was ſufficiently cultivated and improved, and likewiſe that it has a mixture in it of the jargon of ſome of the barbarous nations in Italy, from whence it has derived thoſe ſtrange anomalies, which I think can be no otherwiſe accounted for. C. 14.

C. 14. At the ſame time we are not to believe that there are no irregularities in Greek. For it is impoſſible but that ſome abuſes muſt have crept into an art which is conſtantly practiſed by men who do not underſtand it; and that ſuch abuſes ſhould grow into inveterate cuſtom, ſo that even the men of learning would be obliged to ſubmit to them. But I am perſuaded there are many fewer of them than are commonly imagined. We have, for example, in our common grammars, a long catalogue of irregular verbs; but theſe are nothing elſe but tenſes regularly formed from themes that are obſolete; and they might as well call the ſecond future and ſecond aoriſt of every verb, irregular tenſes. There are certain abbreviations too, of certain forms of the verb, which are now in uſe, and which paſs with ſuperficial grammarians for the original forms. Thus τυπτῃ, the ſecond perſon of τυπτομαι, is thought to be the irregular and original form of that perſon; and τυπτεσαι and τυπτιαι, are ſaid to be a poetic or licentious uſe of the words in place of it; whereas τυπτεσαι is clearly the original word, which was firſt made τυπτειαι, by throwing out the σ, and then contracted into τυπτῃ; and in the ſame

ſame manner, from τυπτεμεναι, which is thought to be the infinitive only by poetic licence, but which is truly the original infinitive, according to the analogy of the language, was formed by ſyncope, τυπτεναι; by apocope, τυπτεμεν; and at laſt, by leaving out the μ, τυπτειν; and by contraction, τυπτειν, the infinitive preſently in uſe. C. 14.

As to the modern languages of Europe, and particularly the Engliſh, they are full of corruptions, ariſing from popular and unlearned uſe, both in the words and phraſes; but to comment on theſe, would be foreign to our preſent purpoſe.

CHAP. XV.

Concluſion of the ſecond part.

I Will conclude this part of my work, as I began it, with ſome general reflections upon human knowledge, and the rank which the grammarian ought to hold among men of letters. C. 15.

The ſubjects of human knowledge are all, either God and his works, or man

C. 15. and his works. The firſt are the proper ſubject of philoſophy; which naturally divides itſelf into three great branches. The ſubject of the firſt, is God himſelf, and his nature and eſſence, ſo far as we can apprehend it; and this part of philoſophy is called *theology*. The ſecond part treats of the firſt principles and cauſes of things, I mean thoſe which, in ſubordination to the great firſt cauſe, produce all this viſible creation; and this part of philoſophy is commonly known by the name of *metaphyſics*. The third ſubject of philoſophy is the viſible world itſelf, and all that we call *natural productions*, the immediate cauſes of thoſe productions, and the laws by which, in ſuch productions, matter operates upon matter. That part of philoſophy, which treats of thoſe things, is known by the name of *natural philoſophy*.

Theſe, I ſay, are the proper ſubjects of philoſophy. For, with reſpect to man, conſidered in his natural ſtate, he, as well as other animals, are the ſubject of that part of philoſophy laſt mentioned. And as to his works, they are what we call the productions of art; and are commonly underſtood

underſtood not to be the ſubject of philo- C. 15.
ſophy. But not only other things are the ſubject of human art, but, as I have elſe-where obſerved, man himſelf has become the principal ſubject of his own art. Of the arts which have man for their ſubject, the principal are thoſe by which he has been formed a rational and ſocial creature: and theſe have been thought of ſuch importance, that they have been made the ſubject even of philoſophy; and have been divided into two branches. The one explains the rational faculties of man, their nature and operations; and this part of the philoſophy of man is commonly known by the name of *logic*. The other conſiders man in his ſocial and political ſtate, explains the nature of that ſtate, and of all the duties and offices ariſing from it. This was known among the antients by the name of *politics*, or *political* philoſophy; among us it is more commonly known by the name of *moral* philoſophy.

Theſe are additions which man has made to philoſophy, on account of the importance of the ſubjects to him. The other arts, as I have ſaid, do not belong to philoſophy. But there is a great difference

C. 15. ence among them as to their dignity and uſe; and the moſt excellent among them, in my apprehenſion, and which therefore, next to philoſophy, ought to poſſeſs the firſt rank, is the art of language; becauſe language is the great inſtrument of rational and ſocial life, without which man could never, in any great degree, have deſerved either of theſe appellations. And I think it is near of kin to that branch of philoſophy above mentioned we call *logic*; for the rational faculties of men could not have been carried any length, without thoſe ſymbols of ideas which we call *words*. And accordingly it has always been acknowledged, that there is a great connection betwixt logic and grammar, the ſame that there is betwixt the ſign and the thing ſignified by it.

The grammarian therefore, if he be truly a maſter of the art, is the greateſt of all artiſts, and the next in rank and dignity to the philoſopher; and, if I am not much miſtaken, I have ſhown in the preceding part of this work, not only that the principles of this art are to be found in philoſophy, which is the caſe of all arts; but that it is ſo intimately connected with philoſophy,

philoſophy, that it is impoſſible to be a complete grammarian, without being a philoſopher, at leaſt without underſtanding the philoſophy of the human mind. C. 15.

Beſides this connection with philoſophy, it was, in antient times, connected with the critical art; for the grammarian profeſſed, to teach men not only to ſpeak and write properly, but to underſtand the poets, and other ſtandard-books in the language *. And indeed the two profeſſions appear to be neceſſarily connected: for as ſuch books muſt be the ſtandard of the language, how can we learn to ſpeak or write well without underſtanding them? and this again cannot be without the knowledge of hiſtory and antiquities. It was not therefore without reaſon, that the profeſſion of grammarian was of ſuch high eſtimation in antient times; and I muſt confeſs, I think it no good ſign, among others, of the preſent age, that it is now ſo little eſteemed. To reſtore the grammarian to his antient dignity, and at the ſame time to recommend the ſtudy of the antient languages, was my chief deſign in this part of my work; as I know certainly that

* *Quintil. Inſtitut. Orator.*

the

C. 15. the contempt of grammar, and the antient languages, will be attended with the downfall of all the arts and ſciences connected with language, and particularly of poetry and eloquence.

DIS-

DISSERTATION I.

Of the formation of the Greek language.

SECTION I.

THat the Greek is a language of very great art, and the work not only of grammarians, but philoſophers, cannot, I think, be denied by any perſon who has thoroughly ſtudied it, and is himſelf a grammarian and philoſopher; or, if it were a point diſputable, I think I have given many proofs of it in the preceding part of this volume. In this diſſertation, I propoſe to give a further proof ſtill of the art of this language, by ſhewing that it is all formed of a few radical ſounds, which are to be conſidered as the *materia prima* of this language. I have already ſhewn, that there is a great deal of derivation in it, much more than is commonly imagined; and that the number of primitives is much leſs than is generally ſuppoſed *. I have further ſhewn, that the radical words in this language, as in Hebrew, are verbs †. But I propoſe here to try, whether the etymology of this language cannot be carried ſtill further; and whether even thoſe verbs cannot be analyſed into a a few primitive ſounds. Sect. 1.

* Part 2 book 2. cap. 15.

† Ibid. p. 192.

Diff. I. That the Greek was originally an Oriental language, brought by the Pelaſgi into Greece, I think I have proved in the firſt volume of this work; but it is as certain that the Greeks made very great alterations upon it, in ſo much that in the days of Herodotus, the Pelaſgic paſſed among them for a barbarous language. Now this alteration appears to have been principally in the termination of the words, and the analogy of the language, by which I mean the flection of the declinable words. The Oriental languages, and particularly the Hebrew, to which I am perſuaded the Pelaſgic was very near akin, terminates by far the greateſt part of its words, and all its roots, in conſonants; whereas the greateſt part of the words in Greek, and all the roots, being verbs, terminate in a vowel. And this difference of termination did neceſſarily produce a great difference of flection; and, in conſequence of that, a great difference likewiſe of roots and derivation. And accordingly, the fact undoubtedly is, that the Orientals form the caſes of their nouns, and the tenſes of their verbs, in a manner very different from that practiſed by the Greeks; and the roots alſo of their languages are very different from the Greek roots.

There are at preſent in Greek two kinds of verbs; the one terminating in -ω, and the other in -μι: but it is evident, that theſe laſt verbs are derived from circumflex verbs in -ω; and that they were a variety in the form of their verbs introduced

duced in later times, and no part of the original conſtitution of their language. Accordingly, in the moſt antient dialect of Greek, I mean the Latin, they are not to be found. Sect. 1.

The verbs therefore, and by conſequence the roots, of the Greek language, did all terminate in -ω. And further, it appears to me, that in the original conſtitution of the language, there was always another vowel which preceded the final -ω in the termination of the verbs. This vowel was one of the following five α, ε, ι, ο, υ; ſo that all the primitives in Greek, that is, the roots of the language, did originally terminate in one or other of the five duads αω, εω, ιω, οω, υω. And this vocal termination ſerved the purpoſe of flection very much better than the termination of the old Pelaſgic or Hebrew in conſonants; for the vowels are of a nature much more ductile and flexible, and more eaſily change into one another, or into diphthongs, than the conſonants do. Thus the final ω, in the flection of the verb, is changed into α, αι, η, ε, ο, υ; and the preceding vowels, or characteriſtical letters as they are called, above mentioned, do ſome of them run together, and coaleſce into one ſound with the final ω. This is the caſe of three of them, α, ε, ο; and in the formation of the *oblique* tenſes, (ſo I call all the other tenſes, in contradiſtinction to the preſent, as all the other caſes of nouns are called *oblique* caſes with reſpect to the nominative), theſe three characteriſtical letters, by the changes they undergo, have a very great

Diff. I. ſhare. For the ι and υ are naturally changed into their correſpondent long vowels η and ω; and the α alſo, by the genius of the language, admits a change into η. Accordingly we ſee thoſe two vowels uſed interchangeably in the different dialects of Greek; and in general we may obſerve, that it is chiefly by the change of vowels that the difference of dialects in Greek is produced. For the conſonants which principally diſtinguiſh words from one another, and may be called the bones and ſinews of a language, are not near ſo much altered in thoſe dialects. The other two characteriſtical vowels, though they do not admit of a change into other vowels, as α does, yet they have that diſtinction which is common to all vowels of long and ſhort; a diſtinction which conſonants have not, and which therefore is another reaſon why they are much leſs proper for the termination of declinable words than vowels.

It is therefore chiefly by the change of the two final vowels that all the variety of tenſes in the Greek verb is formed: for though, in later times, the interpoſition of conſonants betwixt thoſe two letters, particularly of the σ and κ, was practiſed; it appears to me, that in more antient times the tenſes were formed without either of theſe two conſonants *.

And

* The future, I believe, was originally, in Greek, the ſame with the preſent; and I am perſuaded that the verb φιλω, for example, had at firſt no future, but what is now called the ſecond future, viz. φιλῶ circumflected, or φιλέω, as the Ionians uſe it, in its original

And not only do these duads serve the purpose of flection better than any other elemental sounds, but

Sect. 1.

original form. This old future, after the new future was invented, by the interposition of σ, and the change of the ε into the long vowel ἡ, was continued in the language under the name of the second future. In the same manner τυπέω or τυπῶ was the old future of the original verb τυπω, and which became a second future, after the other future was invented. Likewise the future of the liquid verbs, such as νεμω and μενω, are evidently the old presents of these verbs contracted and circumflected; for their old presents were undoubtedly νεμέω and μενέω, as appears from their perfects still preserved. And there are at this day several verbs which make no distinction betwixt their future and present, such as ἐρῶ, ἔδομαι, φαγομαι, πιομαι, words probably of very antient use in the language.

As to the past tenses, I mean the aorist and preter-perfect, they appear of old to have been formed by the change only of the final ω into α, without either σ or κ; and the only difference betwixt the two was, that the perfect had the reduplication in the beginning. As to the aorist, we have in Homer ἔχεα or ἔχευα, the aorist of the verb χεω or χεύω; and we have ἐφιλαμην and ἐφαμην, or without the augment φαμην, being the aorists middle of the verbs φιλῶ and φῶ; and by a like analogy, ἀλευαμην is derived from the the verb ἀλευω. And to these examples I think I may add the word ἔα, which is commonly said to be *Ionicè*, *poeticè*, or I don't know what else, for the imperfect of the verb εἶμι. But I hold it to be the first aorist of the verb ἔω, which is confessedly the original word, and the archetype of εἶμι. In this way it is naturally deduced, according to the analogy of the language; whereas it cannot be derived by any rule, that I know from ἦν, the present imperfect of the verb εἶμι. As to the preter-perfect, we have in Homer γεγαα, the perfect, from the verb γαω; τετλαα, from τλαω; and βεβαως, and μεμαως, and ἑσταως, the participles, from βεβαα, μεμαα, and ἑσταα. All these, in our common grammars and dictionaries, are said to be contractions by poetic licence, or by the particular use of certain tribes of the Greeks, in place of τετληκα, γεγηκα, &c. But this I take to be no more than a fiction of those grammarians, who very absurdly, as I think, suppose that the language was at once formed, such as we have it, e. g. that from the theme τλαω, was immediately formed the perfect τετληκα; and that there was not a progress in language, as in other human arts.

This

Diss. I. but also of derivation; for we may observe, that all the words derived from verbs, whether nouns, adjectives,

This progress is singularly exemplified in the tense of which I am now speaking; for the first change they made in it was of the characteristical vowel either into a long vowel, or into a diphthong. Thus ε they changed into η, and in this way was formed the perfect τετυχηα, to be found in Homer, from the verb τυχεω, and the perfect τεθνηα, and the participle τεθνηως, to be found in the Odyssey, *lib.* 15. v. 23. from the theme θνεω, from whence the present word θνησκω; or they changed it into the diphthong ει, as in the word τεθνειωτες, which is undoubtedly from the same theme θνεω. See upon this subject, *Eustath. Comm. Odyss. pag.* 1700. *lin.* 30. And the next step was the insertion of the κ betwixt the two final vowels, to complete the perfect into the form in which we see it at present. Thus from τετυχηα, was formed τετυχηκα; from τετλαα, or τετληα, τετληκα, &c.

In a manner analogous to this was formed the present future, which, as I have said, was at first the same with the present; but in the progress of the language, they thought proper to distinguish it by the insertion of the σ betwixt the two final vowels of the circumflex verbs, sometimes changing the penult vowel into a long vowel, and sometimes not, as φιλεω has φιλησω in the future, but ἀρκεω has ἀρκεσω. But it may be observed, that originally there appears to have been no change of the vowel; for, in the oldest verbs, and such as we are assured are originals, there is no change of the vowel; such as ἰω, from whence ἰσομαι; ἰω from which ἰσσαντο; ἰκω, and the like. And indeed it is most natural to think that this change of the vowel would come in process of time in the formation of the future, as we have seen it did in the formation of the perfect, from the instances above given of βεβαα, μεμαα, &c.

It may be further observed, that it would appear that antiently in the formation of the two past tenses, the aorist and the perfect, the κ was indiscriminately used. Of this I think there is a vestige in the verbs in -μι, τιθημι, διδωμι, and ἱημι, which are from the roots θεω, δοω, ἱω, and their aorist ἐθηκα, ἐδωκα, and ἡκα. And it further appears, from the example of two of these, viz. τιθημι and ἱημι, that the short vowel of the theme, instead of being changed into the corresponding long vowel, was changed into a diphthong; as τιθημι has its perfect τεθωκα, and ἱημι, εἱκα, in the same manner as we have seen above, that from θνεω was derived τεθνωα.

These

adjectives, or adverbs, are formed by addition to, or alteration of thoſe duads. Sect. I.

Thus it appears, that the five duads above mentioned, are eſſential parts of every root in the Greek language, being of neceſſary uſe in flection and derivation; and therefore I make them the radical and primitive ſounds of the language, from which combined, with other vowels and with conſonants, the whole language, in long order, and a wonderful progreſs of generation, is to be deduced.

It muſt, I think, be admitted, that this hypotheſis is at leaſt plauſible; and that if the language was not in fact formed upon this ſyſtem, it might have been ſo formed; and that no happier terminations could have been found for the verbal

Thoſe things I have mentioned, to ſhew, that thoſe characteriſtical letters of the future and paſt tenſes, viz. σ and κ, were not conſtantly and uniformly uſed in the Greek language, in the formation of thoſe tenſes; but that by the original conſtitution of the language they appear to have been formed only by the change of the two final vowels of the theme, at leaſt of the ω; for the other was not, nor is not yet always changed. And as to the imperfect, it always was and ſtill is formed by the change only of the final ω into ον; for, as to the augment in the beginning, it is evident from Homer, that it was not antiently in uſe. The common lexicons and grammars indeed tell us, that it is omitted *Ionice* or *poetice*. But they who know a little more of the language than what is contained in thoſe books, underſtand no more by that expreſſion, than that ſuch was the antient uſe of the language, which the poets preſerved longer than other writers: For the Muſes, though they furniſhed the matter to the poets, never inſpired them with a new language; and however they might adorn their ſtyle, and raiſe it, by figures, they never violated the rules of grammar that either were in uſe, or were remembered to have been in uſe at the time they wrote.

roots

Diff. I. roots of the language, than thoſe five duads, ſerving ſo well for the purpoſes both of flection and derivation, and particularly of flection, which is a peculiar property of the Greek language, and what conſtitutes the chief difference betwixt it and its kindred languages of the Eaſt. It is not however enough that my ſyſtem is ſuch as might have been the ſyſtem of the language, but it muſt be proved, that in fact it is ſo. This can only be done by induction; that is, by a multitude of examples of words that we are ſure are ſo formed, from which we may reaſonably infer, that all the reſt were ſo formed, though we cannot now trace them up to their original.

But before I come to this, it is proper to obſerve, that although my argument does not require I ſhould prove, that any of thoſe five radical ſounds either are, or ever were, roots of the language commonly ſo called; that is, words ſignificant, from which other words of ſimilar ſignification are derived; yet I am able to ſhew that four at leaſt of the five are ſo. For ἀω, *ſpiro*, and ὑω, or ϝω, with a thick ſpirit, as the Greeks pronounced it, are words of common uſe; and there is a third, viz. ἰω, which, though it is not in uſe in the preſent indicative, is preſerved in ſeveral other tenſes; and even in that tenſe it is preſerved in Latin, with a change common in that language, of the *i* into *e*: for that the verb truly is *io*, and not *eo*, is clear, not only from the other tenſes, ſuch as *ibam*, *ivi*, *ibo*, but from the other perſons of this

this very preſent tenſe, ſuch as, *is*, *it*, *imus*; and the word ἰος, ſignifying an *arrow*, much uſed by Homer, is allowed, by all etymologiſts, to come from this root. The duad ἰω is likewiſe a word unuſed, but it is acknowledged by all grammarians and etymologiſts to be a primitive word, and the parent of a very numerous family: for from thence is derived εἰμι, *ſum*; ἱημι, *mitto*, according to the uſual derivation of the verbs in -μι, from the pure verb ιω (*vid Urſini Grammat.*) and ἱεμαι, *cupio*, which is likewiſe regularly formed from ιω, as τιθεμαι is from θω. And beſides theſe, the words ἰζω, ἱππω, or ἱππυμι, *induo*, are, by all grammarians, deduced from this antient theme. The only remaining duad, is ὀω, or ὠω, with the firſt vowel lengthened, which indeed is not a word in uſe, nor accounted by any grammarian, ſo far as I know, an antient root of the language. But we have the word ὀθω, (Homer uſes ὀθομαι, in the middle voice), and we have alſo the verb ὠθω, of which both the future ὠσω, and the aoriſt ὠσα, are to be found in Homer; now ὀθω or ὠθω may be ſuppoſed to be formed from ὀω or ὠω, by the interjection of the θ betwixt the two ο's in the ſame manner as πληθω is formed from πλεω, and many other Greek verbs in the ſame way. And ὠον, in Latin *ovum*, will come from it in the common way that nouns come from verbs; and if it be true, that all the primitives in Greek are verbs, and all the nouns derivatives, as I think I have Sect. 1.

Diff. I. ſhewn it to be, it is impoſſible that ὠον could be otherwiſe derived.

Thus it appears, that thoſe duads, or at leaſt four of them, are roots of the language in every ſenſe of the word; and the only remaining queſtion is, Whether or not all the other roots of the language be not thoſe very roots combined with other letters both vowels and conſonants?

In the firſt place let us examine the compoſition with vowels. From ἀω the firſt of theſe roots is formed, by prefixing another α, another verb, ἀαω, *lædo*, uſed by Homer; by prefixing the ε, is formed ἰαω, *ſino*; and by prefixing the *i*, is formed the verb ἰαω, or ἰαομαι, as it is commonly uſed. And with the υ interpoſed betwixt the two vowels, comes the verb ἀυω, ſignifying to *make a ſound* or *noiſe*, from which ἀυδαω and ἀυδασκω, *loquor*. See *Etym. Magnum. in voce* ἀυδη. From the next duad ἰω, is formed ἰεω, ἰημι, ἰεμαι, by prefixing the Iota; and by the interjection of the υ, is formed the verb ἰυω, *torreo*. From the root ἰω is formed, by the addition of the α, an old word ἀἰω, *audio*; from whence, in all probability, comes the word ἀισθανομαι, ſignifying the perception of that, and every other ſenſe, and by an eaſy tranſition, the cogitation of the mind alſo. In the ſame manner is formed, by prefixing the ε, the word ὀἰω, *puto*, as it is uſed by Homer, or ὀιομαι, as it is now uſed.

But this kind of compoſition, with vowels only, could not go far, without making the language much

much too ſoft and vocal, beſides that there is not variety enough in them to produce all the words of a language. The conſonants therefore muſt have been called to aid, which, as I have had occaſion to obſerve, make the moſt material parts of language, in ſo much that in the orthography of ſome of the Eaſtern nations, particularly the Arabians, the vowels are neglected to be written. From the combination of theſe duads of vowels with conſonants, we ſhall ſee the whole Greek language flowing with an eaſy deſcent, and a moſt copious ſtream. Sect. I.

To be convinced of this, we need only go over all the conſonants one by one, and by plain induction we ſhall ſee that the whole language is in this manner compoſed. I ſhall give but a few examples, beginning with the firſt conſonant β, which, compounded with the firſt duad ἀω, produces βαω, *eo*, an old verb, uſed in ſome tenſes by Homer, from which, in later times, was formed βαινω; prefixed to ἰω, it makes βεω or βηω; from which βηζω, a word preſerved to us by Heſychius, ſignifying the ſame as φωνεω; prefixed to ἰω, it makes βιω, (from whence the Latin *vivo*, and the Greek βιος), or βιοω, or βιωμι, *vivo*; prefixed to ὀω, it produces βοω, *paſco*, from which is formed βυς, and the Latin *bos*, and another verb now in uſe, viz. βοσκω, by the interjection of the σ and κ, as from γνοω, γνωσκω is formed, and many others after the ſame manner; and laſtly, compounded with ὐω, it produces βυω, *obtura*, *impleo*; from which βυθος, or βυσσος, *gur-*

Diff. I. *ges*, *vorago*. The next conſonant is γ, from which, compounded with ἀω, is produced γαω, *gigno*, (a verb yet preſerved in Homer; in the middle perfect γεγαα, from which γαια, *terra*); then γεω, or γηω, from which γηθω, *gaudio*, as from πλεω, πληθω; γιω, from whence γινομαι, or γιγνομαι, *fio*; γοω, *lugeo*; γυω, from which γυια, *membrum*. According to the ſame analogy, is formed, by the adjection of the next conſonant δ, δαω, or δαιω, *luceo*; δεω, *vinceo*; διω, from which διωκω, *ſequor*; δοω, or δίδωμι, *do*; and δυω, *ſubeo*.

I do not think it is neceſſary to go through all the other conſonants in their order; but if any Greek ſcholar, who is acquainted with the old obſolete roots of the language, will take that trouble, I will venture to ſay, that he will ſee the whole language ſpringing from thoſe duad roots, in a manner that will ſurpriſe him, if he has not made the obſervation before. But he muſt not wonder, if he do not find in every inſtance the immediate derivative: for, conſidering the many changes that muſt have been in this language during the very long time that it has laſted, many of the original words muſt neceſſarily be loſt; and indeed the wonder is, that ſo many of them are preſerved. But where the analogy is eſtabliſhed by ſo many examples, we are at liberty to ſuppoſe roots, as I have done, in the caſe of ὠον and γυον, and as may be done in many other inſtances with like probability. Thus though we cannot find at preſent the verb ζυω, as we do ζαω, ζεω, ζοω; yet we have

ζωη,

ζυμη, *fermentum*, which, according to the common rule of derivation, muſt be from ζυω. In like manner, though we have not ῥιω, or ῥαω, as we have ῥιπω, ῥοω, and ῥυω; yet we have χριω, and χραω, formed in the ſame way from thoſe roots, as κτυπω is from τυπω, the archetype of τυπτω. Sect. I.

Hitherto I have only ſpoken of the compoſition of theſe primitives with a ſingle conſonant. But the propagation increaſes prodigiouſly, when we take into the play more conſonants, and more vowels, either added to the beginning, or thrown into the middle, or both. Thus λυω, *ſolvo*, formed from the duad υω, by the addition of another conſonant in the beginning, is made κλυω, and κλυμι. *audio*. Ταω, an old Homeric word, ſignifying *capio*, from whence τη, in the imperative, by the addition of a κ in the beginning, made κταω, from whence κταομαι, *poſſideo*. From φαω, an old root, ſignifying *occido*, (vid. *Etymol. Magn.*), is derived σφαζω, *occido*, by an addition of the conſonant σ to the beginning, and the interjection of the ζ; and from the ſame root, but ſignifying a different thing, viz. *to ſhine*, by throwing in another vowel, and the conſonant ν, is formed another verb φαινω; and by the addition of another vowel ſtill, the Homeric word φαεινω is produced. In the ſame manner, from λαω, is formed firſt λαβω, and then λαμβανω; and after the ſame faſhion is ανδανω, formed from the old root αδω. According to the ſame analogy, from ανω is formed ανανω, *ſicco*, *arefacio*; from αχω, whence

αχος,

Diff. I. ἄχος, *dolor*, is formed firſt ἄχτω, then ἄχτνω, and then ἄχτνμι, *doleo*. And in the ſame manner, from ὄρω, is ὄρτω, ὄρτνω, and ὄρτνμι, *impetum facio*; in all which inſtances, and many more that might be given, it may be obſerved, that the conſonants which are thrown in, are moſtly liquids, ſuch as μ, ν, ρ, by which the ſound is made ſweeter, at the ſame time that it is made fuller and more pompous. And in order to make it likewiſe ſtrong and maſculine, we ſee the aſpirated conſonants φ, χ, and θ, are uſed; for it is the peculiar praiſe of the Greek language, that the ſounds of it are equally mixed of the ſweet and flowing, and of the ſtrong and rough, ſo that it is ſuited to any kind of compoſition.

It may be alſo obſerved, that the Greeks not only ſwelled their words in the manner above deſcribed, but likewiſe by reduplications of ſyllables in the beginning, of which they appear to have been very fond. In this manner, from δαπτω, they formed δαρδαπτω; from μαιρω, μαρμαιρω; from φαινω, πεμφαινω; derivatives, not only of more beautiful ſound than their primitives, but, if I underſtand them rightly, of greater emphaſis and ſignificancy. For the ſame reaſon they formed new verbs from the preter-perfect of other verbs. Thus from τλαω, τετληκα, they formed τετλημι, *tolero*; from whence the Homeric imperative τετληθι; from βεβηκα, the perfect of βαω, they formed βιβημω; of which the third perſon ſingular is frequently uſed by Homer; and ought not to be miſtaken, as it is by Dr Clarke,

Clarke, for the plu-perfect of the original verb: for it is no more the plu-perfect than πεπληγει, δεδηει, and τετρηχει are, which are all preſent tenſes of derivative verbs of the ſame kind. Sect. I.

I will here, in paſſing, give a caution to etymologiſts, that when they ſee words formed in the manner of λαμβανω, λανθανω, δαρδαπτω, μαρμαιρω, &c. they ſhould not imagine that they are compound words, made up of two ſignificant words; for they are truly no more than derivative words, according to the eſtabliſhed analogy of the language.

In this genealogy of words, I have gone no farther than the verbs derived from the five duads compounded with other vowels and conſonants; but I have not obſerved how theſe verbs beget not only other verbs, but alſo nouns, adjectives, and adverbs; and theſe again other verbs and other nouns, &c. in almoſt infinite progreſſion. And in this way, from one of my roots, a prodigious tree of a family might be made, divided and ſubdivided into branches almoſt without number. Thus from the firſt of them, ἀω, is formed, without any conſonant, ἀημι, ἀηρ, and their derivatives; ἰαω, and its family; ἑαω, and ἀυω, and their families: then, with the conſonants, it produces βαω, γαω, δαω, ζαω, καω, λαω, μαω, &c. and all their ſeveral families, of prodigious number.

According to my ſyſtem therefore of the language, the radical ſounds of it are the five duads, ſo often mentioned, and which are likewiſe roots properly

Diff. I. properly ſo called, that is, words ſignificant, from which other words of ſimilar ſignification are derived. Of theſe, by prefixing another vowel, or any one conſonant, are formed the other roots, which are all verbs; and from theſe, by the addition of other vowels, and other conſonants, in the beginning, middle, or end, are formed other verbs, nouns, adjectives, adverbs, and in ſhort all the words of the language. And in this way, from thoſe ſimple elements, or, as they may be called, ſeeds of the language, there is a wonderful growth of words, by which the language is not only raiſed to a greater pomp of ſound, but enriched with more copiouſneſs of expreſſion, than any other language, at leaſt that I know.

SECT. II.

Sect. 2. THE ſyſtem of the Greek language that I have given in the preceding ſection, is ſo new, and ſo different from the common notions concerning this language, that I cannot expect it ſhould be readily aſſented to by the learned, or that many objections will not be made to it. Such of theſe as occur to me, I am to ſtate in this ſection, and anſwer as well as I can.

And, in the firſt place, it will be ſaid, That thoſe duads, which I call the roots of the language, are not roots at all; becauſe they have either no ſignification,

flexion, or none that is analagous to thoſe words which I make the derivatives from them. Sect. 2.

To this I anſwer, *firſt*, That I have already obviated this objection, by giving thoſe duads, not as roots properly ſo called, nor indeed as words, but only as primitive or radical ſounds of the language; and that they are ſuch, I think it is impoſſible to deny. For certainly the verbs ἰαω, ἰαω, βαω, δαω, καω, βιω, δυω, κω, δνω, λω, and the like, are primitives, and roots of the language properly ſo called; and from theſe, it is evident, that the whole words of the language may be derived according to the common rules of Greek derivation. Now, of all ſuch roots, one or other of the five duads is certainly a moſt material part; being, in the firſt place, the greateſt part; and, ſecondly, that upon which the inflection, and the formation of the tenſes, depend. Now, when we ſee in all the radical words of a language, five combinations of vowels, predominating, and producing ſuch effects with reſpect to flection and derivation, ought not the ſounds of thoſe letters to be diſtinguiſhed from the other letters in the language, and called, by way of eminence, the primitive and elemental *ſounds*, if not the radical *words* of the language?

But, *ado*, There are four of thoſe duads at leaſt that are words themſelves, and undeniably radical words; and the fifth there is good reaſon to ſuppoſe was once a radical word, though it is not now to be found. Now it is poſſible that the art-

Diff. I. iſts who framed the ſyſtem of the language, may have imagined ſome connection of one kind or another, betwixt thoſe original verbs ἀω, ἰω, and the reſt of them, and the other verbs formed from them, by the addition of a vowel or conſonant; ſuch as ἰαω, βαω, δαω, βεω, δεω, and the reſt of them. Upon ſuch remote analogies and diſtant relations of things is formed, as we are told, the ſyſtem of the Sanſcrit language. This language, ſays our author *, is analyſed into a ſmall number of what he calls *primitive elements*. Theſe elements, he ſays, may be conſidered as the *caput mortuum* of the language; for they are of no uſe by themſelves, as they ſignify nothing, properly ſpeaking, but only have a relation to ſome idea: and he gives an inſtance of one of theſe elemental ſounds, viz. *kru*, which he ſays has a relation to the idea of *action*; but it is not a word, nor has any ſignification by itſelf, till it is ſomeway affected or changed by what he calls the ſecondary elements, which make it a word, and give it a determinate ſignification. Thus of *kru*, is made *kar*, *kir*, *kri*, &c. which are all words of the language, having a determinate ſignification; and of theſe, by a wonderful ſyntheſis, the whole language is compounded. Now this may be ſuppoſed to be the ſyſtem of the Greek language; with this difference only, that the primitive elements of the Greek, form words themſelves,

* See *Pere du Pon's* account of the learning and language of the *Bramins*, publiſhed in vol. 26. of the *Lettres Edifiantes et curieuſes*.

having

having a certain meaning, to which we may ſuppoſe all the various words formed from thoſe primitive elements have ſome diſtant relation. Sect. 2.

And what favours this hypotheſis is, that even ſuch words as are allowed to be roots, have hardly any determinate ſignification. Thus φαω, for example, as it appears from its derivatives φῶς, φαεινω, or φαινω, φημι, and σφαζω, muſt denote ſome very general idea, which is ſomething analogous to *light*, to *ſpeaking*, and to *killing*. Now if this be the caſe of thoſe roots, or ſecondary elements, as they may be called, it is likely that it is much more ſo with reſpect to the primitive elements; and accordingly one of them, viz. ἰω, is certainly of very indeterminate ſignification, as appears from its derivatives, εἰμι, *ſum*; ἱημι, *mitto*; ἱεμαι, *cupio*; ἱννυμι, *veſtio*.

But whatever probability there may be of a reſemblance in this reſpect betwixt the Bramin and Greek languages, which I think the more likely that I am perſuaded both Indians and Greeks got their language, and all their other arts, from the ſame parent-country, viz. Egypt; yet I am not diſpoſed to found a ſyſtem of language upon ſuch remote analogies: and therefore I rather incline to adhere to my hypotheſis, that though theſe duads are themſelves proper roots which have their derivatives; yet, with reſpect to the other words of the language, they are no more than radical elements, which, by the addition of one o-

Diff. I. ther element, become radical words, from which the whole language is derived.

Another objection that will naturally occur to my ſyſtem is, That according to it all the radical words in Greek are verbs.

But to this I think I have already made a ſufficient anſwer in the preceding volume, where I have ſhewn, *firſt*, in point of fact, That a great many nouns that are ſuppoſed to be primitives, are truely derivatives from verbs, *2do*, That there is the greateſt reaſon to believe, that all the other words of the language are ultimately derived in the ſame manner, though we cannot in every inſtance trace them up to the original verb; becauſe they may be all ſo derived, according to the common rules of derivation, which take place in the language. *3dly*, That there is a very good reaſon, from the nature of things, why verbs ſhould be the original words of every language. *4thly*, That ſuch is the ſcheme of derivation of the Hebrew language, betwixt which and the Greek there is ſuch a connection, that we cannot preſume them to be different in this fundamental point, however different they may be in termination, flection, and other accidents; to all which may be added, that if we can ſuppoſe the artificers of the Greek language to have formed a ſyſtem of derivation, and to have been at pains to find out the moſt proper words for roots, they could not have found any ſo proper as verbs, becauſe they are the moſt ductile and flexible

flexible part of ſpeech, and, having ſo many different forms, admit of the greateſt variety of derivation; for from every part of the verb, we may derive another word, having ſome ſignification analogous to that of the verb; and accordingly, as we have ſeen, the Greeks have derivatives almoſt from every tenſe, and ſometimes from different perſons of the ſame tenſe. Sect. 1.

Another objection that will occur is, That theſe radical verbs of the Greek tongue I make to be all verbs ending in ω, and all pure verbs, that is, with a vowel before the final ω.

And I believe the fact to be, that all the verbs in Greek were originally pure verbs. At preſent indeed there are three kinds of verbs in Greek, viz. the pure verbs, the barytons, and the verbs in -μι. That theſe three all exiſted together, and were in the original conſtitution of the language, we cannot ſuppoſe, unleſs we likewiſe ſuppoſe, at the ſame time, that ſo great a piece of art as the Greek language, was perfected at once, ſo as to admit of no after improvements or enlargements. Now it is impoſſible, I think, to deny, that the pure verbs are original in the language. And it is as impoſſible to diſpute that the verbs in -μι are derived from them, and were invented in later times, in order to make a greater variety of the forms of their verbs, and of their terminations and flections; and accordingly we ſee, that the moſt antient dialect of Greek, viz. the Latin, has no ſuch verbs. The only queſtion therefore is,

Diff. I. is, concerning the barytons. Now if we ſuppoſe them to be originals in the language, as well as the pure verbs, then have we two ſets of original verbs formed at once; which is by no means likely, if we conſider the progreſs that there is, and muſt have been, in this art of language, as well as in every other human art. And it will ſtill appear more unlikely, if we conſider the way in which the verbs in -μι, which undoubtedly are not of the original ſtructure of the language, but an after addition, are formed. For they are derived from the pure verb, by changing the termination ω into ι, and inſerting betwixt it and the preceding vowel, the conſonant μ. Now is it not reaſonable to think, and agreeable to the analogy of the language, that the barytons are formed in the ſame way, by inſerting a conſonant, one or more, betwixt the two vowels of the pure verb? That a whole race of them is ſo formed, it is impoſſible to deny, I mean all ſuch of them as end in -σκω, as γιγνωσκω and βεσκω, which are formed in that way from γνοω and βοω; now it certainly makes the ſyſtem of the language more uniform and conſiſtent to ſuppoſe that they were all ſo formed. And the reaſon for their formation, is the ſame as for the formation of the verbs in -μι, namely, to give a greater variety of flection to their verbs; for they diſcovered that certain conſonants, ſuch as π and β, would coaleſce very well in ſound with the ſigma, the characteriſtical letter of the future, and by changing

ging them into their correſpondent aſpirates, they made an agreeable variety in their perfects. Further, we ſee that the barytons themſelves, generate other verbs in the ſame way. Thus it cannot be doubted, that the archetype of τυπτω, is τυπω. This is evident, not only from the ſecond aoriſt ἐτυπον, which undoubtedly was the imperfect of the old verb, but alſo from the formation of the future and perfect, which makes it evident that the characteriſtical letter is π. Now from this old verb τυπω, is formed the new verb τυπτω, by inſerting betwixt the two final letters the letter τ; and if ſo, is it not agreeable to the analogy of the language to ſuppoſe, that τυπω itſelf was formed by inſerting a π betwixt the υ and ω of τυω? which may be preſumed to have been the original verb. Sect. 2.

And my hypotheſis is ſupported not only by this reaſoning from analogy, but alſo from facts: for it is evident, that many of thoſe verbs that are now barytons, were originally pure verbs; *e. g.* βαλλω, which is now a baryton, was formerly the pure verb βλεω, as is evident from the future ſtill in uſe, βλησομαι, and the preter-perfect βεβληκα. And the ſame is true of μελλω, and θελω, and many others that might be mentioned: and ἐχω and φερω, though they have not thoſe marks of being once pure verbs, they have another equally certain, which, is that ἐχημι and φερημι are to be found in the antient poets, which muſt have been from ἐχεω and φερεω. The liquid verbs

Diss. I. verbs too in νω and μω, appear to have been derived from pure verbs, as, e. g. νέμω and μένω, are evidently from νεμεω and μενεω, as appears both from their futures and perfects. Even the verb τυπω above mentioned, appears to have been antiently τυπεω, from the second future of τυπτω, which is τυπῶ circumflexed; now this second future is no other than the present of the old verb τυπεω *. For that the circumflected ω in this future is no other than the εω contracted, is evident from the Ionic use of the word, according to which it is τυπεω uncontracted, after the manner of the Ionians; and if there were any doubt in the matter, the antient verb τυπεω itself is preserved to us by Hesychius.

It may also be objected to my system, That I make the Greek language of a very gaping pronunciation, when I suppose the primitive sounds and the chief component parts of the language to be vowels standing open upon one another.

But the fact is, that such was the genius of the antient Greek, and that contractions are but of later use, when glib-speaking, that went trippingly off the tongue, came into fashion, instead of the full-mouth'd high-sounding language that was formerly used. This antient use was preserved in the Ionic dialect, and in the old poets, particularly in Homer, who, in the very first line of his Iliad, opens two vowels upon one another, viz. ω and α, which make a greater gap than any o-

* See Ursini Gram. Græc. pag. 163.

ther

ther. And that he did this purpoſely, is evident; for inſtead of Πηληϊάδυ, which he might have uſed, he ſays Πηληϊάδεω Ἀχιλῆος, not without prejudice to his verſe. Sect. 2.

It may be further objected, That I make the ſyſtem of the Greek language too regular and artificial, more ſo than any thing of popular uſe can be ſuppoſed to be.

This objection proceeds upon the ſuppoſition, that language is an art invented, as well as uſed, by the people. But is it poſſible to believe, that the Sanſcrit language was invented by the people? or can we believe that the Hebrew, a much leſs perfect language than the Greek, was the invention of the vulgar that uſed it? or indeed can we believe, that any art whatever, of the leaſt dignity or excellence, was ever brought to the leaſt degree of perfection, merely by popular uſe, though in that way no doubt the firſt rude practices of every art began? But of this I have already ſaid enough in the preceding volume.

Another objection may be made by thoſe who have not ſufficiently ſtudied the nature of language, That I do not, by my ſyſtem, give an account of all the words of the language; for the conjunctions, ſuch as καὶ and τε, and μεν and δὲ, and the prepoſitions, ſuch as ἐκ, and the pronouns, ſuch as ἐγω and συ, are neither roots nor derivatives, according to my ſyſtem. The ſame objectors will alſo, no doubt, deſire, that I ſhould ac-

Diff. I. count for the interjections, and the names of numbers.

But the anſwer is, That although by far the greater part of things in a language of art are according to rule, ſome things muſt be arbitrary, and not governed by any rule. The nature of language, as we have ſhewn, abſolutely requires, that ſome things ſhould be denominated from others, ſo that every word of a language may not be independent and unconnected with every other; and it belongs to the art to determine what things ſhall be denominated from what. Subſtances, as has been ſhewn, are fitly denominated from their actions and operations. Qualities may be, and commonly are, denominated in the ſame way. Inferior actions may be denominated from the principal actions upon which they depend; and even the words expreſſing thoſe *primary* actions, as I may call them, and which are held to be primitives, may be ſo contrived, as that the ſounds of the letters ſhall have ſome ſimilitude to the actions denoted by them, as I have endeavoured to ſhew. In this manner all the words of the language, both primitive and derivative, which denote things really exiſting in nature, may be formed according to rules of art. And it is of ſuch words that a language is conſtituted: for conjunctions and prepoſitions are to be conſidered only as pegs and nails in the ſtructure of language, and are, properly ſpeaking, no part of the ſtructure; for they do not expreſs any thing exiſting in nature, but

but only the operations of our mind, in connecting together the ſeveral parts of diſcourſe, and expreſſing the relations that we conceive betwixt things. Pronouns likewiſe are no more than an invention of ours to ſupply the place of nouns. Plato therefore, in his dialogue upon etymology, has not ſo much as mentioned conjunctions, prepoſitions, or pronouns, as not being proper ſubjects of etymology. They are therefore, I believe, in all languages, expreſſed by ſounds merely arbitrary. And as to the names of numbers, Plato indeed mentions them, but ſays that they are words that cannot be derived from any other. For this he does not give any reaſon; but I take the reaſon to be, that men have uſed words to calculate, as they formerly uſed pebbles, and now uſe counters. And as to interjections, they are to be conſidered as no more than natural cries, expreſſive of paſſion, which cannot, by their nature, be derivatives from other words. And in this manner, I think we may account for ſome words of a language not being derivatives, nor formed according to rule. Sect. 2.

But beſides theſe, there are other words which cannot be reduced to any rule, and which Plato, in the Cratylus, has likewiſe given up; I mean foreign words, or rather words of the original language of the Greeks, which they preſerved in the ſame ſtate as when they got them from the Eaſt, without adjuſting them to the new ſyſtem they had formed of their language; ſuch is the Phrygian word πυρ,

Diff. I. ſignifying *fire*, and Ἄσυ, the Athenian name for their city, which I had occaſion to mention before, and the four other words of the ſame unuſual termination; and I am perſuaded that many others may be found that were uſed by the Greeks, but never naturalized in their language.

The only other objection that occurs to me is, That according to this ſyſtem, I make the Greek language perfect and complete in itſelf, borrowing nothing from any other; whereas, in the former part of this work, I made it to be derived from the Eaſt, and the ſame originally with the Oriental languages.

The anſwer to this is, That however paradoxical it may ſeem, in certain reſpects both are true: for the artiſts that formed the Greek language out of the materials brought from the Eaſt, did ſo reform it, that it has the appearance of a language quite different from any of the Oriental dialects. This was brought about by a change of the termination and the flection; and in conſequence of that, of the roots, and the whole ſyſtem of derivation, all except that fundamental point, of the roots being verbs. According to this plan, the roots became duads of vowels, either by themſelves, or with a ſingle conſonant prefixed, inſtead of triads of conſonants, as they are in Hebrew, with two vowels, but a conſonant always laſt; ſo that the only ſimilitude that remained betwixt theſe new roots and the old was, that both conſiſted of two ſyllables. But in compounding the words with thoſe primitive duads

and

and conſonants, they made uſe of ſuch conſonants as were uſed in the old language, (with ſuch variations however as ſuited the nice Greek ear); and it is by this means that the Greek and the Oriental languages ſtill preſerve a reſemblance to one another, by which they may be known to be of the ſame family; ſo that ſtill the Greek may be ſaid, without impropriety, to be a dialect of the Eaſt, and a ſtream from that great ſource of languages, but which is much further from the ſource than any other. Sect. 2.

And thus I have endeavoured both to eſtabliſh my ſyſtem, and to anſwer the objections to it. After I had formed it, I was told that it was not entirely new, but that Hempſterhuſius, the Dutch profeſſor, had much the ſame thought, but he never publiſhed it, only communicated it to ſome of his ſcholars. I never could get any diſtinct account of his ſyſtem, but only in general I have heard, that as he was a great Oriental, as well as Greek ſcholar, he made the Greek roots, like the Hebrew, to conſiſt of triads. If thoſe triads were ſuch as I ſuppoſe them to be, conſiſting each of them of one or other of the five duads, and a conſonant prefixed, then there is very little difference betwixt Hempſterhuſius and me; for, according to my ſyſtem, by far the greateſt part of the roots are ſuch as Hempſterhuſius made them. But I think his ſyſtem defective in theſe two things: *firſt*, That he does not carry the analyſis of the language far enough back, nor reſolve

it

Diff. I. it into its primitive elements, which are certainly the five duads. 2*dly*, That he excludes from the number of the roots, the duads themſelves, four of which are moſt certainly radical words of the language; and alſo the compoſition of them with other vowels, making ſuch words as *iaω*, *iαω*, &c. which are likewiſe undoubtedly roots in the proper ſenſe of the word. I therefore think it better to make the duads the primitive ſounds of the language, and themſelves roots likewiſe; and all the other roots to be formed, by prefixing either another vowel or a conſonant to the original duads.

DIS-

DISSERT. II.

Of the Sound of the Greek language.

IN the preceding diſſertation, I have endeavoured to ſhew, that the artificers of the Greek language choſe for the radical ſounds of it, five duads of vowels, for the ſake of the analogy, that is, the formation of caſes and tenſes; —of derivation; —and likewiſe for more agreeable ſound. In this diſſertation I propoſe to ſhew what further the Greeks have done to improve the ſound of their language; as in this reſpect, as well as with reſpect to the formation of the language, the Greek differs very much from the Oriental languages, and thoſe of Gothic and Celtic extraction. Dif. II.

The termination of the words of a language is, with reſpect to its ſound, a very material part of it. Herodotus * very properly obſerves it as a peculiarity of the Perſian lanuguage, that all the words of it terminate in *s*. And there is hardly any thing that diſtinguiſhes languages more than the difference of termination. The languages of the Eaſt, and the Gothic and Celtic, and their progeny, terminate almoſt all their words with conſonants, and theſe, for the greater part mutes, and often aſpirated; ſuch terminations, eſpecially

* *Lib.* 1. *c.* 139. This, ſays our author, is a peculiarity, which eſcapes the Perſians themſelves, but not us Greeks.

if

Dif. II. if the following word begins, as it frequently happens, with a conſonant that does not coaleſce with them in the ſame ſound, make thoſe languages ſeem very harſh to ears accuſtomed to Greek or Latin, or even to the corruptions of the Latin, ſuch as the French and Italian. On the other hand, the Greeks terminate all their words either in vowels, or with the liquid ρ, ſometimes in ς, but very rarely, according to the later uſe of the Greek language, and often in the monadic letter ν; but never with a mute conſonant, and far leſs with an aſpirate. The great difference therefore that we find betwixt the Greek, and thoſe other languages, one of which I am perſuaded it originally was, is in the termination and the flection. This indeed makes ſo great a difference, that to thoſe who are not critics in language, they appear to be altogether different: but when we can trace the Greek word up to its origin, we find that there is no difference but in the termination, and that the body of the word is filled up with the ſame conſonants and vowels, as in the Hebrew, Gothic, or Celtic, with ſuch alterations as the pleaſure of the ear might require.

For the artificers of the Greek language, not only attended to the termination of their words, but they have taken care alſo, that in the middle they ſhall not be crouded with conſonants, as is often the caſe of the languages of northern extraction, and particularly of the Engliſh, in which we find ſometimes four conſonants together, without diſtinction of the kind, whether they be ſuch as run eaſily

eaſily into one another or not. But in Greek there are never above three together, without the interpoſition of a vowel; and of theſe the firſt, or the laſt, or both, are always liquids, or the monadic letter σ; as in the words ἐνδλος, ἀιχρος, ἀοδμα, λαμφθεις, &c. Dif. II.

I obſerved before, that the liquids do not unite with one another in the ſame ſyllable, with the exception only of the μ and ρ in certain words. But thoſe two juſt now mentioned do not admit either of the other two liquids λ and ῥ next to themſelves, even in the following ſyllable; at leaſt this was a junction that offended the delicate Greek ear, though very common among us. In order therefore to prevent ſo diſagreeable a ſound, they threw in, betwixt the μ or ρ and thoſe other liquids, ſome other conſonant, ſuch as δ, or τ, which are commonly interpoſed betwixt the ρ and ῥ, and the labials β, π, φ, which are uſually interpoſed betwixt the μ and the ῥ; and when the λ follows the ρ, this laſt is left out, and the λ doubled, as in ἐλλειψις, for ἐνλειψις; ἐλλαμπω, for ἐνλαμπω.

The three lingual mutes admit no other conſonants after them, in Greek, except the four liquids, λ, μ, ρ, ῥ; becauſe any other conſonants following thoſe mutes, they thought, produced a diſagreeable ſound. It is for this reaſon, in the declenſion of ſuch nouns as μοναϛ, they do not ſay, in the dative plural, μοναδσι, which they ought to do according to the analogy, but μοναϛι; and in

Dis. II. the dative plural of τερας, they say τερασι, not τερατσι. And in like manner, in the conjugation of verbs, they say πλησω, in the future, from πληθω, not πληθσω. I know that the double letter ζ, as it is commonly pronounced, is an exception to this rule, by making the σ follow the δ. But I say, upon the authority of the Halicarnassian, that this is a wrong pronunciation. For he has said expressly, that the composition of this letter is σδ, not δσ; nor do I see any reason for supposing, as certain critics do, that there is an error here in the manuscript with respect to this letter, any more than with respect to the other two double letters, ξ and ψ.

If any of the aspirated is immediately followed or preceded by any of the *tenues* or *mediæ*, they must be aspirated likewise; as ἐλεχθην, ἐτυφθην; and in general, the rule is, that the *tenues*, *mediæ*, and aspirated, follow immediately those of the same class only; as may be observed in the conjugation of the verbs; as, when they say λελεκται, for λελεγται. And in composition and derivation, the concourse of a *tenuis* with a *media* is avoided; as, in place of κατδυσαι, they say καδδυσαι; in place of κατ' δυναμιν, καδδυναμιν; and in deriving ἑβδομος, and ὀγδοος, from ἑπτα, and ὀκτω, the *tenues* in the original are changed respectively into middles of the same organ. But with respect to aspirates, a contrary rule is followed, where they do not immediately follow one another, but are at some distance. For in that way two aspirates do not concur, but the one is changed

changed into its correſpondent *tenuis*. Thus in the declenſion of nouns, from θρὶξ, they do not ſay θριχος, but τριχος; though in the dative plural they ſay θριξὶ, when there is no other aſpirate following the θ. In like manner, they ſay ἐταφθην, from θαπτω, not ἐθαφθην; and they ſay τρεφω, not θρεφω, which appears to have been the original verb, from the future θρεψω. Dif. II.

By an improvement which the Greeks in later times made upon the ſound of their language, the σ is not tolerated after the ρ in the ſame ſyllable. This is certainly the caſe at preſent; but that it was not always ſo, is evident from ſeveral of their words, both nouns and participles. *e. g.* They formerly ſaid Αιανς, in place of Αιας; as is evident from the genitive Αιαντος, and the vocative Αιαν; and in like manner, γιγας was undoubtedly of old γιγαντς; and, if there were any doubt of the matter, the uſe of the Latin language, in which this termination is common, particularly in the participles of their verbs, makes the thing quite evident. Thus the Latins ſay *ſtans*, in place of the Greek participle στας, as it is now uſed; for it appears certain, that originally the Greek participle of this verb was the ſame with the Latin, and that the Greek participles ending in -ας, ſuch as τιθεις, were formerly in -ντς, as appears from the genitives τιθεντος and στατος; and from thence comes the Latin participle in *-ens*.

This method of leaving out letters was practiſed by the Greeks, not only to make the ſound of their

Dif. II. language ſofter, but alſo to make it more maſculine. For this reaſon the vowel ε, as being a weak ſounding letter, is very often left out in their words; as, *e. g.* the genitive of ἀνήρ, according to analogy, is ἀνέρος, as appears from the nominative plural ſtill preſerved to us in Homer; but in order to make the ſound ſtronger, they ſtrike out the ε. This makes it ἀνρος; but the delicate Greek ear not being able to bear the ſound of the ρ after the ν, as I have already obſerved, they inſert the δ betwixt them, and make it ἀνδρος. The Greek word for *ager* was, I doubt not, originally the ſame as in Latin; but adding to the termination in ρ the ſyllable ος, as they commonly did in order to ſoften it, they made it ἀγερος; and then, eliding the ε, they made the preſent word ἀγρος.

There are other examples of the ſyncope of the ε in the middle of words, one or two of which I ſhall mention, becauſe they are not commonly obſerved. The root of the verb πιπτω is undoubtedly πετω, as is evident from the future πεσω, and aoriſt ἐπεσα; from thence by reduplication is formed πεπετω, in the ſame manner as the verbs in -μι are formed; and then, by leaving out the ε, is made πιπτω, the verb preſently in uſe. In like manner, the original of the verb τικτω is τεκω, as appears from the ſecond aoriſt ἐτεκον, from thence τετεκω, then by the ſyncope τετκω; but then, as in Greek the κ never follows the τ, on account of the harſhneſs of the ſound, theſe two letters are tranſpoſed, and ſo τετκω is produced. And according to the

ſame

same process, from γινω is formed γιγνομαι, from Dif. II.
whence the Latin *gigno*; and in the same way, from μενω is derived μιμνω.

And not only did the Greeks thus improve the sound of their language, by leaving out letters, but more still by the addition of letters, and even syllables, in the beginning, middle, and end of words. In the first way are formed the verbs in -μι; and according to the same analogy, some verbs which are not commonly observed, such as μαρμαιρω, from μαιρω, δαρδαπτω from δαπτω, and παμφαινω from φαινω, where there is not only the reduplication of the first syllable, but in the two first the letter ρ is inserted, and in the last the letter μ. How much the sound of these words is raised and swelled by the reduplication, and the addition of the new letter, it is needless to observe.

Of additions in the middle of the word there are many examples, such as from ἀδω, ἀνδανω; from ληβω, or λαβω, λαμβανω; from πωλεω, πωλισκω; and, in general, all those verbs in -σκω. In these instances not a single letter only is added, but in some of them four. In other cases only a single letter is used, as in the case of πιμπλημι, instead of πιπλημι, from πλεω; and in σκηπτρον, from σκηπτω, κατοπτρον from κατοπτομαι, where the ρ is thrown in; as in ἀνδρος, and ἀνωγεως, the ν is thrown in.

And in general it may be observed, that the letters which the Greeks commonly use for filling up the sound of their words, are the ν, the μ, the β, the

Dif. II. the δ, and the ρ, and very often the vowel α, as being of higheſt ſound.

This way of enlarging words is, according to my ſcheme of the Greek language above mentioned, one of the two ways by which the whole language was formed, from compoſitions in duads of the vowel ω and the other vowels, the ω being always laſt. For all the words, according to my notion, are formed, either by additions to the beginning of the original duad, or by the inſertion of other letters betwixt the final ω and the preceding vowel.

As to their practice of adding to the end of their words, we have alſo many examples; as, of μελ (which, I doubt not, was the antient Greek word as well as it is the Latin) they made μελι, for the ſake of the better ſound; and of *legunt*, or λεγοντ, they made λεγοντι; and I am perſuaded, in like manner, all the old words in Greek, which like the Latin words ended in β, or δ, or τ, or λ, had their termination ſoftened, either by the addition of vowels, as in the two inſtances above mentioned, or of the ſyllable -ος, as we have ſeen in the example of words ending in ρ, which was as common a termination in the antient Greek as it is now in the Latin; and the common termination of μ among the Latins, was ſoftened by the Greeks into ν.

It is by additions to the end, as well to the beginning, that the whole race of the verbs in -μι is formed; in which there is no change of the ſignification

cation of the original word, but only an addition of ſound, and of flection. In the ſame way are formed the moſt of the derivatives of the Greek language; by which I mean ſuch words as are derived from others, with ſome change of the ſignification of the root. Of theſe I have already ſpoken; and I will only add here, that we ought not in ſuch derivatives to ſeek for compoſition, any more than in the Latin words *infimus*, and *meditullium*. Thus, *e. g.* it would be ridiculous to ſuppoſe, that the word ἐρατεινος was compounded of ἐραω and τεινω, and not a ſimple derivative from ἐραω, in the ſame manner as ποθεινος is from ποθεω, and κυδαλιμος from κυδος. This, however, is an error which ſome etymologiſts of great name have fallen into, particularly Plato, in the Cratylus, who has given us ſeveral etymologies of that kind. One I remember that is exceedingly ridiculous. It is that of κακια, which is a noun derived in the common way from κακος; but Plato makes it a compound of κακος and the verb ἰω. He might have made a compound of the ſame kind of the Latin term *malitia*. Of this ſort is the etymology which the Roman lawyers give of *teſtamentum*, as being compounded of *teſtor*, or *teſtatio*, and *mens*, *quaſi teſtatio mentis*; whereas in truth it is a verbal noun, derived from *teſtor*, in the ſame way as *ornamentum* is from *orno*, *honeſtamentum* from *honeſto*, *condimentum* from *condio*, and a hundred others.

Diſ. II.

Beſides all the ways above mentioned, by which

Dif. II. which the Greeks improved the ſound of their language, there is yet another known among grammarians by the name of *metatheſis*, or tranſpoſition: for by tranſpoſing letters, they not only varied and ſoftened the ſounds of their language, but enlarged their ſtock of words. Thus they ſay ἐκπαγλος, as well as ἐκπλαγος, tranſpoſing the γ and the λ, tho' this laſt be the word formed by analogy from ἐκπλησσω. They ſay alſo θρασος, and θαρσος; καρτερος, and κρατερος. By this rule ἐρδω is the ſame word with ῥεζω; for if you tranſpoſe the ρ and the ε, and leave out the σ of the compound letter ζ, of ῥιζω, you make ἐρδω; or, *vice verſa*, by the ſame tranſpoſition of the ε and ρ, and by adding the σ, of ἐρδω, you make ῥεζω. The future of which laſt verb ſuffers the tranſpoſition of the ſame letters; for they ſay ἐρξω as well as ῥεξω. Another example of the ſame kind is in the verb ῥιπω, from whence the Latin word *repo*, and our word *reptile*. Of this verb, by tranſpoſing the ρ and ε, they make another verb, viz. ἑρπω, from which the Latins have alſo formed another verb of the ſame ſignification with *repo*, viz. *ſerpo*, from whence *ſerpens*, and our word *ſerpent*. Another example, but not ſo obvious, and which therefore I only propoſe as the conjecture of ſome grammarians, is furniſhed by the verb ἰθελω, the ſame as may be ſuppoſed with ἐλδω, the λ and the θ being tranſpoſed, and the θ being changed into the correſpondent middle letter of the ſame organ. Many ſuch tranſpoſitions are not to be traced in the Greek as it

now

now ſtands, but are to be found in its moſt antient dialect, the Latin. Thus *nervus* is the ſame word with νευρον, *rapax* with ἁρπαξ, *tener* with τερπν, and *forma* with μορφη. Dif. II.

After this manner, by tranſpoſing, changing, and taking away letters, the Greeks ſoftened the ſound of their language, or made it more ſtrong and maſculine; and by the addition of letters or ſyllables to the original words, they gave it a fullneſs and roundneſs, and raiſed it to a pomp of ſound, that no language, ſo far as I know, ever equalled.

But the conſequence, as Plato has well obſerved in the *Cratylus*, of this ſtudy of ornament, and the pleaſure of the ear, is, that the words are ſo diſguiſed, κἀλλωπισμὸ ἡ μεγαλοπρεπειας ἑνεκα, that the originals of them are hardly to be known. Thus in ἀνδανω, or λαμβανω, it is not eaſy to find ἀδω, or ϰαβω; and if we were not taught by our grammars, it would be more difficult to find θω in τιθημι. This conſideration ſhould diſpoſe us, not to reject, haſtily, etymologies that may ſeem at firſt to be very far-fetched, even in the ſame language: and much leſs ought we to do ſo, as I had occaſion to obſerve before, when the language paſſes from one people to another; for undoubtedly the words of derivative languages muſt be at a greater diſtance from the roots, than the words of the ſame language.

Many more obſervations might be made upon a ſubject ſo copious; but theſe may ſuffice for the preſent:

Dif. II. preſent: and I believe moſt of my readers will think them more than ſufficient, and that I have ſpent a great deal too much time upon what may be ſaid to be no better than mere ſpelling. But men of curioſity and ſcience will not be ſatisfied with knowing, what every man muſt know who has ears to hear, that the articulation of the Greek language (for we can hardly be ſaid to know any thing more of the ſound of it) is more copious, various, and high-ſounding, as well as more pleaſant, than that of any other language; but they will deſire to know by what art it has been raiſed, from a few ſhort roots, to ſuch a pomp and flow of ſound; and this cannot be otherwiſe explained, than by ſuch obſervations as I have made, upon the power of letters, and the ſeveral methods of making the combinations of them pleaſant to the ear, by adding, taking away, changing, or tranſpoſing. And however minute and trifling ſuch things may ſeem, if they had not been known, and obſerved by the artificers of this wonderful language, it never would have been ſo much admired as it is by all men of learning and taſte; for it is in art, as it is in nature, *ex elementis omnia conſtant*, as Dr Clarke obſerves in the preface to his edition of Homer.

DIS-

DISSERT. III.

Of the Compoſition of the Antients; and particularly of that of Demoſthenes.

STyle conſiſts of two things; the choice of words, and the compoſition of theſe words. Of theſe two the laſt is eſteemed by the antient maſters of the writing-art to be of the greateſt importance, being that which contributes the moſt both to the beauty and the variety of ſtyle: for it is by compoſition chiefly that different ſtyles are diſtinguiſhed; ſuch as the poetical from the rhetorical;—both from the hiſtorical;—and this again from the epiſtolary or familiar. For the antients made all thoſe different ſtyles of the ſame words, only compoſed and arranged in a different manner. Dif. III.

The modern practitioners of the art, appear to be of a different opinion; and accordingly they beſtow their chief, or rather their only care, upon the choice of words; neglecting almoſt altogether the compoſition *; or, if they beſtow any

* The Halicarnaſſian ſays the ſame thing of the moderns of his time, Περὶ συνθέσεως, *ſect.* 4. where, after ſhewing, that it is compoſition chiefly which diſtinguiſhes poet from poet, and orator from orator, he adds, Τοῖς μὲν ὖν ἀρχαίοις ὀλίγυ δεῖν πᾶσι πολλὴ ἐπίδοσις (f. ἐπιτήδευσις)

Dis. III. any pains upon that, it were better let alone, as it is directed by a wrong judgement and bad taste. When I speak of modern writers, I mean those of this age; not those of the last, such as Milton and Lord Clarendon, who, it is evident, did not neglect this principal part of style; but, on the contrary, by carefully attending to it, have attained to that reputation which they so justly deserve.

The want of the knowledge of this part of writing, has necessarily produced this effect, that our authors, when they want to raise their style, or vary it ever so little from common idiom, not knowing how to do it by composition, are obliged to have recourse to metaphors or figures of different kinds, and to poetical or foreign words; all of which, in some kinds of writing, are improper. And hence it comes, that we have not different styles suited to different subjects; but there is among us but one style; and every author, upon every subject, affects to write what is called

τηδευσις) ἦν αὐτῳ· παρ' ὃ καὶ καλα ἐστιν αὐτων τὰ μετρα, και τὰ μελη, καὶ οἱ λογοι· τοῖς δε μεταγενεστεροις ὑκετι, πλην ὀλιγων· χρονῳ δε ὑστερον πανταπασιν ἠμεληθη· καὶ ὑδεις ᾠετο δεῖν ἀναγκαιον αὐτο εἰναι, ὑδε συμβαλλεσθαι τι τῷ καλλει τῶν λογων. Τοιγαρτοι τοιαυτας συνταξεις κατελιπον, ὁιας ὑδεις ὑπομενει μεχρὶ Κορωνιδος διελθεῖν. After this he gives a long catalogue of later authors who entirely neglected composition; and among these he names Polybius, an author as valuable for his matter, as he is despicable for his style. I have often regretted, that some of those great masters of the Greek tongue, such as H. Stephen, who not only understood the language perfectly, but practised the writing of it, did not take the trouble to translate Polybius into Attic Greek, with a proper composition. Then he would have been one of the pleasantest, as well as most instructive of historians.

fine

fine language, that is, a motley mixture of the froth of rhetoric and the flowers of poetry. Dif. III.

Dionyſius the Halicarnaſſian, an author whom I have made ſo much uſe of in this work, has written a moſt valuable treatiſe, which he has intitled, Περὶ συνθέσεως, or, *Of Compoſition*; in which, though he has treated of compoſition only ſo far as it affects the ear, yet he has made it a chief beauty of ſtyle, and compared it to the rod of Minerva in Homer *, which could transform a prince and a hero, into the appearance of an old decrepid beggar, or contrariwiſe. In like manner, ſays he, the nobleſt thoughts, even tho' the words be ſuitable, may be degraded by mean compoſition; and, on the contrary, low matter without any pomp or dignity of expreſſion, may be raiſed as much as is proper, and made beautiful, by an agreeable arrangement of the words. Of this he has given us a remarkable example from that paſſage of the Odyſſey, where Homer has introduced Ulyſſes and the ſwine-herd, ſitting and converſing together; and where there is nothing grand or fine, either in the matter or words, but rather the contrary; yet, by the art of the

* Dionyſius *ibid.* The touch of this rod at one time made Ulyſſes appear

Πτωχῷ λυγαλέῳ ἐναλίγκιον, ἠδὲ γέροντι.

And at another time

Μείονα τ' εἰσιδέειν, καὶ πάσσονα.——

Odyſſ. ϛ. v. 243.

compoſition,

Dis. III. composition, the verses are beautiful, and not below the dignity of heroic argument *.

—— Tantum series juncturaque pollet;
Tantum de medio sumptis accedit honoris.

This kind of plain work is entirely out of fashion in our poetry, for the reason I have mentioned, and but little used even in our prose, and every thing in both is embroidery and ornament. But

* The passage is in the beginning of book 16. of the *Odyssey*. It begins thus,

Τὼ δ' αὐτ' ἐν κλισιῃς Ὀδυσευς καὶ θειος ὑφορβος
Ἐντυνοντ' ἀριστον ἁμ' ἠοῖ, κειαμενω πυρ'
Ἐκπεμψαν τε νομηας ἁμ' ἀγρομενοισι συεσσι.

The whole passage is wonderfully pleasant and natural: and though it describe nothing but what is common, and belonging to vulgar life, πραγματια λιτα καὶ βιωτικα, as our author expresses it; and though the images be what a modern critic would call *low*, no man of good understanding and taste, not entirely corrupted by modern manners, will say, that as Homer has expressed them, they are below heroic dignity. And whence, continues our author, does this come? from the choice of the words, or from the composition? From the choice of the words, no body, as I think, will say; for all the words are of the meanest and lowest kind, such as any plowman, mariner, or mechanic would use. For proof of this, let us change the arrangement, and take down the verse, and then the diction will appear such as it truly is, without metaphor, figure, or ornament of any kind. It remains therefore that it must be the composition which gives the beauty to this passage, and makes it as pleasant and agreeable to the ear as any poetry. Of the same kind, says our author, I could give numberless examples from the same poet; but, says he, let this suffice. I will however add one, describing a thing as mean and low as can be, not to be filthy, I mean the putting on shoes, which he expresses in the following sweet-sounding line,

Ποσσι δ' ὑπαι λιπαροισι ἰδησατο καλα πεδιλα.

the

the taſte of Milton, and I may add of the age in which he wrote, was very different; for in him we have many paſſages, not only beautiful, but even ſublime, without metaphor or figure, or any thing of what is now called *fine language*. I will mention one or two of them. In the council of fallen angels, after Moloch had done ſpeaking, he deſcribes Belial riſing up to ſpeak in the following lines. Dif. III.

He [*Moloch*] ended frowning, and in look denounc'd
Deſperate revenge, and battle dangerous
To leſs than Gods. On the other ſide up roſe
Belial, in act more graceful and humane,
A fairer perſon loſt not heaven. He ſeem'd
For dignity compos'd and high exploit:
But all was falſe and hollow, (tho' his tongue
Dropt manna, and could make the worſe appear
The better reaſon, to perplex and daſh
Matureſt counſels); for his thoughts were low,
To vice induſtrious; but to nobler deeds
Timorous and ſlothful; yet he pleas'd the ear,
And in perſuaſive accents thus began.

No body of any taſte or underſtanding will deny that this is a moſt beautiful paſſage; and yet in the whole of it there is not one metaphorical or figurative word. In what then does the beauty of it conſiſt? I ſay, in the juſtneſs of the thought, and propriety of the expreſſion; and no leſs in the

Dis. III. the art of the composition. And, first, the versification is most beautifully varied by pauses and different feet; and to give still greater variety, there are two verses, viz.

For dignity compos'd, and high exploit

and the last

And in persuasive accents thus began.

where there is no pause from the sense, nor any stop at all, except a little *cæsura* towards the middle, which this English verse requires, as well as the Latin hexameter. Then from the words, —"On the other side uprose,"— all is one period variously divided into members of different lengths, and in such a manner that though it be of extraordinary length, it is perfectly clear, to those at least who are accustomed to such artificial composition *. There

* The beauty of joining composition in periods and oratorial numbers, with the harmony of poetry, I have before observed in this volume. It is a beauty that has not escaped the Halicarnassian. See Περὶ συνθεσεως, *sect.* 24.; where he gives a fine example, from Homer, of composition such as I praise in Milton. It is in the Odyssey, and begins thus,

Ἀυταρ ὁ ἐκ λιμενος προσεβη τρηχειαν ἀταρπον, &c.

where the Halicarnassian has taken pains to lead us, as it were, by the hand, and shew us how the period is divided into members of different lengths, and how these members cut the verse, sometimes into equal, and sometimes unequal parts: for the critical works of the Halicarnassian have this advantage above any other of the kind that I know, that the instruction they give is more particular, and

There is in it a pretty long parentheſis, which I have marked, but is not marked, ſo far as I know, in any edition of Milton, and perhaps never was obſerved before. The parentheſis I mean is after the words, —"But all was falſe and hollow;"— and in it he tranſlates the Greek, τὸν ἥττονα λογον κρειττονα ποιῶν, the impudent profeſſion of Gorgias the ſophiſt, which after his time was charged againſt all the ſophiſts, and even the philoſophers. This parentheſis comes down to the words, —"for his "thoughts were low,"— which can only connect with the words,—"But all was falſe and hollow;"— ſo that all betwixt is interjected, or what is called a parentheſis. This figure of compoſition, which is hardly ever uſed in common diſcourſe, is much employed by the beſt writers of antiquity, in order to give a caſt and colour to their ſtyle different from common idiom; and by Demoſthenes particularly; and not only by the orators, but the poets. There is a remarkable inſtance of one in Virgil, longer than this of Milton, and which may ſerve as an apology for Milton to ſuch readers as think he needs one. It is in the beginning of the Georgics, where, ſpeaking of the place that Auguſtus Cæſar was to have among the gods, he ſays, Dif. III.

Quicquid eris, (nam te nec ſperent Tartara regem,
Nec tibi regnandi veniat tam dira cupido,

and more fitted to the capacity of the young ſcholar, an advantage which I believe they would not have had, if the author had not practiſed teaching.

Diſ. III. *Quamvis Elyſios miretur Græcia campos,*
Nec repetita ſequi curet Proſerpina matrem),
Da facilem curſum, et audacibus annue cœptis
Ignaroſque viæ mecum miſeratus agreſtes
Ingredere, et votis jam nunc aſſueſce vocari.

I need not obſerve how beautifully Milton, in the ſpeech of Belial, which follows the paſſage above quoted, changes the colour of the ſtyle, and gives it the rhetorical caſt; preſerving, however, ſtill the ſimplicity of the diction, and making the rhetoric conſiſt only in the figure of the compoſition. This will be obvious to every man who has formed his taſte upon the ſtudy of the beſt authors. And I proceed to another example of the beauty of compoſition, without the leaſt of what we call fine language, and with leſs ſtill of art or variety than is to be obſerved in the preceding example. And I quote it the rather, that there is in it an alluſion, which I think has not been obſerved, to a very fine paſſage of Plato. It is the beginning of book 8.

The angel ended, and in Adam's ear
So pleaſing left his voice, that he a while
Thought him ſtill ſpeaking, ſtill ſtood fixt to hear;
Then, as new-wak'd, thus gratefully replied.

The compoſition here, as well as the diction, is ſweetly ſimple; the verſification ſufficiently varied by the pauſes, and concluding, like the laſt paſ-

ſage,

ſage, with a flowing line, without any pauſe, which makes it go off with a roundneſs and ſmoothneſs that is very agreeable. The alluſion I mean is to a paſſage in the Protagoras of Plato, where Socrates deſcribes the effect that Protagoras's diſcourſe had upon him, in much the ſame terms that Milton has uſed to deſcribe the effect of the angel's ſpeech upon Adam *. Diſ. III.

The paſſages I have quoted are beautiful and fine, but cannot be ſaid to be great or ſublime: but I will mention one or two, where there is the greateſt ſublimity, conſiſting altogether in the thought expreſſed in proper words, and with a ſuitable compoſition of thoſe words. The firſt I ſhall mention is juſt in the beginning, where he opens the wonderful ſcene of his poem in the following lines.

Nine times the ſpace that meaſures day and night

* Πρωταγορας μὲν τοσαυτα καὶ τοιαυτα ἐπιδειξαμενος ἀπεπαυσατο τοῦ λογου· καὶ ἐγω ἐπι μεν πολυν χρονον κεκηλημενος, ἐτι προς ἀυτον ἐβλεπον, ὡς ἐρουντα τι, ἐπιθυμῶν· ἐπειδη δε ᾐσθομην ὁτι τῷ ὀντι πεπαυμενος ἐιη, μογις πως ἐμαυτον ὡσπερει συναγειρας, εἰπον. p. 229. *Edit. Ficini.* Milton, as his learning was extraordinary no leſs than his genius, abounds with ſuch alluſions and imitations, which are often at ſuch a diſtance as to eſcape obſervation. For he almoſt never tranſlates, and very ſeldom imitates ſo cloſely as he does this paſſage of Plato. *Homer* was his model for the plan and conduct of his poem, and for the deſcriptions, ſimiles, and other ornaments of ſtyle; and I will venture to ſay, there is much more of Homer in his ſtyle than even in Virgil's, though Virgil has very often imitated cloſely, and even tranſlated Homer. *Demoſthenes*, as I have obſerved, book 3. ch. 3. was his model for the ſpeeches; and it is not eaſy to ſay which of their manners he has beſt copied.

Diſ. III. To mortal man, he with his horrid crew
Lay vanquiſh'd, rolling in the fiery gulph,
Confounded, though immortal, &c.

When Milton thus begins to ſound his trumpet, almoſt every other poet in Engliſh, compared with him, may be ſaid,

Stridenti miſerum ſtipulâ diſperdere carmen.

Of the ſame kind is what he ſays, after his catalogue and deſcription of the hoſt of fallen angels:

——— Thus far theſe beyond
Compare of mortal proweſs, yet obſerv'd
Their dread commander: he above the reſt
In ſhape and geſture proudly eminent,
Stood like a tower: his form had yet not loſt
All her original brightneſs, nor appear'd
Leſs than Archangel ruin'd, and th' exceſs
Of glory obſcur'd: As when the ſun new-riſen
Looks through the horizontal miſty air,
Shorn of his beams; or from behind the moon
In dim eclipſe, diſaſtrous twilight ſheds
On half the nations, and with fear of change
Perplexes monarchs: darken'd ſo, yet ſhone
Above them all the Archangel.

Where, among other things, the reader may obſerve the noble ſimplicity of that expreſſion,—

"Nor

"Nor appear'd leſs than archangel ruin'd," Dif. III.
— much like that in the paſſage above quoted, —
"Battle dangerous to leſs than gods:" — Expreſſions which the reader may be aſſured no man would have uſed who had not formed his taſte upon the chaſteſt and moſt correct models.

I ſhould never have done, if I were to quote every paſſage of this kind in Milton; I will therefore have done with him, and return to the antient compoſition; from which, however, I hope the reader will not think that I have digreſſed far by what I have ſaid of Milton's compoſition.

I have obſerved already *, what variety in Latin there is in the arrangement of only three words, *Petrus amat Johannem.* If the number of words is increaſed, the variety increaſes in proportion. Now ſetting aſide the pleaſure which this liberty of arrangement is able to give to the ear, by joining together words, which ſeparated, and joined to other words, might produce a very unpleaſant ſound; (for it is with words, as with ſtones in a building, all are not fitted to join with all); ſetting aſide alſo the pleaſure which the antient rhythms and accents muſt neceſſarily have afforded to their learned ears, however little they may afford to ours, and which muſt have depended entirely upon the arrangement of the words: ſetting aſide, I ſay, all theſe conſiderations, there is a pleaſure in variety itſelf, which is

* Above, p. 350. 351.

predominant

Dif. III. predominant in all the works of art, and without more or leſs of which no work of art can truly pleaſe. And indeed ſuch is the beauty of antient compoſition in this reſpect, and ſuch the tireſome ſameneſs and dull uniformity of the modern, let us take what pains we will to vary it, that an ear accuſtomed to the variety of the antient can hardly endure it.

But is the pleaſure of the ear all that is gained by antient compoſition? Was not the ſenſe ſtudied by them in the multiform ſtructure of their language, as well as the ſound? I think it was; and it is chiefly with a view to ſhew this, and to illuſtrate it by examples from Demoſthenes, that I have written this diſſertation, which I intend as an appendix to chapter 4th of the 3d book of this volume. It is, I think, a curious ſubject, and a view in which compoſition has not been conſidered by any author, ſo far as I know, antient or modern.

The two moſt famous authors of antiquity, for the beauty of their compoſition, are two of very different kinds, Plato and Demoſthenes. The firſt of theſe ſtudied words, and the elegance of ſtyle, more, I believe, than any philoſopher that ever wrote; and whatever any man may think of the matter of his philoſophy, (of which I own myſelf a very great admirer), he muſt confeſs, if he be a man of taſte, that the dreſs he has put philoſophy into, is the fineſt, and the moſt agreeable, it ever wore. For his Dialogues are truly poetical

poetical pieces, and very fine ones too; the ſtyle much ornamented, and as much varied, particularly by diverſity of arrangement, as I think is poſſible. For there is nothing belonging to ſtyle which he ſtudied more than compoſition; and they tell a famous ſtory of him, that when he died, there was found in his tablets, or pocket-book, the beginning of his books of Polity, compoſed and arranged in different manners *. But nevertheleſs I do not think Plato's compoſition a perfect model for what I have chiefly in view, I mean the ſenſe. For I muſt be allowed to think, that he has ſometimes carried the liberty of compoſition, which his language allowed him, too far; and that ſtudying to vary too much, probably for the ſake of the ear, he has often obſcured the ſenſe, and made a ſtyle, which, as his ſcholar Ariſtotle ſaid, was neither verſe nor proſe †, but hobbling betwixt the two. For though Greek and Latin proſe admits of a great variety of compoſition, yet it has its bounds; and there is a compoſition in thoſe languages, which every man of taſte, and who has formed his ear by the ſtudy of the beſt authors, will tell you at once is not

Dif. III.

* This ſtory is told of him by the Halicarnaſſian, Περὶ συνθέσεως. ſect. 25. The words of Plato are, as they ſtand at preſent, Κατέβην χθὲς εἰς Πειραιᾶ μετὰ Γλαύκωνος τοῦ Ἀρίστωνος. One ſhould think that it was of very little importance, how theſe few words were arranged; but Plato, it ſeems, judged otherwiſe; ſince at the age of eighty (for ſo old he was when he died) he employed himſelf in tranſpoſing them different ways.

† See Diogenes Laertius *in vitâ Platonis.*

claſſical.

Dif. III. claſſical. Such is the compoſition of Ammian Marcellinus, for example, which we readily perceive to be barbarous, compared with that of Cicero, who, in this, as well as other reſpects, is, I think, undoubtedly the beſt writer among the Romans. There is nothing in which I think our modern writers of Latin fail more than in the arrangement; and I have ſeen ſeveral modern Latin compoſitions, where the words and phraſes were all claſſical, but the order ſo perverſe and unclaſſical, as not only to be very offenſive to the ear, but almoſt unintelligible *.

There is one part of his works, particularly, in which I think Plato has uſed this licentiouſneſs of compoſition more than in any other. It is in the *Sophiſta* and the *Politicus*, where he has introduced a ſtranger of Elea ſpeaking a language that I cannot help thinking is ſtrange; and I would deſire the learned reader only to peruſe the laſt ſentence of the Politicus, to be convinced of the truth of what I ſay, where the ſenſe is certainly obſcured by the arrangement: and if there be any beauty in the numbers, it is ſuch that my ear cannot perceive; but, on the contrary, the compo-

* Of this kind are ſome books of ſcience that have been written in this age, by men who, though very learned in their ſeveral ſciences, had not ſtudied the propriety and elegance of the Latin compoſition. There is particularly a work of Boerhaave, upon *fire*, which, though the words be all Latin, I cannot underſtand, without reading ſometimes twice or thrice over.

ſition

ſition appears to me looſe, disjointed, and without any roundneſs, or agreeable flow *. Dif. III.

However much therefore I may admire Plato in other reſpects, there is, I think, a better model for compoſition; I mean Demoſthenes, who is in this reſpect, as well as in many others, an acknowledged maſter, according to the judgement of the Halicarnaſſian, who has written a whole treatiſe upon the compoſition chiefly of Demoſthenes †. And there are two reaſons beſides, which make me chuſe him rather than any other. Firſt, that he appears to me to have underſtood perfectly that great ſecret of writing, ſo little known in modern times, of making an *uncommon* ſtyle of *common* words. For Demoſthenes's words are all the *verba forenſia*, or common language of buſineſs, among the Athenians, without any poetical, gloſſematic, or hard words, as we commonly call them,

* The ſentence runs thus: Τουτο δε τελος ὑφασματος ἐυθυπλοκιᾳ ξυμπλακεν γιγνεσθαι φαμεν πολιτικῆς πραξεως, τὸ τῶν ἀνδρων καὶ σωφρονων ἀνθρωπων ἠθος. ὁποταν ὁμονοιᾳ καὶ φιλιᾳ κοινον ξυναγαγουσα αὐτῶν τὸν βιον ἡ βασιλικη τυχη, παντων μεγαλοπρεπεστατον ὑφασματων καὶ ἀριστον ἀποτελεσασα, ὡςε εἰναι κοινον, τῦς τε ἀλλυς ἐν ταῖς πολεσι παντας δουλους καὶ ἐλευθερυς ἀμπισχυσα, συνιχη τουτῳ τῷ πλεγματι, καὶ καθοσον ἐυδαιμονες προσηκει γιγνεσθαι πολει, τυτυ μηδαμη μηδεν ἐλλειπυσα, ἀρχη τε καὶ ἐπιστατη. Here Plato ἀμετρητον ὁρμην λαβων, as Dionyſius expreſſes it, (for it is not my judgement only of him, but likewiſe that of this great maſter, and of ſeveral others whom he quotes; ſee his epiſtle to Pompey), runs out to a great length, and obſcures and perplexes every thing, not ſo much by the uſe of the trope of the web and garment, though in that way too, as the Halicarnaſſian obſerves, he often darkens his ſtyle, as from the ſtrange diſordered compoſition.

† It is intitled, Περὶ τῆς ἐντητος τῦ Δημοσθενυς.

Dif. III. and with fewer epithets, metaphors, or tropes of any kind, than any ſtyle I know, which can be ſaid to be raiſed or ornamented in the leaſt degree. And ſecondly, Becauſe he neither did nor could give himſelf the ſame liberties in compoſition that Plato did, conſidering that he ſpoke to the people; and therefore, though he has varied the ſtructure of his language extremely, yet he was obliged to keep within certain bounds, not too far removed from popular uſe, for fear of not being well underſtood; and as his buſineſs was to move and perſuade the people, he would certainly chuſe that arrangement which was proper to convey his meaning the moſt forcibly. I have therefore thought him the fitteſt author from whom to draw thoſe rules which I am now to preſent to the reader, of claſſical compoſition, in reſpect of the ſenſe. For I think it is impoſſible to ſuppoſe, that in all that liberty of arrangement which the antient writers allowed themſelves, they ſhould have had no regard to the ſenſe, which is certainly principal in every compoſition, but conſulted only the pleaſure of the ear.

And, in the firſt place, it is to be obſerved, that thoſe long periods of Demoſthenes, ſuch, for example, as that famous one with which he begins the third Philippic, conſiſting of ſeven members, ſome of them very long, and containing parentheſes interjected, could not have been ſpoken ſo as to be intelligible, much leſs to convey the meaning with force and emphaſis, without the greateſt

art

art of pronunciation. For want of this art, Plutarch, in his life of Demoſthenes, tells us, that he ſucceeded very ill at firſt; inſomuch that he once ran out of the aſſembly with his head covered. For it would ſeem he compoſed periods that he was not able to pronounce; and it is very probable he would have renounced public ſpeaking altogether, if a friend of his, who was a player, had not ſhewn him in what he was deficient, by making him repeat ſome verſes of Euripides, and then repeating them after him, with ſo much more propriety and emphaſis, that Demoſthenes was amazed at the difference, and immediately applied himſelf to the ſtudy of pronunciation; in which he came at laſt to excel very much, and was ſo thoroughly convinced of the advantage of it, that, as the ſtory goes, being aſked, what was the firſt quality of an orator? he anſwered, *Action;* under which the antients included the action of the voice, or what we call *pronunciation*, as well as the action of the body, and of the face, or, as it is commonly expreſſed, the *look*. Being aſked again, what the ſecond was? he anſwered, *Action;* and being aſked, what the third was? the anſwer was the ſame. Now, what is not well compoſed, can never be well pronounced; ſo that compoſition is by its nature in order before pronunciation. Nor could Demoſthenes have excelled every body ſo much in pronunciation, if he had not firſt excelled them in compoſition. But by joining both excellencies together, he ſo filled and pleaſed the ears of the peo- Dif. III.

Dif. III. ple, as to draw them after him by a charm that was irreſiſtible. For it is more by the ears than by the underſtanding, that the people are to be captivated; and if a man was to ſpeak to them in that hopping, bounding way, in which Tacitus and his modern imitators write, without any roundneſs or fulneſs, he never would convince them, though he were to utter thoſe oracles of wiſdom which the admirers of Tacitus find in him.——But to come to particulars:

It is evident, that the ſenſe of every word will be more diſtinguiſhed, by its being placed in one part of the ſentence rather than in another; and, as I have ſaid, it is impoſſible to ſuppoſe, but that the antient compoſers, in the great liberty of arrangement which the genius of their language admitted, would have a regard to this, and would place the principal word or words, ſuch as there muſt be in every ſentence, in that part of it where they would ſtrike the hearer or reader moſt. That part I have determined to be the beginning or the end of the ſentence, or of any member of it *. Thoſe two places may be conſidered as the places of honour, which diſtinguiſh the words that are there put, while thoſe that are thrown into the middle are leſs to be obſerved.

But is there no rule for determining to which of theſe two places what is principal ſhould be allotted? Or if there be more than one principal

* Vol. 2. book 3. c. 2.

thing,

thing, which of them ought to be put in the firſt place, which in the laſt? And I think there is a rule, and it appears to me to be this, *That whatever is antecedent in the reaſoning or narrative, or moſt connected with what goes before, ſhould be put firſt; what again is conſequent in the reaſoning or narrative, or moſt connected with what follows, ſhould be put laſt.* Dif. III.

This therefore is the firſt rule, That the principal things ſhould be put firſt or laſt in a ſentence, or member of a ſentence, according as they are antecedent or conſequent, more or leſs connected with what goes before or follows: for being ſo placed, not only in writing, but ſtill more in ſpeaking, eſpecially if they be pronounced with emphaſis, as they ought to be, they will attract the attention more, and better mark the connection and dependence of the other words upon them, than if they were in any other poſition.

I will now give an example of this rule, from the third Philippic, beginning with the fine period above mentioned; and which, in my judgement, is the fineſt of all his Philippics. It is of the deliberative kind, ſpoken upon occaſion of the great progreſs of Philip's arms againſt certain Greek cities in Thrace and Theſſaly, which he had ſubdued. This Demoſthenes conſiders as making war againſt the Athenians, though without declaring it; and he adviſes them to make war in the ſame manner againſt Philip. Ye muſt not, ſays he, wait till Philip ſhall declare himſelf openly your

Dif. III. your enemy; for he never will do that while ye ſit tame and quiet, and are willing to be deceived. Then he mentions ſome ſmall cities in thoſe countries, which Philip had deceived and deſtroyed, without declaring war againſt them; after which he adds, εἶτ' οἰεσθε, ὅτι μὲν οὐδεν ἂν αὐτον ἐδυνηθησαν ποιησαι κακον, μη παθεῖν δε ἐφυλαξαντ' ἂν ἰσως, τουτους μεν ἐξαπαταν αἱρεισθαι μαλλον ἢ προλεγοντα βιαζεσθαι ὑμῖν δε ἐκ προῤῥησεως πολεμησαν, καὶ ταῦτα ἐως ἂν ἐκεινοις ἐξαπατωδε; which may be thus literally rendered. "And do ye think, that, who could do "him no harm, but might poſſibly have been "upon their guard, and prevented any harm "which he intended them, thoſe he would ra-"ther chuſe to deceive, than openly attack; yet "againſt you would declare open war, and this "while ye were willing to be deceived?" I will add a tranſlation of what follows, that the ſcope of the reaſoning may be the better underſtood. "It cannot be; for he would be the "moſt fooliſh of men, if ye ſubmitting to be in-"jured, and not blaming him, but ſome among "yourſelves whom ye threaten with trials and "proſecutions, he ſhould, to put an end to the "ſtrife and conteſts among yourſelves, bid you "turn againſt him, and ſo take from his hirelings "here, thoſe pretences by which they retard your "reſolutions, endeavouring to convince you that "he does not make war upon you. But is there, "in the name of the gods, any man of ſenſe, "who will judge by words, and not by things, "whether

" whether a perſon make war upon him, or be Diſ. III.
" at peace with him ?"

The firſt ſentence, which I gave in the original, is the example of my rule. There are here two things principal, and which therefore were to be diſtinguiſhed by their places in the ſentence, viz. the little cities of Thrace and Theſſaly, and the Athenians. As he had been ſpeaking juſt before of the firſt, and was from them to draw the conſequence to the Athenians, he ſets them at the head of the firſt member of the period, ὅι μὲν ὐδὲν ἄν ἄυτον ἐδυνηθησαν ποιησαι κακον. Then in the other member of the period, when he comes to draw the inference with reſpect to the Athenians, he ſets them likewiſe at the head of it, — ὑμῖν δ' ἐκ προῤῥησεως πολεμησειν ; — not at the end of it, becauſe they are oppoſed to one another ; and then the rule is, That they ſhould occupy the ſame place, whether at the beginning or in the end.

The effect of this compoſition is not only to ſet what is principal in the ſentence foremoſt to the view, but to give to the period the τὸ συστροφον, as the Greek critics expreſs it, and the τὸ σφιγγωδες, by which the period is, as it were, knit and compacted together, ſo as to come with double force, both on the ear and the underſtanding. To be convinced of this, let us take it down in the following manner, preſerving both the ſame thought, and the ſame words : ἔιτ' ὀιωδε ἐξαπαταν μεν ἀιρειωδαι μαλλον ἡ προλεγοντα βιαζεωδαι τυτους, ὅι μὲν ὐδὲν ἀν ἀυτον ἐδυνηθησαν ποιησαι κακον, μη παθεῖν δ' ἐφυλαξαντ' ἄν ἰσως, ἐκ προῤῥησεως

Dif. III. προρρήσεως δε ὑμῶν πολεμήσειν. By this change the compoſition, inſtead of being nervous and ſpirited, becomes ὑπτιος and διαλελυμενος, that is, flat and looſe or languid.

This is an inſtance of placing the principal word in the beginning of the period, or member of the period, to which it relates. I will now give an example or two, of the laſt place being made the place of diſtinction. And this ſame third Philippic furniſhes me one, where, ſpeaking to the Athenians, he ſays, εἰτ' οὐκ αἰσχυνεσθε, εἰ μηδ' ἁ παθοιτ' ἀν, εἰ δυναιτ' ἐκεινος, πᾶντα ποιησαι, καιρον ἐχοντες, οὐ τολμησετε; he is ſpeaking of a fine opportunity the Athenians had to attack Philip; and he aſks them, whether they were not aſhamed, not to dare to do to *him* what he would certainly do to *them*, if he had the ſame opportunity? The ſentiment is a common one, and the words in which it is expreſſed are likewiſe common; but the order and arrangement gives it a beauty which every man of taſte muſt acknowledge. The two principal things in it are the ſhame which the Athenians ought to feel, and the reaſon why they ſhould be aſhamed, viz. their want of courage, or not daring. The firſt of theſe is put at the head of the ſentence, the other at the end of it, ſo that it is an inſtance of the rule in both reſpects.

It may be objected, That as to the verb here being laſt, it is the common place of it; ſo that on that account we are not to imagine that any particular emphaſis lies upon it. But to this I anſwer,

anſwer, *firſt*, That though ſuch poſition of the verb be indeed very common in the Latin compoſition, it is not ſo frequent in the Greek; nor is it ſo placed by the beſt authors in that language, unleſs where it is really the principal word; for, as I ſhall obſerve afterwards, the Greek compoſition is, in this and other reſpects, more various than the Latin. But, *2dly*, I will give one or two examples, among many that might be given, where another kind of word is put in the end of the ſentence, on account of its ſignificancy. And the ſame third Philippic furniſhes me one example, where Demoſthenes, ſpeaking of the Athenians, ſays, Καὶ γαρ ἂν ἁπαντες δικαιως δη. πυ συγχωρησαιεν οἱ ἀλλοι ὑμιν χι ὑπερ τῆς ἐλευθεριας ἀγωνιστεον. "If all others ſhould yield to "be ſlaves, you it behoves to ſtruggle for free-"dom." Here the emphatical words are *others*, and *you* (the Athenians), the firſt of which concludes the firſt member of the ſentence, and the other begins the next. Dif. III.

Another example is in the following Philippic, towards the beginning, where, ſpeaking of the injuſtice of Philip, he ſays, Ὁτι δ' ὐκ ἐνι ταυτης ἐκεινην ἐμποδων ἐκ λογυ καὶ δημηγοριας, ὑδεις ἀγνοει δη πυ. "That "we cannot put a ſtop to his violence and injuſtice by arguments and ſpeech-making, every "body muſt know." Here the ſentence concludes, not with the verb, but with an adverb of aſſeveration.

A third example I ſhall give, becauſe it juſt

Dif. III. follows in the ſame Philippic. "If," ſays he, "any one has any doubt of this, he may thus "be aſſured of it." Ἡμεις ὐδαμυ πωποτε, ὁπυ περὶ "τῶν δικαιων εἰπειν ἐδεησεν, ἡττηθημεν, ὐδ' ἀδικεῖν ἐδόξαμεν, ἀλλὰ παντων πανταχῦ κρατῦμεν, καὶ περισμεν τῷ λογῳ ἆρ' ὐν διὰ ταυτα ἐκεινῳ φαυλως ἐχει τὰ πραγματα, ἢ τῇ πολει καλῶς; "Where-ever the diſpute was about what "was juſt or right, we were never found to be in "the wrong, or convicted of doing any thing that "was unjuſt, but were always victorious in reaſon "and argument; but for this did he thrive the "worſe, or we the better?" Here we ſee that the firſt member is concluded by the noun λογῳ, and the other by the adverb καλῶς, both emphatical words, upon which the whole argument turns.

My ſecond rule is, *That if two words which are ſeparated by the grammatical conſtruction, expreſs things, which, for the greater perſpicuity and emphaſis, ought to be joined together in the ſentence, the words ſhould likewiſe ſtand next to one another*; and vice verſa, *if the words, though joined by the grammatical conſtruction, expreſs things which ought to be ſeparated in the ſentence, as meriting a ſeparate conſideration, the words ought alſo to be ſeparated.* This, it is evident, can very ſeldom be done in the modern languages, for want of genders, numbers, and caſes; but in Greek and Latin, it may be done as often as we ſee occaſion. I will give ſome inſtances of both being done with propriety.

And,

And, firſt, as to words being joined together, which by the ſyntax are ſeparated. There is an example in the oration, Περὶ Ἁλοννησου, where, ſpeaking of the abſurdity of taking from pirates a place which they had violently poſſeſſed themſelves of, and then pretending that it belonged to the taker, and not to the Athenians, the former proprietors, he expreſſes it thus, Τὸν τοπον τυτον, ὑ ἦσαν οἱ λησαι, τὸν ὀντα ἡμετερον, τῶν τιμωρησαμενων τὰς λησας γιγνεσθαι. "How abſurd a pretence," ſays he, "is it, that the place where the pirates had ſettled "themſelves being ours, ſhould become the "property of thoſe who puniſhed the pirates?" Here we ſee, that in the Greek, though it cannot be expreſſed in the Engliſh, the words ἡμετερον and τῶν τιμωρησαμενων τὰς λησας, are fitly ſet beſide one another, though they cannot be conſtrued together; and in two diſtinguiſhed places, the one concluding the firſt member of the period, and the other beginning the laſt, becauſe the whole argument turns upon theſe two things. Dif. III.

Another example is to be found in the oration, Πρὸς τὴν Φιλιππου Ἐπιστολήν, where, ſpeaking of the Macedonian power, as being weak in itſelf, and made ſtill weaker by Philip, he has theſe words, Ἔτι δὲ, αὐτην (viz. δυναμιν) ὑτος αὐτος τοῖς πολεμοις καὶ ταῖς στρατειαις, καὶ πᾶσιν οἷς ἄν τις μεγαν εἶναι νομισειε, σφαλερωτεραν αὐτῳ πεποιηκε. Which may be thus tranſlated: "This power he himſelf, by his wars and expedi- "tions, and all other things by which one ſhould "have thought it would have become great, has

Dif. III. " made more unſtable, and leſs to be depend-
" ed upon." Here the Macedonian power, and Philip, who had made it leſs, are fitly joined together as to the ſenſe. And with reſpect to the ſound, we may obſerve, that the αὐτην and the αὐτος, in the beginning of the period, make a ſimilarity of ſound; which our modern critics cenſure under the name of a *jingle*, but it is really an ornament of ſpeech, when ſparingly uſed, and not induſtriouſly ſought; as it is often by Plato, but never by Demoſthenes.

I will next proceed to give examples of words being divided in the compoſition, which are neceſſarily joined in the ſyntax; and this for the ſake of the greater emphaſis. And an example occurs in the third Olynthiac, where, calling the attention of the Athenians to the ſtate of Philip's affairs, he ſays, Ἄξιον δὲ ἐνθυμηθῆναι καὶ λογίσασθαι τὰ πράγματα ἐν ᾧ καθέστηκε νυνὶ, τὰ τοῦ Φιλίππου. Here the affairs of Philip are mentioned with particular emphaſis. For, firſt, it ſaid, how do affairs ſtand? Then, as if the queſtion had been aſked, What affairs do you mean? it is ſubjoined, the affairs of Philip. But this emphaſis muſt neceſſarily be loſt in Engliſh; for all we can make of the paſſage is to tranſlate it thus: " It is worth your
" while to conſider the affairs of Philip, in what
" ſituation they now are."

Another example is to be found in the ſame Olynthiac, where, ſpeaking of the Athenians, he ſays, Καὶ νυνὶ σκοπεῖτε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, Φιλίππου ἡμᾶς,

καὶ

καὶ κατεστησαμεν τηλικουτον, ἡλικος ὐδεις πω βασιλευς γε- Dif. III.
γονε Μακεδονιας. Here we ſee, that ἠυξησαμεν and ἡμεις, which are neceſſarily joined in the conſtruction, are divided in the compoſition; the one of them being ſet at the head of the firſt member of the period, and the other at the end of the ſame member; by which there is an emphaſis laid upon *we* (the Athenians) that would not have been ſo ſtrong if the two words had been joined together in their natural order. But neither can we preſerve this in Engliſh; for we muſt tranſlate it thus: "It is we, O men of Athens, who "have raiſed Philip, and made him ſuch as no "king of Macedon ever was before."

Upon this paſſage, it may be further obſerved, that Φιλιππον and ἡμεις are properly joined together, as the two things upon which the ſentence turns. And the period concludes aptly with the word Μακεδονιας, as the kingdom of Macedon, before the time of Philip, was of very little conſideration, and the people ſo little eſteemed, that, as Demoſthenes ſays ſomewhere elſe, people did not care to purchaſe ſlaves from thence; and yet, ſays he, they are now become, by your ſloth and timorouſneſs, a powerful nation.

It often happens, that a principal word in the ſentence is divided from another principal word with which it is connected, by ſomething that is interjected betwixt; and yet it is proper, for the ſake both of emphaſis and of greater perſpicuity, that

Dif. III. that the connection ſhould be marked. And this I make my third rule; of which I will give one example among many, (for it is a common idiom among the Greek rhetoricians), from the oration above-mentioned, Πρὸς τὴν Φιλιππου ἐπιστολην, where, ſpeaking of the toils and dangers that Philip had gone through to acquire what did not belong to him, he ſubjoins how ſhameful it is, Αθηναιους δε, οἷς πατριον ἐστι μηδενος ὑπακουειν, ἁπαντων δε κρατειν ἐν τοῖς πολεμοις, τουτους διὰ μαλακιαν ἢ ῥαθυμιαν ἐγκαταλιπειν τα τε τῶν προγονων ἐργα καὶ τὰ συμφεροντα τῆς πατριδος. Here the word τουτους is altogether ſuperfluous as to the conſtruction, and a mere repetition; but ſuch as gives great force and emphaſis to the meaning. It may be thus rendered into Engliſh, preſerving as much as poſſible the turn of the Greek: "The Athenians, the eſtabliſhed cuſtom "of whoſe country it is, handed down to them "from their anceſtors, to yield obedience to "none, but to command all in war; is it not "ſhameful that *they* ſhould, through effeminacy "and indolence, deſert the place of their an- "ceſtors, and give up the intereſt of their coun- "try?" We commonly do this in Engliſh, by repeating the words with *I ſay*, or *to repeat it again*, or ſome ſuch form of words; but it is much more cleverly done in Greek by the pronoun οὗτος.

Theſe are the rules which I have obſerved to be followed, in order to convey the ſenſe with the greateſt

greateſt force and perſpicuity, by the Greek writers, and particularly by Demoſthenes, the greateſt artificer of proſe, I believe, that ever exiſted *. But it is evident, that they not only ſtudied the ſenſe, but likewiſe the pleaſure of the ears, *quarum judicium eſt ſuperbiſſimum*, as Cicero ſays; and we muſt ſuppoſe that the ears of the Athenians, accuſtomed to hear ſuch fine ſpeeches almoſt every day, were indeed very delicate and faſtidious. It is in this way we are to account for many tranſpoſitions of words in the Attic writers, and particularly their orators, which appear to us very ſtrange and unnatural †. And it was chiefly by this kind of compoſition, that the Attic writers were diſtinguiſhed from others. And Dif. III.

* The greateſt praiſe that perhaps ever was beſtowed upon Demoſthenes, is given him by Lucian, in his *Jupiter Tragœdus*, where he makes Jupiter begin his ſpeech, in the council of the gods, with a very pompous preamble, taken from the exordium of the firſt *Olynthiac* of Demoſthenes. After going on in this high ſtrain for two or three ſentences, he ſtops all at once, and—"Here," ſays he, "Demoſthenes fails me: I muſt therefore tell you plainly for what "purpoſe I called you together." Then he goes on by a compoſition that is far from being vulgar or deſpicable, conſidered by itſelf; but compared with what goes before, is a higher eulogium upon the compoſition of Demoſthenes, than any thing Lucian has ſaid in a whole treatiſe that he has written in praiſe of Demoſthenes.

† As in the oration againſt Midias, p. 370. *edit. Morel.* where, ſpeaking of many people that had been condemned for leſs offences than thoſe of which he accuſed Midias, he ſays, Πολλῶς ἂν ἐτέρους ἔχοιμι λέγειν, ὧν οἱ μὲν τεθνᾶσιν, οἱ δὲ ἀτιμώσαντες διὰ πολλῶ τινων ἐστὶν ἐλάττω πράγματα, where the natural order of the laſt part of the ſentence is, οἱ δ' ἀτιμώσαντες εἰσὶ διὰ πράγματα πολλῷ ἐλάττω τινῶν. Again, in the oration againſt Ariſtocrates, p. 428. ſpeaking of a general who had ſuffered ſome loſs, which not only no body pretending

Dis. III. And when it was carried too far, a writer was said to be *too Attic*. Thus Photius, in his *Bibliotheca*, commending the style of Diodorus Siculus, as plain, perspicuous, and proper for history, adds, that his composition was not too Attic *.

The Latin writers, as in other things, so in this, imitated the Attic authors; and it is from this imitation that they derived every thing that is beautiful, various, and high-sounding, in their composition, both in verse and prose. It is from these authors that Virgil learnt to make such verses as

Hinc tibi, quæ semper vicino ab limite sepes
Hyblæis apibus florem depasta salicti,
Sæpe levi somnum suadebit inire susurro.

Eclog. 1.

and

Ora modis Anchisiades pallentia miris.

and

Dives inaccessos ubi Solis filia lucos
Assiduo resonat cantu, tectisque superbis

Urit

tending to be a general would have suffered, but not any common man, he uses this structure of the words: Πραγμα ἐπαθε τοιουτον ὀυχ' ὁτι στρατηγος ἀν ἡγνοησε τις εἰναι φασκων, ἀλλ' ὀυδ' ὁ τυχων ἀνθρωπος, where the natural order of the words is, ὀυχ ὁτι τις φασκων εἰναι στρατηγος ἡγνοησεν ἀν.

* Κεχρηται δε φρασει σαφεῖ τε καὶ ἀκομψῳ, καὶ ἱστορικῳ μαλιστα πρεπουσῃ· καὶ μητε τὰς, ὡς ἀν εἰποι τις, λιαν ὑπερηττικισμενας ὁ ἀρχαιοτροπος Διωκων συνταξεις, μητε προς τὴν καθωμαλισμενην νευων παντελως, ἀλλὰ τῷ μεαῳ τῶν λογῶν χαρακτηρι χαιρων. cap. 70. where we may observe, that

Urit odoratam nocturna in lumina cedrum, Dis.III.
Arguto tenues percurrens pectine telas.
ÆNEID. 7.

Such transpositions do often occasion, to us at least, an ambiguity in the sense; one or two of which I have observed in Horace, who of all the Roman authors most diligently imitated the Greek. Speaking in praise of wine, he says *, *Tu lene tormentum ingenio admoves Plerumque duro*; where the word *plerumque*, because it begins the line, is construed by all the commentators that I have seen, with *duro*, the following word; whereas the sense, I think, evidently requires that it should be joined with *admoves*, the word which concludes the preceding line; so that the order is, *Tu plerumque admoves lene tormentum ingenio duro*. For I do not imagine that Horace meant to say, that mens geniuses were for the greater part hard and inflexible; but that it was a *common* effect of wine, to soften the rigour of such dispositions, and make them more pliant. There is another mistaken construction of this word *plerumque* in the 34th ode of book 1. where Horace says,

that Photius contrasts the *Hyperattic* composition with the abject and vulgar, and is of opinion that the proper style for history lies betwixt those two extremes. I agree with him in the rule; but I differ a little from him in the application of it to Diodorus Siculus: for I think his style comes too near one of the extremes, viz. the vulgar. And indeed all that Photius says of it is, that it is not altogether vulgar and abject; μητε προς τὴν καθωμαλισμενην νευων παντελως.

* *Lib.* 3. *od.* 21.

Namque Dieſpiter
Igni coruſco nubila dividens
Plerumque, per purum tonantes
Egit equos volucremque currum.

Here the comma is generally put immediately after *dividens*; whereas it ſhould be put after *plerumque*; ſo that *plerumque* is to be joined with *dividens*, and not with *egit*; and this the ſenſe evidently requires. This is an obſervation which I find Dr Bentley has made before me, and ſome body whom he mentions had made it before him. Another example ſtill more remarkable is in the ode * beginning,

Phœbus, volentem prælia me loqui,
Victas et urbes, increpuit, lyrâ;

where, as the ancient ſcholiaſt Porphyrion has well obſerved, *lyrâ* muſt not be joined with *increpuit*, the word next to it, but with a word at a diſtance from it, viz. *loqui*; and this way the ſenſe is plain, and agreeable to other paſſages in the ſame poet, ſuch as where he ſpeaks of the *imbellis lyra*.

The beſt compoſer, and, I think, in every reſpect, the greateſt writer, in proſe, among the Romans, is Cicero, not only in the rhetorical way, but in the epiſtolary, philoſophical, and critical; yet even he has not attained to all the beauty and variety of the Greek compoſition: whether it was the de-

* *Lib. 4. od. 15.*

fect

fect of the writer or of the language, I will not pretend to determine. He is, I think, inferior to Demoſthenes in many reſpects, but particularly in the variety of his compoſition. That concluſion of the ſentence with a verb, ſo much more frequent in Latin than in Greek, gives a ſameneſs to the Latin compoſition, which is not a little diſguſting to an ear accuſtomed to the variety of the Greek. In this way we may obſerve Cicero running on for many ſentences together, more I think in his orations than in his other works; and there was one favourite clauſule of his, which was obſerved in his own times to recur too often; I mean, the *eſſe videatur* *. It is true indeed, that the verb is very often a material word in a ſentence with reſpect to the ſenſe, and always with reſpect to the conſtruction, being the hinge, as it were, upon which the whole ſyntax turns: it is therefore often intitled to a principal place, but not always; and where it Dif. III.

* I do not however mean to ſay, that there is not a variety in Cicero's compoſition. But if we would be convinced how much more variety there is in the Greek, let us compare with him the author I have ſo often mentioned, Dionyſius the Halicarnaſſian, who has practiſed not only the hiſtorical ſtyle, but alſo the rhetorical, in the ſpeeches which he has inſerted into his hiſtory; the critical or didactic, and likewiſe the epiſtolary, a very fine ſpecimen of which we have in his introduction to his treatiſe of compoſition, which is addreſſed to two young men, the ſons of one Rufus Melitus, his patron. There the compoſition is moſt beautifully varied, by different arrangements of the words, and different clauſules of the ſentences; and though it be not looſe, or *elumbus*, as the Latins expreſs it, yet it has nothing of the τὸ συνεσταμμενον, or *contortum*, of the oratorial ſtyle, and is upon the whole one of the ſweeteſt pieces of compoſition I ever read.

Dif. III. is ſo intitled, it is not neceſſary that it ſhould be ſo often thrown to the end as it is in Latin.

Thus I have endeavoured to explain how ſtyle may not only be varied, but made more emphatical and expreſſive, by the arrangement only of the words. It is this chiefly, in my opinion, that makes the difference betwixt claſſical and unclaſſical arrangement; a difference which every ſcholar, and who at the ſame time is a man of taſte, immediately perceives; but no body hitherto, ſo far as I know, has attempted to explain wherein it conſiſts. How ſtyle may be otherwiſe varied, and adorned by figures both of the ſenſe and of the words, I will explain in the laſt part of my work, when I come to treat of ſtyle in general, and of the rhetorical in particular.

The End of PART II.